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THE CONCEPT OF MUKTI
IN
ADVAITA YEDĀNTA



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THE CONCEPT OF MUKTI IN ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

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PREFACE

The Philosophy of Advaita urgently demands the rebuilding of the entire fabric of life. It is not a matter of intellectual jugglery or dialectical fire-works. Advaita derives its vital impetus from man's hunger for the Spirit, for perfection, for self-transcendence. Its unique distinction lies in its scheme of deliverance from the *alpa* and the *ārta*, finitude and penury of spirit. What gives its significance to Advaita is its being at once a way of thinking and living. It is pre-eminently a programme for raising life to its highest value. The heart of Advaita is its doctrine of *Mukti*, the quintessence of reality and value. This conviction, born of a study of the relevant literature, led me to a critical re-examination and re-interpretation of the Concept of *Mukti* in Advaita.

Though the importance of *Mukti* has always been recognized, the treatment given to it even in Advaitic classics like *Citsukhī* and the *Advaita-siddhi* may suggest that very little beyond its being a condition of blissfulness may be stated about it. But an ideal which means so much to human life everywhere, and which has been rightly described as 'the most precious jewel of Indian faith' demands and deserves a clearer and ampler statement. The fact that *Mukti* has been dealt with in all schools of Indian thought necessitated, in Part I of this thesis, its examination from the points of view of them all, the better to discover the uniqueness of the Advaitic ideal. Each of these systems has been treated as an effort to answer the question how man can reach perfection. The solutions they offer together with their presuppositions have first been stated, then critically examined, and their inadequacies exposed. I have presented them as steps leading to the Advaitic position both in their metaphysics and ethics. Next, in Part II, I have presented Advaita Philosophy as a vision or *Darśana* of reality, solely concerned with the problem of man's *paramapuruṣārtha* or the *summum bonum*. Part II begins with the exposition of Brahman as at once reality and value, and therefore, the final End of the search for perfection. How the problem of imperfection arises at all is the theme of the next three chapters on *māyā*, *jīva* and *jagat*. What exactly is the nature of imperfection or human bondage is explained in the fifth chapter. An idea of the all-round *sīdhana* or spiritual endeavour demanded of the seeker after perfection is sought to be conveyed in the penultimate chapter on 'the Way.' Here an attempt has been made to show that the alternatives posed 'whether the world is real or illusory' for Advaita are altogether naive and misleading. In fact, throughout the chapters II to VI I have endeavoured to restate the idea of 'illusoriness' in Advaita.

HPEW.	The History of Philosophy, East and West.
IA.	Indian Antiquary.
ILA.	Indian Logic & Atomism — Keith.
IOC.	All India Oriental Conference.
IP.	Indian Philosophy, Radhakrishna.
IPC.	Indian Philosophical Congress.
ITI.	The Idealistic Thought of India, P. T. Raju, 1953.
IU.	Isāvāsya Upaniṣad.
JMV.	The Jīvanmukti Viveka.
JPPS.	The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology & Scientific methods.
JU.	The Jābālopaniṣad.
KaU.	The Kausitaki Upaniṣad.
KeU.	The Kenopaniṣad.
KSS.	The Kāśī Sanskrit Series.
KU.	The Kathopaniṣad.
LA.	The Lankāvatara Sūtras.
LC.	The Laghucandrikā, a tīkā on AS.
MaBh.	The Mahābhārata.
MaiU.	The Maitrayani Upaniṣad.
MB.	Madhvabhāṣya on BS.
ME.	The memorial edition of Śaṅkara's Works.
MK.	The Mūlamādhyamika Kārika of Nāgārjuna.
MNU.	The Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad.
MSS.	The Mādhvasiddhāntasāra.
MU.	The Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad.
MuU.	The Muṇḍakopaniṣad.
MuKU.	The Muktikopaniṣad.
NB.	The Nyāyabhāṣya.
NKS.	The Naiṣkarmyasiddhi.
NR.	The Nyāyaratnāvalī on SB.
NS.	The Nyāyasūtras.
NSB.	The Nyāyasūtra & Bhāṣya, Ed. by Jha, 1939.
NTU.	The Nṛsiṃhottaratāpaniṣad.
NV.	The Nyāyavaiśeṣika School.
PA.	The Philosophy of Advaitā, Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan.
PB.	„ of Bhaskara, Srinivasācāri.
PD.	The Pañcadaśī.
PMS.	The Pūrvamīmāṃsā in its sources.
PP.	The Pañcapādikā.
PU.	The Prasṇopaniṣad.
PUD.	The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, Deussen.
RB.	The Rāmānujabhāṣya on BS.

RP.	The Ratnaprabhā on BSS.
SB.	Siddhantiābindu.
SBE.	Sacred books of the East.
SDS.	Sarvadarśanasamgraha.
SK.	Sāṃkhyakārikas.
SLS.	Siddhāntaleśasamgraha.
SN.	Svātmanirūpaṇa of Śaṅkara.
SS.	Svārājyasiddhi.
SSS.	Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha.
S'S.	Samksepaśāstraka.
S'B.	Śaṅkarabhāṣyā.
S'D.	The S'āstradīpikā.
S'U.	The S'vetāśvatara Upaniṣad.
S'V.	The S'lokavārtika of Kumārila.
ṢDS.	Ṣaddarśanasamuccaya.
TA.	Taittirīyāranyaka.
TP.	Tattvaparakāṣikā.
TS.	Tarkasamgraha of Śāntarakṣita.
TSP.	Tarkasamgrahapañjika.
TU.	The Taittirīyopaniṣad.
TUB.	Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣya of Śaṅkara.
US.	Upadeśasāhasrī.
V.	The Vanamālā Comm. on TUB.
VC.	The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi.
VeS.	The Vedāntasāra.
VKL.	The Vedāntakalpalatā.
VP.	The Vedāntaparibhāṣā.
VPS.	The Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha.
VS.	The Vaiṣeṣikasūtras.
VWW.	Vedānta for the Western World.
YMD.	Yatīndramatadīpikā
YS.	Yogasūtras.
YV.	Yogavāsiṣṭha.

Dr. Warriar presents here a clear and comprehensive account of Advaita with particular reference to the concept of *mukti*. He has developed his theme adopting the comparative method; and his comparisons include both Indian and Western views.

Despite careful proof reading by the Author, there are many printing mistakes. A correction list of the more important of these errors is added at the end.

MADRAS,
January 29, 1962. }

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

and to define precisely the implication of its doctrine of *mithyātvā* or falsity. In the concluding chapter on *Mukti*, I have underscored its immense practical importance and tried to clear up some current misconceptions about the activity or *karma* of the *mukta*. Also, I have sought to reinterpret the concept of *Mukti* in terms of value, emphasising that in Advaita the supreme value is one only, viz., bliss or *ānanda*. Further, I have suggested that the *jīvanmukti* of Advaita is the realization of an all-inclusive ideal of supermanhood. Finally, I have also argued that the Advaitic ideal of *Mukti* does not entail the surrender or loss of anything that enlightened reason can hold precious for progress in life. Throughout Part II, I have presented the Advaitic statement of problems and their solutions side by side with what the Viśiṣṭādvaita and the Dvaita have to say on the same matter in order to render the Advaitic position all the more vivid.

Here I wish to place on record my sincere gratitude to the authorities of the Travancore University for granting me three years' study leave with stipend to undertake research on a subject which has always fascinated me, and to the authorities of the Madras University for affording me facilities to carry out that research work. It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge the valuable help which the President of the Theosophical Society, Sri N. Sri Ram, extended to me by permitting me to stay at the Headquarters and use the Adyar Library for consultation. Finally, this work could neither have been undertaken nor completed without the generous help and guidance which Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan, Professor of Philosophy, Madras University, so unstintedly offered to me. I thank him most sincerely for it.

*vairāgyavijñānadayāmburāṣer
asmānmahādevaviśiṣṭānāmnaḥ,
ādītyabindūn katicitkṛtajño
grantham kṛtaṃ tatra samarpayāmi.*

Trivandrum
January 11, 1962 }

A. G. KRISHNA WARRIER

FOREWORD

The present work constitutes the doctoral thesis written by Dr. A. G. Krishna Warriar as a research scholar attached to the University Department of Philosophy during the years 1952-55. The theme of the work is the concept of *Mukti* in Advaita-Vedānta. As the concept is central to every school of Indian philosophy except the Cārvāka, and as all other concepts are organically related to this one, Dr. Warriar has had to cover, in a sense, the entire range of Indian philosophy.

Mukti or *mokṣa* (release) is known by other names also : *apavarga*, *kaivalya*, *nirvāṇa*, etc. The concept has a negative as well as a positive side. In its negative aspect it signifies complete freedom from sorrow which is the necessary accompaniment of the transmigratory process ; in its positive aspect it stands for the plenary happiness or bliss. Some schools of Indian thought regard *mukti* as a negative status ; others look upon it as the highest positive value. Several of the metaphysical views think that *mukti* is a future achievement, an experience that is yet to come. For Advaita-Vedānta, *mukti* is the eternal state of the Self ; it is no other than *Brahman-Ātman*.

So far as the nature of *mukti* which is *Brahman-Ātman* is concerned, all Advaita-Vedāntins are in perfect agreement with one another. On minor points, however, they hold divergent views. What is the status of the world ? Is the world a figment of one's own imagination ? Or, does it have any objectivity ? What is the character of the soul ? Is the soul a reflection of *Brahman* ? Or, is it the result of a limitation ? Is there only one soul ? Or, are there many souls ? Different answers to these and similar questions have been given by Advaitins. Dr. Warriar dissociates himself from what he characterizes as extremist Advaita, and expresses himself in favour of moderate Advaita. He equates Advaita with objective idealism, and rejects those versions of Advaita that lean towards subjectivism.

A LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS¹ USED IN THIS BOOK

AA.	Aitareyāranyaka.
AAE.	Ānandāsrama Edition.
ABS.	Advaitabrahmasiddhi.
AL.	Ānandalahari.
AOJ.	American Journal of Oriental Studies.
AR.	Appearance & Reality, Bradley.
AS.	Advaitasiddhi.
AU.	Aitareyopaniṣad.
BB.	Bhaskarabhāṣya on BS.
BC.	Bodhicaryāvatāra.
BG.	The Bhagavatgītā.
BGC.	The Bhagavatgītā with Commentaries, Nirṇaya Sāgara Edition, 1919.
Bhā.	The Bhāmatī on the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya.
BrS.	The Brahmasiddhi.
BS.	The Brahmasūtras.
BSS.	Brahmasūtra Śaṅkarabhāṣya.
BSSM.	The Brahmasūtrasiddhānta muktāvalī of Vanamālī.
BT.	Buddhism in Translation, Warren.
BU.	The Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad.
BUB.	The Bṛhadāranyaka with Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya & Ānandagiri's Tīkā:
BV.	The Bṛhadāranyakavārtika of Sure's/ varācārya.
CHI.	The Cultural Heritage of India.
CIP.	Contemporary Indian Philosophy.
CSB.	Catuṣsūtrabhāṣya of Madhva, ed. by B. N. Krishna Murti Śarma.
CSS.	Calcutta Sanskrit Series.
CSV.	Comparative Studies in Vedānta ; Sircar, 1927.
CU.	The Chāndogyopaniṣad.
CUB.	S'B. on CU.
DSV.	The System of Vedānta, Deussen.
DV.	Dvaita Vedānta.
ERE.	The Encyclopaedia of Religion & Ethics.
GPK.	The Gauḍapāḍakārikā, AAE.
HIP.	The History of Indian Philosophy, Das Gupta.
HOS.	The Harward Oriental Series.

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PART I

MUKTI IN NON-VEDĀNTIC SYSTEMS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

All the major religions of the world cherish as their final goal the salvation of man¹. Perhaps their agreement does not extend far beyond this ; for, to the questions regarding the characteristics of that goal, the seeker who strives to reach it, and the environments amidst which it is sought to be won, various and even contradictory answers have been returned. The names used to designate the common goal of life have of course been diverse, and each suggests characteristic differences as regards the contents denoted by it. Thus perfection in the new Testament is held up as the goal of the conscientious adherent of the christian way of life, but it is evident that Perfection in its fullest measure is eternally beyond the reach of man.² In its fulness Perfection is the attribute of God alone.³ But the Nirvāna of the Bauddha, or the *Mokṣa* *Kaivalya*, or *Apavarga*, of the schools of Hinduism and of Jainism, denoting as they do varying concepts of salvation are, one and all, emphatically within the reach of the strenuous aspirants.

The Indian systems of Philosophy demonstrate by reasoning propositions in regard to what a man ought to do in order to gain true happiness or what he ought to realise by direct experience in order to free himself completely from suffering and thus be absolutely independent. In other words, they either deal with '*Dharma*' or the moral value of virtue, or *Mokṣa*, the spiritual value of Freedom. The name for Philosophy in Sanskrit, viz., *Dars'anam* denotes that it is the science of 'thinking consideration' or '*vicāra Śāstram*.'⁴ Its contents are not mere speculation in regard to the duties of man or the verities of life.

There are two chief divisions in Indian Philosophy. The first is concerned with the rational demonstration of the

1. Form and Spirit, a study in Religion, pp. 160 ff; J. B. Badley.

2. E. R. E. Vol. IX 'Perfection'.

3. N. T. Luke 18, 19.

4. Hindu Realism, J.C. Chatterjee, The Indian Press, Allahabad.

prepositions of duty laid down in the Veda—the repository of the traditional wisdom of the people. Here is indicated the answer to the questions of the type :—What man should do or avoid in order to achieve happiness in some state of specific existence. This is the *Dharma* or the *Karma mīmāṃsā*.

The second division discusses questions in regard to the truths of the fundamental nature of things, which man should realize by direct experience so that he may be absolutely free. This is, therefore, termed *Tattvamīmāṃsā* or *Mokṣa Darśana*. Apart from the two heterodox schools of Jainism and Buddhism, there are only three main metaphysical systems in Indian Philosophy, whose discussions on the final goal of life merit our special attention : (i) The *Nyāyī-Vaiśeṣika*, (ii) The *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* and (iii) The *Vedānta*.¹ The metaphysical basis of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* brings it into the first group. Though, historically, these three groups arose more or less independently as the result of the speculative activities of different schools of thinkers, to the extent that they are all dealing with the self-same problems of life's meaning, environments and goal, the results they offer may be said to represent three great standards suited to three grades of minds.²

The creative thinkers of India offer the fruits of their speculations, with certain pre-suppositions, a clear statement of which is necessary, therefore, for their right appraisal. But in this respect they may be likened to their counterparts in the West, where it is held that (i) man cannot know metaphysical truths by direct experience, or (ii) even granting that some day, they may be known, so far no man has known them, and (iii) therefore, being pure speculations, the various schools of Indian Philosophy, like the speculative system of the West, must be mutually contradictory, and that if one is true, all the rest must be false. Now, the presuppositions of the Indian thinkers are : (i) Man can know metaphysical truths directly ; (ii) there have been such men and there may still be *Rṣis* or perfected seers ; (iii) the *Rṣis* teach metaphysical truths after

1. *S'iva Dhyāna,* P1 Qd. in Hindu Realism.

2. †Pp. 36 ff., Advaita Brahma Siddhi · Kāśmīra Śrīśadānanda Yati Cal. Uty., 1932.

knowing them directly; (iv) while all *Rṣis* know the same truths, just as all men of sight see the same sun, they teach these truths in different standards or grades represented by the texts of the schools.¹

It is important to remember these facts to arrive at a correct estimate of the value of the conclusions offered by the Indian Schools of Thought. That some savants of the West, too, were aware of those characteristics of Indian thought is borne out by Max Müller's remarks: "The longer I have studied the various systems, the more have I become impressed with the truth of the view taken by *Vijñāna Bhikṣu* and others that there is behind the variety of the six systems a common fund which may be called the national or popular philosophy, a large *Mānasa* lake of Philosophical thought and language far away in the distant north and in the distant past, from which each thinker was allowed to draw for his own purposes."²

In all these grades the ultimate object of inquiry is the 'supreme good' or 'summum bonum' namely *mokṣa*; for, as has been remarked by Lord Lytton in the first session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 'in the West, which delights in definition, Philosophy has been a study; in the East which loves infinity it is a practice'. Whether this pre-occupation with salvations or *mokṣa* has adversely affected the search for truth we shall examine at a later stage in our study. The undeniable importance of the Indian systems of thought, both orthodox and heterodox, derives from the fact that they are, each in its own way, earnest efforts at elucidating the practical problem of achieving perfection or liberation. This truth also has found notable recognition at the hands of a modern critic of Indian thought. "From the start I was convinced that all thought is really concerned with the great problem of how man can attain spiritual union with infinite being. Indian thought is busied with this problem."³ That the Indian genius always had an extraordinary penchant for 'the spiritual union with infinite Being' seems to be further borne out by The Rev. Heras's book

1. Hindu Realism (p. 7); IP ii. P. 769.

2. Six Systems, P. XVII; MaxMüller.

3. Indian Thought and its development (preface vi); A. Schweitzer.

'*Mīnkan*' in which he makes it out that even in the pre-Vedic days of Mohanjodaro the perfected man of the 'fish-eyes'—the *Mukta*—was known and held in the utmost reverence.¹ However, in the Vedic age itself, during the period of the *Samhitās* and the *Brāhmanas* the idea of *Mokṣa* was not in evidence. The goal of the devout individual during this period was 'length of days on earth and life in heaven in companionship with the Gods.'² In the interval between the *Samhitās* and the Upanisads the life of the Indian peoples must have undergone profound changes. The naive and gay world-view evident in the *Ṛgveda*, and the relatively carefree attitude to life which prevails in the *Brāhmanas* give place in the Upanisads to a profound concern with the gravest problems of life and death. Whereas, in the *Ṛgveda*, men knew nothing about the doctrine of transmigration and the sense of weariness and despair which a contemplation of its unending rounds is bound to generate in the sensitive heart, the Upanisads³, for the first time, refer to the mysterious powers of Karma and their sway over the destiny of man. Intimately bound up with Karma and transmigration is the doctrine of *Samsāra*—the rounds of births and deaths in bondage to the laws of Karma. To match the doctrine of *Samsāra* there comes to the fore in the Upanisads a doctrine of the Self or *Ātman* or Brahman, the imperishable principle of reality in man and nature. True, the doctrine of the immortal Self in man contrasted with his obvious mortality was anticipated in an earlier text⁴ '*Puruse tvevāvistarāmātmā; Sahi prajñānena sampannatamah; Martyenāmṛtatvamīpsati.*' It was this suggestion of the intellectually gifted mortal striving for immortality that was worked out and developed by the Upanisads into the full-fledged doctrine of *Mokṣa* or Liberation, "the most precious jewel of Indian faith"⁵ as Deussen characterises it. All later schools of Indian Philosophy inherited this Upanisadic bias for the problem of Liberation and worked

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1. *Mīnkan*—The Rev. H. Heras, S. J. Hind Kitab, Bombay 1947.
 2. The Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas and the Upanisads. Keith, A. B.; The Philosophy of the Vedānta, an address by P. Deussen, P. 334 in Elements of Metaphysics.
 3. BU. III, 2, 13.
 4. Ait. Ara., 2, 3, 2.
 5. The system of Vedānta, P. 253, P. Deussen.

out their own characteristic solutions. While the main aim of the present undertaking is to elucidate the concept of *Mukti* as developed by the school of Advaita Philosophy, we believe that, for a full comprehension of it, it is necessary to exhibit that concept against the background of the solutions of the problem of *Mukti* as worked out by the other schools. Before proceeding to do so it may be advantageous to bring together the various relevant points of philosophic interest on which all the main schools of Indian Philosophy more or less agree.

With the solitary exception of the *Cārvāka* system, all Indian Schools of thought accept the theory of Karma and rebirth. Also, it is recognised that while the chain of Karma has no assignable origin, an end can be put to it by man here and now, provided an appropriate and determined effort is made towards that objective. In effect, this is the recognition of the feasibility of *Mokṣa* or Liberation as the goal of life. Besides, this presupposes a self or *Ātman*, which is, *per se*, pure. Buddhism in all its varied schools is unique in all Indian Philosophy for having rejected the doctrine of an enduring self while it holds fast to the doctrine of *Nirvāṇa*, which is nothing but a species of *Mokṣa*. Necessarily, it also follows that all Indian Schools start with a world view which can only be characterised as pessimistic; for, were the world in which we work out our destinies quite satisfactory, we would have been left without the impetus to think and strive for a better and more valuable life. Because time is so intolerable, the Indian philosopher strives after eternity. But, equally inevitably, all Indian systems close on a note of triumph; their pessimism is only initial.

In the preoccupation of Indian Philosophy with the problem of *Mukti*, it is permissible to see its dominant interest in the highest value of human life, *paramapurusaṛtha*. In every school of Philosophy in India, the *trivarga* (the aggregate of three)¹, consisting of *dharma* or virtue, *artha* or wealth and *kāma* or pleasure has been treated as instrumental values, which directly or indirectly subserve and promote the intrinsic value, *mokṣa* or liberation. The unanimity among the Indian

1. The Philosophy of values, The Cultural Heritage of India, p. 645.

thinkers testifies to their recognition that 'the true value of a human being is determined primarily by the measure and the sense in which he has attained to liberation from the self.'¹

The study, then, of how this significant theme of Liberation has been handled in the Indian Schools of Philosophy cannot be without an interest and importance of its own. It is hoped that it will throw into relief the dominant Indian idea of the destiny and value of the individual, besides indicating how the Indian solution of the problem of human destiny has a perennial validity of its own.

1. The World as I see it, P. 7 A. Einstein.

CHAPTER II

THE MATERIALIST APPROACH TO MOKṢA

Before considering the concept of *mukti* as developed in the full-fledged philosophic schools, what amounts to a scornful repudiation of the ideal of Liberation, unique in the history of Indian thought, may be briefly noticed. A review of the main ideas of the *Cārvāka* or the *Lokāyata* school, i. e., the seductive school of materialism, will show that, despite the predominantly idealistic and spiritual bent of the Indian genius, deviationism of a radical kind has been by no means unknown.

The origin of the heretical views has been traced back to the days of the *R̥gveda* itself.¹ And, no wonder; for under names such as *Bārhaspatya*, *Svabhāvavāda*, *Lokāyata*, the tendencies of thought which have crystallised in India are but an expression of the materialistic bias present in human nature all over the world. They constitute an extreme expression of what Deussen calls the innate realism present in all of us.

The germs of materialism, scepticism and agnosticism found in the *R̥gveda* developed in course of time into a materialistic creed with several phases. For example, Mahāvīra refers³ to a sect of *Aṃnānīyas*, who were in fact ignorant, yet professed to have gone beyond all doubts, *vitigiccatinṇā*. In the spirit of the blind leading the blind, they offered a 'sound view' of life for the acceptance of the rest of mankind.

The Indian materialists, unlike the materialist school of the West, do not pretend to offer a complete system of Philosophy. Their aim has always been to expose the pretensions of the orthodox schools of thought. By adopting the technique of the *Vitandāvāda*⁴ or destructive criticism, they seek to discredit the notions of an enduring, independent, Ātman or self, a life hereafter, whether in heaven or hell, and any goal of

1. R̥g V. X, 72, 2; Yāska's Nirukta.

2. The System of Vedānta, Deussen, Chicago, 1912, P. 100.

3. Sūtrakṛtāṅga, I, 12, 2.

4. NB. I, 2, 3.

life other than *artha* and *kāma*, wealth and pleasure.¹ Their supreme motto in life is : Let us eat, drink and make money, for tomorrow we die.²

Accepting no other means of right cognition than *pratyaksa* or sense perception,² the materialists affirm that *Ātman* or *Puruṣa* is nothing beyond the living body itself. In the *Advaita Brahmasiddhi*⁴ are quoted what are purported to be some aphorisms of Bṛhaspati, the legendary founder of the materialist school "*Caitanyaviśiṣṭahkāyah Puruṣah*"—"The body qualified by consciousness is the self. Consciousness is not an independent, much less, eternal principle, as several other schools maintain. It is only a function of the body, a necessary concomitant thereof, in certain of its states. Like the red⁴ colour from the combination of chewing materials like the betel leaf, areca, etc., or the power⁵ of intoxication from fermenting grains, consciousness arises from the four elements, earth, water, etc., which constitute the human body. This is confirmed by the fact that when the body disintegrates, consciousness is extinguished outright.

Besides, with characteristic effrontery, the materialist quotes the Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad⁶ to prove that no self or *ātman* survives the death of the body⁷.

That the living body is the *Ātman* is also borne out by linguistic usages like 'I am stout, I am thin, I am black, etc.'⁸ On the other hand, the expression 'my body' is merely figurative similar to the 'head of Rāhu,' while *Rāhu* is, in fact, just 'head' alone.

The facts of memory cannot be cited to prove a self different from the body; for the traces left by previous experiences may be transmitted to the succeeding states just as the odour of musk is to a cloth in contact with it.⁹

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1. SDS. P. 2, Abhayankar Edn. Poona, 1951 ;
 2. SDS. II, 2 ; Madras, 1909 ; 3. PP. 121, ff ; 4. SSS. II, 7 ;
 5. SDS. I, 4 ; 6. BU. II, 4, 12 ; 7. SDS. P. 3. ; 8. SDS. I, 4 ;
 9. In his Outlines of Philosophy : B. Russel holds the tendency of a furled up paper to resume its prior state to be its physical memory.

From the position that the Ātman is the body, all questions regarding transmigration to reap the consequences of one's actions may at once be seen to be a sheer irrelevance. Morality, to meet whose demands transmigration, heaven, hell, are postulated, is itself an idle construction of designing impostors.¹

The character of the world in which we live our lives is entirely determined by '*Svabhāva*' or the nature of things.¹ There is neither a God nor gods to initiate or control nature's phenomena; "The hotness of fire, coolness of water, the medium temperature of air, the gorgeous feathers of the peacock, or the ravishing melody of the *koil* are there due entirely to the nature of things".² The materialists of the extreme type, *dhūrtīa cārvākas*, even deny the concept of causality and maintain that things come into being of their own accord.³ Only the first four elements, viz., earth, water, fire and air are admitted by the materialists; for, only they are testified by *Pratyakṣa*, and the body is a combination of these four alone.

In a world where *Pratyakṣa* alone functions, obviously, the reality of *dharma* or the moral good is bound to be at a discount; in fact, its very existence is denied. Inference cannot establish the reality of *adṛṣṭa* or the unseen potency which embraces both *dharma* and *adharma*; for inference itself is not a valid means of cognition. Invariable concomitance or universal relations i.e., *vyāpti* or *avinābhāva*, on which inference⁴ rests, can never be established beyond a peradventure. Where, sometimes, fruitful action ensues on the basis of inference, we need see no more than a lucky coincidence. True, in the name of *dharma*, social rules and regulations relating to the chastity of woman, the duties of castes and stations of life and so forth have been instituted, but the authors of these rules and regulations were at once calculating and weak.⁵

Since in life money alone can minister to pleasures, beyond which there are no conceivable human ends or goals, the

1. SDS. I. 9, 10;

2. SSS. II, 5, 8 & SDS. P. 13.

3. CHI. Vol. III. P. 182.

4. SDS. P. 12.

5. SSS. II, 12; SDS. I. 7.

materialists declare the first two ends, wealth and pleasure, alone to be relevant to life, the one being instrumental and the other intrinsic. Thus runs the aphorism '*kāma eva puruṣārthaḥ*.'¹ To avoid the rare pleasures of life for fear of consequences or because they are never unmixed is crass stupidity." "As a non-vegetarian rejects the bones and enjoys the flesh, or as a vegetarian eschews the husk and relishes the kernel, so should one grab at the pleasures of life and avoid its inevitable pains."² To waste one's substance, in the name of *dharma*, on the futile sacrifices enjoined by the Vedas concocted by the crafty priests is only to set a premium on scheming indolence—*buddhipauruṣahīnānām jīvikā*. Using traditional expressions one may state that Liberation or *apavarga* is bodily disintegration or death. '*maraṇamevāpavargah*.'³

Certain refinements of the materialistic views, accredited to 'progressive' *Cārvākas* (*Suśikṣita*) have been noticed by the author of the *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*.¹ Those consist of the opinion that sense-organs which function till death are the self or *Ātman*; for expressions like 'I see', 'I hear', etc., point that way as seeing, hearing and so on are the functions of the sense-organs. More advanced is the view that sets the claims of the mind to be deemed the self above those of the sense-organs; for, while the senses yield only vague indeterminate cognitions, mind imposes a determinate form on them. Besides, even when other senses decline and dwindle away, mind persists and functions. Pursuing the same line of subtlety *Prāṇa* or the vital breath was conceded the status of the *Ātman* by the most advanced *Cārvākās*, for even in deep sleep or trances, the vital breath is up and doing.

But despite all his subtlety and passion, it is difficult to take the materialist seriously. There is the initial difficulty of conceiving the coming together of the four inert elements to fashion the body. For, before the body is formed there is no consciousness according to him, while without a conscious agent the elements may not combine in the right proportion. Still, the materialist who does not recognise the possibility of a

1. Advaita Brahma Siddhi, P. 121.

2. SDS. P. 4. 3. Advaita Brahma Siddhi, P. 121; SDS, P. 6.
4. PP. 124 ff.

world dissolution, or *pralaya* may argue that the living body arises from the parental act. The world being without beginning the existence of the living body at any given time thus stands explained. The *Advaitabrahmasiddhi* attempts to show that without assuming an unseen force or *adṛṣṭa* it is impossible to explain the existence of the variety among living beings,¹ and that *adṛṣṭa* implies past lives.

The common usages such as my body, senses, etc., denote that they are not 'me' or 'ātman', but 'mine'; the *ātman* must be beyond its 'properties' or 'possessions'. In fact the persistent sense of 'I-ness' in and through the changes to which the entire psycho-physical complex is subject argues the distinction and otherness of the *ātman*—the substrate of 'I-ness'².

The equipment of innate apprehensions with which a new-born babe faces the world points to a self which existed prior to its bodily entanglement and gathered experiences upon which it may now be drawing.

Again, it is impossible to conceive the total destruction or prior non-existence of the *Ātman*; for who, in those presumed states, is to be aware of either? An event without a conscious witness thereof is simply a mare's nest. Hence, the *Atman* must be deemed to be the indestructible consciousness itself.

The insurmountable objection to the materialist case lies in the problem of consciousness itself. Its nature is so radically different from that of matter that the effort to derive it from the latter cannot be regarded as serious. Analogies cannot help us out of this basic difficulty. Consciousness is original and independent, which grasps matter as its object. From the failure to grasp this root fact flow all the gross shortcomings and inadequacies of the materialist position.

Besides, it has been pointed out by Udayana in the *Kusumāṅjali* that even for the materialist it is prudent to avoid infringements of the moral law or *dharma*. "It is the

1. P. 125.

2. Cf. *Bhāmati*; *Yogavyāvarttamāṇeṣu yadanuvartate tattebhyo-bhinnaṃ yathā kusumbhyah sūtram*.

part of wisdom to avoid sin even though it is only probable or possible that there is life hereafter. If there be none what does he lose ? but if there be, the materialist will find himself in hot waters ”.¹

That the chief aim of the materialists was to caricature orthodoxy follows from the meanings they place on the quotations from the Upaniṣads in total disregard of all sober canons of interpretation. To treat pleasures as the sole end of life, man has to ignore all that distinguishes him from the brute. No thinking man can take the proposal seriously ; nor was it, perhaps, seriously made. The hedonist or the epicurean no doubt will lend a sympathetic ear to the slogan : Live for pleasure. But both will refuse to restrict the range of pleasures to the sphere of sense-organs. Man does not live in his sense-organs alone. ‘ My mind to me a kingdom is ’ is what the cultivated man, everywhere, seeks to assert in life.

Their ignoring of *dharma* or the moral good as a human value squarely places the materialists outside the pale of civilised society. Perhaps this ancient prejudice against the moral good finds expression in the modern doctrine that the end justifies the means.

A relentless pursuit of pleasures is bound to lead mankind back to the state of the brute from which the course of evolution, however interpreted, has pushed them forward to a civilisation based on self-sacrifice, devotion to duty, and a preference for the remoter ends of human life.

1. Sandigdhe'pi pare loka tyājyamevāhita_m budhaih ;
Yadi na syāttatah ki_m syādaścennāstiko hatah.

CHAPTER III

THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEŚIKA DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM OF MOKṢA

Introduction

Though, historically, the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* systems originated independently¹ of each other, their approaches to philosophical problems had so much in common that at a very early time they joined forces and have since come to be treated as one syncretist school. While the systems like the *Sāṃkhya* and the *Vedānta* are mainly speculative and deal with the universe as a whole, the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* is analytical² in its methods and upholds the point of view of common sense. Both systems profess to provide a clear-cut formula for the achievement of salvation or *mukti*, the *raisond'être* of all system-building in India.

Categories

The categories of the *Vaiśeṣika* system, later incorporated into *Nyāya*, are what a common sense observation of experience yields — substance, quality, activity, generality (*Sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*) to which the later⁴ *vaiśeṣika* thinkers, Śrīdhara, Udayana and Śivāditya added non-existence or *abhāva*.⁵ The category of substance or *dravyam* consists of the five elements, earth, water, fire, air, *ākāśa* or ether and space, time, *ātman* or self and *manas* or mind. In this category are thus included all corporeal and incorporeal things.

1. CHI. Vol. III, P. 91.

3. VS. I. 1, 4.

2. IP. Vol. II, P. 29.

4. IP. II. P. 185.

5. *Abhāva-cavaktavyo niḥsreyasopayogitvāt bhāvaprapañohavāt Kāraṇabhāvena kāryabhāvasya sarvasiddhatvāt upayogitva-siddhiḥ*—*Nyāyalīlavatī*.

The World

The world in which the *Jīvas* or embodied selves live, suffer and die times without number till the achievement of *apavarga* or *mokṣa*, viz., emancipation, is fashioned out of the eternal atoms of the first four elements,¹ ether, space and time. All these constituent factors of the world exist eternally in their own right.² The last three entities are also all pervading. Usually, a place for God is found in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* as the organizer or engineer of the world order who manipulates the eternal atoms to fashion out of them the world as we see it. This organizing action of God is said to stem from the moral necessity to furnish a stage for the *Jīvas* to work out their destinies. Here they reap the results of their former deeds and sow the seeds of their future experiences. It is God who builds up this cosmic environment of the selves for the purpose of giving to each being its due.³

Of course the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* rejects the notion that whatever exists is momentary (held by the Buddhists, for example). True, there are momentary⁴ things, but also more or less permanent entities like stones and mountains.⁵

Their continuity follows from the fact that we recognise them after a lapse of time. Only composite things or products are liable to disintegration.⁶

Ātman

The existence of the *ātman* or self which goes through empirical life and is destined to be emancipated is proved by inference,⁷ to corroborate which scriptural evidence also is

1. VS. IV, 1, 2.

2. NB. IV; i, 25-28.

3. "But it has been widely held that to begin with, both the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya* did not accept the existence of God. It was not till a subsequent period that the two systems changed to Theism, although neither went so far as to assume a creator of matter." Garbe Qd. IP, ii P. 165 F. N. & vide CHI. Vol. III, P. 110.

4. S'ankara refers to the *Vaiśeṣikas* as 'ardhavaivāṇśikas'—semi-nihilists in BSS, II, 2, 18.

5. NB. III, 2, 11.

6. NB. IV, I, 29-33.

7. NS. I, 1, 10.

adduced. The *Vaiśeṣika* system points ¹ out that the cognition of sense-objects implies an entity other than the senses and their objects. Perception or *Pratyakṣa* does not show that the substrate of cognition is either the body or the senses. The *viṃśi* ² on the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtrās* sets forth the inference:—The cognition of colour, etc., has reference to a substance, for this cognition is a quality like colour, etc. Along with the fact that other known substances, elements, space, time, mind, are not fit to be the seat of cognition, the above inference is held to establish the reality of the *ātman*. Of course, the body is not the seat of cognitions because its constituent causes or parts, viz., the elements, are severally unconscious. Also, because, when the body remains intact after death, it is not seen to be conscious. The *Nyāya Kandali* ³ proposes the inference; cognition must be located somewhere; because it is an action; just as the action of cutting. That in which cognition rests is the self. Like other objects, cognition also must be perceived, and the cogniser is the self.

Besides the marks of the *ātman* enumerated in the *Nyāya-Sūtras*. I, 1, 10, *icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhaññānānyātmano lingam*, the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* III, 2, 4, sets forth other characteristics like respiration, winking, mind's movement, and the affections of the senses to prove the reality of the *ātman*. Nevertheless, the *Vaiśeṣika* notes that other schools deny the inferrability ⁴ of the self and so, suggests that the self is to be known from the declarations of the scripture ⁵:—*tasmā-dāgamikah*.

But *āgama* or scripture is not by any means the sole proof; there is reasoning also in support of its reality. The notion 'I' cannot be referred to any substance other than the *ātman*. That is to say the meaning of 'I' is the *ātman* ⁶ *ahamiti pratyagātmani bhāvatparatrābhāvādarthāntarapratyayah*.

The self is other than the senses and controls them, and synthesizes their contributions.⁷ Thus the unity of the subject of seeing, hearing, etc., inheres in the self alone, the agent who

1. VS. III, 1, 2;

3. P. 71. Ibid.

5. VS. III, 28 & 18.

7. NB. III, 1, 1.

2. V Sūtras with Bhāṣyam etc. P. 129.

4. VS. III, 2, 6 & 7.

6. VS. III, 2, 14.

wields the instrumental senses. That the *ātman* is different from the mind or *manas* follows from the instrumental character of the latter. Body, senses, and mind fall within the sphere of the object, whereas the *ātman* is the subject.¹

The *ātman* cannot be limited in size, for what is limited in size has parts and is liable to destruction. Hence, it must be either atomic or infinite. Were it atomic, the cognition which extends over the whole body would become inexplicable.² Nor can it have the same size as the body, as the Jains hold; for, then, with the body it will have to undergo changes, and being changeable, once more, becomes liable to destruction. So it must be all-pervading or infinitely large like *ākāśa*.³ This infinitude of the *ātman* does not entail its simultaneous cognition of all objects. For the mind, connection with which is the necessary condition of all cognitions, is atomic in size. Normally each *ātman* is endowed with only one mind, which like the *ātman* is eternal.

Plurality of *ātman*s

The *ātman* is unique⁴ in each individual and there are, of course, as many *ātman*s as there are individuals; thus there is an infinitude of *ātman*s. Were there but a single *ātman* common to all individuals (as, e. g., the Advaitins maintain), we should all share one another's thoughts and feelings.⁵ The *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* III, 2, 18, according to the *vivṛti*, attacks the advaitic doctrine of *ātman*'s unity. To prove the plurality of selves reference to *śruti* like *dvebrahmaṇī*⁶ *dvāsuparṇā*,⁷ etc., is also made.

Consciousness

One of the most remarkable doctrines of the *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* system is that consciousness is not an essential property of the *ātman*. Contact with the mind alone, or with the mind which is in contact with the senses and sense-objects, generates cognitions in the self. But the series of cognitions or states of consciousness must have an end. "As regards the final cognition, it is destroyed, either when there are no causes

1. N. Vārtika, III, 2, 19.

3. VS. VII, 1, 22.

5. VS. III, 2, 20.

2. Tarka-samgraha Dipika P. 17.

4. NB. III, 1, 14.

6, 7. MU. III, 1, 1; PU. V. 2;

for its continuance, viz., merit and demerit or by reason of the peculiarities of time (which put an end to the operation of merit and demerit), or by the appearance of impressions produced by the final cognition itself." ¹ It is clear, therefore, that the *ātman* in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* is only a substrate of consciousness. In itself, it is unconscious or *jaḍa*, which, under appropriate conditions, acquires consciousness as an attribute. ²

At the same time, consciousness can be an attribute of *ātman* only in the manner that a flame's brilliance cannot exist apart from the flame.

In producing in the self its conscious states, *manas* or mind plays the most decisive part. Through it are mediated all the impressions from the outer senses. Otherwise, these impressions would be simultaneous; for the senses would be in immediate conjunction with all the eternal *ātman*s. Besides, *manas* is the direct means of cognising the self's attributes of knowledge, feelings and volitions. It also explains the phenomenon of memory. Also, the real principle of individuation is the mind, for though in theory the *ātman*s are said to have each a *viśeṣa* or particularity (just as all ultimate entities have), no distinction of *ātman*s which is not based on the mind is actually discernible. ⁴

It is the movement of the atomic mind or its impressions, *samskāraḥ*, that generate the attributes of the *ātman*.

The eternal entity, *ātman*, is repeatedly connected with a body answering to its merits and demerits. The nature of the body is determined by the acts of the embodied self in prior life periods. ⁵ The *Nyāya* system recognises not only embodiments of the self in earthly bodies, but also in the regions of *Varuṇa*, *Sūrya* and *Vāyu* in aqueous, fiery and aerial bodies.

The body is formed under the influence of *adr̥ṣṭa* or the unseen force of destiny. ⁶ It is the result or the persistent effects

1. N. Vārtika III, 2, 24. 2. NB. & N. Vārtika I, 1, 10.

3. Udayana's view seems to be that the *ātman* is atomic, though capable of pervading the body. It possesses knowledge, joy and other pure qualities. It is eternal and immutable. IP. II, F. N. P. 149.

4. ILA. Keith, P. 243.

5. NB. III, 1, 27.

6. NB. III, 2, 62-72.

of the prior acts of the individual.¹ It is certain potentialities of relation or moral worth, and may be described as postponed *karma*. The *Vaiśeṣika* distinguishes between *adīṣṭa* and *saṃskāra*.² The birth of an individual is due to the conjunction of several exactly determined *kārmic* forces. According to Uddyotakara, "the *karma* of parents who have to enjoy the experiences resulting from the birth of the child as well as the *karma* of the individual who has to undergo experiences in the world, both these conjointly bring about the birth of the body in the mother's womb."³

Bondage

While birth is the connection of the self with the body, their separation is death.⁴ The repetition of the same process of births and deaths is *samsāra* or bondage. Uddyotakara answers the interesting question whether *ātman* or *manas* is subject to *samsāra*. 'If by *samsāra* you mean the action (of entering and moving from bodies), then it belongs to the *manas*; for it is the *manas* that actually moves, *saṃsarati*. On the other hand, if by *samsāra* you mean experiencing (of pleasure and pain), then it belongs to the *ātman*, since it is the *ātman* that experiences pleasures and pains.'⁵

The history of an individual embraces not only several lives in one cycle, but countless cycles, a fact which aggravates his worldly predicament. Very little that can be called proof is offered to show that an individual undergoes repeated births and deaths. As was mentioned at the very outset, the twin doctrines of reincarnation and *karma* have been the accepted dogmas of the *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* system as well.

The smiles and cries of infants denoting joys and griefs are cited to show that they were already familiar with similar situations in the past. These symptoms cannot be explained as similar to automatic actions like the closing and opening of flowers.⁶ The behaviour patterns of babes are treated as proofs in this system of the memories of past experiences.

1. NB. III, 2, 63, *Parvaktaphalānubandhāttadutpattih*.

2. *Hindu Realism*, J. C. Chatterjee P. 103.

3. N. Vārtika III, 2, 63.

4. NS. IV, 1, 10;

5. N. Vārtika, I, 1, 19.

6. NS. III, 1, 19-21.

Ethical considerations also point to pre-existence and the future existence of the *ātman* in embodied states. Without these states, there would result for it the loss of the fruits of performed acts, and the accruing of those of unperformed acts, *kṛtahāni* and *akṛtābhyaṅamaḥ*.

Dharma and Adharma

The concept of *dharma* and *adharma* in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* merits examination. Jayantabhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamāñjari* describes them as the pillars of the edifice of *samsāra*.¹ This character they owe to the fact that they are conceived as the cause of pain and pleasure, the quintessence of worldly life. Like these latter, their causes, merit and demerit, inhere in the *ātman* as *samskārah* or traces, left by deeds, *pravṛttis*, which are three-fold, viz., those done mentally, by word of mouth, and with the body.²

As a support of the edifice of *samsāra*, *dharma* has an eminent role to play in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system. *Dharma* is that whence results the accomplishment of exaltation and supreme felicity or *moksa*.³ The *Upaskāra*⁴ understands by *abhyudaya tattvajñāna* or spiritual insight and makes *dharma* the cause thereof. Only Śāṅkara Miśra, the author of the *Upaskāra* takes *dharma* here to stand for *nivṛttilakṣaṇa*, the merit of abstention from action. Another view of *dharma* is that it is *adṛṣṭa* or the unseen potency generated by the carrying out of the vedic injunctions such as 'nididhyāsītavyaḥ', '(ātman) must be mediated on'. Thus *dharma* is the general instrument for realizing the ends of human life, namely, happiness and the cessation of pain, *sukha* and *duḥkḥābhāva*. In this context *sukha* means heaven. Those two alone can be the objectives of an independent will—*anyechānadhīna-icchā-visaya*.⁵

The *vivṛti* points out that both pleasure-seekers and the freedom-seekers, *bubhukṣus* and *mumukṣus*, seek after *dharma*. 'It is a perfume' says the *Bhāṣyam*,⁶ which lingers long after

1. P. 77, *mūlabhūtau ca tāveva stambhau samsārasadmanah*.

2. Ibid P. 45; NS. I, 1, 17.

3. VS. I., 1, 2, *yato'bhyudayanīhśreyasasiddhihsadharmah*;

4. P. 5;

5. Ibid, P. 5.

6. Ibid, P. 7.

the righteous deeds have been accomplished'. Hence it has been called a potency or *śaktiviśeṣa* engendered by visible and invisible acts, *dr̥ṣṭādṛṣṭānāṃ karmaṇāmādheyah*.

What promotes *dharma*

What promotes *dharma* is right action which is threefold ; (i) Truthful and helpful speech (ii) the feeling of compassion, the cherishing of faith and the turning away from desire (iii) the making of gifts, the rendering of service and granting protection. Under the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* VI, 2, 2¹ are enumerated the actions which generate *dharma* or virtue – ablutions, fast, chastity, life in the teacher's house, a life of retirement in the forest, sacrifice etc. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* VI, 2, 3² lays it down that the observance of the duties associated with the four *āśramas* promotes *dharma*, while misbeliefs and disbeliefs engender *adharma*. The avoidance of impurities like lust and anger and the cultivation of purity consisting of faith, alertness, industry etc., are recommended.³

Sorrow or *Duḥkham*

Dharma whose practical form is meritorious activity has been prescribed as a way out of the life in *saṃsāra* which is predominantly painful.⁴ As a psychological state, pain as well as pleasure results from contact of *ātman* with mind, sense and sense-objects.⁵ Indeed, this is true of all the nine specific qualities of the *ātman*, namely, cognition or *buddhi*, pleasure, pain, desire, merit, volition or *prayatna* impressions or *bhāvanā* or *saṃskāra* and aversion or *dveṣa*.⁶ The *Nyāya* view is that life is a load of sorrows.⁷

Sorrow or *duḥkha* is defined as '*bādhānālakṣaṇam*' – what obstructs or occasions a sense of constraint.⁸ The embodiment of the *ātman* is suffering – *vinidhabādhānāyogādduḥkhameva-janmotpattiḥ*. Psychologically, false cognition or error is

1. Abhiṣecanopavāsabrahmacaryagurukulavāsavānaprastha-yajñadānaprokṣaṇadīnnaśatramantrakālaniyamāścādr̥ṣṭāya.
2. Cāturāśramyamupadhā anupadhāśca.
3. VS. VI, 2, 4. SDS. P. 246. 4. Ātmatattvaviveka, P. 440.
5. VS.V. 2, 15. ātmendriyamanorthasannikarṣātsukhaduḥkhe.
6. SDS. P. 282. 7. Nyāyamañjari, P. 47.
8. NS. IV, 1, 55 and I, 1, 21.

regarded as the ultimate source of pain. ~~Vaṭṣyayana writes~~ that *mithyājñānam* or error refers to the ~~knownables or knowables~~ *prameyam* such as *ātman*, body, senses, objects, cognition, mind, action, defects, rebirth, fruit of action, pain and emancipation.²

The general definition of error is the taking of one thing for another – ‘*atasmin talbuddhi*.’ Judgements like the following imply error or *mithyājñānam*: The *ātman* does not exist, or the non-*ātman* like the body, etc., is the *ātman*.³ All incorrect judgments regarding the world, life and its values come under *mithyājñānam*.⁴ The commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* I, 1, 4, also bears out this view. Under the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* X, 1, 1⁵ Śāṅkara Miśra points out that in *Nyāya Sūtra* I, 1, 9 *sukham* or pleasure is not mentioned separately from *duḥkham* or pain because, at bottom, both are one according to Gautama whose object in so treating them is to arouse the spirit of detachment from all life.

Twenty one varieties of pain have been distinguished in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system. They are enumerated in the *Nyāya-Sāra*⁶ as follows: ‘The body, the six sense organs including the mind, their respective objects like odour, taste, etc., the six cognitions resulting from the contact of the senses and their objects, pleasure and pain’. The body has been identified with pain being its seat, while the senses, objects and their cognitions are counted pain being instrumental thereto⁷: *tat-sādhanaabhāvāt*. Pleasure itself is deemed a type of pain because it is invariably accompanied by it. As *Saddarśanasamuccaya*⁸ remarks, pleasure resembles, in the pains and sufferings accompanying its nature and acquisition, ‘honey mixed with poison’. Even objects righteously acquired yield but a few luminous drops of pleasure, while those acquired by foul means entail unthinkable sufferings. Vācaspati Miśra also, under *Nyāya Sūtra* I, 1, 22 writes that the word *duḥkham* denotes all objects – *duḥkhaśabdēna sarve sarīrādayaūcyante*.

1. NS. I, 1, 2.

2. Ibid I, 1, 9.

3. SDS. P. 245.

4. NB. I, 1, 9.

5. *Īṣṭāṇiṣṭakāraṇaviśeṣāt virodhāccamithaḥ sukhaduḥkha-yo-rarthāntarabhāvaḥ*, PP. 346–347.

6. P. 81.

7. Cf. BG. V, 22.

8. PP. 251 ff.

This total condemnation of all life suggests a world-view hardly different from the Buddhist, according to which all is pain—*sarvam duḥkham*.¹ This total ban on life as pain is evident from the *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* condemnation of pleasure itself as a form of pain.

The Cause of Pain

The cause of pain and suffering in this system is not essentially different from what it is in others.² The specific cause of sorrow in all its aspects is ignorance, yearning, merit and demerit. That merit causes sorrow follows from the above contention that pleasure is also a form of pain.

From *mithyājñāna* or ignorance springs the three-fold defect or *doṣa*,³ consisting of *rāga* or desire, *dveṣa* or aversion and *moha* or delusion. Desire is the mental clinging to what promotes one's immediate interests; aversion is antipathy to what obstructs them; while delusion is the psychological state in which attachment and aversion are possible at all.⁴ These defects lead on to activities which are immoral and unrighteous. The forbidden acts also are three-fold according as they are committed by mind, speech or body. They constitute sin.⁵ In its activist form *adharma* also, as remarked above, may express itself in these three forms. By the combined forces of *dharma* and *adharma*, embodiment and birth, *janma*, becomes inevitable and with birth and life, once again the round of sorrows begins. The repeated subjection to this unwearying cycle, beginning with ignorance and ending with sorrow, is the essence of the individual's bondage.⁶ All activities, good or bad, bind us to the wheel of *samsāra* and lead to some kind of birth, high or low. To the *Naiyāyika* life is a disease of the

1. SDS. P. 40.

2. Nyāya Sāra, *tasyanivartakamasādhāraṇakāraṇamavidyātṛṣṇe dharmādharmauca*.

3. NS. IV, 1, 3-9.

4. VS. VI, 2, 10, 11, 13; I, 1, 18 – *pravartanālakṣaṇādoṣāh*.

5. SDS. PP. 245, 246.

6. NS. I, 1, 2, *duḥkha janma pravṛtthidoṣa mithyājñānānām*, etc.

spirit, an activity excited by passion.¹ In the state of bondage or *samsāra*, it is forgotten that, in itself, the *ātman* has no sort of partialities at all. To win back this primeval and proper state of the self, the state of freedom from all affections which is the absolute value, we must break the chain of causes and effects which constitute *samsāra* or bondage. First ignorance must go, then its products, the defects, will disappear. With their disappearance, activities will cease, and thus birth will be arrested. With the arresting of birth will be abolished all pain. This is the consummation aimed at in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system, the *mokṣa* as it conceives it.

Adhikārin

The prime condition for this sole, worth-while, endeavour is a vivid realization that worldly life is a bondage, being intensely sorrowful – a realization which comes to very few, indeed. They are the people of discrimination who alone may be deemed the fit candidates for *mokṣa*.² Jayanta asks: Should not a wise man shrink from the very idea of birth? But, obviously, wise men are rare, though Udayana in his *Āmatattva-Viveka*³ maintains that they are not too few. Consequently, those who cultivate that special branch of *dharma* which promotes right knowledge or spiritual insight are always in a minority. Still, *niḥśreyasam* or the supreme Good, being the highest value of life, is upheld as the goal of our noblest endeavour. Owing to the maturing of past meritorious acts, the best candidate learns from his teacher's lips the sorrowful nature of earthly existence and becomes convinced of it. Thereupon, he feels he must withdraw from such a life. This he can do only if he acquires right knowledge.⁴

1. Novalis, Qd. in IP. II. P. 162.

2. Cf. YS. pariṇāmatāpasasṃskāraduḥkhaigunaṇavṛttivirodhācca-duḥkhameva sarvaṃ vivekinah.

3. P. 440.

4. Not all Vaiśeṣikas agree that all selves will be liberated. The authors of *Kandali* and *Līlāvatī*, e.g., deny it; according to them some selves are eternally condemned to a life in *samsāra*. vide (*Citsukhi*), P. 357, N. Sāgara Edition, 1915.

Means to *Mokṣa*

Not only the *Nyāyasūtra* I, 1, 1,¹ but the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* I, 1, 4² also, makes the achievement of the supreme Good dependent on right knowledge—but here, of all the *Vaiśeṣika* categories, by means of their resemblances and differences. But in *Nyāya*, *mokṣa* or *apavarga* is not so much the result of the knowledge of the sixteen *padārthās* enumerated in I, 1, 1 as of the specific knowledge of the *pramāṇa* and *prameya*—the means of right cognition and the knowables. Perhaps even this was felt to be too arduous an undertaking for even the most ardent aspirant. Hence the means to *mokṣa* was later made more modest by the demand that the knowledge of the *ātman* be cultivated for overcoming all sufferings.³ But this is only an apparent simplification; for the knowledge of the self is dependent on that of the remaining knowables; without this latter knowledge a discriminative knowledge of the *ātman* is not feasible.

According to the *Vivṛti* on *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* I, 1, 4, the special merit *dharmaviśeṣa* referred to is what leads to *tattvajñāna*, namely *manana* and *nidhidhyāsa*, i. e., reflection and meditation, on the *ātman*. The *Upaskāra* takes *tattvajñāna* to mean either the realization of the *ātman* or the knowledge of the *Vaiśeṣika* system; and the *dharmaviśeṣa* is *nivṛtti* or abstention from egoistic activities. In the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* VI, 2, 16⁴ by the actions of the *ātman*, Sankara Miśra⁵ understands *śravaṇa*, *manana*, *yogābhyāsa*, *nidhidhyāsa*, *prānāyāma*, etc. The *Vaiśeṣika* system prescribes a yoga of its own, more rudimentary than the Pātanjala, as a means to conquer pain. It is defined by *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, V, 2, 16.⁶ The activity of the

1. *pramāṇaprameyasamśayaprayojanaḍṣṭāntasiddhāntā-vayavataṛkanirṇayavāḍajalpavitandāhetvābhāśacchalaajātinigraha-sthānānām tattvajñānātniśreyasādhigamah.*

2. *dharmaviśeṣaprasūtātḍravyagunakarmasāmānyaviśeṣa-samavāyānām padārthānām sādharṇyavāidharṇyābhyām tāitvajñānātniśśreyasam.*

3. *Nyāya Sāra* P. 83, *tasyopāyastattvajñānamātmavisayam.*

4. *ātmakarmasu mokṣo vyākhyātaḥ.*

5. *VS.* with *Upaskāra*, etc. P. 241,

mind stops¹ when the mind becomes fixed on the *ātman*; then there is no more pain in the body or limited self. In other words yoga, here, is the contact with *ātman* of the mind detached from other objects.

In support of the primary importance of realizing the *ātman*, the *Naiyāyikas* appeal to *śruti*². That their basic approach to the question of self-realization has much in common with that of other orthodox schools also follows from the steps suggested in a verse quoted in the *Nyāyasāra*.³

Two kinds of Ātman

Later writers like Bhāsarvajña and Annam Bhaṭṭa hold that the varieties of the *ātman*, the individual self or *aparātmā* and the supreme self or God, *paramātmā* must be known so that *mokṣa* may be achieved. The reality of God is sought to be proven by inference in the *Nyāya* system in its post-sūtra developments. Thus is derived the idea of God, the organiser of the world, whose cognition, desire and volition are eternal verities. His activity is eternal, as the blind forces of nature require perpetual guidance. The relation of the individual or *apara ātman* to God, the *paramātmā*, is neither one of complete identity nor of an identity in difference. There is absolute difference between the two types of *ātmans*. In the *Kusumāñjali*, Udayana speaks of the worship of God as instrumental in achieving *mokṣa*; even the entire intellectual discipline of the *Nyāya* philosophy, according to him, is only a form of the worship of God.⁵ But this apparent theistic deviationism is sought to be corrected by Vardhamāna by making the knowledge of God contributory⁶ to the realization of the self or *aparātmā*.

1. Cf. YS.I, 1. — Yogaścittavṛttinirodhaḥ.

2. BU. II, 4, 5 — ātmā vā are draṣṭavyah &c.

3. srotavyah śrutivākyaebhyo mantavyaścopapattibhiḥ |
jñātvā ca satatam dhyeya ete darśanahetavaḥ ||

4. CHI. Vol. III, P. 112.

5. Kusumāñjali I, 13

nyāyacarceyamīśasya mananavyapadeśabhāk |
upāsanaiva kriyate śravaṇānantarāgatā ||

6. CHI. Vol. III, P. 123.

The knowledge of the individual self prompts to meritorious activities which lead to higher levels of life or *abhyudaya* and the destruction of demerit. Both these results are conducive to *niḥśreyasam*. Praśastapāda¹ explains that the desire for release leads one to acquire knowledge of the categories from a suitable master. The knowledge thus obtained terminates ignorance and leads to the extinction of desire, aversion and delusion - the *dosas* of the *Nyāya* system. Then, no more merits and demerits accumulate. The aspirant remains unattached to the body. The last function of his merit or *dharma* is to generate the joy of contemplation of the self. Now he has done with the body and every result of his past deeds. Rebirth is now no longer possible for him. Knowledge of the truth aided by *dharma* (to which Kaṇāda ascribes knowledge) brings supreme felicity.

Udayana in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*² considers the carrying out of the scriptural injunction, *ātmānam upāsita*, in the manner indicated by the further imperatives, *śrotavyo mantavya*, etc.

To comprehend the teachings of the *śruti*, they must be discussed among fellow-students and teachers who are earnest in the pursuit of spiritual well-being and are free from malice³. The object of taking this step is to overcome doubts and false notions in respect of the self-*asambhāvanā* and *viparītābhāvanā*.

One who seeks to enter the city of *mokṣa* has to avoid several seductive gateways which are bound to lead the seeker astray. Such, e.g., is the fascination felt for the non-essential and false objects held up by the *Karmamīmāṃsā* and the *Cārvāka* schools. Next must be faced and overcome the view that the world is just a welter of ideas only, as the *yogācīras*, for instance, maintain. Certain expressions of the *śruti* e.g., '*atmaivedam sarvam*' may be misunderstood in this sense. But

1. Praśastapāda Bhāṣyam PP. 281-282 and Nyāyakandalī, PP. 282-283.

2. P. 447.

3. NS. IV, 2, 48, *taṁ guruśiṣyasabrahmacāribhiḥ śreya'rthibhiranusāyubhirabhyupeyāt*.

this false view must be discarded in the light of other scriptural pronouncements such as 'aśabdam asparśam arūpam' etc., which means that the real is not a welter of ideas. The scriptural teaching, 'asadevedamagra āsīt' points to the fact that the self is, in reality, not involved in the world, that it is an independent principle. *Advaitins* and *Nihilists* uphold the apparent sense of the scriptural words, but of course are grossly in error.

The next step in the process of realization is to perceive that the *ātman* is beyond matter—a line followed by the *Sāmkhyas*. But the words 'nānyad sad' of the Upaniṣad discredit the *Sāmkhya* view. There is no *Prakṛti* other than and opposed to the *ātman*.

At this stage, according to the *Advaitin*, shines forth the self, the sole reality. But Udayana is emphatic that this also is a partial view to be discarded in the light of the words *nādvaitam nīpi ca dvaitam*—neither non-dual nor dual. It is by embracing this final non-egoistic and perfectly objective view that all traces of past experiences are wiped out from the mind. At this stage which is completely beyond the reach of words,¹ no more alternatives, indeed, no more thoughts, are conceivable. The ineffable real alone remains.²

Udayana goes on to remark that this final stage is the proper gateway to the city of *mokṣa*—*mokṣanagaragopurāya-māṇatvāt*. The steady mental mode, *nirvikalpakavṛtti*, subsides of its own accord, like fire without fuel, adds *Nārāyaṇī*³. Such is the position of *Nyāya*, affirms Udayana after quoting the celebrated words—*athayoniṣkīma akāma.....brahmāpyeti*.^{4, 5}

1. Cf. *Yato vāco nivarttante aprāpya mansā saha*, &c.

2. *Ātmatattvaviveka*, P. 450 ;

3. *Ibid* P. 451.

4. *BU*, IV, 4, 6.

5. But obviously this can at best have been only Udayana's personal view. To the extent he held it, he was not an orthodox *Naiyāyika*, but a crypto-*Advaitin*. *Brahmānanda Sarasvati* in his *Laghucandrika* on the *Advaitasiddhi* (P. 228—N. Sāgara Edn., 1917) expatiates at some length on Udayana's fundamental identity of view with the *Advaita* position. But, has the orthodox *Naiyāyika* anything to do with the notion that the seeker's self

This important question of self-knowledge or *ātmajñāna*, is developed in a theistic spirit by Bhāsarvajña. Knowledge of the individual self or *aparātma* only subserves, but does not yield, *mokṣa* or supreme felicity. On the other hand, the theoretical knowledge of God or *Parātmā* helps meditation on Him, and directly results in *mokṣa*¹. The practical steps of meditation Bhāsarvajña prescribes are the same as those laid down in *Pātāñjala Yoga*, and will be considered in the section on the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga*. The practice of meditation must be carried out in a spirit of the utmost detachment, actuated by the knowledge that every station in the world from that of *Brahmā* downwards has manifold sufferings associated with it. Positively, the practice of yoga must be inspired by ardent devotion to *Śiva* in contrast to *Paśupati* of the *Kāṇāḍas*². The process of meditation culminates in the direct perception of *Śiva* due to which supreme Good accrues to the aspirant. Quoting the *Śvetāsvatara*³ Bhāsarvajña concludes that *mokṣa* results from the vision of *Śiva*.

Discussing⁴ the means to *mokṣa* in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system, Śaśadhara, the author of the *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa*, elucidates Udayana's view that acts and right knowledge may not be deemed as co-ordinate causes of *mokṣa*. Acts favour the dawn of knowledge and thus indirectly only help the attainment of the final goal of life. In this view also, Udayana gives evidence of his Advaitic bias.

Mokṣa

What is the nature of *mokṣa* or *apavarga* according to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school?

Logically, *mokṣa* for this school should consist of a complete cessation of the specific qualities of the *Ātman*⁵. It or *ātman* is *Brahman* or that his supreme felicity is the realization of identify with *Brahman*? This is of course the Advaitic view.

1. NS. IV, 2, 46; *Nyāyasāra*, PP. 90 ff.
2. SDS P. 51. But this difference is immaterial, vide SDS. P. 210.
3. VI, 20; III, 8.
4. N.S.D. Pandit Series, 1924, PP. 201 ff.
5. N.B.I, 1, 22: S.D.S. P. 72.; Cf. *Samastātma viśeṣa gunochedopalakṣitā svarūpasthitireva mokṣah*—*Nyāyakandalī*.

also implies the separation of the *ātman* from the entire psycho-physical organism^{1, 2}. For merit, and demerit, the cause of all embodiment, have been totallay exhausted. The complete cessation of pains and sorrows is said to be the characteristic of the liberated *ātman*. *Nyāya-bhāṣya* on I, 1,22 declares *apavarga* to be absolute freedom from the twentyone varieties of pain-*tadatyantavimokṣo'pavargah*. It is an endless state, *aparyanta*, fearless, unaging, and above death—*tad abhayaṃ ajaram amṛtyupadam brahmaṣkemaprāptiḥ*. It is the great attainment of rest and security. Dr. Jha in a foot-note³ points out that *apavarga* in the *Nyāya*-system is not an extinction as of a light. That it is a positive state is the truth denoted by the words '*brahma*' and '*kṣemaprāptiḥ*'.

But Vātsyāyana maintains in this section that there is no bliss in *mokṣa*, such as the *Advaitins* advocate; for there is no proof in support of such a contention. None of the means of cognition may be appealed to to prove it.

If both bliss and its apprehension are eternal, the *ātman* in bondage will be no worse than in liberation. In bondage also, bliss and its apprehension, being eternal, must coexist with transitory pleasures and pains due to merit and demerit.

Perhaps it will be urged that the apprehension of the eternal bliss of the self is transient; but then a reason for this transience must be assigned. Is the contact of *ātman* and mind, together with some other factor like *dharma*, the reason for the transience? If the *dharma* in question is a product of Yoga, like all products, it will be exhausted, and so, what it causes, viz., the apprehension of bliss, in its turn, will also cease. When bliss ceases to be experienced, it is as good as non-existent. Therefore, naming it eternal will not mend matters. Only on the basis of uninterrupted experience of bliss may it be deemed eternal. But then there will be nothing to distinguish liberation from *saṃsāra*. Also, thus, remains the contingency of this eternal bliss being experienced

1. NS. IV, 2, 45-*tadabhāvaścāpavarge*.

2. VS. V, 2, 18-*tadabhāve samyogābhāvo'prādurbhāvaśca mokṣah*.

3. NSB. Poona Edn. 1939 I, 1, 22.

side by side with normal pleasures and pains due to merit and demerit. Again, the non-apprehension of bliss may not be explained away as due to the obstruction caused by the body, senses etc., for the body etc., are meant precisely for aiding this very apprehension of bliss, indeed for all experience, in general. No inferences to the contrary can be permitted. A disembodied *ātman* cannot be supposed to have any experience at all.

The Vedāntin may argue that all human endeavour aims at achieving what is desirable – *iṣṭādhigamārthā pravṛttiḥ* and so, the endeavour to liberate oneself also must be directed towards winning bliss-experience. The *naiyāyika's* answer is that this contention is untenable. In this instance, the purpose of endeavour is only to wipe out pains and sorrows. Human experience proves that all that is desired is more or less mixed up with repellent elements. So even this alleged bliss cannot be unalloyed. It may be argued, with the same plausibility as the Vedāntin does, that the seeker after *mokṣa* aims at securing a permanent body in lieu of his perishable one. The quest of unalterable bliss is as inconceivable as that of a permanent body.

Therefore, Vātsyāyana concludes, what scriptures call bliss is only the absolute cessation of pain. Empirically, even cessation of pain may be described as pleasure or bliss. Even the clinging to permanent bliss must obstruct the attainment of *mokṣa*; for, all *rāga* is bondage. How, then, can bondage, in the form of *rāga*, generate *mokṣa*? Only one who is free from all clings, the *vītarāga*, is entitled to liberation.

Mokṣa is marked by perfect tranquillity and freedom from defilement. Udyotakara urges that if the released self is to have everlasting pleasure, it must be equipped with a permanent body; for, experience without a body is unthinkable. ¹

Prāśastapāda holds ² that at the moment of liberation, the yogin vividly perceives all the categories of the *Vaiśeṣika* Philosophy as well as the atoms. The highest kind of pleasure,

1. N. Vārttika I, 1, 22, Cf. NS. IV, 2, 45, *tadabhāvaścāpavarge*.

2. Prāśastapāda Bhāṣya, P. 187, 7.

according to him is the pleasure of the wise, which is independent of all such agencies as the memory of the object, desire, reflection and is due to their knowledge,² peacefulness, contentment and the peculiar character of their virtue or *dharma* ¹.

Jayanta in the *Nyāyamañjari* ² points out that to condemn the *nyāya* ideal of *mokṣa* as a sort of petrification is pointless. The question concerns a matter of fact and not of feeling or prejudice. He echoes Vātsyāyana when he says that the clinging to bliss, even, must hold up liberation. He also denies the possibility of positive pleasure in *mokṣa*. Absence of pain is what is taken for pleasure ³. *Ātman* is devoid of all attributes including bliss and *mokṣa* is only the real status of the *ātman* ⁴.

The *Nyāyasāra* ⁵ says that *mokṣa*, according to some, *i.e.*, the *Vaiśeṣikas*, is the final state of the *ātman* devoid of all its specific qualities, in which it resembles infinite space during the period of cosmic dissolution. Intelligent endeavour may very well be directed to getting rid of pain as when a thorn is removed from the flesh. But Bhāsarvajña ⁶ himself holds that the *Vaiśeṣika* view of it makes *mokṣa* no better than a state of perpetual swoon. So no intelligent man can strive for it. The effort to get rid of pain is meant to facilitate the enjoyment of pleasure. Bhāsarvajña falls back on scriptural statements to prove that *mokṣa* is a state of blissfulness ⁷. The objection of Vātsyāyana that in case bliss is of the nature of self it must be experienced even in *samsāra* is rebutted with the argument that demerits and pains eclipse it in *samsāra*, whereas in *mokṣa* these bliss-eclipsing factors are wholly absent. Nor is this contact with bliss in *mokṣa* artificial and liable to interruption or destruction; for, the apprehension of bliss in *mokṣa* is like annihilative non-existence or *pradhvamsa* everlasting. The relation with bliss, namely, that of subject, *samvedana* and object, bliss,

1. Ibid. P. 259.

2. PP. 78 ff ;

3. Cf. Bharatṛhari-Pratīkāro vyādheḥ sukhamiti viparyasyati janah.

4. Nyāyamañjari, Part II P. 2.,—ātmaivāpavarga ucyate.

5. PP. 95. ff.

6. Nyāyasāra, P. 96.

7. Vijñānam ānandam brahma — BU. III, 9, 28, — ānandam brahmano rūpam tacca mokṣebhivyajyate.

viṣayaviṣayibhāva is not, technically, one of the *vaiśeṣika* categories, and so, product as it is, it is indestructible. Thus, the liberated self's experience of bliss is eternal like the cognitions of God. No cause can be imagined to impede it in any way. So, according to Bhāsarvajña, *mokṣa* consists in the absolute cessation of sorrow on the one hand and the perpetual apprehension of bliss, on the other ¹.

That Bhāsarvajña's view is only an exception to the general consensus of *Nyāya* writers as regards *mokṣa* follows from the fact that in *Navyanyāya* also the goal of moral life remains the absolute negation of all sorrows. Gadādhara in his *muktivāda* explicitly sets aside the view that eternal bliss characterises *mokṣa* ².

A criticism of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* view of *Mokṣa*

The difference between the early *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* view and that of some later writers in regard to the nature of *mokṣa* is palpable. The earlier view robs it of all significance. In effect, it is indistinguishable from the crass materialist travesty of *mokṣa* expressed in the form that it is death or disintegration of the bodily organism. This repellent character of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* view of *mukti* was perceived in very early times and the antipathy aroused finds expression in the oft-quoted words ³ : *Varam vṛṇḍādvane ramye śṛgālatvam sa icchatu | Gautamābhikhitām muktīm Gautamo gantumārhati ||* "Better the life of a jackal in the fair jungles of Vṛṇḍā than the Liberation as set forth by Gautama. Send him to such Liberation !"

The individual being is neither the *ātman* nor the body, singly, but their union. Upon the separation of the two, which occurs in *mokṣa*, 'nothing whatever can happen to excite sensa-

1. *Nyāyasāra*, P. 98—*Nityasamvedyamānasukhena viśiṣṭāntiki duḥkanivṛttirmokṣaḥ*.
2. *CHI*. Vol. III, P. 147.
3. *NSD*. Prabhā, P. 232; Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Sanatsujātīya* quotes the verse with the second half thus : *natu nirviṣayam mokṣam kadācidapi Gautama; Memorial Edn. Vol. 13, P. 177.*

tion, not (even) if earth shall be mingled with sea, or sea with heaven'.¹ The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika mokṣa* is a lifeless *nirvāṇa* ².

In *mokṣa* what the *Naiyāyika* achieves is the peace of the grave, or, as was said above, a swoon without an end. It is a sleep without a dream, much less an awakening, and the *mukta* has no more felicity than a stone ³. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system seems to have idealised a state of painless stoic existence, but it turns out to be a mere travesty of what an idealist hopes to achieve. It is a state to which no intelligent being can attach the slightest value. Śrī Harṣa, therefore, rightly asks ⁴ how a disembodied self or *ātman*, which is no better than a piece of stone, can be the goal of human aspiration. It has nothing in common with the saintly state in which one feels one has inherited the life eternal. The later *Nyāya* view as illustrated in the *Nyāya Sāra*, which seems to identify *mokṣa* with a state of eternal beatitude, logically involves a complete revision of the concept of *ātman*. For, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is right in insisting that *apavarga* is only *ātman* as it is—*ātmaivāpavarga ucya*te ⁵.

Can the *ātman* be unconscious in itself and still be made to account for the phenomenon of memory? If consciousness be only a temporary product due to contact with mind, etc., there remains no self-conscious and self-identical entity which is the subject of all experiences and which, therefore, may conceivably recollect them later. "Even for him who maintains that consciousness fails in sleep, etc., it is not possible to speak of a failure, unwitnessed by consciousness" ⁶. Hence *ātman* must be conceived as a conscious continuum, which, under no circumstances, may be dissipated or extinguished.

Of course, it cannot be identified with empirical states of consciousness, which, like the flickerings of a feeble light, may come and go. To make the unconscious *ātman* the agent of recollection is no better than making the brain do that function. What in effect is a material substance cannot answer the need

1. Lucretius, Qd, in IP. II, P. 152.

2. Das Gupta, HIP; Vol. 1, PP. 362 ff.

3. SDS. Com., P. 247; SSS. Ch. 7, 6, 10. 4. Naiṣadha, XVII, 75

5. Nyāya-Maṅjari, Pt. II, P. 2.

6. BSS. II, 3, 18.

for a transcendental spiritual self. The mere assertion that the *ātman* is a non-material substance will not do if it has none of the characteristics of the spirit which alone is truly non-material. Indeed it would seem that the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* theory nowhere clearly envisages a real spirit. A spirit without consciousness is a word without sense. In this respect, obviously, the *Sāṃkhyan* view of the *puruṣa* marks a definite advance.

Śaṅkara in the *Brahmasūtra-Bhāṣya*¹ asks how in the state of *pralaya* the *ātman* can retain traces of former experience; for, then, it is not in contact with atoms including the mind. Does, then, the mind retain these traces, and does it remain with the *ātman* to which it was tied up during *samsāra*? Among the other objections urged by Śaṅkara may be noticed a few. All *ātman*s are all-pervading and so all of them must be assumed to be in contact with every single mind. So each individual must share the experiences of all others. Equally inevitably should these all-pervading *ātman*s be present in any one body².

To make consciousness, which is an undeniable fact of psychical life, a contingent result of inter-action between an inert substance called self and other equally inert substances called mind, sense-organs, etc., is merely to repeat the materialistic contention, viz., consciousness is a by-product of the constituent elements of the body. If the soul substance or *ātman* is non-material as the *Naiyīyikas* insist, it cannot interact with material substances. The two are incommensurable and the gap between them will remain unbridgeable.

The only way to escape from materialism, which makes consciousness a chance-effect of a blind dance of atoms, is to grant it complete autonomy and recognise its absolutely independent status. Which is the same as saying that the *ātman* must be seen to be spirit.

The place assigned to God in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system is neither creditable to Him nor to man. Their relation is said to be one of absolute and unqualified otherness. How then can

1. II, 2, 17.

2. Ibid : II, 3, 50—53.

meditation on, or knowledge of such an Other have any intelligible bearing on the destiny of the individual self? Notwithstanding the pious affirmations of writers like Udayana, *mokṣa* of the individual self cannot depend on the knowledge of an entity which is neither its cause nor its self. Moreover, the *Naiyāyikas* use¹ the concept of God as an expedient to solve their logical difficulties in the way they handle the *adṛṣṭa* also. Such a God can neither evoke piety nor promote the *summum bonum*.

What is therefore required to offer a more convincing answer to the questions regarding the life and destiny of the individual is a deeper insight into his essential nature, and his relations to the world in which he lives. A further step in this direction may be detected in the *Sāṃkhya-yoga* system of philosophy to which we shall now turn our attention.

CHAPTER IV

THE SĀMKHYA-YOGA CONCEPT OF MUKTI.

Antecedents of the Samkhya-Yoga System.

Both the *Sāmkhya* and the *Yoga* systems of Philosophy represent ¹ primarily ways of achieving the highest good or the absolute freedom of the spirit of man. The germs of the ideas which later came to be systematised and codified as *Sāmkhya* and *Yoga* were long before current in the Vedic Schools of thought. For example, in the celebrated Vedic hymn of creation ² may be seen clearly expressed the idea of an absolute conscious entity breathing breathless with its own power; it is depicted as beyond time, space, death and immortality. Nothing was beyond this unconditioned ground-work of all being. But within that absolute consciousness arose the self-affirmation "I am" ³, which entails the positing of then on-ego, the not-I. The 'I' without the opposition of a not-I of which it is conscious is an incomprehensible abstraction. And, in point of fact, this hymn does assert the *ābhu* ⁴, by which Sāyaṇa understands the primeval *māyā* or material source of things, covering, i.e., conditioning the self-affirming "I". The emanation of the 'I' and the not-I, the *Puruṣa* and the *Prakṛti* from the primordial absolute consciousness is said to have taken place through *tapas*.

This hymn depicts the birth of a real world from the primitive matter represented by water ⁵. The realistic note sounded so early in the history of Indian speculation echoes in several other *Ṛgvedic* hymns ⁶. Similarly, 'crude' ⁷ conceptions of the value of ecstasy and hypnotic trances are to be met with in the *Ṛgveda*, which also mentions the word '*muni*' ⁸. The realistic and mystic tendencies of the Indian mind continued

1. SPB. Introdn. to I, 1; ŚDS. P. 96 *yadi viditamte Kapilamatam tatprāpsyasi mokṣasaukhyamacirena*.

2. X, 129; 3. Cf. Exodus III, 14; 4. Cf. Manu. I, 5.,

5. IP. I. P. 104; 6. X, 90; 82, 5-6; 12, 1

7. IP. II, PP. 338, 339.

8. X, 136, 4-5. X, 127; X, 86, 2, etc.

side by side with a more pronounced monistic vein into the Upaniṣadic period. In the *Śvetāśvatara* the word *Sāmkhya* occurs for the first time ¹, but the *Sāmkhyan* ideas may be traced in the earlier *Upaniṣads* like the *Kaṭha* ² and the *Chāndogya* ³. Detailed references to Yoga practices are met with in the *Kaṭha*, the *Śvetāśvatara*, and the *Maitrāyaṇi Upaniṣads* ⁴. The notion that supernatural powers may be won through the practice of austerities may be traced back to the *Atharva Veda* ⁵.

That the influence of *Sāmkhya* and *Yoga* ideas was far more widespread than the paucity of these references suggests is borne out by the immense sway they exercise in later *Purāṇa*, *Itihāsa* and *Vaiṣṇava* Literature. The *Bhagavad Gītā*, which is the most popular of Hindu Religious Texts, gives ample evidence of the final ascendancy of the *Sāmkhya* and *Yoga* ideas, which, however, have undergone considerable alterations to suit the synthesis of thought attempted in that scripture.

As already mentioned, the *Sāmkhya-Yoga* systems of thought and practice aim at the liberation of the spirit of man. While the *Sāmkhya* provides the framework of the metaphysical thought bearing on this grand theme, the *Yoga*, with a few significant alterations, ⁶ sets forth the practical steps to implement the theoretical scheme elaborated by the former. Since the understanding of the practice can follow only from a sure grasp of the theory presupposed by it, we shall notice below the salient points of the *Sāmkhya* metaphysics.

The Basic Principles of the Sāmkhya.

The two irreducible and basic principles of the *Sāmkhya* theory are *Prakṛti*, the metaphysical ground of the entire material component of the world, and *Puruṣa*, the intelligence or Spirit, embodied in all living forms. *Prakṛti* is a composite principle, being in fact the state of equilibrium of the three *guṇas*,

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| 1. VI, 13. | 2. III, 10-11; | 3. Ch. Up. VI, 4, 3. |
| 4. Ka. Up. I, 3, 6, 13; II, 3, 10; II, 12. | | S'vet. Up. II, 8-15 |
| Mait Up. VI, 10, 20, 21, etc. | | |
| 5. IP. I, P. 131; | 6. Das Gupta, Yoga Philosophy. P. 2.; | |

Sattva, *Rajas* and *Tamas* ¹. These three, though styled *guṇas* or qualities, are substances and not attributes such as are denoted by the word *guṇa* in the *Vaiśeṣika* system. For, these unlike the *Vaiśeṣika guṇas*, come into contact with and separate from, each other as only substances do ². The way the *Sāmkhya* philosopher has arrived at this all-important concept in his system seems to have been a process of inductive argument ³.

How the concept of Guṇas was arrived at.

Analytic reflection on any experience yields two irreducible ultimates, namely, being and movement. Whereas Advaita asserts being or *Sat* alone to be real, and Buddhism that movement alone to be so, adequate explication of experience even in these systems of thought could not dispense with correlative concepts like *māyā*, a principle of movement and '*sūnya* or *Nirvāṇa*, a principle of changeless being. But in the *Sāmkhya* system both concepts are frankly accepted as equally real. *Sattva* here does not denote an empty abstraction which represents the common trait of all experiences, but the ultimate mode of intelligibility. It is that aspect of things by which they become related to consciousness as existent facts. But for this inherent intelligibility, this transparency to consciousness which all ponderables have, nothing like thought or awareness would have been possible. It is the universal transparency of objects to thought, their inherent luminousness, that the term *Sattva* denotes in the *Sāmkhya*. On the plane of mind or thought *Sattva* manifests itself as *prakāśa* or light; on the plane of grosser matter it is represented by the lightness of things ⁴, *laghu*. This universal intelligibility of things, their *Sattva*, further suggests that this trait of theirs is close kin to intelligence itself. That intelligence comprehends things is evidence of their sharing with intelligence itself some kinship of nature or substance. It is this latter that is called *Sattva* in the *Sāmkhya*.

1. SPS. I, 61;

2. SPB. I, 61.

3. P. XII, Introdn: to Aniruddha's commentary, Calcutta, 1892, Garbe.

4. *Sāmkhya Kārikā*, 13.

But, of course, *Sattva* does not exhaust the nature of things. Pure intelligibility does not wholly constitute them. There remains what is comprehended, the mass which possesses *Sattva* or intelligible being. Unlike the Advaitins who would ultimately dismiss this mass, or object of comprehension, as unreal, the *Sāmkhya* affirms its reality and makes it constitutive of that whole which confronts intelligence. Clearly there is a difference between the facts of the mental plane or ideas and those of the material plane or objects.

The Characteristics of the Guṇas.

In the latter case, the mass is predominant ; in the former, intelligibility is so ; *Tamas* is predominant in material objects ; *Sattva* in mental objects. But just as material objects have their own share of *Sattva* or luminous intelligibility, mental objects i.e., ideas, have their *tamas*, viz., their impenetrability to other ideas. For, like matter, thought also, obviously, maintains itself in the face of opposition. For example, the idea of water would not yield to or be penetrated by that of fire. This universal tendency of things to maintain themselves in their position, their inertia, is what the *Sāmkhya* designates by the term, *Tamas*, which is *guru, varṇakam* ¹.

Over and above these universal characteristic of things, material and mental, is a third one: they have an energy of their own by which they are supported in all their phases. Indeed, no phenomena, mental or physical, are conceivable without their having an energy of their own. This force which all share is termed *Rajas* in the *Sāmkhya* and described as '*calam*' *upaśṭhambhakam* ². In fact, the energy with which *Sattva* makes things intelligible, light and luminous, or *tamas* makes them heavy, opaque or immobile is furnished by *Rajas*.

Thus, for the *Sāmkhya* Philosophy, the whole world on all its planes and in all its phases is constituted by the *guṇas* or substantial components, *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*. Besides the characteristics mentioned above, the various kinds and degrees of feelings evoked by things also are credited by the *Sāmkhya*

1. Ibid. 13.

2. Ibid. 13.

to the three components of reality. Observations of one's own feelings in their incipient moments and those of undeveloped organisms lower down the scale of evolution suggest "that a feeling can exist without forming part of consciousness" ¹. That feelings in mutual relations may exist independently of consciousness lends colour to the *Sāmkhya* notion that the basic components of things or *guṇas* are, also, essentially feelings. For, there is no experience unaccompanied by some emotive colouring or other; hence, the things experienced must be made of the primitive 'feeling-stuff' ¹. To explain this basic conviction of the *Sāmkhya*, Vācaspati, writing on the *Sāmkhya-Kārikā*, 13, may be quoted with advantage. "All objects made up of the three *guṇas* are pleasure, pain and apathy ², which are opposed to one another and, as regards their self-manifestation, depend on causes which also are, essentially, pleasure, pain and apathy *sukhaduḥkhamohāḥ*. Of course, they differ from one another, for they overwhelm, or are overwhelmed by one another. For example, a beautiful, youthful and high-born woman pleases her husband, because, in relation to him, her nature as pleasure comes into evidence. But that very woman causes grief to her rivals, since, in regard to them, it is her *rājasic* nature that manifests itself. And finally, towards her disappointed lover, her *tāmasic* nature comes into play and confounds him. This women may be taken as typical of all material reality whatsoever".

Bhikṣu writing ³ on *Sāmkhyapravacana-Sūtra* I, 127, quotes *Pañcaśīkhā* to indicate the characteristics of the *guṇas*. *Sattva* is in essence pleasure though including infinite differences and shades of feelings such as cheerfulness, buoyancy, devotion, joy, endurance, contentment; *Rajas* is essentially pain including all its countless shades and degrees, while *Tamas*, is of the essence of apathy with distinctions like sleep and so forth ⁴.

1. Das Gupta, *Yoga Philosophy*, P, 83,

2. *prītyapritivīśādātmaśāh* - S. *Kārikā*, 12.

3. *prītyapritivīśādādyairguṇānamanyonyaṃ vaidharmayam*.

4. Also, writing on *YS. II, 15*, in the *Yogavārstikam* Bhikṣu declares that exactly like the states of the mind, all external objects are pleasurable, painful and apathetic—*sukhaduḥkhamohadharmakāḥ*.

Thus, the *Sāmkhya* concludes that the entire realm of matter is compounded of the three *guṇas*, which are essentially 'feeling-stuff'.¹ They illumine, energize and immobilize through mutual co-operation, suppression and intimate intercourse.

The statement that the constituents of *Prakṛti* are three requires further clarification. It is not as though the countless objects of the world on all its planes are made up of just three ultimate entities. The fact] is that the [number three refers to the types of ultimate reals of the objective world and not to their actual manifoldness.² This view of the infinitude of the *guṇa*-reals, advocated by Bhikṣu is not apparently held by Vācaspati.³ Bhikṣu argues that without such a postulation, the endless variety of the world of effects will remain inexplicable. On the other hand, the classification of the *guṇa*-reals into three is justifiable; for, all the individuals of the *Sattva* group share the common characteristics of lightness, luminosity, pleasure, etc; and, similarly, those of the remaining groups, too.⁴

The way these mutually opposed and yet co-operative *guṇas* function has been likened to that of a lighted lamp in which the wick, the oil and the flame, different though they be in substance, still co-operate to produce light.⁵

The arguments for *Prakṛti*'s being :

So far we have been discussing the nature and number of the constituents of *Prakṛti* the metaphysical cause of the objective world. But why should such a cause be postulated at all—a cause described above as the equipoise of the three *guṇas*⁶? The answer is furnished by the *Sāmkhyan* theory of causality known as the *satkāryavāda*, the [doctrine of the prior existence of effects in their causes. We experience a universe of effects of varying degrees of grossness and subtlety, which evoke pleasure, pain and apathy. This universe cannot

1. S. Kārikā, 12; 2. SPB. I, 127, 128; 3. IP. II, P. 265.

4. Das Gupta: *Yoga Phily.* P. 92. 5. S. Kārikā, 13.

6. *guṇā eva prakṛtiḥ abhāvavacyā, natutadatiriktā prakṛtirasti, Yoga Vārtika, II, 18.*

come out of nothing; for, nothing comes out of nothing. The *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*¹ enumerates the reasons why the doctrine of the pre-existence of effects must be maintained. Vācaspati explains it thus²: if nothing could produce something, all kinds of effects should crop up everywhere, for absence, *abhāva*, is ubiquitous. If the effect did not exist prior to the operation of the causal collocation, it could not be brought about by any means. Who can get the yellow colour out of the blue? The causal operation is meant only to manifest the preexistent effect, as instanced by the squeezing out of oil from the sesamum seed.

Again, the effect is essentially the same as the cause, *kāraṇabhāvāt*; e.g., the cloth is no more than the threads themselves in a new setting. The preexistence of the effect in the cause may be likened to the way the tortoise holds its limbs within its shell, whence they are but manifested as occasions arise. The *Gītā* enunciates the same principle in the well-known words³, *nāsato vidyate bhāvaḥ*. Thus arguing from the three-fold nature of the world of effects, the *Sāṃkhya* arrives at the concept of an eternal, material, composite, cause, viz., *prakṛti*. Vyāsa thus describes it: that which never is nor is not, that which exists and does not exist, that in which there is no non-existence, the unmanifested, devoid of any special mark, the background of all.⁴ This description testifies to its strictly noumenal character⁵; it is essentially *avyakta*, or unmanifest. Still, being an infinite continuum of active reals, it always tends to produce effects - *prasavadharmi*.⁶ *Prakṛti* is

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| 1. No. 9. | 2. Sāṃkhya Tattva Kaumudī on Kārikā, 9. |
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3. BG. II, 16;
 4. YB. II, 19. *nihsattasattam nihsadasad nirasad avyaktam-alingam*.
 5. The other arguments leading to the inference of *Prakṛti* are summed up in the S. Kārikās - 15 and 16. The particulars of the world, being finite cannot be the cause of the world; homogeneity of the world points to a homogeneous cause. There is a force at work in all things in the world, a force manifested at different levels. The unity of the world also points to a single cause.
 6. S. Kārikā, 11. The noumenal character of *Prakṛti* suggested by Vyāsa's description is reinforced by a quotation given

not so much being as force ; it is the pure potentiality of the world of effects.

Puruṣa :

Before describing how the world in which we live rises from the cause thereof, i. e., *prakṛti*, we must refer to the second ultimate factor, in the *Sāmkhyā* analysis of the world, viz., *Puruṣa*, or Spirit or Intelligence. There can be no question regarding the ultimacy of this factor. In the living organism of, say, man, there are but two factors in the final analysis—the intelligence which knows or is subject and all the rest which is known or is the object. The unbridgeable gulf that separates the intelligent subject from the inert object justifies, according to the *Sāmkhyā*, the reduction of the entire world to the two ultimate factors *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. All events of the world, internal or external, fall within the realm of objects or knowables—they are but the phenomena¹ of *guṇāk*. By the same token, that which knows them all, the spirit or *Puruṣa*, remains absolutely unaffected by them, being beyond the reach of all changes. The *Puruṣa*, then, is absolutely different from the psycho-physical complex with which he is found in association. Consciousness itself proclaims that the knowing *Puruṣa* for whom body, mind and thoughts are objects is other than these objects.

The arguments for the reality of the *Puruṣa* postulated above may be briefly noticed.² An aggregate of things such as a bed or a house suggests an intelligent being for whose sake they exist and who can enjoy them. This world which is an assemblage of the five elements is also for another's use. There is a Self for whose enjoyment this body with its intellect, etc., exists.³

in YB. IV, 13. guṇānām paramāmriṇaṁ nadṛṣṭi-
pathamrocatiyattu dṛṣṭipatham praptānta māyeva sutu-
echaakam. śaṣṭitantra.

1. BG. III, 28 ; YS. IV, 24.
2. S. Kārikā, 17 ; SPS. I, 66 ;
3. Gaudapāda on S. Kārikā, 17.

There must be a being other than and opposed to all that is composed of the triple 'gunas'.¹ There must be a controlling power, a pure consciousness, to coordinate all experiences. The products of *Prakṛti* which are all inert must be enjoyed by some one who is intelligent. In nature, atleast in human nature, there is a persistent striving towards liberation, which again, argues for an intelligence with traits opposed to *Prakṛtis*.

That *Puruṣa*, the sentient subject, is not a product of *gunas*, or the elements which are the products of *guṇāḥ*, follows from the fact that these are not severally conscious.² Similarly, *Puruṣa* is different from the senses, mind and intellect - all these being the products of *guṇāḥ*. Were the spirit liable to any changes, knowledge would be inconceivable³ and states of complete black out of all apprehensions would result. The unfailing⁴ light of *Puruṣa*'s consciousness falls impartially on all states of mind, pleasant, painful or indifferent, whether they represent⁵ right knowledge, doubt, error, memory, or sleep. Hence, the *Sāṃkhya Kārikā*, 19, describes the *Puruṣa* as the neutral witness and percipient, a non-acting, free, spirit. *Puruṣa* thus is as indubitable a reality as *Prakṛti*, though he is neither cause nor effect.⁶ From this it follows that, though consciousness as a phenomenon in life is mediated physically, it cannot be subsumed under anything physical. The living organism which is a conglomerate of effects and means subserves the *Puruṣa*. As from all other material characteristics, from feelings like pleasure and pain also, the *Puruṣa* is strictly free. Thus, unlike the Upaniṣadic concept of Brahman or Ātman, the *Sāṃkhya Puruṣa* is not bliss or even blissful; for, the presence of bliss in the *Puruṣa* would break

1. *Sāṃkhyataruvasanta*, (S.T.V.) a comm. on the S. *Kārikā* referred to on P. 48, f. n. 1 of the text edited by S. S. Sastry writes: The denotation of the word 'I' is not the body, since 'I' is devoid of *sattva*, etc.
ahamartho nadehah, triguṇacetanatvādirahitatvāt.

2. SPS. V, 130; III, 20.

3. SPB.VI, 2, - cetanśyapariṇāmitve kadācit āndhyaparina-menā satyā api buddhivṛtteradarśanena samśayādyaṭteḥ :

4. SPS. I, 75; SPS. I, 146.

5. YS. I, 6.

6. S. *Kārikā*, 3; SPS. I, 61.

up its integrity. ¹ *Puruṣa* is infinite as, otherwise, being with parts it will be perishable, or, being atomic, it would not have cognition all over the living body. ² *Sāṃkhya* denies that *Puruṣa* is an agent, ³ or can have any other attributes whatsoever. Otherwise, it could not shake itself free of them in any state and *mokṣa* would be out of question.

Plurality of *Puruṣas* follows from the different endowments and experiences of living beings, according to the *Sāṃkhya*. ⁴ Were there but a single spirit, birth, conditions of pain and pleasure, etc., should be identical for all. To account for the unity of an individual's experiences, an integral subject is postulated while the distinctions of individual experiences point to plurality of selves. Scriptural texts, insisting on the unity of consciousness, is interpreted in the *Sāṃkhya* as denoting nondifference in kind, or the sameness of essential properties. ⁵ The sole positive characteristic of the *Sāṃkhyan* *Puruṣa* is its consciousness; *cit*. In every respect *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* are opposed to each other; — *Puruṣas* being many, conscious, inactive, immutable, devoid of *guṇas*, while *Prakṛti* is one, inert, ever active, changeful and constituted by *guṇas*.

The cause of the evolution of *Prakṛti* :

The world of objects, the stage on which the embodied *Puruṣas* or individuals play out their lives, is a product of the evolution of *Prakṛti*. *Prakṛti*'s evolutionary activity is said to be solely aimed at the service of *Puruṣa*'s interests. This part of the *Sāṃkhya* doctrine is as important as any other. That the inert *Prakṛti* which, in its non-manifest form, is in a state of dynamic tension of its constituent *guṇas* should undergo a series of self-initiated mutations and evolve from subtler to grosser forms to produce the world we live in, is, on the face of it, implausible. Yet this is precisely what the classical *Sāṃkhya* affirms. It is pointed out that *Prakṛti*'s state of equipoise or *sāmyāvasthā* only conceals its inherent tendencies

1. SPS. V, 66.

2. SPS. and SPB. I, 50, YB. on I, 36 quotes Paṇḍarāśikha who held that self is atomic ;

3. S. Kārikā, 19.

4. S. Kārikā, 18 ;

5. SPB. V. 61.

to action. These latter are, however, held in check by the tendencies to obstruction and inactivity; i. e., *sattva* and *rajas* are opposed by *tamas*. But *Prakṛti* is all along being moved by an inherent teleology¹;—a sort of blind instinct moves her, inert as she is, to promote the experiences and emancipation of *Puruṣas* entangled in the web she has woven. In other words, *Prakṛti*'s evolutionary activities are bound up with the bondage of the *Puruṣas*. What makes this proposition plausible is the dogma of the beginninglessness² of *samsāra*, which, with the rest of the Indian Schools of Thought, the *Sāṃkhya* also accepts. With occasional breaks due to *pralaya* (relapse of the world of effects into the cause, *Prakṛti*), *samsāra* goes on in repeated cycles. Thus *Prakṛti*'s evolution refers to the start of one of these cycles, and is not an absolute beginning. So the *Sāṃkhya Kārikā*, 60, says that *Prakṛti* in manifold ways, without thought of any profit to herself, *apārthakam*, acts to promote the interests of the *Puruṣas* who do not requite her in any way. The motive force of *Prakṛti*'s evolution is the drive to promote the ends of *Puruṣas*.³

But the riddle of an inert mass of forces functioning to bring about the ends of an intelligent being who has no commerce with it remains unexplained. Analogies like the flow of the cow's milk to nourish⁴ the calf and co-operation of the lame man mounted on the back of the blind man in proceeding to the former's goal are obviously inadequate. Perhaps, some sort of a pre-established harmony between the interests of spirit and the capacities of matter has to be assumed. But, who brought it about?

Recognising these difficulties, the Yoga system or *śeṣvara Sāṃkhya* assigns to *Īśvara* the role of removing obstacles in the way of the free activity of *Prakṛti*. True, neither the *Yoga Sūtras* nor the *Yoga Bhāṣya* explicitly refers to this world-initiating function of *Īśvara*. But Vācaspati in the *Tattvavaiśārādī* under *Yoga Sūtra*⁵ IV, 3, says that *Īśvara* removes obstacles

1. *Kārikā*, 58; SPS. III, 61.

2. SPS. III, 62; 3. *S. Kārikā*, 31; 4. *S. Kārikā*, 57.

5. *nacapurusaṛtho'pi pravarttakah, kintu taduddeśena Īśvarah. Īśvarayāpi dharmādhiṣṭhanārtham pratibandhāpanaya eva vyāpārah.*

in the path of *Prakṛti*, and that the ends of *Puruṣa* cannot function in that way. Moral factors' also play their part in starting *Prakṛti* on her evolutionary course; but, being *Prakṛti's* own products, they cannot be said to cause her to act.¹

Prakṛti's evolution :

Now we shall briefly sketch the course of that evolution which produces the world both in its psychological and physical aspects. The first evolute of *Prakṛti* is *mahat* or the great,² so called, because, it is the tangible cause of the whole universe. It is the first basis of the consciousness of the individual. To denote this individual reference, it is styled *buddhi* or intellect. Its function in the psychical life of the individual is determinative, *adhyavasāya*; i. e., it is the organ by which we distinguish objects and perceive their distinctive characteristics.

Like its cause, *Prakṛti*, *buddhi* also is constituted by the three *guṇas*. In its *sāttvic* aspect, *buddhi* possesses³ virtue, *dharma*, wisdom, *jñāna*, detachment, *virāgya* and lordliness, *ais'varya*. In its *tāmasic* aspect *buddhi* has the reverse of these attributes. *Vijñāna* Bhikṣu describes it as the repository of all *sāmskāras*,⁴ for, injury to sense organs, or the dissolution of *manas* and *ahaṅkāra* (mind and ego-sense) does not affect memory, its seeds, the *samskāras*, being preserved in the *buddhi*, intact.⁵

1. YB. IV. 3, na ca kāryamkāraṇamprayojayati.

2. S. Kārikā, 22; KU. 1, 3, ii;

3. S. Kārikā, 23.

4. SPS. II, 41, 42.

5. Now, at the beginning of the evolutionary movement *mahat* or *buddhi* arises; but obviously, at this stage, it has no objects to determine or perceive. Therefore, *buddhi* must be taken in a cosmic sense, in the first place, as the basis of distinction between the subject and the object. The phase of the Sāmkhya system in the Mahābhārata, in fact, represents this feature of a cosmic *mahat*. (See Sāmkhya system, Keith, P. 35). The subject at this stage will be a world-spirit, a cosmic subject, for whom the classical Sāmkhya makes no provision.

From the *buddhi* arises *ahamkāra* or the self-sense, which is the principle of individuation. Due to its action, the *Puruṣa* obtains the sense of distinctness and finitude, conceit in the limited embodiment, *abhimāna*.¹ Psychologically the sense of self-hood cannot rise without a non-ego or the object, which, in the *Samkhya*, only follows the appearance of the self-sense. Hence, as in the case of the *buddhi*, the possibility of a cosmic *ahamkāra*, must be conceded out of which individual subjects and objects may arise.² *Ahāmkāra*, too, is naturally material like its cause, *māhāt*. *Puruṣa* identifies himself with the acts of *Prakṛti* through *ahamkāra*. Unlike the cognitive *buddhi*, *ahamkāra* is conative; for real agency belongs to it.³

The relation between *buddhi* and *ahamkāra* is that of consciousness and self-consciousness. *Ahāmkāra* does not individualise universal consciousness; for, as the plurality of *Puruṣas* shows, consciousness is individual, per se. But it individualises the impressions that come from the world, outside. In dreamless sleep, the function of *ahamkāra* is absent but desires and tendencies, inherent in the stuff of which it is made, of course, persist.⁴

The *guṇas* take three different courses of development from the self-sense, and, accordingly, the latter is distinguished as *vaikārika*, *taijasa* and *bhūtādi*, which are respectively, *sāttvic*, *rājasic* and *tāmasic*. From the *vaikārika* are derived *manas*, the five organs of perception, and the five of action, while from the *bhūtādi* are derived the five fine elements or *tanmātras*. The *taijasāhamkāra* is held to aid the other two in their activities and is present in the evolutes of both.⁵

1. S. Kārikā, 24; 2. IP. II, P. 268;

3. SPS. VI, 54 *ahamkārah kartānapuruṣah*.

4. SPB. I, 63.

5. S. Kārikā, 24, 25. STV. derives the organs of action from the *taijasa* on the authority of the *Bhāgavata*, SSS. Edn. P. 58. Bhikṣu on SPS. II, 18, writes that *manas* alone is derived from the *vaikārikā*, the ten sense-organs being derived from the *taijasa*. Again, while *Vācaspati* derives *tanmātras* from *ahamkāra*, Bhikṣu holds that the separation of *ahamkāra* and the evolution of the *tanmātras* taken place in the *māhāt*. Cf. SPB II 18.

In its widest sense, the organ or *indriya*, can be said to be thirteen-fold ; the intellect, individuation and mind form the inner organ and are functions, while the ten senses form the outer organ. Through the outer organ only can the inner organ be set in activity.

The position of the intellect is one of special importance : all the actions of the other organs are carried out for the intellect which works directly¹ for the *Puruṣa* producing its experience of all existence, and, finally, promoting its isolation.

Out of the fine elements, the *tanmātras*, arise the gross ones through the intermingling of the former. Together with the organs, the fine elements form part of the *liṅga*, the psychic apparatus which, like an actor, passes from life to life.² A necessary part of the *liṅga* is the subtle parts of the gross elements which serve as the seed from which the physical body springs.³

The gross elements consist of two portions, those described as born⁴ of father and mother which encase the psychic apparatus and the *prabhūtas* which form the mass of inorganic nature. Though the gross elements are derived from the *tanmātras* which in their turn are derived from the principle of individuation, still, the two portions of the gross elements are treated as being the same for all, and so as cosmic. This fact reveals a realistic basis in the *Sāṃkhyan* picture of the world.

Fourteen classes⁵ of living beings have been enumerated, eight divine, five of animals and one of men. In the world of gods *sattva* prevails, in that of men *rajas* and in the rest, *tamas*.

Jiva :

The empirical individual or *jīva*, of whom alone freedom and bondage are really predicable, is *Puruṣa* in conjunction with a body and the psychic apparatus.⁶ That the pure *Puruṣa* cannot be regarded as either bound or free follows from

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| 1. S. Kārikā, 37 ; | 2. Ibid. 40-42 ; | 3. Ibid. 41 ; |
| 4. Ibid. 39 ; | 5. Ibid. 53. | |
| 6. SPS. VI, 53 ; Ka. Up. I. 3, 4 ; | | |

its immutability, etc., set forth above. But this pure self is conceived as reflected in the *sattva* of *buddhi*, and this reflection, identified with the ego-sense or *ahamkāra*, *buddhi*'s evolute, is the apparent agent of all activities, or the empirical self. There is an error or *viparyaya* involved in this identification; for, it is to take one thing for another, which, in the *Advaita*, has been styled *adhyāsa* or super-position. But in this root-error consists the empirical individuality, or *asmitā*.¹

Bondage :

The transition of the pure spirit from its purity and aloofness to impurity and entanglement in the body is traced to the operation of *avidyā* or ignorance, a factor which is almost invariably recognised by most Indian systems of thought. The birth of the empirical individual is thus traced in the *Sāṃkhya* and *Yoga* to *avidyā*. The source of it, in the *Sāṃkhya*, is nothing but the contact between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*'s evolutes. But it is not clear how such a contact can be established between a transcendent *Puruṣa* and the material products of *Prakṛti*. In other words, the bondage of the *Puruṣa*, its degradation to the status of the *Jīva*, requires explanation.

While none such is forthcoming in the earlier texts of either *Sāṃkhya* or *Yoga*, commentators like Vācaspati, Bhoja and Vijñāna Bhikṣu attempt to clear up the mystery which envelopes the crux of the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* scheme of emancipation. Thus Vācaspati, writing on *Yoga-Bhāṣya*,² I, 4, remarks that the *Puruṣa* does not literally contact the mind-stuff, but it has proximity to the latter, *tatsannihitam*. This proximity is not either spatial or temporal, *Puruṣa* being beyond space and time. So, proximity in this context means a special fitness consisting in the spirit's power of enjoyership, *bhoktṛas'akti* and the mind's capacity of being enjoyed, *bhogyas'akti*. Explaining how these powers function, he further writes³ that the contact as explained above is not inherent in the *Puruṣa*. Were it so there would be no hope of its liberation. Hence, the *sannidhi*

1. YS. II, 6.

2. cittamayaskāntakalpaṃ sannidhimātropakāri.

3. YB. II, 17;

in question must be due to a cause, *naimittika*. The cause is the beginningless chain of impressions, *saṃskāras* left by the acts and afflictions, *kles akarmavāsanāśantāna*, in the mind-stuff.¹ What Vācaspati means is that the Sattvic modifications of the *buddhi* reflect the *Puruṣa*: they become animated by the spirit and become conscious themselves, as it were.

Vijñāna Bhikṣu differs from Vācaspati. The alleged fitness of the *Puruṣa* must continue even after its liberation and the sense of bondage prove interminable. Bhikṣu, therefore, pleads for a real contact, *samyoga*, of the *Puruṣa* with *buddhi*; this would not involve *Puruṣa*'s transformation, just as contact of *ākāśa* with other entities does not transform its character. *Buddhi* alone develops states as a result of the contact, on the one hand, with the *Puruṣa* and on the other, with external objects *via* the mind and sense-organs. These states of *buddhi* are reflected in the *Puruṣa*, giving rise to the notion of enjoyership in it, while the reflection of the *Puruṣa* in the states of the *buddhi* intelligises them, and makes them conscious cognitions. Bhikṣu thus attempts to improve on his predecessor's account with a theory of mutual reflections between *Puruṣa* and *buddhi*.² But hereby the original problem is duplicated, and the cause of understanding is not served.

Bhoja commenting on *Yoga-Sūtra* ³ IV, 22, makes some pertinent observations on the crucial nature of these reflections. "Reflection is possible only in the case of a finite material object in a clear medium, e. g., a face in a mirror. Being all-pervading and immaterial, how can the *Puruṣa* be reflected in an inferior medium like the *sāttvic buddhi*? By reflection therefore, is meant the manifestation of the power of intelligence latent in the *sāttva* (of *buddhi*), on account of the proxi-

1. During pralaya, the latent *saṃskāras* of the mind-stuff become indistinguishable from Prakṛti. At the beginning of the world-cycle, they become energised and impel Prakṛti to new evolutionary activity.

2. Y. Vārtikā, I. 4; SPS. II, 35; VI, 28.

3. *dṛśyoparaktameittam sarvārtham*.

mity of the *Puruṣa*.¹ Like the *Puruṣa*'s own power of intelligence, its reflex, *tacchīyā*, also manifests itself."²

These various efforts at solving the problem of the contact between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* have not materially altered the original position. The nature of the *Puruṣa*'s bondage remains a mystery at heart. Somehow the *Puruṣa* has fallen into *Prakṛti*'s bondage. This fact is expressed by the phrase that *Puruṣa* is the victim of primeval ignorance or *avidyā*. As in many other systems, *avidyā* in *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* also is a given fact so long as subjection to it continues. An explanation of *avidyā*'s inexplicability has been attempted by the Advaitic theory to which we shall advert in its proper place.

Cause of Bondage or *avidyā* :

In the *Sāṃkhya*, *avidyā* is beginningless; its essence is lack³ of discrimination between the evolutes of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. Though without a beginning, *avidyā* may be terminated by winning that *viveka* whose negation is *avidyā*. *Aviveka* is said to be the cause of conjunction, *samyoga*, between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*.⁴

Whereas in the *Sāṃkhya* Philosophy, the concept of *avidyā* is essentially negative as it denotes a mere absence of discrimination, the *Yoga* understands it in a positive sense, as a form of false knowledge. It is defined in the *Yoga sūtras* as the mistaking of things which are ephemeral, impure, painful and of the nature of non-self as permanent, pure, pleasant and as selves.⁵ The *Bhāṣya* on this points out that *avidyā* is negative only in this form of its designation; it is, in fact, a positive

1. *yaiva sattvagatāyāḥ abhivyaṅgyāyāścicchakteḥ puruṣasya sānnidhyāt abhivyaṅktiḥ saiva pratibimbanamucyate.*
2. In this account, a radical departure has been made from the SY. metaphysics, due, no doubt, to the influence of the Advaitic theory of perception; for, the latency of the power of *cit* in the *buddhi* is assumed, as a factor, in addition to *Puruṣa*.
3. SPS. VI, 68; VI, 12;
4. SPB. I, 19; 55; YS. II, 23, 24.
5. YS. II, 5;

reality. *vāstusattvam*, just as the term *amitra* denotes not the absence of a friend, but the reality of an enemy.

The entire pith of bondage is denoted by *avidyā* and its off-shoots. To treat the world of objects which, as the evolutes of *Prakṛti*, are unstable, impure, painful and non-selves as the opposite of all these is of the essence of the state of bondage. Thus the *avidyā* of the *Yoga* is psychological in its nature. Its difference from the *mithyājñāna* of the *Nyāya* system also is remarkable. False knowledge there denoted one's ignorance of the sixteen categories, and had but a remote relation to the bondage of the *ātman* in that system. The off-shoots of *avidyā* in the *Yoga* are *asmitā* or egoism, *rāga* or attachment, *dveṣa* or aversion, *abhinivesa* or the will-to-live.¹ Due to the positive error of mistaking things for what they are not, arises egoism, i.e., the sense of unity between the *Puruṣa* and the intellect,² and the consequent clinging to pleasures, aversion to pains and the instinctive desire to live, which all living beings share.

From the nature of bondage as wrong understanding, it follows that it is a state of *buddhi* or the mind-stuff in its essence.³ This point needs great emphasis; for, this implies that in the *Sāmkhya-Yoga* System, bondage, properly, is a state of *Prakṛti* and not of *Puruṣa*. It only comes to be attributed to *Puruṣa*. Thus *Vijñāna Bhikṣu* writes⁴ that bondage, striving for liberation, etc., characterise the mind-stuff, *cittam*; their attribution to the *Puruṣa* is only verbal, *vāñmātram* and resembles that of the red colour of a flower to the crystal near it.

Bondage implies pain in this life, but also the inevitability of transmigration. The entity that transmigrates is the *liṅgam* or the subtle body consisting of all the evolutes of *Prakṛti*, minus the gross elements.⁵ The subtle body endowed with dispositions, *bhāvāh*, *sāttvic* or *tāmasic*, transmigrates from life to life. These dispositions are virtue, wisdom, detachment, power and the opposites of these.⁶

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| 1. YS. II, 3, 4. | 2. YS. II, 6; | 3. S. Kārikā, 37; |
| 4. SPB. I, 58; S. Kārikā, 62; | | 5. S. Kārikā, 40; |
| 6. S. Kārikā, 23; | | |

Prakṛti binds *Puruṣa* with seven of the dispositions of her evolute *buddhi*,¹ or, speaking more rigorously, she binds herself with the seven dispositions and liberates herself with one, viz., knowledge. Virtue or *dharma* cannot liberate, for, as was said above, bondage is a malady of understanding and so, only a rectification of it can cure the plight of the *Puruṣa*. What virtue can accomplish is transmigration to higher realms as of the gods, while its opposite, vice, entails lives in the lower kingdoms of subhuman beings. Of bondage resulting from ignorance, or *viparyaya*, *Sāṃkhya* recognises three varieties,² viz., *prākṛtika*, *vaikārika* and *dākṣiṇaka* which have been rendered as natural, incidental and personal.³ Vācaspati⁴ explains that those who adore *Prakṛti* as self suffer from the first variety of bondage and their reward is merger in *Prakṛti* for a lac of years.⁵ Those who look upon *Prakṛti*'s evolutes, or *vikārāḥ* as the *Puruṣa* are subject to the incidental bondage and have to linger on after casting off their gross bodies, for varying stretches of years.⁶ Personal bondage pertains to those who repose their faith in works prescribed by *Śruti* and *Smṛti* - *iṣṭāpūrtakīriṇaḥ* and yearn for their rewards.

Suffering or Duhkha :

Preponderant suffering in life is the specific characteristic of bondage; hence the urgency to secure liberation. The very inspiration of the *Sāṃkhyan* inquiry derives from the assault of the three-fold suffering or sorrows of life,⁷ and the consequent desire to discover a sure and final remedy for it. *Duhkha* falls under three heads - the *ādhyātmika*, arising from the psychophysical nature of man; the *ādhibhautika*, arising out of external world; and the *ādhidaiivika*, arising from super-natural agencies. In view of the *guṇa*-constitution of the world, it is natural to expect pleasure as well as pain, enjoyment as well as suffering; still, both *Sāṃkhya* and *Yoga* insist on the pre-

1. S. Kārikā, 63. 2. S. Kārikas, 44, 45. 3. IP. II, P. 310.

4. Tattvavaiśārādī on YS. I, 24; S. T. Kaumudi on S. Kārikā, 44;

5. Ibid. 6. Ibid.

7. S. Kārikā 1; SPS. VI, 6-8; YS. II, 15;

ponderance of pain. *Sāmkhya Sūtra* ¹ VI, 6 points out that men's dread of suffering is far greater than his craving for pleasure. It is but rarely that in the vast world one meets a really happy man.² Even this rare happiness is so mixed up with pain that men gifted with discrimination would treat it as a form of sorrow.³ Bhikṣu quotes from *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* to the effect that even the objects which yield immediate joy turn out to be the seeds of future sorrow.⁴ Explaining this preponderance of sorrow in life, *Yoga Bhāṣya* on II, 15⁵ points out that all pleasure born of sense contact is of the essence of ignorance in so far as it is the result of mistaking the impure for the pure and so forth.⁶ Sense pleasures constitute the ultimate goal of the vast majority of human beings.⁷ But there is no satisfying the mounting demands of the senses for gratification. Besides, they end in bitter disillusionment and grief.⁸ The proneness of pleasures to transform themselves into pains, *parināmaduḥkhatā*, casts its shadow on sensitive and discriminative men even in states of enjoyment.

Again, the incessant search for the means of pleasure entails sufferings for others as well. Besides, the very sufferings leave impressions on the mind-stuff which make for a future crop of sorrow. This stream of sufferings, like ignorance, its cause, is without beginning in time and its floods encompass all life.⁹ But, of course, only the sensitive mind is aware of this awful truth.

A testimony to the validity of this view is given by Jaigīṣayya.¹⁰ "Whatever I have experienced, born over and

1. SPS. VI, 6 - yathāduḥkhatkleśaḥ puruṣasya natathā sukhā-dabhiḥlāṣaḥ.
2. SPS. VI, 7.
3. SPS. VI, 8; YS. II, 15;
4. yadyadprītikarāṃpumsāmvastumaitreya jāyate; tadeva duḥkhavṛkṣasya bījatvamupagacchati.
5. pariṇāmatāpasaṃskāraduḥkhaṅgaṇāvṛttivirodhāceaduḥkha-mevasarvaṃvivekinah;
6. YS. II, 5;
7. Cf. paśvādhibhiścāviśeṣāt Śāṅkara Introdn. to BSS.
8. BG. V, 22; XVIII 38; Manu II, 94;
9. Nyāyasāra.
10. YB. III, 18;

over again among gods and men, was nothing but pain." He adds that in his view he has been largely influenced by the sufferings of subhuman creatures. Even the joy of contentment is pain, compared with the bliss of isolation — *kaivalya-sukhāpeksayā duḥkhameva*.

Adhikārin or Candidate for Mokṣa :

The right candidate for the liberation from the sorrows of life, it follows, is the man of discrimination who realises the nature of the predicament of all life in *samsāra*. The consolation of the *Sāmkhya-Yoga* philosophy are not confined to the *trivarnikas*.¹ This generosity of outlook is already in evidence in the great epic,² where the result of *Yoga* is declared to be open even to women and *Sūdras*. Perhaps this was due to the fact that the *Sāmkhya-Yoga* system was not exclusively built on the foundation of the Vedas. Neither was insistence made on the candidate accepting any special *āsrama* as pre-requisite for following the *Sāmkhya-yoga* way of life. The knowledge of the theory of life as held by the school was the sole indispensable qualification.³

Means of Mokṣa :

The practical problem for the *Sāmkhya-Yoga* was to prescribe the means to get rid of the pain which all life was pronounced to be. For, once the reality of suffering is granted, the highest goal of life must needs be its removal.⁴ Quite rightly Bhikṣu points out that life's goal cannot be the getting rid of pain as such, but rather the suffering of that pain. "*Duḥkhabhoganivṛtteḥ puruṣārthatvam, duḥkhanivṛttistu na svataḥ puruṣārthaḥ*".⁵ *Yoga sūtras* also make the point that, since past and present pains are not properly the fit objects of any intelligent endeavour, only the future pains may be sought to be eliminated—*heyamduḥkhamanāgatam*.⁶ Therefore, the entire *Sāmkhya-Yoga* Philosophy assumes a four-fold character like the medical science.⁷ Corresponding to the four main

1. Cf. BS. I, 3, 34 ;

2. XIV, 19, 61.

3. SSS. IX, II ;

4. SPS. I, 1 ;

5. SPB. I, 1 ;

6. YS. II, 17 ;

7. YB. II, 15 ;

sections of the latter, the *Sāmkhya-Yoga* also deals with suffering, its cause, liberation from it, and the means thereof. We saw that the nature of *saṃśāra* is suffering or *duḥkham*, and that its cause is the contact, *saṃyoga*, however, interpreted, between the *Puruṣa* and the evolutes of *Prakṛti*.¹ The means to break this contact is unsullied discriminative knowledge, *vivekakhyātiraviplavā*.² Thus *viveka* alone is potent to effect the release of the spirit – a truth which follows from the point made earlier that, in strict fact, bondage is a state, not of *Puruṣa* but of *Prakṛti*. Did the *Puruṣa* in fact suffer bondage, no means would have availed to secure its final release.³ So, the aim of the *Sāmkhya-Yoga* is to bring about a state in which the false attribution of bondage to *Puruṣa* may no longer take place. It is clear also that *Prakṛti*, contact with whose evolutes results in *Puruṣa*'s bondage⁴, cannot be abolished; she is as real as *Puruṣa*. The requisite means, therefore, is discrimination between *buddhi* etc; and *Puruṣa*.

The way of the Sāmkhya :

The dictum *Jñānānmuktiḥ*⁵ – Liberation comes from knowledge – determines the way of the *Sāmkhya* to the sum-mum bonum. Of the eight intellectual or *baudda* dispositions, virtue, vice, wisdom, ignorance, attachment, non-attachment, power and infirmity⁶, wisdom or *Jñāna* alone is helpful to the candidate for *mokṣa*. These eight causes and their results have again been grouped into four and styled ignorance, infirmity, complacency and attainment.⁷ The first three with their 42 subdivisions⁸, being forms of subtle or gross bondage and impediments on the path to the saving knowledge, must be eschewed. Attainments or *siddhis* alone are related to knowledge and liberation. '*Siddhi*' comprises the various steps to the cessation of suffering and may be noticed in some detail.⁹

1. YS. II, 17;

2. YS. II, 26;

3. SPB. I, 7; *Yadyātmā malino'svaccho vikāṛīsyād svabhāvataḥ nahi tasya bhavenmuktirjanmāntarāśatairapi* 1; *Kārma Purāṇa*;

4. SPS. Vṛtti, VI, 44.

5. SPS. III, 23; *S. Kārikā*, 2, 44, etc.;

6. Ibid; 44, 45.

7. Ibid; 46;

8. Ibid; 47;

9. Ibid; 51.

Among the attainments may be noted two groups, one consisting of the principal ones, and the other the instrumental ones. The three suppressions of sorrow, *duḥkha* *trayaḥ*, are the main attainments. They are approached through study, *adhyayana*; understanding or *śabda*; proper reasoning or *ūha*; friendly discussion or *suhṛtprāpti*; and purity or *dīna*. Study consists in the mastery of the texts dealing with self-knowledge; the teacher chosen to impart it must himself have attained the highest goal. This first attainment is known as *tāra*. This leads on to the next *siddhi* entitled understanding or *śabda - śabdajanitam arthajñānam*¹. Here, clearly, the effect is being denoted by the term suited to the cause. Its technical name is '*sutāram*'. These two, referring to the word and its understanding, represent the '*śravaṇam*' of the upaniṣadic tradition, according to Vācaspati.

Next comes *ūha*, reasoning, which conforms to sound tradition; it involves the examination of *prima facie* views and a final decision. This step corresponds to '*manana*' and is technically named '*tāratāram*'.

The fourth stage is the submitting of the conclusions arrived at by oneself to the scrutiny of one's teacher, co-disciples, and disciples, so that they may be tested and confirmed and so it is styled 'friendly discussion', *suhṛtprāpti*. Its special title is '*ramyaka*'.

The last of the preliminary attainments is '*dīnā*' or the clarification of the knowledge of discrimination secured through the previous process. Thus, it exactly corresponds to Patañjali's declaration, *Vivekakhyātiraviplavā*.² This involves the overcoming of doubts, errors and their impressions in the mind-stuff and the consequent even flow of the realization of the distinction between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. This state is called '*sadāmudita*'.

The three final attainments consisting in the abolition of the three-fold sorrow are styled *pramoda*, *mudita*, *modamāna*.³

1. S. T. Kaumudī, 51.

2. YS. II, 26;

3. An alternative explanation is noted by Vācaspati taking the words *ūha*, &c; less logically, but more literally. Cf. *Jaya-maṅgalā* on this *Kārikā*.

The saving knowledge itself is the result of the repeated study of the principles taught in the *Sāṁkhya*, *tattvābhyāsāt* and the mastery of the three main categories of the *Sāṁkhya* system - *vyaktāvyakta-jñāh*.¹ The final form this knowledge takes is as follows: I do not exist (i. e., as a phenomenon); nothing belongs to me; I am not. Thus is put an end to the confusion between the *Puruṣa* and the *buddhi* by which life in the body so far went on.² With the dawn of this pure knowledge, *kevalajñāna*, the object of *Prakṛti*'s activities is attained.

The Yoga Way:

But, from very early times, it was frankly realized by many thinkers that the unaided efforts of man, or a mere process of discrimination, may not suffice to liberate *Puruṣa* from the clutches of *Prakṛti*. Thus, tendencies of a theistic nature, in contrast to the deliberate rejection³ of God by the *Sāṁkhya*, asserted themselves. A systematic discipline was developed in course of time to effect the isolation of the spirit through meditation on God, and with His grace. Hence, in the Yoga system, a clear picture of the psychological processes leading to the liberation of the spirit emerges. So great has been the prestige of this Yoga method that later *Sāṁkhya* writers like VIJNANA Bhikṣu accept it as a part of the *Sāṁkhya*, even,⁴ and practically all religious disciplines in India find a place for it at some stage or other as indispensable for the attainment of their several goals.

As in *Sāṁkhya*, in Yoga also, the problem is to enhance the purity of the mind-stuff so that *Puruṣa* may catch a clear reflection of itself in the mirror of *buddhi*. The object is to secure the '*aviplavī vivekakhyāiti*'. According to the Yoga psychology, the mind stuff is in a state of perpetual flux; it is a sort of stream flowing towards good and evil, at once.⁵ What is necessary is, in the first instance, to arrest its movement towards evil, *pāpa* and strengthen its impetus towards good, *punya* or *kalyāṇa*.

1. S. Kārikā, 2;

2. Ibid; 64; YS. II, 6.

3. SPS. I, 92-95;

4. SPB. I, 55, 56.

5. cittanadināmobhayatovāhini vahatikalyāṇāya, vahatipāpāyaca. YB. I, 12;

The modifications of the mind stuff are of five types ¹, and they are either afflicted or unafflicted (or hindered or unhindered), *kliṣṭa* or *akliṣṭa*. They are sources of valid ideas, misconceptions, predicate-relations, sleep, and memory. So long as the *vṛttis*, like waves, rise and agitate the lake of the mind, *Puruṣa* cannot perceive itself as it is in that mirror. Hence mind's proneness to break itself up into waves must be stopped, and the *vṛttis* must be arrested. Therefore, the very definition of *Yoga* is '*cittavṛttinirodha*,' ² the restriction of the fluctuations of the mind-stuff.

The method of achieving this end is to apply oneself repeatedly and with passionlessness ³ to steadying the mind. The effort to stop the flow of the mind, to keep it fixed to a chosen theme, is *abhyāsa*; it gains in effectiveness when persisted in for a long time, without break and with faith. Passionlessness or *vairāgya* has a decisive part to play in the endeavour to calm the mind.

From among the four traditional forms of detachment ⁴ the *Yoga* system singles out the highest ⁵ as the goal of the lower forms. It is the consciousness of being master on the part of one who has rid himself of thirst for either seen or revealed objects.

Now, before the seeker after liberation can achieve utter passionlessness, *vaśikīrasamjñā*, he has got to take certain indispensable preliminary steps. The natural propensities of the mind, like thoughts of injuring others, deceitfulness, desire for unlawful possession, sex, etc., have to be conquered. Hence the *Yoga* system insists on the abstentions or *yamas* ⁶, viz.,

1. YS. I, 5, 6. 2. YS. I, 1; 3. Ibid. I, 12.
4. Tatvavaiśārādi on YS. I, 15. The four forms of passionless are styled *yatamānasaṁjñā*, *vyatirekaṁjñā*, *ekendriya-samjñā*, and *vaśikarasamjñā*. The first denotes the initial determination and effort to restrain the sense-organs from flying to their objects. Vide Kath. Up. I, iii, 6; the second is the perception which 'affections' *Kaṣāya* of the mind-stuff have matured and which have not; the third refers to the stage when the matured 'affections' merely abide in the mind without hustling it.
5. YS. I, 15; 6. YS. II, 30;

abstinence from injury, from falsehood, theft, incontinence and acceptance of gifts. Along with these have been prescribed five observances or *niyamas* with the same end in view, though these *niyamas* are not as comprehensive as the *yamas* in their scope. They are ¹ cleanliness, contentment, austerity, study and devotion to God, or the dedication of all actions to Him, ² *sarvakarmārpaṇamvā*. So long as mind control does not include these in their widest connotation, the mind's proneness to distraction will remain. It will thus break itself into fluctuations, *vṛttis*, which are either *kṣipta*, restless, *mūḍha*, infatuated, or *vikṣipta*, distracted. ³ As an effective aid to overpower and uproot the undesirable *vṛttis* of the mind-stuff has been recommended the cultivation of friendliness, *maitrī*, towards the happy and pity *karuṇā*, towards the distressed; one should take delight in the virtuous deeds of one's fellow-beings, *muditā*, and practise indifference, *upekṣā*, towards the vicious. ⁴

Devotion to God prescribed above is meant only for those with a theistic bent of mind. It is recognised as one of the quickest ways of getting rid of obstacles to concentration ⁵. But even when God is meditated upon, the purpose of Yoga remains the same; i. e., to stop the fluctuations of the mind stuff. Meditation on God is a means to achieve *samādhi*, and the final isolation of the *Puruṣa*. ⁶

Meditation on God or any other object one chooses ⁷ must be conducted in a comfortable seated posture. ⁸ When the posture has become easy and habitual, regulated breathing exercises have to be undertaken. They have been classified into four kinds, ⁹ the object being to attenuate the *karma*-

1. YS. II, 32

2. YB. II, 32;

3. YB. I, 1;

4. YS. I, 33;

5. YS. I, 29. The obstacles to yoga have been enumerated in YS. I, 30, and their accompaniments in the next sūtra. "Sickness, langour, doubt, heedlessness, listlessness, worldliness, erroneous perception, failure to attain any stage (of concentration), and instability in the state are the obstacles. What accompany them are pain, despondency, unsteadiness of the body, inspiration and expiration." Transln. by Woods, HOS., Vol. 17.

6. YS. II, 45.

7. YS. I, 39.

8. YS. II, 46;

9. YS. II, 49-51;

stuff¹ which normally envelopes the light of *buddhi's sattva*² and to enhance the mind's powers to function steadily. The next step in Yoga is *pratyāhāra* or withdrawal of the sense-organs from their respective objects with a view to induce in them a state of abstention similar to the mind's own.

So far, only the relatively external part of the Yoga-praxis has been sketched.³ The next three steps constitute the Yoga proper, viz., *dhāraṇā*, the fixing of the mind on a select spot either within or without the body,⁴ *dhyānam*, contemplation or the unbroken continuity of any given state of the mind-stuff, and *samādhi*, concentration, in which the mind becomes transformed into the objective form it contemplates. These last three steps are but stages of a single process. With the mastery over these dawns the light of wisdom, *prajñāloka*.⁵

In the beginning, the mind may have concentration or *samyama* (the last three steps of yoga taken together⁶) on a concrete object and identify itself with its name, concept, etc. This *samādhi* is termed *saṁvitarka*, (with deliberation). When in the next stage, name and concept are ignored, the *samādhi* is termed *nirvitarka*, (without deliberation). The next higher stage of concentration relates to subtle objects like the *tanmātrās*, when also, as above, it is called *saṁvīcāra*, reflective or *nirvīcāra*, super-reflective according as it is accompanied by reflection or not. These four stages are often counted as two, *vitarkānugata*, associated with deliberation and *vicarānugata* associated with reflection. There are still two higher forms of concentration, accompanied either by 'happiness or 'I-sense',

1. YS. IV, 7. Four kinds of Karma with different colours associated with them are referred to in the Yoga system—the black, the white and black, the white, and the neither white nor black. Wicked deeds are black; the white and black are those achieved through external means, involving both merit and sin. The white are purely meritorious consisting of austerity, contemplation, &c., and are purely internal. The last are the deeds of Sanyāsins who are in their last life-period. The yogins aim to get rid of the first three kinds.

2. Tattvaviśārādī on YS. II, 52;

3. YS. III, 7;

4. YS. III, 1;

5. YS. III, 5;

6. YS. III, 4.

ānandānugata and *asmitānugatā*. In the last-mentioned stage, the mind-stuff is in a state of pure being, and the *Puruṣa* is one with the *buddhi* – *dyḡdarśanaśaktyorekātmatā*.

Again, the first two types of concentration have been styled *grāhyaviṣaya* as they are based on objects, *grāhya*, gross or subtle; in the *ānandānugata*, the empirical self has raised itself above the object-based concentration and become one with the blissful aspect of the senses; hence it is styled *grāhyaviṣaya*. The last or *asmitānugata* is the one in which the *buddhi* turns back to itself, the *Puruṣa* becomes one with *buddhi* and there shines forth the steady light of *sat̥tva*.¹

These four types of *saṃādhi* have the common mark of being based on an object gross or subtle and so are styled *saṃprajñāta*. When full mastery over *saṃprajñāta* is achieved, and the *sāttvic* intellect rid of *rajas* and *tamas* is unshakably becalmed,² the Yogin's powers of intuition come into evidence. Now, he is in a position to get the non-discursive knowledge of things – *kramānanurodhiprajñā*. The inerrability of his intuition at this stage of yoga is denoted by the title it traditionally bears *ṛtaṃbharāprajñā*, truth-bearing knowledge. This is the result of a normal process and has nothing magical about it.³ "One wins the highest yoga by developing one's intuitive powers, *prajñā* with the help of traditional wisdom, *āgama*, reasoning, *anumāna* and the unremitting practice of Yoga."⁴

Whereas *āgama* and *anumāna* yield the knowledge of the universal and the ordinary perception cannot reach out to subtler strata of reality like the *tanmātras* and the spirit,⁵ the *ṛtaṃbharā* faculty operates in regard to these latter and yields precise knowledge in regard to them. The tendencies and impressions imparted to the mind-stuff by this yoga-born faculty prove stronger than its latent impressions and cancel

1. Bhikṣu holds that here *Puruṣa* shines forth in its proper nature;
2. YB. I, 47; *sthitipravāha*;
3. YS. I, 48;
4. These three steps correspond to the *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nidhidhyāsana* of the Upaniṣads.
5. YS. I, 49.

them out; for the mind has a natural preference for truth¹ and once the real is seized, the vagaries of the mind stop. The impressions of *ṛtambharū* would not impart to the mind their own impulse to further restlessness; rather, they liberate the mind from its inherent propensity to wander and break up into modes.

The mindstuff that has been purged, disciplined and elevated to the level of *ṛtambharū* now steadily forges ahead to isolation, bent solely on discrimination—*vivekanimnaṃ*, *kaivalya-prāgbhāraṃ*.² Nevertheless, in the intervals of this steady mental flow, there still may shoot up, from the roots of deep-lying, age-old, impressions, alien notions of the form 'I am' or 'asmi', 'mine are' 'mama', 'I do know' or 'I do not know', 'jānāmi na jīnāmi vī'. But these impressions, too, like the afflictions³ of the mind-stuff, *kleṣa* no longer reproduce themselves; for, they have been burnt up in the fire of discriminative knowledge and now are fast dying out.

The knowledge of discrimination between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* is perfected only when the mind-stuff is purged from the last traces of *rajas* or tendencies to distraction. This state is entitled *paraṃ prasamkhyānaṃ*, supreme knowledge or highest elevation, 'identifying the property with what it pertains to'.⁴ Here, the perception of the fundamental difference between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* stands out in all its vividness.⁵ The spirit is pure, i. e., non-*Prākṛtic* or essentially other than what is pleasurable, painful, or apathetic. Thus to have reached the acme of discrimination is to rise above all feelings,⁶ including the feelings for beauty; for, the most beautiful object, even, being finite, *antavat*, occasions sorrow. Hence the Yogin who discriminates renounces beauty, too.

All along, the *Puruṣa* perceived what was presented to its gaze by the mind-stuff, *darśitaviṣaya*, without forfeiting its immutable nature. Never was it interfused with the states of

1. Tattvavaiśārādi on YS. I, 50;

2. YB. IV. 26. 3. YS. I, 24;

4. Tattvavaiśārādi on YB. I, 2;

5. Ibid on YS. I, 2.

6. BG. VI, 20-23 - identifies this state with blissfulness;

the mind-stuff – *apratīsamkrāma*. On the contrary, the highest *sāttvic* state of *buddhi* or the fluctuation as *vivekakhyāti* is in all respects, the opposite of *Puruṣa*. Such a perception as this is naturally followed by an attitude of detachment even to this *prasamkhyāna*; it is felt that even this, with its liability to occasional, though harmless, interruptions due to dying impressions, must be rectified. The result is the achievement of the concentration known as *dharma megha* – the cloud of virtue. The mark of this highest perfection of the *samprajñātasamādhi* is that the knowledge of discrimination, for good, ceases to be interrupted; all seeds of *samskāras* have been finally destroyed. ¹

Jīvanmukti :

The result of achieving *dharmamegha* is the destruction of all afflictions such as *avidyā* and actions like *śukla* and *kṛṣṇa*. With the abolition of these two groups, the wise yogin is liberated even when alive – *Jīvanneva vidvān vimukto bhavati*. ² The *Sāmkhya* also recognises the status of *Jīvanmukti* or liberation in life. ³ It also indicates why, notwithstanding liberation, the body of the sage remains functioning for some-time. The surviving momentum of earlier *samskāra* is the reason advanced. As the potter's wheel continues to whirl due to the prior impulse even after the pot has been fashioned fully, the body of the sage, too, keeps functioning. *Vācaspati* ⁴ writes that the seeds of karma can sprout only when the soil of *buddhi* is watered by *kleśas*, such as *avidyā*. The sun of right knowledge has dried up that soil and the seeds will sprout no more. Though, in the *Yogabhāṣya*, the cause of the survival of the living body has not been specified, it is clearly none other than the force of the *prārabdhakarmas*, actions that have already begun to bear fruit. ⁵

The stages of Yogic wisdom leading to the *Jīvanmukti* stage and beyond have been specified as follows. ⁶ The first

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| 1. YB. IV, 29. | 2. YB. IV, 30. |
| 3. S. Kārikā, 67. | 4. S.T. Kāumudī, 67. |
| 5. S. T. Vasanta, Qd. P. 117, S. S. S. Edn. S. Kārikā; Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2. | |
| 6. YS. II, 27. | |

four are states of consciousness and are associated with the four stages of the *samprājñāṭasamādhi*. The primary stage of the Yogin's wisdom or *prajñā* takes the form: 'I have known the world of objects as essentially painful and so it must be discarded; nothing more remains to be known.' Next comes the perception that the roots of sufferings have dwindled away. The third stage is the direct realization of the removal of sorrows in the concentration of restriction.¹ In the fourth arises the conviction that the means of escape, viz., discriminative discernment, has been firmly secured.

The next three stages of that advance towards isolation follow automatically; they are not psychological stages at all.² They represent metaphysical facts of the involutory movement of *Prakṛti*'s evolutes. They are the three moments of the final lapse into their cause of the psychical apparatus of the liberated spirit. Thus the mind-stuff has performed its twofold function of promoting the experience and liberation of the *Puruṣa*. The *guṇas*, constitutive of the mind-stuff concerned, plunge back into the *Prakṛti* like loose stones from a hill-top. No longer will they emerge from their cause to reform the psychical apparatus again. Now the *Puruṣa* shines forth as pure *cit* or intelligence. Liberation has been achieved.

Videhamukti :

The *Jīvanmukta* is established in the clarity of discriminative wisdom, above all sorrows; he beholds suffering humanity like a man on a hilltop who watches the people below. But the *Puruṣa* achieves isolation outside all embodiment, *videha-kaivalyam*,³ in the *asamprajñāta samādhi* in which whatever impressions may remain promote isolation, *kaivalyabhāgiya*⁴ and the mind stuff is resolved back into *Prakṛti*. Now the *Puruṣa*'s position is described as *svarūpapraṭiṣṭhācitiśakti*—the energy of intelligence grounded in itself.⁵ This is the highest

1. Vācaspati on YB. II, 27.

2. Yoga Phily. P. 346, Dās Gupta.

3. S. Kārikā, 68; 4. YB. I, 51; 5. Ibid; I, 3; III, 50, IV, 34;

goal of man.¹ All the envelopes of the energy of perception having been destroyed²; the *Jīvanmukta's* knowledge is practically infinite. Still, compared with the ineffable grandeur of the *Videhamukta*, he is called a *madhyavivekasta* (established in partial discrimination)³. But his reality and effectiveness are proved by the validity of the teaching he imparts. Rebirth for the *Jīvanmukta* is inconceivable.⁴

From the *Videhamukta*, *Prakṛti*, finally, withdraws herself like a danseuse⁵ after exhibiting her art to an audience, or like a bashful lady who avoids the stranger to whose gaze, inadvertently, she exposed herself.⁶

Mokṣa :

The *mokṣa* in the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* system is not a state of bliss, nor, as in the *Nyāyavaiśeṣika*, does it resemble the state of a stone. In the first place it is a state of freedom from pain. In this respect, it agrees with the *Nyāyavaiśeṣika* concept of liberation. True, in the *Upaniṣads*, *Ātman* or *Puruṣa* is often described as bliss.⁷ But the word *ānanda* is used there figuratively to denote the fact that the Self is free from pain.⁸ Besides, pleasure, *Sukham* is only the cessation of both pain and pleasure.⁹ Also, there are passages in '*Sruti* which deny that the nature of Self is pleasure - e.g., *nānandam na nirānandam*. The self is an object of absolute attachment only because it is free from pain. The aim of the *Upaniṣads* in using the word *ānanda* to denote the self figuratively is to recommend its realization to those who are weak of intellect.¹⁰

In an effort to make its own view of *mokṣa* plausible, *Sāṃkhya* argues¹¹ that the self cannot be consciousness and delight; that would be to admit a duality in the Self which the

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| 1. Ch. Up. nahavaśaiśārīrasya sataḥ priyāpriyayorapahatirasti ; | 3. SPS. III, 77-79 SPB. on the same ; |
| 2. YS. IV, 31 ; | 4. S. Kārikā, 59, 61. |
| 4. YB. IV, 31 ; | 7. BU. TU, &c. |
| 6. Ibid. | 9. SPB. V, 67. |
| 8. SPS. V, 67. | |
| 10. SPS. V, 68 - vimuktipraśameṣā mandānām ; | |
| 11. Ibid. V, 66 ; | |

Advaitins cannot allow. Nor can both consciousness and delight be regarded as transcendental; if so, how are they ever known at all? If they are proved to be distinct, of course, *Advaita* has to be ruled out.

The delight of the self may not be regarded either as being hidden or obscured by ignorance, which is incorporeal; for, the the Self, and so its delight are all-pervading realities. All the more so, if this ignorance be deemed to be illusory. Besides, the self has been declared to be '*asanga*', unrelated.

To say that the delight of the Self is experienced is to make one and the same thing subject and object at the same time. Also, the experience of bliss in *mokṣa* would set up a *tripuṭi* (the subject, object and experience) there and destroy *Advaita*. In empirical experience, delight and knowledge are always felt as distinct from each other.

For the same reason, it may not be held that in *mokṣa* there is a manifestation of bliss, ¹ bliss and manifestation not being properties of the Self.² Of course, *mokṣa* is not, as the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* system contends, a cessation of the specific traits of the self or *Ātman*; for the latter has no property.³ The *Sāṃkhya* denies that absence of pain is a property of the self or *Puruṣa*; this absence of pain or *mokṣa* is not related to any object of experience or *bhogyā*.⁴

The liberated spirit, of course, no more returns to the state of bondage or re-enters the weary rounds of *samsāra*. This position is held with the help of declarations in the *S'ruti* to the same effect.⁵

A criticism of this concept :

Such is the theory and practice relating to the concept of *mokṣa* or *apavarga* in the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* School. The differences between them affect only the means of achieving *mokṣa*. But can this end, as conceived by this school, stand scrutiny?

Mokṣa is the dissociation of the *Puruṣa* from the psychical apparatus with which it finds itself in association. This is an

1. Ibid. V, 74.

2. SPB. V, 74;

3. SPS. V, 75.

4. SPB. V, 75.

5. SPS. VI, 44.

essentially unintelligible idea. The *Puruṣa* as conceived by the *Sāṃkhya* cannot fall into bondage at all, for it has nothing in common with *Prakṛti* into whose clutches it falls. If it is the innate disposition of *Puruṣa* to identify itself with matter, the possibility of its liberation, except with its destruction, must vanish for ever.¹ If this identification with matter or bondage is contingent, there must be a cause for it. Can it be the presence of *Prakṛti* or the proximity of *Puruṣa*? Either way, release must remain impossible; for both these conditions persist for ever, *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* being equally eternal.

It has been argued that *Prakṛti*, after accomplishing the experience and isolation of *Puruṣa* by virtue of her inherent double tendency,² will retire of her own accord, and that, thenceforward, for ever, they will coexist without mutual interference like a blasé couple. But it is impossible to conceive how inert matter can be credited with so much discretion. It is a piece of sheer special pleading.

Again, the essential nature of *Puruṣa* requires no extraneous aid for self-fulfilment; it has no lack, being pure *cit*, self-sufficient and free. Why should it crave for a sight of *Prakṛti* or the adventures resulting therefrom? The author of the *Sāṃkhyataruvasanta* observes that *Puruṣa*, who is the Power of sight, was so long lost in self-contemplation that it got sick of it and turned to the marvellous creations of *Prakṛti*.³ Then it forgot itself, got interfused in *Prakṛti*'s evolutes, acted, reaped the results of acts, and finally, grown sick, turned to the goal of isolation. Now this fanciful account entirely ignores the metaphysical nature of *Puruṣa*. For one thing, self-consciousness is unintelligible except as the result of confrontation with a non-self, and it is just this possibility that requires explanation. Before turning to *Prakṛti*, *Puruṣa* cannot develop self-consciousness. Secondly, this self-disgust may recur even

1. Nyāyaratnākara, Benares Edn., P. 669.

2. Bhojavṛtti on YS. IV, 22 - anulomapratilomalakṣaṇaparīṇāmadvayam.

3. Darśanasvabhāvaḥ puṁśo purātmānamekamevapaśyan-
nityadarśanādātmanivirakta ātmānamupekṣyaprakṛtidarśitaḥ
mindrajālam paśyati;

after isolation and the whole process repeat itself. Finally, the idea of time implied in long self-contemplation and subsequent turning to *Prakṛti* has no application to the timeless spirit or *Puruṣa*.¹ Thus *Puruṣa's* bondage remains incomprehensible.

This feeling was obviously shared by some thinkers of the *Sāṃkhya* school themselves; for it is declared² that *Puruṣa* is neither bound nor liberated; nor does it transmigrate. It is *Prakṛti* alone that undergoes these states, in fact, *Puruṣa* does so only in appearance. This position is, if anything, still more incredible. To speak of inanimate *Prakṛti* as bound or liberated simply makes no sense. Concepts of freedom and bondage are essentially bound up with those of intelligence and will, neither of which has been ascribed to *Prakṛti*. Assuming that somehow bondage has occurred, the prospect of release is very remote and gloomy. Why should *Prakṛti's* mechanism, once set going, ever stop at all? The *Sāṃkhyan* explanation is that there are two tendencies in *Prakṛti*, parts of her inherent teleology - one making for evolution, and the other for involution. But this is merely a statement of the facts as assumed by the *Sāṃkhya* which demand an explanation and no intelligible reply is forthcoming.

Can we make the God of Yoga philosophy responsible either for the bondage or the liberation of the *Puruṣa*? In Yoga, *Īśvara's* role is strictly limited; he helps *Prakṛti's* evolution by removing obstacles in her path as a peasant removes obstacles to the flow of water from one field to another;³ he also helps the *Jīva* in the effort to achieve isolation by bestowing grace. The liberated *Jīva* or *Puruṣa* resembles *Īśvara* in its purity⁴ and independence, but the two have no closer relation. Thus in *Puruṣa's* liberation God may be said to play a part, while its bondage remains inexplicable.

The basic difficulty of the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* system is its unsatisfactory metaphysics of a dualistic pluralism. Neither *Puruṣa* nor *Prakṛti* is a fact of experience, being mere abstrac-

1. Time and space are only aspects of *Prakṛti's* evolute, *ākāśa*.

2. S. Kārikā, 62; SPS. II, 1.

3. *Thattvavaiśārādī* on YB. IV, 3.

4. Mu. III, 1, 3.

tions set up to account for it. It is true that consciousness cannot be derived from matter. But as an empirical item of experience, consciousness is always mediated by matter. The *Sāṃkhyan* metaphysics ignores this elementary fact and lifts the *Puruṣa* above all mental states. Not being experienced in any way, such an entity should not have been introduced into a sound metaphysics at all. Of the *Sāṃkhyan Puruṣa* nothing positive can be affirmed. Actually, what we experience is an integral *Jīva* and when we split him up into a *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, sundering the one from the other, nothing can bring them together again to explain phenomena like bondage.

The *Sāṃkhyan* arguments in support of the plurality of *Puruṣa*'s establish only that of the empirical selves. For example, death, etc., of one self would affect others only if death, etc., pertained to the spirit which the opponent may claim is one. Of course, events like death befall the organism and have nothing to do with the indwelling spirit. The facts of experience prove only that the *Jīvas* are many. Differences of interests,¹ i. e., of psychological make up, may account for the variety of their experiences.

Again, the notion of plurality or number, a derivative from the realm of matter, ought not to be illegitimately transferred to the realm of spirit. The *Sāṃkhyan* makes all *puruṣas* absolutely alike, they being nothing but all-prevading intelligences. Then, why are they said to be many? Multiplicity without distinction is irresponsible.² Hence, perhaps, the *Sāṃkhyan* commentator Gauḍapāda is inclined to the theory of one *Puruṣa*.³

A *Puruṣa* who is said to enjoy cannot, at the same time, be passive, or *akartā*; rather the contrary. Actually, the dance of *Prakṛti* is meant not for the impassive *puruṣa*, but for the embodied *Jīva* only who is both agent and enjoyer. And, the *Jīvas*, or reflected *Puruṣas* are, of course, many.

Were the being of *Puruṣa* necessary for the play of *Prakṛti*, one *Puruṣa* should suffice. If all *Puruṣas* are absolutely alike,

1. SSS, XII, 68, 69;

2. I. P. II, 322;

3. Gauḍapāda on S. Kārikā 11, 44.

then, being equally close to *Prakṛti*, they should all have simultaneous experiences.¹

Now, the concept of *Puruṣa* is meant to explain experience. *Puruṣa* is the subject of all experiences, in some sense. But if we abstract it from them all and make it a mere symbol, it ceases to explain anything, and becomes a problem in itself. Consciousness is a fact of experience and so cannot be severed from it, hypostatized and made the cause of that consciousness which characterised experience. An unchanging *Puruṣa* can neither cognise nor enjoy. Nor can *Prakṛti* do any of these. Hence, there arises no question of superposition, *adhyāsa*, due to proximity, as in the case of the crystal and the hibiscus. Only an intelligent being can indulge in superposition through error. Thus, facts of experience, properly criticised, lead to the plurality of the *Jīvas*, and not of the pure spirit, who must not be confounded with any individual. The latter is, at best, a distortion of the spirit. The striving for liberation means that every *Jīva* is potentially spirit.

Prakṛti in *Sāṃkhya* is as much an abstraction as the *Puruṣa*; its name '*avyakta*' testifies to its vagueness as a concept. It is the formless substrate of objects. The three *guṇas* of *Prakṛti* represent three moments of all being. To look upon *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* as mutually opposed and still constituting all objects suggests that these are states of conflict, unreal and uneasy, seeking to transcend themselves. There can be neither rest nor harmony in nature. Even in *pralaya*, there is a tension of *guṇas*. To give this state any meaning, a *Puruṣa* has to be introduced who will determine it one way or another. The real is that in which the opposition of *guṇas* is overcome. *Prakṛti* cannot be that, being an endless process relative to something other than herself. This inherent dependence is the hall mark of the unreal. Hence the Advaitic position that the world is relative and non-real, in a word, *māyā*.

The activities of *Prakṛti* in regard to immutable *Puruṣas* are purposeless and uncalled for. To make her an agent and still to deny her the capacity of enjoying the fruits of her activity

1. BSB II, 3, 5.

is purely arbitrary.¹ To make God responsible for the initial movement of *Prakṛti* as the Yoga and Bhikṣu have done is the first-step to rob *Prakṛti* of her independence and reality².

The difference between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* can be understood only on the presupposition of their initial unity. The distinction between the subject and object, on which the concepts of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* depend, is derived through analysis of an original, impartite, experience. This last escapes our notice due to our ignorance or *avidyā*. This is no excuse for splitting up that original unity and setting up two independent principles in its place between which there can be no relation at all.

The main weakness of the *Sāṃkhya* system is this – that an unacknowledged chasm has been created between the only two principles it acknowledges as primary. Nevertheless, a deep unity between them is implied throughout the system. Experience of the world and the achievement of the final goal are impossible without the unity of purpose and action between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. *Puruṣa* informs *Prakṛti* in all its evolution; *buddhi*, *prakṛti*'s first product, acts as *Puruṣa* throughout life.

Were *Prakṛti* exclusively mechanical, there could be no freedom of will, will being a product of *Prakṛti*. Yet the *Sāṃkhya* feels man has duties to perform, vices to avoid, and virtues to cultivate. There is something in man which is free. With the full recognition of this truth, it is difficult to reconcile the independent and co-ordinate reality of *Prakṛti*. One of the two has to be given up. The Advaita system gives up the independent reality of *Prakṛti*. But before turning to a consideration of the concept of *mukti* developed in that school, we shall discuss a few other systems to see how they meet the persistent claim of the human spirit for liberation and independence.

1. kartuṃ nāma vijānāti pradhānam vyañjanādikam ; |
bhoktuṃ na cavijānāti kimayuktamataḥ param ; ||
Tattvasaṃgraha, śl. 300.

2. Vijñānāmṛta I, 1, 2. 'Prakṛtipuruṣasamyoga isvareṇakriyate.

CHAPTER V

THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF NIRVĀNA.

Among the Indian concepts of man's deliverance, that which is associated with the teachings of the Buddha reveals several novel features. In our study of the Advaitic concept of *Mukti*, the teachings of the Buddha on Nirvāṇa and the chief interpretations placed on them by his followers deserve close scrutiny, because of the striking resemblances as well as the significant differences that emerge from a comparative study.

Nirvāṇa or deliverance is the central idea of the teachings of the Buddha, the *raison d'être* of the religious discipline he recommended to his followers. "As the vast ocean, O monks, is impregnated with one flavour, the flavour of salt, so also, O monks, this my Law and Discipline is impregnated with the flavour of deliverance"¹. This remarkable preoccupation with the problem of the deliverance of man points to a view of life as utter suffering and a sense of urgency to indicate a way out of it. By virtue of his having personally tackled this problem in all its intricacy and successfully solved it through the enlightenment he won under the Bo-tree at Uruvella, the Buddha confidently places before all living beings a comprehensive plan for securing deliverance from the pain which is life.

We shall analyse below the salient points of the Buddha's scheme of liberation, the path and the goal to which that path leads.

Life of man :

For Buddhism which is largely a scheme of deliverance, the life of man is inevitably a mass of suffering. Had life not partaken of the nature of intolerable suffering, few would have paid any heed to a teaching which promised hardly aught more than relief therefrom. In this initial pessimism, the Buddha agrees with his predecessor Kapila, the founder of the *Sāṃkhya* system, who also undertakes a philosophical enquiry to rescue

1. Cullavagga, IX, 1, 4.

man from his three-fold pain.¹ But the Buddha's impression of the painfulness of life is far more comprehensive and appalling : "In the whole history of thought, no one has painted the misery of human existence in blacker colours and with more feeling than the Buddha".² Perhaps, he deepened the shadows in the picture of life with a view to make people long for deliverance. The pilgrimage of beings, *samsāra*, has its beginning in eternity. No opening can be discovered from which proceeding creatures, mazed in ignorance, fettered by a thirst for being, stray and wander. "What think ye, disciples, whether is more the water which is in the four great oceans or the tears which have flowed from you and have been shed by you, while ye strayed and wandered on this long pilgrimage and sorrowed and wept, because that was your portion which ye abhorred and that which ye loved was not your portion? A mother's death, a brother's death,.....all this have ye experienced through long ages. More tears have flowed from you.....than all the water which is in the four great oceans."³

The life of a man, teaches the Buddha in his celebrated fire sermon,⁴ is a sheet of flame. "Sabbam bhikkhave ādittam" Everything is on fire. How? The eye is burning. Visible things or *rūpa*, impressions formed through the eye, *cakkhu viññānas* and contacts of the eye with visible things are burning. Whether the sensations produced by the eye-contact be pleasant, unpleasant or neither, they are burning. With what fire? With the fire of lust, hatred and delusion, *rāgāgginā*, *dosāgginā*, *mohāgginā*, as also with the fire of birth, decay, death, grief, lamentation, suffering, dejection and despair. Similar is the case with the other sense-organs like the ear, the nose, the tongue, the body (i. e., the skin). In view of all this, concludes the Buddha, a noble disciple, *ariyasāvaka*, gets weary of the eye, the visible things, impressions based on sight, etc., divests himself of possessions, *virajjati*, and is freed.⁵

1. Sām. kārika, S'l. i;

2. IP. I. p. 362.

3. Samyukta Nikāya. Quoted by Oldenberg in Buddha PP. 216-217

4. Vinaya. I, 21, 1-4 or BT. PP. 350 ff.

5. Cf. The sermon at Saranath;

It is noteworthy that to the thinking or learned observer alone life appears to be a scene of intense suffering.^{1, 2} All life is suffering is the one inexhaustible theme of Buddhist philosophical speculations. Birth, old age, and death are the three main forms of earthly sorrow. "But for these, the Buddha would not have appeared in the world."³ The theme of the impermanence and sufferings of man here below is poetically handled in the *Dhammapada*.⁴

Duḥkha or misery :

Whereas Buddhism emphasized the misery of life, it is necessary to understand by the word *duḥkha* something more than the corporeal sufferings of man. It rather denotes in Buddhism the widest possible concept of the unideal.⁵ Together with *anicca* and *anatta*, *duḥkha* denotes the basic character of early Buddhism. Stcherbatsky⁶ points out that *duḥkha* in philosophical Buddhism is a more comprehensive concept than that of suffering, sorrow, etc. Expressions like : the element of vision, *cakṣu*, is *duḥkha* all elements influenced (sāsrava-influenced by desire to live) are *duḥkha*, become unintelligible with such a sense attached to the word. What is meant is that the elements referred to are in a state of perpetual commotion or unrest, and that the ultimate goal of the world-process consists in their gradual appeasement and final extinction. This wider sense is already suggested by the old Buddhist credo, *ye dharmāḥ hetuprabhavāḥ*, etc.⁷ Vasubandhu⁸ uses it in this sense when he says that the Buddha's method of salvation

1. Cf. YS, II, 15.

2. The insistence of the Buddha on the fact of suffering may be likened to the remark of Kant : Would any man of sound understanding, who has lived long enough and has meditated on the worth of human existence care to go again through life's poor play, I do not say on the same conditions, but on any conditions whatever ? Qd. IP. i, P. 364.

3. Anguttara Nikāya.

4. XI, 146-150 ;

5. Buddhism, P. 160 ; Mrs. Rhys. Davids, 1928 Edn. ;

6. The Central Concept of Buddhism PP. 48 ff.

7. *yedhamāḥ hetuprabhavā hetuṃ teṣāṃ Tathāgato hyavadat ; teṣāṃ cayoṇirodha evamvādī mahāśramanah*

8. Abhidhāma Kośa i, 3.

consists in converting all *utpattidharmas* into *anupattidharmas* i. e., in stopping for ever the commotion of the forces in the process of life. With this meaning of *duḥkha* attached to all the elements of life, Buddhism, of course, becomes a doctrine of salvation. From the point of view of *Nirvāṇa*, all the elements of life may assume one of two characters: they may either tend towards life, commotion, and turmoil; then they are called *sāsravāh*,¹ or influenced by passions. Or, they are *anāsravāh* i. e. uninfluenced by them and exhibit the opposite tendency towards reduction of life and appeasement.

Anicca or impermanence :

As important as the trait of *duḥkha* and indeed its cause, is the *anicca* or impermanence which characterizes all the elements of life. Nowhere does the Buddha see permanence; everything is in a state of flux or becoming. As soon as there is a beginning, there begins, at that very moment, to be an ending. Everything, animate and inanimate, is putting together, a confection, *samskāra*. Even the eternal hills and the deepest ocean-depths grow into being and pass away as surely and quickly (when compared with eternity) as the butterfly. In fact, there exists no static moment when, becoming attains to beinghood. The duration of the life of a living being is exceedingly brief, lasting only while a thought lasts. Just as a chariot-wheel rolls only at one point of the tire, and in resting rests only at one point, in exactly the same way, the life of a living being lasts only for the period of one thought. "The being of a past moment of thought has lived, but does not live, nor will it live. The being of a future moment of thought will live, but has not lived, nor does it live. The being of the present moment of thought does live, but has not lived, nor will it live."²

Of course it is obvious that an old man or a full grown tree is not identical with the babe or the seed.

Strictly speaking, the elements of existence are momentary appearances, momentary flashings into the phenomenal world,

1. Cf. BG. Ch. II, S'l. 26.

2. Visuddhimagga, Ch. VIII, Translated BT. P. 150.

out of an unknown source.¹ They are not related to each other either in time or in space, since they last only one single moment.² Thus a moment becomes a synonym for an element or *dharma*. The result is that elements in Buddhist thought do not change, but disappear,³ and the world becomes a sort of cinema show. Disappearance is the very essence of existence. What does not disappear does not exist.⁴

Anatta or Self-lessness :

Why are all elements of life, without exception, *anicca*, nay, momentary? The answer is furnished by the third fundamental concept of Buddhism, viz., that of self-lessness or *anatta*. This latter concept is inseparable from the doctrine of impermanence.⁵ The pith of the doctrine of self-lessness is that there is nothing changeless in things, nothing like an eternal *Ātman* or self. "The world is empty, O Ananda, means that it is empty of a self. What is empty? The five seats of the five senses, the mind, the feeling related to the mind - all these are void of a self or aught self-like."⁶ Every object, including living beings, thus, is a process or stream of moments and is no more constant than a flowing river into which one cannot step twice. Whatever continuity it possesses is, therefore, that of an everchanging identity.

The term *Ātman* in the expression *anatta* means a personality, an ego, an individual, a living being, a conscious agent, etc.⁷ The point is that whatever is denoted by these terms is not an ultimate fact, but a mere name for a multitude of interconnected facts. The self-lessness or *nairātmya* is but the opposite of *dharmatā* or the existence of ultimate realities. It must be emphasized that Buddhism never denied the exist-

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1. The Central Concept of Buddhism P. 37 ;
 2. SDS. II, P. 29 ;
 3. Katha Vatthu, XXII, 8—ekacittakhanikā sabbe dhammā ;
 4. Cf. The truth is that we change without ceasing and that the state itself is nothing but change" Creative evolution, P. 2.
 5. Buddha & the Gospel of Buddhism, P. 96, A. Coomaraswamy.
 6. Samyukta Nikāya IV, 54 ;
 7. The Central Concept P. 25.

ence of a personality or a soul in the empirical sense. What it asserts is that soul or self is not an ultimate reality. Hence the technical term denoting the individual in Buddhism is *santāna*, i. e., a stream of interconnected facts, both physical and mental.

The Individual :

At this stage the question what according to Buddhism is the individual or *Jīva* must be directly raised ; for, the doctrine of deliverance concerns the individual and the nature of the deliverance will be determined, as we have seen in other schools of thought, by the concept of the *Jīva*.

M. Poussin¹ observes that the facts are well-ascertained and beyond discussion : (i) Śākyamuni does not admit the existence of a self or *ātman*, a permanent individual ; (ii) He teaches that the so-called self is a compound of material and spiritual elements called *skandhas* ; (iii) but, nevertheless, he teaches rewards of actions in a future life.

Skandhas :

In Buddhism, then, man, the seeker after deliverance, is an assemblage of different properties or qualities, none of which is equal to self. These constituent qualities have been grouped into five classes each being called a *skandha*. These are (i) the material qualities or *rūpa skandha* ; (ii) Feelings or *vedanā-skandha* ; (iii) abstract ideas or *saṃjñā skandha* ; (iv) tendencies of the mind or *samskāra skandha* and (v) the forms of consciousness or *viññāna skandha*.

(i) *Rūpa skandha* comprises 28 items in all. They are the four elements earth, water, etc., each being composed of atoms ; the five sense organs, the eye, the ear, etc., the five attributes of matter such as colour, sound, smell, taste, touch, the two distinctions of sex ; the three essential conditions, thought, vitality and space ; the seven qualities of living bodies, buoyancy, elasticity, power of adaptations, power of aggregation, duration, decay and change ; and the two means of communication, gestures and speech.

1. The way to Nirvāṇa, P. 34.

(ii) *Vedanā Skandha* or feelings are divided into six classes as they are immediately apprehended by each of the five senses and, sixthly, by the mind, through memory. Further, they have been subdivided into 12 classes, for each of the six may be either agreeable, disagreeable or indifferent.¹

(iii) *Samjñā Skandha* denotes abstract ideas or the perceptions which are divided into six classes corresponding to the six classes of feelings, e.g., the idea blue or the idea of a tree is classed under sight, the idea of sweetness under tastes and so on.²

(iv) *Samskāra Skandha* or pre-disposition group has 52 divisions (51 according to Warren's Translation). These are not mutually exclusive. Besides, some of these include, or, are the same as, the items shown in the classes given above. The distinction is that while the members of the *samskāra* group are given from a subjective point of view, those given in the earlier groups are more objective. Instances of the *samskāra* are contact, *phassa*; feelings, *vedanā*; abstract ideas, *saṃjñā*; the regrouping of ideas, *cetanā*, etc.

(v) *Vijñāna skandha* or the consciousness-group is, in fact, only an amplification of thought, a member of the *Samskāra* group. It is divided into 89 classes according to the merit or demerit resulting from different thoughts. According to T. W. Rhys Davida,³ these subdivisions are not very vital for understanding the Buddhist scheme of Nirvāṇa.

“The first or the form-group i. e., *Rūpa Skandha* is like a mass of foam, gradually forming and vanishing. The second, the *Vedanā Skandha*, is like a bubble dancing on the face of water. The *Samjñā skandha* is like an uncertain mirage in the sun-shine. The *Samskāra* group is like the plantain stalk without firmness or solidity. The *Vijñāna* group is like a

1. BT. P. 488 gives a different account of a five-fold division, viz., happiness, misery, gladness, grief, and indifference, each of which may be conjoined to consciousness either meritorious, demeritorious or neither.
2. Here also Warren's account differs—vide P. 488, Ibid.
3. Buddhism;

spectre or magical illusion.”¹ These five *skandhas* may be understood as respectively standing for matter, feelings, ideas, volitions and other faculties and pure sensation or general consciousness. According to Stcherbatsky,² the group of *rūpa* or matter represents only sense-data. The self or soul is replaced by feelings, ideas, volitions and pure sensations. Thus the entire scheme suggests that man is an epitome of matter and mind.

The physical elements of personality including its outer environment are represented by the *rūpa skandha*. The mental elements are distributed among the remaining four. The Upaniṣadic expression, *nāma-rūpa* is often employed to denote the entire individual. Then *nāma* would denote the last four groups or mind, while *rūpa* stands for the material frame.

The absence of an enduring self, *ātman* or substance, is the distinctive thesis of Buddhism, as already pointed out above. Then is there no single agent responsible for the actions performed by the individual and obliged to reap the fruits of such actions?; none transmigrating and destined, eventually, to achieve Nirvāṇa? The Buddha clearly declares³ that form or *rūpa* is not the *ātman* or agent in question. For, were it so, form would not tend towards destruction and it would have been possible to say of it:—“Let my form be this way; let not my form be that way”. But form in fact tends towards destruction and it cannot be altered at will. Therefore, it is not the *ātman*. Similar is the case with regard to all the remaining four groups. So none of them may be deemed the self of man. All these groups are equally transitory and evil. Hence, none of them deserves to be the self or ‘I’. “Accordingly, as respects all forms whatsoever, past, future or present, subjective or external, gross or subtle, mean or exalted, far or near, the correct view in the light of the

1. Spence Hardy's *Manual*; *Samyukta Nikāya* iii, 142.
‘phenapiṇḍūpamaṃ rūpaṃ vedanā bubbulūpamā |
marīcikūpamāsaṅgā, sankhārakadalūpamā |
māyūpamañ caviṇṇānam dīpitādiccabandhunā’ ||

2. *The Central Concept* P. 6.

3. *Mahāvagga*, I, 6. *BT. PP.* 146-7.

highest knowledge is as follows: "this is not mine; this am I not; this is not myself." This formula is extended to the remaining *skandhas* also.

Thus, in Buddhist thought, right from the beginning no self i. e., no unity or a permanent feeling or thinking entity has had a place. There is only the body which is a visibly composite, growing, decaying thing and a number of associated phenomena like feelings, perceptions, etc. That these inner states depend on a self is an unwarranted surmise; for, there can be no connection between being and becoming. "There are perceptions, but we do not know a perceiver."¹ The conclusion of the above discussion is that man, the seeker after deliverance, is made of the five *skandhas*; he is a compound and no compound can be an individual; a being.

This striking concept of man may be best illustrated by the simile of the chariot given in the *Milinda Pañhā*.² Milinda asks Nāgasena, the Buddhist sage: "What is your name?" "I am known as Nāgasena, but, Nāgasena is only a term, appellation, designation, mere name, mere empty sound, for there an individual does not exist". "But", says Milinda, "if the individual does not exist, who is it, then, who furnishes you with robes, food and so on? Who is it who keeps the precepts of the Buddha?..... Do answer me. Are not your body, feelings, sensations, volitions, cognitions, Nāgasena?" Nāgasena answers in the negative and Milinda concludes: "You speak a falsehood, a lie." Now Nāgasena asks Milinda: "Did you come on foot or in a chariot?" "I came in a

1. Cf. "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, never can observe anything but the perception..... and were all my perceptions removed by death and could I neither think nor feel, nor see nor love, nor hate, after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is further requisite to make a perfect non-entity". Hume's Works, Vol. I, PP. 13 ff. Qd. IP. i, PP. 393-4.
2. SBE. XXXV, i, P. 40, BT, P. 129;

chariot." "If you came in a chariot, explain to me what a chariot is. Is the pole, the chariot?" Milinda confesses that neither the pole, nor the axle, nor the wheels, nor the frame, nor the yoke, nor any part of the chariot, is the chariot. Nāgasena concludes: "When you said 'I came in a chariot,' you spoke a falsehood, a lie; there is no chariot." For, as it is said elsewhere: "Just as the word chariot is but a mode of expression for axle, wheels and other constituent members placed in a certain relation to each other, but when we examine the members one by one, we discover that, in an absolute sense, there is no chariot, just as the words 'house', 'fist', 'lute', 'army', 'city', 'tree' are only modes of expression for collections of certain things disposed in a certain manner, in exactly the same way, the words 'living being' and 'ego' are only modes of expression for a complex of bodily and non-bodily constituents"¹.

"If you infer an entity behind an individual man, you must also logically infer it behind every individual thing, such as a chariot. Buddhists reject both entities and Plato, equally logically, accepts both, when he recognizes in a bed the existence of some one form which includes the numerous particular things to which we apply the same name."²

None the less, may it not be suggested that, among the constituents of man, the mind or consciousness is his enduring self, responsible for the unity of his thought and action? The Buddha rejects such a suggestion. Even the ignorant, unconverted, man may conceive an aversion for this body, which increases or wastes away. But that which is called mind, intellect, consciousness—here the ignorant man is not equal to conceiving an aversion. Because, from time immemorial the ignorant man has held the notion:—This is mine, This am I, this is myself. But it were better if the ignorant man regarded the body as the self rather than the mind. Because it is evident that this body lasts for some time, a year or twenty, or a hundred years. But what is called the mind or consciousness incessantly perishes and springs up.³

1. Visuddhimagga, BT. P. 133;

2. E. J. Thomas, Buddhist Scriptures, 119.

3. Summarised from the Samyukta Nikāya, vide BT. PP. 150 ff.

The conclusion that seems to follow from the considerations so far adduced may be expressed in Rhys Davids' words: ¹ "Sākyamuni acknowledged the reality of the emotional and intellectual dispositions, but he refused absolutely to look upon them as a unity. There should be no mistake about it. Yet the position is also so original that there is a great temptation to attempt to find a loop-hole through which at least a covert or esoteric belief in a soul and in the future life (of a soul) can be recognised in some way. There is no loop-hole and the efforts to find one have always met with unswerving opposition both in the scriptures and in extra canonical works."

Notwithstanding this categorical assertion, Mrs. Rhys Davids in several of her books insists that the conclusion drawn above is a falsification of the original intentions of the Buddha. She argues ² that great world religions like Buddhism invariably show a More of some kind in man and never a less as the Buddhism which has survived in the *Piṭakas* does.³ This unfortunate result she attributes to the work of monks who allowed their ideals of life-and-self-negation to obscure the immanent self which the Buddha originally assumed in consonance with the Upaniṣadic teaching on the subject. Monkish ideals have made Buddhism pessimistic. Their pre-occupation with the study of the mind has led to the ignoring of the 'minder'. That, in fact, the Buddha taught a more in man and assumed man's self to be identical with the Upaniṣadic *Ātman* is proven by the 'fragments' which have survived in the *Piṭakas*. In the *Vinaya Piṭaka* ⁴ the Buddha is shown as asking the thirty sportive young men looking for a woman: "What think you, young men? What is better for you? that you should seek a woman or yourself?" This passage has striking resemblance to the Chāndogya. VIII, 1, 1⁵ and the Buddha is evidently referring to a supremely significant reality immanent in the young men whom he was addressing. Again, his words in the

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1. Dialogues of the Buddha, I. P. 189 ;
 2. Buddhism, its birth and dispersal; revised edition, 1934.
 3. Sākya or Buddhist origins, PP. 54 ff.
 4. I, 13 "katamam nukhu tumbhakam varam yam vā tumhe ittingaveseyyātha, yamvā attānam gaveseyyātha ti" ..
 5. tadanvesavyam tadvāva vijjijāsitavyam.

Mahāparinibbāṇa sutta: "Live as they who have the self for a lamp, for a refuge, as they who have *dhamma* for a lamp, for a refuge, and none other"¹ refer to the self as God in man and not mere self-reliance or self-confidence. No weak transient creature can be lamp or refuge. *Attā* in this context means, rather, the God Self, the innate power, in every man, to evolve from his actual into his potential self, to grow from manhood into the Godhead latent in man.²

This positive interpretation of *attā* seems to gain further support from atleast one celebrated sermon of the Master on 'the Burden and the Bearer of the Burden'³ "And what, O priests, is the burden? The five attachment groups, viz., the five *skandhas*. And who is the bearer of the burden? The individual, the venerable so-and-so of such-and-such a family. He is the bearer of the burden."⁴ This passage apparently contemplates a something other than the five groups who bears them, the burden.

On the other hand, it must be recognized that while the Buddha tells us what the *attā* is not, he does not state what it is; so that there is room for divergence of views. A wandering monk Vacchagotta puts the Buddha the direct question: Is there the ego? (*attā*). The exalted one was silent. "How, then, is there not the ego?" Still the Buddha maintained silence. After the questioner went away, the Buddha explains that by his silence he meant to disagree with the two heresies of the permanence and annihilation of the *ātman* or self. From this episode, Oldenberg⁵ concludes that the Buddha's silence arose from his reluctance to shock a weak-minded hearer by asserting that, in fact, the self is a fiction. But, were it so, Nirvāṇa must mean annihilation, a suggestion that the Buddha repudiates. Nirvāṇa is only a negation of the flux. What seems to follow from the Buddha's silence is that the Self of man is nothing empirical, that, without transcending experience, we cannot make assertions about the reality behind the phenomena of life.⁶

1. The Dialogues - ii, 26;

2. Cf. The Dhammapada verses 160 and 380;

3. BT PP. 159 ff.

4. Adapted;

5. Buddha P. 273;

6. IP. i, P. 397;

Man's moral responsibility :

The individual, caught up in the incessant flux of life and aware that all life is suffering, is naturally eager to seek a way out of it. He may not take comfort in the thought that he has no permanent self or that he is just a combination of *skandhas* and avoid the responsibility to seek the path leading out of sorrow. Buddhism has always waged incessant war against the mere nihilists or *nāstikas* and the fatalists¹ who deny the law of causality, especially in the realm of acts and their consequences.² The Buddha taught: to say that man, when the body dissolves, is cut off, perishes, does not exist any longer, that is heresy, heretical belief, heretical jungle, heretical wilderness.

Indeed it is the heresy, the *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*, the most dangerous among human errors and sins.³ To reconcile the position that man has no permanent self to transmigrate with the doctrine of the inescapable reward for his actions, one has to agree with H. C. Warren⁴ that Buddhism recognizes rebirth of character and not transmigration of a self. What is reborn is not a self but character, as Rhys Davids says. Thus the moral responsibility for one's actions is squarely placed on oneself and there is no way to shirk it. The way out of the life of suffering must be trodden by each seeker after Nirvāṇa. No grace from on High, no miraculous salvation through the efficacy of vicarious suffering, is there for the Buddhist aspirant to rely on. The last reported words⁵ of the Buddha inspire him, "Behold now, brethren, I exhort you saying, "Decay is inherent in all component things: Work out your salvation with diligence." The Buddha only gives guidance but does not save. His teachings indicate the manner in which one must strive to reach the goal of holy life-*brahmacariyaṃ*. In his

1. *Brahmajālasutta*

2. *Way nirvana*, P. 45 ;

3. "To believe in a self is a heresy, *dr̥ṣṭi*, the *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*, but not a sin. A believer in the self may be reborn as a god and even as *Brahmā*. On the contrary, the denial of the reward of actions in a future life is a sin like murder, theft etc." *Way to Nirvāṇa*, P. 46 F.N.

4. *BT.*, P. 234.

5. *The Mahā Parinirvāṇa Sutta*, *BT.*, P. 109 ;

sermon at Sāranāth, for instance, the Buddha declares : "If ye walk according to my teaching, ye shall be partakers, shortly, of that for which noble youths leave their homes and go into homelessness, the highest end of religious endeavour. Ye shall, even in this present life, apprehend the truth itself and see it face to face."¹

The four noble truths :

The teachings of the Buddha which the seeker after Nirvāṇa, the *āryaśrāvaka*, must heed and master indeed, which constitute the essence of Buddhism—are the four celebrated *āryasatyas*, sacred or noble truths. The first is the sacred truth of *duḥkha* or suffering, viz., birth, old age, sickness, death, contact with the unloved things and separation from loved ones are all suffering.² The second sacred truth is *duḥkha-samudaya* or the origin of suffering. It is the thirst, *taṇhā*, leading from birth to birth together with lust and desire, *nandirāgasahagatā* the thirst for pleasures, *kamataṇhā* ; for being, *bhavataṇhā* ; for power or prosperity, *vibhavataṇhā*. The third sacred truth relates to the extinction of suffering, *duḥkhanirodha*. It consists in the extinction of this very thirst by the total wiping out of desire, *aśeṣavirāganirodha*, letting it go, expelling it, separating oneself from it, giving it no room. The last sacred truth is the *maggo* or the path leading to the extinction of suffering, viz., the noble eight-fold path.

While a general discussion of the first sacred truth was attempted above, a clear understanding of it in accordance with the Buddhist scheme is necessary to get an adequate idea of that state of bondage, whence deliverance is sought. The two tenets of the origin of suffering and its extinction *duḥkha-samudaya* and *nirodha* comprise the sum of all human destiny. How does *duḥkha* arise is tantamount to the question how does human life arise ; for, as was stressed above, all life is suffering. The second and third sacred truths state in general terms that suffering is born of the thirst (for being) which leads from birth to birth and that its extinction is secured by the annihilation

1. Vinaya Pitaka I ;

2. The nature of the truth of suffering, *duḥkha*, has been discussed above.

of this self-same thirst. A complete picture of the process by which suffering (or life) is engendered is furnished by the Buddhist formula of *paṭiccasamuppāda* which is second in sacredness only to the four *ariyasaccas*. In the *Mahādidāna-sutta*¹ the Buddha affirms that it is through not understanding this doctrine that mankind is like to an entangled warp or to an ensnarled web and fails to extricate itself from punishment, suffering, perdition and re-birth. The chain of dependent origination in a generally accepted form is as follows: "By reason of ignorance or *avidyā*, dispositions or *samskāras* arise:² by reason of dispositions, consciousness or *viññāna* arises; by reason of consciousness, name and form or *nāmarūpa* arises; by reason of name and form, the six fields, i. e., senses and objects, the *ṣaḍāyatanas* arise; by reason of the six fields, the co-operation of the organs and consciousness, *spṛṣā*, begins; by reason of this co-operation, definite sensations, *vedanā*, arises: by reason of sensations, the awakening of the *trṣṇā* or craving takes place; by reason of this awakening of the sexual instinct, various pursuits in life, *upādāna*, arise; by reason of these pursuits, life, i. e., various conscious activities, *bhava*, ensue; by reason of life, rebirth, *jāti*, follows; by reason of rebirth, new life, decay, death, pain, lamentation, etc., *jarāmaraṇaśokaparivedanaduḥkhadurnanastā*, ensue.³

Of these twelve links, *avidyā* and *samskāra* refer to the former life of the individual concerned; the next eight from *viññāna* to *bhava* pertain to the present life; and the last two *jāti* and *jarāmaraṇādi*, belong to the future life. In his *The Central Concept*,⁴ Stcherbatsky points out that the twelve linked chain does not represent an evolution in which one member produces the next, e. g., *viññāna* does not produce the *nāmarūpa*, as the *sāṃkhyan buddhi* produces the rest of the psycho-physical organism. In fact, as soon as the first moment

1. BT. PP. 202 ff.;
2. Stcherbatsky equates this with karma; the Central Concept PP. 106, 107;
3. In the translations of the sanskrit terms Stcherbatsky's renderings have been mainly followed. Cf. PP. 29 ff. of *The Central Concept*.
4. P. 28, F. N.

life, i. e., *viññāna*; appears, all the five groups are already present. ¹ *Vijñāna* must be understood in this 'wheel of life' as a technical term denoting the first moment of a new life arising on account of pre-natal forces, *avidyā* and *saṃskāras*.

The next seven members mark the stages of the development of the embryo into a child, youth and grown-up man. The *tīṣṇā* stage corresponds to maturity, when new *karma* begins to be formed. The two last members briefly refer to future life.

In depicting the origin of life, this formula, at the same time, depicts that of all suffering, too. By removing the earlier links, the succeeding links of the chains are broken and sufferings are annihilated. What comes out prominently from this delineation is that "We be, because we thirst for being; we suffer because we thirst for pleasures." Whomsoever this fierce craving, full of poison, overcomes in this world, his sorrows increase like the abounding *birana* grass. ²

Avidyā:

From the chain of dependent origination, it is clear that, according to the Buddha, the ultimate cause of life and suffering is *avidyā* or ignorance. But who is ignorant and of what is he ignorant? So far as early Buddhism or the Buddhism of the *Piṭakas* is concerned, *avidyā* has no cosmogonical power as it has in Advaita Vedānta; ³ it simply stands for the ignorance of the four sacred truths. The question is discussed in the *Viśuddhi Mārga*: ⁴ "What is ignorance? Want of knowledge

1. "Suppose consciousness or *viññāna* were not to descend into the maternal womb, pray, would name and form consolidate in the maternal womb?" the Buddha asks Ānanda; BT. P. 207.
2. Dhammapada XXIV, 335;
3. Later Buddhist texts support the correspondence between the Advaitic *Māyā* and the Buddhist *avidyā*. The Buddha says to S'ariputta in the *Prajñāpāramitā*: Things exist in so far as they do not exist in truth. In so far as they do not exist, they are called *avidyā* i. e., the non-existent, or ignorance. Quoted in Buddha. PP. 237-8, Oldenberg.
4. BT. PP. 170 ff;

concerning misery, *duḥkha*, the origin of misery, the cessation of misery and the path leading to it." ¹ The Buddha sometimes spoke of *avidyā* as beginningless. ² At other times, he used to say: On the arising of the depravities depends the arising of ignorance. ³ Similarly, the desire for existence also was treated as without beginning, though possessing a definite dependence. All this adds up to the position that the wheel of existence is without known beginning and that both ignorance and desire are its roots. ⁴

Thus *avidyā* is a positive entity in early Buddhism and not a fictitious category as conceived by Advaita Vedānta. ⁵ The significant idea that the origin of the world of suffering has been conditioned alike by *avidyā* and *trṣṇā* has been graphically expressed in the *Lakṣaṇavāṇī*: ⁶ *trṣṇā* or desire is the mother and *avidyā* or ignorance is the father of the individual and his sorrows. ⁷

Of *avidyā* the Buddha says: ⁸ Just as in a peaked house, O brethren, whatever rafters there are, all converge to the roof-peak, resort equally to the roof-peak, all go to junction there, even so, whatever wrong states there are all have their root in ignorance, referred to ignorance, fixed together in ignorance, go to junction there. Again: Whatever misfortunes there are here in this world, or in the next, they all have their root in ignorance, *avijjāmūlakā*, and are given rise to by longing and desire. ⁹

1. Sammaditṭhi suttanta, Majjhima Nikāya.

2. "As I have told you, O priests, the first beginning of ignorance cannot be discerned, nor can one say, "Before a given point of time there was no ignorance; it came into being afterwards";" BT., P. 171.

3. Ibid. P. 171.

4. Ibid. P. 175.

5. The Buddhist Doctrine of Flux, P. 258. In later Buddhism there is a change towards assimilation to the Advaitic view of. Śālistambasūtra: tattvepratipattimithyāprtipattitve ajñānaṃ avidyā, Qd, in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, P. 222.

6. P. 140, Qd, in The Basic Conception of Buddhism, V. Bhattachārya, P. 38;

7. Cf. Dhamma Pāda verses 294, 295.

8. Samyukta Nikāya XX, 1;

9. Itivuttaka, 40. Cf. The BU. IV, 4, 6, 7.

Dharma as Law :

Here may be noted the basic agreement between the Buddha and the Vedic tradition ¹ as regards the cause of suffering and bondage. The entire chain of dependent origination throws into relief the Buddhist conviction that the whole world including the life of man is subject to the reign of law or *dharma*. For the Buddhist what has been made, *samskṛta*, has existence only and solely in the process of being made. Whatever is, is the process of a being. The world is the world's process, the formula of causality is the expression of this process, at least of that part of it which concerns man. "Life according to Buddhism is neither a metaphysical thing nor a physical thing, but a metaphysical grasping itself, a mental self-contained process. It is not a self-identity, but an ignorance about itself." ²

The category of *samskāra* also implies the doctrine of *karma*, the law of moral retribution. What appears to be a man's body, is in truth, "The action of his past state, which, assuming a form, has become tangible."³

Samskāra and *dharma* are the two buddhist terms for all things whose being consists in their mutual relation. All *dharma*s are *anattā* or not-I. But in this world of impermanence and selflessness, there reigns the absolute law of causality, a fact on which rests hope of man's full deliverance from sorrow and bondage.

The Adhikārin or Candidate for Nirvāṇa :

Now, the question rises as to who, according to Buddhism, are entitled to strive for complete deliverance. Who are the proper candidates for the highest result of religious life, *Nirvāṇa*? "One deep divergence must be named. The Buddhist scheme proclaims the ultimate salvation of all beings. Christia-

1. The *Rgveda*, X. 129, 4 - *kāmastadagresamavartatāgre manaso retah prathamamyadāsīt*; - also makes desire, the root of the world process *kamabandhanamevedaṃ nānyadstīha bandhanam Vyāsa*: also Cf. *Atharva Veda* IX, 2, 19-20.
2. Buddhism, its place in the mental life of mankind, P. 81, Dahlke,
3. *Āṅguttara Nikāya*.

nity in its most widespread historic forms, still condemns an uncounted number to endless torment and unceasing sin." ¹ This absolute catholicity of Buddhism follows from the injunction of the Buddha himself: O! monks, live and preach the holy life for the good of all people, for the happiness of all, out of compassion for all; (for promoting) the goal of all, *atthayā* for the good, weal of gods and men.² While all are entitled, nay, expected, to tread the path leading to deliverance, the actual stage of deliverance is deemed attainable by the monks alone. For, "full of hindrances is household life, a path defiled by passion; free as the air is the life of him who has renounced all worldly things. How difficult is it for the man who dwells at home to live the higher life in all its fullness, in all its purity, in all its bright perfection!" ³ However, an exception was made in favour of pious lay disciples, *upāsakas* and *upāsikas*. "I tell thee O! Mahānāma, that between a lay disciple who has attained the stage of deliverance and a monk freed from all impurity, there exists no difference as regards the state of their deliverance."⁴ But lay or clerical, all aspirants to Nirvāṇa are expected to be intelligent enough to grasp and act upon the teachings of the Buddha. "The doctrine may be mastered by any intelligent man for himself; such a one may be enlightened and is expected to act accordingly."⁵

It is well-known that irrespective of caste and class distinctions, all people could and, indeed, did join the Buddhist order and attain Nirvāṇa.

The means to Nirvāṇa, or the ethical life:

The way out of the sufferings of life, *dukkha*, which the candidate has to tread is set forth as the fourth sacred truth, otherwise known as the noble eight-fold path, *ariya aṣṭāṅgiko-maggo*. The principle underlying it derives from the conviction of the Buddha that there operates in the actual world *dharma* as the norm, and a strenuous moral life in consonance with the

1. J. E. Carpenter, *Buddhism & Christianity*, 1923, P. 306.
2. *Vinaya Piṭaka* I, 11, 1. *yassatthāya kulaputtā sammadeva agārasmā anagāriyam pabbajanti*.
3. *Tevijjasutta*, i, 47;
4. *Samyukta Nikāya*.
5. *Samyukta Nikāya* XVI, 3, BT. P. 410.;

dharma must eliminate all sorrows, which are but the symptoms of deviation from it. The moral ideals embodied in the noble eight-fold path are not subjective fancies or the casual products of the evolutionary process. They are rooted in the soul of the universe. They are the only realities on which we can safely count. The redemption of man in the grip of manifold sorrows consists in the actualization of the universal *dharma*. Insight into *dharma*, *dhammavipassanā*, is enlightenment. The end of the eight-fold path is the winning of insight, "the attainment, comprehending and realizing, even in this life, of emancipation of heart and emancipation of insight." The light which the seeker after deliverance is advised to seek amidst the encircling gloom of sorrow and suffering¹ is none other than the wisdom embodied in the eight-fold path.

The eight factors or ideals constituting the path are right views, *samyakdr̥ṣṭi*; right aspirations, *samyaksamkalpa*; right speech, *samyakvācā*; right conduct, *samyak karma*; right livelihood, *samyakājīva*; right effort, *samyakvyāyāma*; right mindfulness, *samyaksmṛti*; and right contemplation *samyak samādhi*.

The right views are those which are free from superstitions and delusions. What we do reflects what we think. Wrong acts result from wrong beliefs and not from any original sin. The most deadly of these wrong beliefs is the superstitious and persistent clinging to an imaginary self or individuality. All sufferings may be traced to the vain endeavour to maintain one's ego or self against the rest of the world. All wrong and immoral behaviour stems from this pathetic faith in one's private self. The first step, therefore, towards final deliverance consists in getting rid of this superstition and the rest which follow in its wake. To remove wrong views, right knowledge is needed—knowledge which is to issue in proper conduct; for, in Buddhist psychology, will and intelligence go together.²

A more technical sense attached to the right views refers to the knowledge regarding the four noble truths.³

1. Dhamma Pada XI, 146.

2. IP. i, P. 420;

3. BT. P. 373; 82.

Right aspirations is a product of right vision. It should be such as is worthy of an intelligent, earnest, man. "It is the longing for renunciation; the hope to live in love with all, the aspiration of true humanity."¹ Giving up the idea of separateness, the aspirant works for the whole.²

Aspirations must be translated into actions. Hence, upon its heels follow right speech, right action and right living. "To abstain from falsehood, to abstain from backbiting, to abstain from harsh language and to abstain from frivolous talk is called right speech."³ It is kindly, open and truthful.

Right conduct is peaceful, honest, pure, in a word, unselfish, behaviour. Sacrifices, spells, prayers, which usually figure prominently in other religions have no place in Buddhism. "Better homage to a man grounded in the *dharma* than to *Agni* for a hundred years." "No river can cleanse the doer of evil, the man of malice, the perpetrator of crime.....Have thy bath here, even here, O Brahmin, be kind to all living beings."⁴ "Not superstitious rites but kindness to servants, underlings, respect to those deserving of respect, self-control coupled with kindness in dealing with living creatures – these and virtuous deeds of like nature are verily the rites that are everywhere to be performed."⁵ What the Buddha did was to infuse moral significance into the forms of ceremonialism rather than seek to uproot it altogether. "Anger, drunkenness, deception, envy, these constitute uncleanness, not the eating of flesh."⁶ With rare ethical insight the Buddha proclaims the eternal moral law that should govern the dealings of man with man and nations with nations: "Never are enmities appeased through enmity; they are appeased through non-enmity (friendliness) only – this is the eternal law."⁷

1. Ibid; Sutta vibhanga ;

2. In the Mahāyāna, the aspirant resolves; I must bear the burden of all creatures – Vajradhvasasūtra.

3. BT., P. 373. ;

4. Essence of Buddhism, P. 230. Lakshminarsau ;

5. Asoka's Pillar Edict (vii) ;

6. Cf. "It is not that which entereth into a man that defileth him, but that which cometh out."

7. Dhamma Pada I, 5. ;

Right action issues forth in right livelihood, which brings hurt or danger to no living being. It must be free from lying, deceit, and fraud. Manufacture of arms, service in the army, etc., are obviously out of bounds for an aspirant to Nirvāṇa.

So far, the uprightness and purity of external conduct¹ have been emphasized, but inner purification is necessary for integrity and sanctity. The last three steps, right effort, mindfulness and contemplation refer to the achievement of inner purification.

Selftraining and selfcontrol form the essence of right effort. The object is to prevent the rise of evil impulses. This implies the inhibition of the wicked, and the reinforcement of virtuous, impulses."² "All that we are is the result of what we have thought; it is founded upon our thoughts; it is made up of our thoughts. If a man speaks or acts with an evil thought, pain follows him, as the wheel follows the foot of the ox that draws the wagon"³ "Karma is volition and the bodily or verbal action which follows volition."⁴ So great, indeed, has been the emphasis on the purification of will and the consequent rightness of action that an oft-quoted verse⁵ runs thus: The eschewing of evil, the perfecting of good deeds, the purifying of one's mind – this is the teaching of the Buddhas.

In this connection, it is expedient to refer to the well-known *brahmavihāra* *jhānas*,⁶ the divine state contemplations, than which Buddhism knows no better way of purifying the mind and raising it to the zenith of tranquillity. "He (the aspirant) with amity-consorted-mind abides suffusing one quarter, thus also the second (quarter), thus also the third, thus also the fourth. So above, below, across, every way, by everywhere, the entire world with amity-consorted mind, with abundant, expanded, immeasurable unhate, unill-will suffusing

1. The fact that conduct is the beginning of this religion appears from the passage: What is the first of the meritorious qualities? Purity conduct. BT. PP. 285-287.

2. BT. P. 373; 3. Dhamma Pada I, 1.;

4. Way to Nirvāṇa, P. 70; 5. Dhamma Pada XIV, 183.;

6. Anguttara Nikāya and Abhidhamma quoted in Sākyā, PP. 217-218.

abides he. And thus again with pity-consorted mind he abides suffusing one quarter....And then again with gladness-consorted mind he abides.....And then again with poise-consorted mind he abides suffusing one quarter with abundant, expanded, immeasurable unhate, unill-will suffusing abides he.'

The practice of this formula forms a part of the training of each aspirant who seeks to reach Nirvāṇa in this very life. Here is a recognition that one's real welfare, spiritual upliftment, and inner purification are bound up with those of the rest of the world. Moreover, it implies an effort, atonce at self-qualification and the upliftment of follow-beings. The process has been rightly described as tele-volition.¹ This distinction is noteworthy when it is remembered that in the *Yogasūtras*, in which the self same practice is recommended, the aim is limited to self-purification.²

Another way of expelling undesirable states of mind is by *aśubhabhāvanā* or reflection on the evil of life. Thus is engendered disgust for all that is corrupt. "Whosoever understands the truth of suffering in its four-fold aspect will acknowledge the falsehood of vulgar notions and will see pleasures and existence as transitory and painful, but he will not destroy his innate desire for pleasure, his thirst after existence. What is to be gained is a profound and efficacious feeling of the miseries of life, of the impurity of the body, of universal nothingness, to such a degree that the ascetic should see a woman as she really is, as a skeleton furnished with nerves and flesh, as an illusion made up of carnal desire. Mind will thus be freed from love, hatred, and from every passion."³

1. *sabbesattā sabbepāṇā sabbabhūtā ca kevalā sabbe bhaddāni passantu mākaṇḍipāpam āgamā*; Qd. *Sākya*, P. 221; Cf. *YS.I, 33*;
2. The current view among the scholars is that the Buddha was the author of the 4 *Brahmaviharas* meant to be used by monks & laymen for self-culture. Mrs. Rhys Davids holds that here is an enjoining of man to work for the welfare of his fellowmen. *Sākya*, P. 232;
3. M. Poussin: *Transactions of the third international congress of religions*, Vol. II, P. 41.

The effort to attain such clarity of vision through self-training and self-control is right effort.

So far has been considered that part of the noble eight-fold path which may be subsumed under *śīlaṃ* or the moral life. It has a three-fold character, the *cūla śīlaṃ*, the *majjhimaśīlaṃ*, and the *māhāśīlaṃ*.¹ The *cūlaśīlaṃ* which is obligatory on all the followers of the Buddha consists of the following items:—*ahimsā* which includes not only non-killing, but also the practice of modesty and pity and results in kindness to all creatures; *asteya* nonstealing, *brahmacarya*, continence, *satya*, truthfulness in speech. The aspirant at this stage must practise other positive virtues, e. g., he must bind together those who are divided and thus be a peace maker. He should avoid all harsh language,² vain talk and speak with nice regard for truth, inculcate the good doctrine and discipline. He does not seek gold or silver or collect uncooked grain. Thus, the aspirant eschews all possessions as well as worldly activities.

The *majjhimaśīlaṃ* has a wider scope. Injury even to plants is forbidden. The monk cannot store property like meat, drink, clothes, etc. Public spectacles and games detrimental to virtue must be avoided. The use of elevated couches and ornaments is taboo. No mean or vain conversation is allowed, much less noisy wranglings. Servile forms of duties and hypocritical craft must be avoided.

The highest form of *śīlaṃ* consists, besides the above, in not seeking a living by low arts and lying practices like divination, dream-reading, etc. It is at this stage that the *Brahma-vihāras*, 'far-reaching, great, measureless' prove indispensable. Such a *bhikkhu* who practises this highest form of conduct will have nothing to do with woman, wrath and malice; he is pure and self-controlled.

Right mindfulness, *smṛti*, must go along with right effort in order to make the latter effective. It denotes the active watchful mind whose tendency to roam about has been checked.

1. *Tevijja sutta*;

2. Cf. BG, XVII 15.

All emotions have to be disciplined for they are 'failures, disturbances of moral health and if indulged, become chronic diseases of the soul.'¹ Spiritual pride also must be carefully avoided through right mindfulness. "Whosoever is pure and knows that he is pure and finds pleasure in knowing it becomes impure and dies with an impure thought. Whosoever is impure and dies and knows that he is impure and makes effort to become pure dies of a pure thought." On the mind depends *dharma*; on the practice of *dharma* depends enlightenment.²

The next step is right *samādhi* under which may be subsumed the last three steps of the eight-fold path. *Samādhi* may be defined as an intentness of meritorious thoughts,³ and may be analysed into the four *Jhānas* or trances. The first *Jhāna* is a state of joy and happiness. It is born of seclusion and is full of reflection and investigation into the theme the aspirant has chosen for his contemplation. He has, of course, already isolated himself from sensual pleasures and demeritorious traits. The second *Jhāna* is also a state of joy and happiness, but they are born of deep tranquility. No longer is there either reflection or investigation. It is an interior tranquilization and intentness of thoughts. At this stage there is the predominance of intuition. In the third *Jhāna*, there is the paling of joy. The aspirant is indifferent, contemplative, conscious, and in the experience of bodily happiness. This state the *arahants*, eminent men, describe when they say, "indifferent, contemplative, and living happily." In the fourth *Jhāna* there is the abandonment of happiness and misery, the disappearance of all antecedent gladness and misery. Now the aspirant has *samādhi*, as refined by indifference.⁴ Here, perhaps, the reference is to a moment of unusual conviction and insight, followed by exalted religious ecstasy ending in abiding religious peace.⁵

1. Qd. IP. i, P. 423.

2. "cittādhīnodharma dharmadhīno bodhih" Cf. Suttanipāta, stanza 916;

3. Visuddhimagga Ch. iii, BT., P. 288;

4. Aṅguttara Nikāya iii, 88 – BT., P. 288;

5. T. W. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, P. 176.

When once the stage of *samādhi* is reached, there is no possibility of falling back to a lower stage of life. What chiefly strengthens *samādhi* is the preceding state of conduct or *śīlam*.

Both *śīlam* and *samādhi* are associated with *prajñā* which stands for the highest activity of the human mind and has supreme value from the religious point of view. Attempts have been made in the Pali cannon and the *Viśuddhi magga* to bring *prajñā* under one of the *skandhas*. In Buddhagoṣa's day, *samjñā*, *viññāna*, and *prajñā* were regarded as simple and complex modes of human insight. The *skandhas* represent the empirical point of view where the individual is treated as a separate entity. But when the individual nature is transformed into unity with the whole, *prajñā* displaces the empirical knowledge. The unregenerate experience *viññāna* while the regenerate develops *prajñā*. Sense-cognition or *viññāna* steadily develops, through *śīla* and *samādhi*, into true insight or *prajñā*. It is *prajñā* which terminates in *bodhi* or enlightenment.¹

In the Buddhism of the Pali canon there is no place for grace. The aspirant has to be *ātmśarṇa*, *ātmadīpa*, self-reliant and self-guided. Through right effort, the supreme exercise of will, he can, just as the Buddha did, attain full enlightenment and Nirvāṇa. "Not even a god can change into defeat the victory of a man who has vanquished himself."² The faith in the method of yoga to secure the highest insight or the saving knowledge is shared by Buddhism with other schools of Indian thought. But of course, the actual contents of the final insight are not identical in all these schools. In the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* schools, e.g., we saw that the yogic insight related to the qualitylessness of the self and the complete otherness of the self, respectively. In Buddhism, the successful aspirant realises through *samādhi* and with *prajñā* the utter emptiness or *anattā* of the world, including himself. What the Buddha himself realized at the supreme moment of illumination is expressed in the *Dhamma Pāda*³ as follows: I have been

1. IP. i, PP. 423 - 424.

2. Dhamma Pāda, VIII, 105.

3. XI, 153, 154;

through a course of many births looking for the maker of this dwelling and finding him not ; painful is birth again and again. Now are you seen O ! bullder of the house ; you will not build the house again. All your rafters are broken. Your ridge-pole is destroyed ; your mind, set on the attainment of Nirvāṇa, has attained the extinction of desires.

What is perceived in the light of *prajñā* is the real nature of desire, *taṇhā*, the co-worker with *avidyā*, which, together, fashioned this tabernacle of flesh. To perceive them truly is to destroy them for ever. "Delusion fashioned it, safe pass I them - deliverance to obtain." ¹ The knowledge and the insight sprang up within the Buddha :—" My deliverance is unshakable ; this is my last existence ; no more shall I be born again. " ²

Arhatship :

As a result of the conjoint practice of *śīla*, *samādhi*, and *prajñā* or moral self-culture, the aspirant treading the eight-fold path reaches the goal of Nirvāṇa. The interdependence of these factors in effecting Nirvāṇa is emphasized in the *Mahā-Parinibbāṇa sutta* : *Samādhi* perfected by the *sīla* or conduct proves of great advantage and yields the supreme fruit, *mahapphalo* ; insight, *paññā*, perfected by *samādhi* proves of advantage and

1. The light of Asia, Book VI, ; 2. Majjhima, 26, B.T., P. 338. The eight-fold path is often divided into four stages where each is marked by the breaking of the fetters, *samyojanas*, binding man in *samsāra*. The first of these fetters is *sakkāyadṛṣṭi* - the delusion of a personal self, the source of all sufferings. The second is scepticism or *vicikitsā* - about the Teacher, Dhamma, Order, the system of training, the past, present and future action of Karma and about the validity of the way. The third fetter is the *silabbata parāmassaie*, the faith in efficacy of good works and ceremonies. Mere morality and good works would not suffice to free ourselves from lust, hatred and ignorance. One who has broken these three fetters is the *sotāpanna* : - he who has entered on the stream and cannot be turned back. Cf. Dhamma Pada, XIII, 178. The fourth and fifth fetters are *Kāma* sensuality and *paṭighā* or malevolence. When these are reduced, one becomes a *sakadāgāmi*, he who will but once be reborn in the world of men. But when these two fetters are completely destroyed, one becomes *anāgāmi* ; he has no fear of falling back. The last five fetters are *rūparāga*, the love of life on earth amidst forms, *arūparāga*, desire for life in the formless worlds, *māno*, pride, *uddhacca*, self-righteousness, and *avijjā*, ignorance. To have got rid of all these 10 failings or fetters is to become an *arahat*, to win the blessedness of Nirvāṇa.

yields the supreme fruit. And the mind, *citta*, perfected by *paññā* is purged of all *āsavas*, viz., sensuality, individuality, delusion, and ignorance, *kāma*, *bhava*, *diṭṭha* and *avijjā*.

The crown of the moral life in Buddhism is *arahatship*. It is known by several names like emancipation, *mukti*, the island of refuge, the end of craving, etc. This is *Nirvāṇa* in which the three fires of lust, ill-will and delusion, *rāga*, *dveṣa*, *mohā*, are extinguished. One may almost say that *arahatship* is early Buddhism.¹ The significance and spirit of the arahat ideal has been faithfully expressed by J. A. Symmonds in the following lines :

“ ‘Tis self whereby we suffer. ‘Tis the greed.
 To grasp, the hunger to assimilate
 All that earth holds of fair and delicate,
 The lust to blend with beauteous lives, to feed
 And take our fill of loveliness, which breed
 This anguish of the soul intemperate.
 ‘Tis self that turns to harm and poisonous hate
 The calm clear life of love that Arahats lead,
 Oh ! that’t were possible this self to burn
 In the pure flame of joy contemplative !
 Then might we love all loveliness, nor yearn
 With tyrannous longings ; undisturbed might live
 Greeting the summer’s and spring’s return
 Nor wailing that their bloom is fugitive.”

An idea of arahatship may be got from several of the utterances of the Buddha and those of his successful followers in the *Theragāthā* and the *Therīgāthā*. The liberated or inlywashed saint is in the first place self-less and so no more craves for future lives.² He is proof against all objects of senses, because feelings no more tempt him ; he has lost all tastes for them.³ He has safely crossed the flood of *samsāra* even while living in the body, i.e., he has become a *Jīvanmukta*, delivered in life⁴.

The sage is unconcerned about reports fair or foul ; his heart is ever light. Of course he can never be guilty of self-

1. T.W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, P. 151.

2. *Suttanipata*, *āṭṭhaka*, stanzas 777, 786 ;

3. *Ibid.* 778.

4. *Ibid.* 779

praise¹. Having no mental propensities of his own, the sage can hardly be characterized as this or that; he is absolutely unique. His freedom from theories regarding the ultimate nature of things is very often stressed.²

Not only is he free from theories, but also from all kinds of earthly possessions. In his detachment from the world he is likened to the lotus in the water.³ The equality of vision which sees none inferior or superior and the absence of the very tendency to compare are stressed. He knows no grades.⁴ The truly wise homeless Brāhmaṇa is he who is free from *samam* and *viśamam*; he never wrangles.⁵

In the portrait of the perfect man which the Buddha draws in the *Purabheda sutta*,⁶ the sage is depicted as free from cosmological theories. He does not seek preferences. Devoid of wrath and dread, remorse and vaunts, the saint controls his words in teaching sanely. He has neither future hopes nor past regrets. No sense-impressions mar his inner life. Aloof, guileless, free from envy, meek, the saint scorns and slanders none. He is courtly but not credulous, *nasaddho*. He does not seek gifts. Dainty fares do not allure him. Poised, vigilant, he never ranks himself as 'high' or 'low' or 'equal to the best'; for saints can never indulge in self-assertion.

He is a man whom mastery of truth, *dhamma*, has made independent. He harbours no desire to be or not to be. The saint at peace, *upasanto*, has no chains,⁷ no sons, herds, fields; no 'yes' or 'no' he has for views on self. He is timeless, *akappiyo*, as he no more transmigrates. Whoso owns nothing in the world, nor grieves over what is transient, nor is subject to sense impressions is the saint.⁸

Though sick and hungry, let him put up with cold and heat,⁹ and let the houseless wanderer, alone like the rhino-

1. Ibid. 782-783;

2. Ibid. 788;

3. Cf. BG. V. 10;

4. Sutta Nipata, stanza 842;

5. Ibid. 843, 844;

6. Verses 848 ff.

7. Cf. KU. VI, 15; MU. II, 2, 8;

8. Adapted from Chalmer's Translation, P.205, HOS. 37;

9. Cf. BG. II, 15;

aeros,¹ bear up and struggle on. He must under no circumstances be stung to sharp retorts. He must even welcome reproof if necessary.²

Two forms of Nirvāṇa :

When the *bodhi* or enlightenment is won, what happens is the final destruction of the fires of lust, hatred, and ignorance. But the body of the saint - the five *skhandas* - need not fall outright, as indeed it did not in the case of the Buddha who won enlightenment at the age of 35 and spent the next 45 years in active preaching and doing good. This form of Nirvāṇa 'resembles a town all of whose criminals have been killed'³. To refer to this class of liberated saints and mark them all from those who do not live after liberation, a distinction is made between *sopādisessa nibbāna* and *nirupādisessa nibbāna*. According to Childers the former denotes the condition of a perfect saint where the five *skandhas* are still present, though the desire which binds one to life is extinct. In the *nirupādisessa* there takes place the cessation of all being, consequent on the death of the saint. This form of Nirvāṇa may be likened to the state of the city of which not only the criminals have been destroyed, but also the very being⁴. The second type of Nirvāṇa has also been styled *parinirvāṇa*, which may be described in the language of arithmetic as a remainderlessness.⁵ Obviously, these two types of Nirvāṇa exactly correspond to the *Jīvanmukti* and the *Videhamukti* of the *Advaitins*.

The concept of Nirvāṇa :

Arhatship is Nirvāṇa, it has been said, and we have given a picture of the *arhat's* life which strikingly resembles that of the *Upuniṣadic mukta* or the *sthītaprajñā* of the *Gītā*. Nonetheless, the question what exactly is the connotation of Nirvāṇa has been widely discussed and conflicting views have been expressed by competent scholars. Many of the earlier scholars such as Bigandet, Burnouf, and Hardy were inclined to interpret Nirvāṇa as annihilation or *Uccheda*, though as a matter of fact,

1. Suttā Nipāta, Verse, 35 ;

2. Ibid, 973. ;

3. Mādhyamikavṛtti, P. 518, ll. 6, 7,

4. Ibid, P. 520 ;

5. Q. Wārd, Hinayāna, P. 100.

the early Buddhists were opposed to this very dogma. ¹ As M. Pouassin points out, this conclusion of those scholars was an inevitable result of the denial of the *attā* by the early Buddhists. ² There have been scholars who considered Nirvāṇa to be (i) a state of annihilation ³; (ii) that Nirvāṇa is an inconceivable and inexpressible eternal state; (iii) that Nirvāṇa has been left undefined; *avyākṛta*, by the Buddha; ⁴ (iv) that the Buddha held Nirvāṇa to be eternal, pure and infinite consciousness. All these opposing views may be supported by quotations from the *Nikāyas* which do not present a coherent system of doctrines. It must also be remembered that several *sūtras* have been lost. ⁵ But if those passages suggesting that Nirvāṇa is annihilation are read in the light of others according to which Nirvāṇa is an inconceivable existence, ⁶ we will be obliged to modify the first impression. Prof. Keith explains ⁷ that the simile of the extinction of the flame, on which the theory of Nirvāṇa as annihilation is based, has been interpreted very differently in the *Aggivaccagottasutta*. What it signifies is not the extinction of fire but its disappearance into a state of existence which is 'deep, immeasurable, difficult to fathom'. "The flame returns to the primitive, pure, invisible state of fire, in which it existed prior to its manifestation in the form of visible fire." ⁸ Buddaghoṣa refers to the following:

Viññāṇam anidassanam anantam sabbato pabham,
 Etha āpo ca pathavi tejo.vāyo na gādhati,
 Ettha dighaṇ ca rassaṇ ca añumthūlam subhāsubham,
 Ettha nāmaṇca rūpaṇ ca asesam uparujjhatī,
 Viññāṇassa nirodhena etth'etam uparujjhatīti. ⁹

This is the answer the Buddha gives to a *bhikkhu* who puts the question: What is that place where distinctions like the water and earth, fire and air have no footing, where long and short,

1. Samukta Nikāya III, P. 109. Yamaka harboured the wrong view that the Buddha taught that: *Khīṇāsavo bhikkhu kāyassa bhedaṃ bhijjati, vinassati na hoti param maranā*;

2. Nirvāṇa, PP.vii,ff.; 3. Suzuki, Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism, P.352, quotes Vimalakīrtisūtra; Non activity and eternal annihilation were cherished by Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas;

4. ERE. 11, P. 377. 5. Abhidhamma, Kośa ii, 55, P. 278-*sūtrāṇi ca bahunyantarhitāni mūlasangitibhramṣāt*;

6. Khema's conversation with King Pasenaei - Samyukta Nikāya IV, PP.374 ff; 7, 8. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy P. 66;

9. Dīgha Nikāya I, P. 223, and Majjhima I, P. 329.

fine and coarse, good and bad or name and form cease absolutely? The Buddha's answer quoted above is: it is *viññāṇa* or consciousness which is signless, infinite, radiant on all sides, where all distinctions cease, and where *viññāṇa* (as constituted), after cessation, disappears. Buddhaghosa says that the first *viññāṇa* is another name for Nirvāṇa while the second is one of the five *skandhas*.¹ Buddhaghosa's interpretation is based on certain *Nikāya* passages. Speaking of the *parinibbāṇa* of Vakkali, the Buddha said that his *viññāṇa* cannot be localised, *apatitthita*.² *Apatitthita viññāṇa* is explained as consciousness which requires no support, *patitthā*, for its origin. It is free, steady, happy and fearless. Thus, according to Buddhaghosa, Nirvāṇa is inexpressible and infinite. It is a transcendental state.

Poussin distinguishes two forms of Buddhism: (i) popular and devotional; (ii) clerical and mystical.³ The first holds out the prospect of paradise for the laity, a sort of intermediary state; for, in later lives, lay men could become monks and take to the clerical and mystical aspect of Buddhism and ultimately reach Nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa itself, according to Poussin, is the highest happiness as it puts an end to *duḥkha* and transmigration. That is to say, in Nirvāṇa there is neither merit nor demerit. It is reached by a purely ascetic discipline.⁴ What the monks seek is, of course, not perishable paradise,⁵ but a state of eternal beatitude.⁶ This state is denoted by the term *amatapadam*, immortality—a very old designation of Nirvāṇa. According to Poussin, in ancient Buddhist literature, the notion of Nirvāṇa is clear and definite. It is an abode, supreme and definite; as yet, it is not coloured by theological and philosophical notions. Nirvāṇa was not conceived in opposition to any Brāhmanical theories of *Brahman* or *Ātman*. Nirvāṇa is an invisible abode where the saint disappears, often, in the middle of a flame or in a kind of apotheosis.⁷ The *Hinayāna* Buddhism aimed at the immortal, inexpressible state

1. Sumangala Vilāsinī;

2. Samyukta III, P. 124; Dhammapada Atthasālinī;

3. Nirvāṇa PP. 1, 7, 8; 4. Ibid, P. 2;

5. Cf. CU. VIII, 1, 6; 6. Nirvāṇa PP. 48, 60.

7. Nirvāṇa, p. 57;

as a deliverance from birth and death. Immortality is the name given to Nirvāṇa, viz., perfect happiness, extinction (of passions), detachment. What Poussin is concerned to maintain is that Nirvāṇa is not annihilation.¹ He would not, however, identify it with the Bliss of the Vedāntic *Para Brahman*, for the early Buddhists were not metaphysically interested and had no such notion as *Para Brahman*.

Stcherbatsky disagrees with Poussin. He holds that Nirvāṇa is a sort of conceivable ultimate existence as suggested by the expression, *amatapadam*.² But he does not examine the passages referred to by Poussin. For his estimate, he relies mainly on the *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu which does not profess to present the Piṭaka view of Nirvāṇa. Following the Kośa, Stcherbatsky ascribes to the Buddha the following views; (i) The Buddha was led to a denial of every permanent principle; (ii) the originality of the Buddha consisted in denying substantiality altogether; (iii) forsaking the monism of the *Upaniṣads*, and the dualism of the *Sāṃkhya*, the Buddha established a system of the most radical pluralism.³ These views, which have a bearing on Nirvāṇa, were perhaps held by the later *Vaibhāsikas*, but do not represent the position of the early Buddhists or the Buddha. So long as the texts of the

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1. Poussin has collected the following uses of the term Nirvāṇa: (i) the absolute, the uncaused which is by itself the destruction of passion of *dukkha*. (ii) the reduction of all passions and all new existences to the quality of *anupattika*, not being capable of reproducing i. e., N. is saintship or *sopādisessa* N. with corporeal residue; (iii) The consciousness of the possession of N. obtained in ecstasy; (iv) The possession of the *samādhi* of the cessation of ideas and sensations (*Samjñāvedayitanirodha*) open to saints. They are conscious of it through the body only, since thought is then stopped; (v) The entering into N. at the last moment of thought - transition to *anupādisessa* N. without corporeal residue; (vi) An incomplete sanctity enjoyed in ecstasy relating to the cessation of particular passions.
 2. 'na mrtyum paśyati' in CU. VII, 26, 2 refers to *pramāda moha*. Cf. *Dhammapada*, *Pamādo maccunopadam*.
 3. Stcherbatsky, *Nirvāṇa*, P. 3.

Piṭakas which represent Nirvāṇa as a reality are ignored, no justice to the views of either the Buddha or the early Buddhists can be done. The *Thera*-and the *Therīgāthas* and the *Milinda Pañha*¹ support the eternal reality of Nirvāṇa.

But with a view to prove that Nirvāṇa, in early Buddhist thought, is eternal death, Stcherbatsky quotes a passage from the *Mahā Parinibbāṇa suttā* commented upon in the *Mādhyamikaṣṭhi*: *Pradotyasveya nirvāṇam vimokṣastasya cetasaḥ*. According to him the commentator makes *cetasovimokṣa* tantamount to extinction of consciousness.³ But, according to Buddhaghosa, *vimokkha*, the removal of all screens hindering vision, and the extinction of the flame, indicates the state of non-manifestation.⁴

That Nirvāṇa is a *vastu* or material reality may apparently follow from its inclusion, along with *ākāśa*, in the *āsaṅkhata dhātus* or uncompounded *dhātus*. But similarity to *ākāśa* is misleading if it is pressed too far. Like *ākāśa*, Nirvāṇa is inexpressible, beyond empirical determination,⁵ but it is not a material substance. In the *Mahāniddeśa*,⁶ a large number of *bhikkhus* is said to attain *aunpādisesanibbāṇadhātu* without causing any increase in it.⁷ The *Milinda Pañhā* compares Nirvāṇa to *ākāśa* or *samudda* implying that it exists, but that its form, location, age or measure cannot be ascertained. It is like fire without a continued objective existence, until called forth into being when the necessary conditions are put together.

1. 'It exists and is perceptible to the mind - like the wind colourless and formless.' Pp. 104, 107, Part (i) *Milinda*.

2. P. 525.

3. Nirvāṇa, P. 191.

4. Dr. N. Dutt, *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 162.

5. Cf. 'Atthi, bhikkhava, tadāyatanaṃ yatthana eva pathaviṇa āpo...nāyamlokonaparaloko ubhe candimasūriyā, tadāham, bhikkhave, na eva āgatiṃ vadāmi nagatiṃ nacutiṃ na upapattiṃ, appatiṭṭham appavattam anārambhanam evatam esa evānto dukkhasāti' *Udāna*, VIII, 1.;

6. *Mahāniddeśa* - I, P. 132

7. *Aspects of Mahāyāna*, P. 165;

Stcherbatsky's description of Nirvāṇa 'as a kind of entity where there is no consciousness' ¹ represents only the *sarvāstivādin's* view of the matter; not of the Buddha or the early Buddhists. This view of Nirvāṇa resembles one of the heretical notions condemned by the Buddha, viz., *asaññiattī hoti arogo parammarūpā*, the self remains after death as an unconscious but healthy entity. ² If Nirvāṇa is extreme happiness, *paramasukha*, a place of perfect peace, *santivarapada*, ³ an object of realisation, *saccikiriya*, it comes closer to Poussin's view as the highest conceivable paradisiacal existence.

Keith holds ⁴ that there are in the *Nikāyas* 'positive assurances of the reality of something over and above the empirical world'. He adds that 'the great sermon at Benares on the characteristics of that which is not self does not deny in express terms that there may be another realm of existence exempt from empirical determinations and which, therefore, must be regarded as absolutely real'.⁵ But he would not say that the Buddhist Nirvāṇa is 'essentially the absolute, parallel with the Brahman'.⁶ Thus, according to Keith also, the *Nikāyas* do not teach that Nirvāṇa is annihilation or eternal death. In Nirvāṇa he finds only a negative aspect of the absolute and so he would not identify it with the Upaniṣadic Brahman.

This view, according to Poussin is true only of the Mahāyānic Nirvāṇa; in the Hīnayāna, according to him, Nirvāṇa is something real and definite. Stcherbatsky has no hesitations; for him the Hīnayānic Nirvāṇa is eternal death while the Mahāyānic Nirvāṇa is eternal life. ⁷ Against Keith and Poussin, Stcherbatsky asserts that 'it is quite impossible to maintain that *Hīnayāna* is an *advaita* system'.⁸

1. The Central Concept P. 53 ;

2. Kevaddhasutta, Dīgha. I, P. 223.

3. Majjhima I, P. 257 ;

4. Buddhist Philosophy, P. 67 ;

5. Ibid, P. 61 ;

6. Ibid. P. 68 ;

7. Dr. F. O. Schrader favours the metaphysical conception of the Absolute as the right interpretation of Nirvāṇa. Article on N. J. P. T. S. (1904-5)

8. Nirvāṇa P. 42, f. n. ;

Now Poussin's contention that, in Nirvāṇa or *saññāvedayitanirodha*, the body is pervaded by an extremely pleasant feeling while the mind is inactive and feels no pleasure is paradoxical.¹ The Pali texts nowhere mention a blissful sensation enjoyed by the body apart from the mind.² The joy the saint feels in this highest meditation is a foretaste of what he is going to experience permanently. At the *arhat* stage, one is assured of the fact that supreme bliss in the inexpressible form of existence is his, after the dissolution of his body. The close relation between the meditation of *saññāvedayitanirodha* and *Nibbāṇa* is expressed in the *Udāna* thus :

Abhedikāyo nirodhi saññāpitidahamsu sabbā ;

Vupasamiṃsu saṅkhārā viññāṇam atthamagamāti ;

"The body is disintegrated, perception stops, all sensations are burnt away, the activities cease and (the constituted) consciousness disappears." The *Majjhima*³ adds that a perfect saint not only attains it (i.e., the *saññāvedayitanirodha*) but also destroys his *āsavas*, impurities, by knowledge and goes beyond the clutches of *māra*.

Summing up, it may be pointed out that the early Buddhist concept of Nirvāṇa has three aspects : (i) ethical ; (ii) Psychological ; (iii) metaphysical. (i) So many are the ethical discussions on Nirvāṇa in the *Nikāyas* that statements to the effect that Nirvāṇa is purely and solely an ethical state have been made.⁴ Throughout the *Nikāyas*, Nirvāṇa has been described as the destruction of passion, *rāga*, hatred, *dosa*, and delusion, *moha* ; as the destruction of craving *taphā* ; of impressions, *sāṅkhāra* ; of impurities, *āsavas*, etc. Positively the *Nirvāṇic* state is very happy, *accantasukha*, imperishable, steady, tranquil and free from fear. It is a state of bliss, *amata*.

(ii) The *Jhānas* bring out the psychological aspect of Nirvāṇa. They are meant to raise the mind to a level above empirical pleasures and pains. The method adopted was to detach the mind from all worldly matters by means of the

1. Ibid, Pp. 83-84.

2. Mahāyāna Buddhism, Dutt, P. 160 ;

3. I, P. 60, III, P. 45.

4. Mahāyāna Buddhism, Dutt, P. 167.

trances or *Jhānas*. In the highest of them, *saññāvedayita-nirodha*, this detachment is fully achieved. This is identical with *Nirvāṇa* provided the other conditions of *arahathood* are also satisfied.

(iii) The most notable passages on *Nirvāṇa* of the greatest metaphysical significance occur in the *Udāna*¹ and the *Iti-vuttaka*,² “*Atthi bhikkhave abhūtam akatam asaṅkhatam*,” etc. They show that to the early Buddhists, *Nirvāṇa* was not annihilation,³ but a positive something, infinite and ineffable like the *Akāśa*. It is a *lokuttara dhātu*, a transcendental reality, a state to be realized within one's own self, *paccattam vedītabbo viññāhi*. It is homogeneous, *ekarasa* and devoid of individuality.

1. VIII, i, Qd. f. n. 5, P. 107 above ;

2. P. 107.

3. Keith Buddhist Philosophy, PP. 67-68.

CHAPTER VI

THE BUDDHIST SCHOOLS ON NIRVĀṆA, A BRIEF REVIEW

Vaibhāsika School

The teaching of the early canonical texts on Nirvāṇa, we found, are open to more interpretations than one, and, in fact, numerous interpretations arose among the early Buddhist sects themselves. For our present purposes, we shall refer to four schools of Buddhist thought which constitute the *Hīnayāna* and the *Mahāyāna* divisions of Buddhism.¹

The *Vaibhāṣikas*, whose devotion to the *Vibhāsa*, the commentary on the *Abhidharma*, earned for them their appellation,² are radical pluralists. In regard to their thought they are the continuators of the oldest of the schools, viz., the *sarvāstivādins*.³

The *Vaibhāṣikas* inferred things from words, i. e., they set up eternal, objective, realities corresponding to the ideas ex-cogitated mentally. For them existence is of a double kind, either transient or eternal. The former, the phenomenal part, is then analysed into matter, mind and forces, while the latter, the eternal, consists of space and Nirvāṇa. Then two sets of elements are constructed,—i representing the ever-lasting

1. A word about the terms *Hīnayāna* and *Mahāyāna* would not be out of place. These titles are known only to the northern school of Buddhism, the *Mahāyāna*, developed between the 2nd century B. C. and the 3rd century A. D. From the time of Nāgārjuna, who was not the founder of the *Mahāyāna*, the two terms came into vogue. Synonyms of the *Hīnayāna* are *Dvīyāna*, *Triyāna*, *Arhatyāna*, *Srāvākayāna*, etc; those of the *Mahāyāna* are *Ekayāna*, *Agrayāna*, *Bhadrāyāna*, *Paramartha-yāna*, *Bodhisattvayāna*, *Buddhayāna* &c. "Those who worship the Bodhisattvas and read the *Mahāyāna Sūtras* are the *Mahāyānist*; those who don't are the *Hīnayānist*"—Itsing - *Hīnayāna & Mahāyāna*, a historical study R. Kimura.

2. Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, P. 155;

3. Stecherbatsky, *Nirvāṇa*, P. 23;

nature of elements, *dharmasvabhāva*; (ii), their momentary manifestations, *dharmalakṣaṇāḥ*. This analysis closely resembles that of the *Sāṃkhya* which also posits an eternal matter, *avyakta* and its incessant transformations—the *vyaktīḥ*.¹

In accordance with the naive realism of the *Vaibhāṣikas* the mind becomes conscious of objects existing apart from it, in their own right. These latter are presented in knowledge and not created by it. But the objects as we see them have only a brief, nay, momentary, duration,² though their underlying permanence is admitted.³

The self called *puḍgala* has no existence apart from the elements of personal life, viz., the five groups. The unity of the individual is an appearance due to the rapidly shifting states of the mind as in the case of a flame.

Of Course, the *āryasatyas* are cherished by all schools of Buddhism; so that the evaluation of the world as sorrow and the obligation to tread the eight-fold path to reach *Nirvāṇa* hold good for all alike.⁴ But the actual interpretations of *Nirvāṇa* by the various schools naturally differ.

According to the *Vaibhāṣikas*, *Nirvāṇa* is the same as what the *Hīnayāna* calls *Pratisaṃkhyānirōdha* viz., the dissociation of (consciousness) from the *āsravas* and *kleśas*, passions and impurities.⁵ Here the individual is essentially regarded as a series of momentary states of consciousness which constitute a stream, *pravāha* or *santāna*. In the case of the unregenerate man, this stream is impure or mixed with passions, born of ignorance, such as lust, hatred, delusion. As a result of increasing knowledge or *pratisaṃkhyā* or *prajñā*⁶ aided by *śīlam* and *samādhi*, the individual stream consciousness is purged and the passions are reduced to impotence. The last moment of

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1. Cf. *Nihsattasattam nihsadasad nirasad avyaktam alingam Pradhānam* – YB. II, 19;
 2. SDS. P. 20;
 3. IP. 1, P. 615;
 4. SDS. P. 40;
 5. *Tarkasaṃgraha Pañjikā* P. 140, 11. 8–12;
 6. BSS. II, 2, 2, 22 and *Bhāmationit*, “*Bhavaprattipābuddhi-santamasantaṃkaromīti*.”

consciousness is severed from the potency of selfreproduction and thus rebirth is stopped. Thus is Nirvāṇa attained and the liberated individual becomes the *Arhat*.

This *Pratisamkhyānirodha* or dispersion of *kleśas* is the summum bonum of life and is the Nirvāṇa according to the *Vaibhāṣikas*. Vasubandhu observes: "The essential characteristic of it is everlastingness. Its description is beyond power of the tongue of man. It can only be realized by the self-experience of a perfect man. Generally speaking, it may be, for all practical purposes, designated as the highest good, eternally existing, which may be called also *visamyoga* or deliverance." ¹

"*Pratisamkhyānirodha* is neither quite the same as the *skandhas*, nor quite different from them, but its nature is different from the *sāsrava dharmas*." ² It is an entity, *dravya*, real, good, eternal and distinct from others.

Poussin maintains that *prathisaṃkhyānirodha*, i. e., Nirvāṇa, is a *dravya* which the *arhat* enjoys in his life time in the highest trance, *saṃjñāvedayitānirodha*; but it remains when the *arhat* passes out of existence after death. The mind does not exist, nor any consciousness in the final Nirvāṇa. But this position runs counter to the *Vaibhāṣika* metaphysics according to which no real element of existence can be absolutely extinguished. ³

Stcherbatsky holds that to the *Vaibhāṣikas* Nirvāṇa is *vastu*, real, which is interpreted by Poussin as denoting a simple faith in immortality on the part of the earliest Buddhists. ⁴ "When all manifestations are stopped, all forces become extinct, remains the lifeless residue. It is impersonal, eternal, death and it is a separate element, a reality, the reality of the elements in their lifeless condition. This reality is very similar to the *Sāṃkhya's* undifferentiated matter, *Prakṛti*; it is eternal absolute death." ⁵ He explains that the moral law,

1. Systems of Buddhist Thought; P. 165;

2. Ibid; P. 116;

3. The Buddhist Phil. of Universal Flux, S. Mookerjee, P. 253;

4. Nirvāṇa, P. 25, Stcherbatsky;

5. Ibid; P. 27;

through a long process of evolution, converts the living world into a state of final quiescence, in which there is no life. "In this sense, the *Vaibhāṣika* outlook resembles the materialism of modern science." ¹

Now, it is agreed on all hands that the imperishable existence of *dharma*s in their noumenal state is a doctrine of the *Vaibhāṣikas*. Therefore, the mind, *manas* being one of the elements of existence must be present in the state of *Nirvāṇa*, so far as the noumenal character of the mind goes. The relevant question now is: does consciousness also exist along with the mind? Stcherbatsky observes: "Nirvāṇa is a kind of entity where there is no consciousness. The theory is that consciousness cannot appear alone without its satellites, the phenomena of feeling, volition, etc." ² *vis-a-vis* this question, *Abhidharmakośa* says: Will not the last moment of (the *arhat*'s) consciousness (before entering the unqualified *Nirvāṇa*) be a *manodhātu*, since it would not emerge into being? No, it exists in the form of *manas*, but there is no emergence of tainted consciousness which might link it to another birth and another phenomenal embodiment; for other co-operative causes (like *karma* and passions) are absent. ³ Can this *manodhātu* be the same as consciousness? It has in fact been regarded as the substrate of mental phenomena like *saṃjñā*, concepts, *cetanā*, will, *vedanā*, feeling, etc. ⁴ Thus *manas* is distinct from its phenomena. But whether consciousness is an essential mark of it is not clear. In arranging the *skandhas* according to the increasing degree of their subtlety, Yaśomitra, the commentator on the *Kośa* places *viññāna* last; "*Vijñānamtu sarvasūkṣmam upalabdhimātralaksanatvāt*, etc." ⁵ In other words, *viññāna* is pure consciousness without content. If one could equate *manas* with its subtlest phenomenon, then it will be of the nature of pure consciousness, and as *manas* remains in the state of *Nirvāṇa* in its utter purity, as the *Vaibhāṣikas*

1. Ibid ; P. 29.

2. The Central Conception of Buddhism, P. 53;

3. I, 17 Qd. Phily. of Flux, P. 251 ;

4. Abhidharmavyākhyā, P. 70, *cittādarthakūntarabhūte saṃjñā-vedanā &c.*;

5. Ibid P. 51 ;

maintain, the nirvāṇa of the *Vaibhāṣikas* may be regarded as essentially spiritual.¹ Thus it would resemble the *Sāṃkhya Yoga* conception of *Kaivalya*. On the other hand, *manodhātu*, may be regarded as the mere substratum of phenomenal consciousness and different from it. Then the *Vaibhāṣika Nirvāṇam* will be the same as that of the *Sarvāstivāda* school which has been described by Stcherbatsky as a 'materialistic kind of annihilation.'²

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1. *Philosophy of Flux*, P. 252.

2. *Nirvāṇa*, P. 26.

THE SAUTRĀNTIKA VIEW OF NIRVĀṆA

The *Sautrāntikas* take their name from the fact that while neglecting the authority of the *Abhidharma* texts and their commentary, the *Vibhāṣa*, they asserted that whatever *abhidharma* the Buddha taught is contained in the *sūtras* themselves.¹ Hence they adhered to the *sūtras* solely, while accepting such views of the *vaibhāṣikas* as did not conflict with their own.

Objects :

Their characteristic epistemological position is that the variety of our cognitions leads to the inference of a corresponding variety of objects external to our consciousness. Unlike the *Vaibhāṣikas* who were content to maintain the impermanence of objects, the *sautrāntikas* reduce all things to a series of moments of coming to be.²

Self :

The doctrine that self is a continuum, *samtati*, of moments of consciousness³ takes definite shape in the *Sautrāntika* theory. The consciousness that appears at birth and that which disappears in death, *aupapattyaṇṣika* and *marāṇṣantika*, are in essential relation. Each moment impresses itself on what follows it or perfumes it, just as the jasmine assumes various hues if, in seed form, it has been imbued with a dye. Thus, at every moment, man carries within himself his future. The ever-changing continuum of consciousness has no beginning in time, but may come to an end in Nirvāṇa. Also, consciousness is self-conscious.⁴

1. Buddhist Philosophy, Keith, P. 158. It is said to have been founded by Kumāralāta. HPEW. P. 177);
2. Ibid; P. 167. F. N. 2. We noted above, that according to SDS. momentariness is a feature of things in the *Vaibhāṣika* theory also. Cf. HPEW. P. 178.
3. Ibid. P. 170.
4. IP. I, P. 623; Buddhist Philosophy, Keith, P. 174 HPEW. P. 177.

Bondage :

According to the *sautrāntikas*, bondage or *samsāra* is a positive fact, the effect of real causes. It connotes the presence of *avidyā* in the subjective centre, involving birth, decay, death, etc., according to the formula of *paṭicca-samuppāda*.

Means :

Passions and ignorance, *kleśas*, vanish as soon as the truth of *nairātmya*, selflessness, is realized, just as darkness vanishes with the dawn of light.¹ There are two kinds of hindrances to spiritual perfection :—(i) the veil of ignorance and passions, *kleśāvaraṇa*, which impedes the realization of purity and truth ; (ii) the veil hiding the reality, *jñeyāvaraṇa*. The first veil is destroyed by the realization of the *nairātmya* and the second by unremitting meditation on this very *nairātmya* continued for a long time.² The *Sautrāntika* view is that the nature of consciousness is to apprehend the object only and that, in its healthy state, it does not apprehend a self or *ātman*. Nonetheless, if consciousness is felt to reveal the self, it must be condemned as an illusion.³ Therefore, long meditation on the principle of selflessness has a good chance of abolishing the illusion of self, truth being stronger than fiction.

This saving conviction of selflessness grows and develops by degrees. Thus, first one comes to believe in the truth of selflessness from the teaching of an expert. This has been styled *śrutamayājñāna*, or knowledge consisting in verbal instruction. In fact, this is more belief based on trust in the teacher than knowledge based on conviction. The next stage is reached when the aspirant convinces himself by ratiocination of the selflessness of things. This is the stage of intellectual conviction based on logical arguments. This has been called

1. Pratyakṣīkṣtanairātmye na doṣo labhate sthitiḥ |
Tatvīruddhatayādipre pradipe tīmiramyaṭhā ||

Taraksamgraha, Sl. 3338.

2. Cf. YS. satudīrghakālanairāṇṭaryābhyāsā
śevito dīrghabhūmih ;

3. Philosophy of Flux ; P. 262 ;

cintāmayajñāna. The climax of the progress is reached when, realizing the truth in its fullness in meditation, all doubts are dispelled in regard to selflessness. This is intuition born of contemplation or *bhāvanāmayadarśana*. This last alone can finally abolish passions and egoity alike.¹ This state of freedom from all illusions of the self and the passions and afflictions born of them is the supreme good or Nirvāṇa.² The realization of selflessness is the unshakable foundation of the fearlessness of the wise, though the unregenerate individual naturally contemplates it with dread.³

Nirvāṇa :

According to Śāntārakṣita, *mokṣa* or *Nirvāṇa* is the purity of the consciousness from which all defiling passions and their causes like *avidyā* have been expelled.⁴ Both bondage and liberation, *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, are depicted as positive states by Śāntārakṣita and his commentator, Kamalaśīla⁵ and it may be noted that these writers have described themselves as *Sautrāntikas* in more places than one.⁶ But according to gunaratna, the commentator on the *Saddarśana Samuccaya*, the Nirvāṇa of the *Sautrāntikas* is the absolute cessation of the consciousness continuum, brought about by the steady meditation on selflessness.⁷ Professor Stcherbatsky writes that, according to orthodox *Sautrāntika* theory, Nirvāṇa is the absolute end of the manifestations, the end of passions and life without any positive counter part.⁸ Nirvāṇa is only the end of the life-process. It is no life-less substance or *dharmā* in which

1. The Three steps referred to are obviously the counterparts of the Upanisadic śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana.

2 & 3. Advitīyam śivadvāram : kuḍṣṭīnāṃbhayamkaram |
Vineyebhyo hitāyoktam naiśātmyam tenatusphutam
TS. Sl. 3322.

4. Kāryakōraṇabhṛtaśca tatrāvidyādayo matāḥ |
Bandhastadvigamādiṣṭo muktirnirmalatādhiyah |

5. Cittamevatu samsāro rāgādimaladūṣitam |
Tadevatairvinirmuktaṃ bhavānta iti kathyate ||
TSP., P. 184.

6. Philosophy of Flux. P. 255 ;

7. Nairātmyabhāvanāto jñānasantānocychedomokṣah
SDS. with Gunartna's Com. P. 47 ;

8. Nirvāṇa, P. 29.

life has been extinguished, as the *Vaibhāṣikas* were inclined to held. Thus, for the *Sautrāntikas*, Nirvāṇa is no longer materialist.

But the question remains whether any sort of consciousness may be associated with the Nirvāṇa of the *Sautrāntikas*. Obviously, there is no room in Nirvāṇa for any sort of individualized consciousness. But the possible survival of an impersonal consciousness in Nirvāṇa cannot be ignored. According to *Sāntarakṣita*, true knowledge is that of pure consciousness alone,¹ and pure consciousness, as such, is free from the subject-object relations. But his teachings on this topic need not represent those of the *Sautrāntika* school at all. The epithet *Vaināśikas* applied to the *Sautrāntikas* by *Śāṅkara* in the *Brahmasūtra Byāṣya*² implies that traditionally, extinction of consciousness in Nirvāṇa was associated with them. Besides, the materialist contention that consciousness is extinguished in death is based on the analogy of the extinction of the saint's consciousness in Nirvāṇa³; *Sāntarakṣita* does not challenge the validity of this analogy.

The *Sautrāntikas* argue that Nirvāṇa is *abhāva* (absence of passions etc.); for, as one of the *asaṃskṛta* or nonproduced entities, it must share their common characteristic of unreality. Consider, e. g., the nature of *ākāśa* which is an *asaṃskṛtadhātu*, according to the *sarvāstivādin*s. *Ākāśa* or space is nothing but the absence of anything tangible, i. e., of resisting entities. Now, Nirvāṇa has been identified with the second *asaṃskṛtadhātu*, viz., *pratisaṃkhyānirodha*,⁴ and so it is also nothing more than the absence of desires and existence, with the certainty that they will no more be produced.

In support of their contention that Nirvāṇa is only an absence, or, purely negative, *abhāvamātra*, *Sautrāntikas* quote

1. etadeva hi tajjñānaṃ yadvijuddhātmadarsanaṃ.

TS. S'1. 3535.

2. BSSB. II, ii; 18;

3. sarāgamarāṇaṃ cittaṃ na cittāntarasaṃdhikṛt |
marāṇajñānabhāvena vītaklesasyatadyathā ||

TS. S'1. 1863,

4. Cf. Supra. *Vaibhāṣika* section,

a *Samyukta* text,¹ where 'Nirvāṇa is described as a disappearance, *Vyantibhāva*, a decay, *kṣaya*, a destruction, *nirodha* an appeasement, *vyupaśama*, a passing away, *apratisaṃdhi*, of sorrow. They also take advantage of the simile of the extinction of the flame quoted earlier.² Finally, they quote an *Abhidharma* text which contains the statement:—What are the *avastuka dharmas*? They are the *asamskṛtas*. To the *Sautrāntikas*, *avastuka* means unreal or without true nature.

Thus, on this point of unconsciousness in the state of Nirvāṇa, the views of the *Theravāda* and the *Sautrāntikas* seem to agree. Nirvāṇa is a blank and as such it has been severely criticised by the Brāhmanical writers like Śāṅkara, Udyotakara and Jayanta.

But this view of the *Sautrāntikas* is really inconsistent with their own stand-point. For, a *santāna* or entitative series can be wiped out only if there is a hostile entity. In fact, the pure consciousness of the saint is not opposed by anything hostile to it. How, then, can it be extinguished? So long as the passions, etc., are not part and parcel of consciousness so that the destruction of the former must entail that of the latter also, it is illogical to argue that the purified consciousness of the saint is extinguished in Nirvāṇa.³

Again, the conscious-continuum is not susceptible to destruction; for, the last moment of it, whose destruction entails that of the whole, must either produce an effect or not. If it does not, it is not real at all, since reality consists in causal efficiency, *arthakriyākāritā*. And, with the unreality of the last moment, that of the entire continuum of conscious moments also follows, the cause of the unreal being itself unreal.⁴ Therefore, in accordance with their own standpoint, the *Sautrāntikas* must hold that Nirvāṇa is the emergence of a pure impersonal consciousness. Śāntarakṣita adopts such a view in

1. *Samukta Āgama*, 13, 5;

2. "pajjotassevanibbāṇam vimokkocetaso āhu "

3. *Philosophy of Flux*. P. 270.

4. *Bhāmati* on the *BSS*. II, 2, 22;

certain places of his work ¹ to which Jayānta ² and *Sarva-darśana Samgraha* ³ refer. Professor 'Stcherbatsky also states ⁴ that besides the elements which are extinguished in Nirvāṇa, there is a subtle consciousness which survives after achieving Nirvāṇa and of which the phenomenal forms of consciousness are manifestations. This is the germ which developed into the full-blown concept of *Ālayavijñāna* in the *Vijñāna Vāda* School.

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1. "muktinirmalatādhīyah"—TS. S'l. 544 ;
 2. nirvāṇādīpadākhyeyam apavargamtu saugataḥ : |
santatyucchedamicchantisvacchāmvājñānasantatiḥ ||
Nyāyamañjarī, P. 512.
 3. tadubhayanīrodhastadanantaramV vimalajñānodayovā-
muktiḥ. SDS. P. 42 ;
 4. Nirvāṇa, P. 80.

THE YOGĀCĀRA OR VIJÑĀNAVĀDA VIEW OF NIRVĀNA

The *Vijñānavāda*, the idealist school founded by Maitreya-nātha¹ and developed by Asanga and Vasubandhu, is a legitimate development of the *Sautrāntika* theory of a continuum of moments of consciousness. The followers of this school were also known as *Yogācāras* since they adopted the way² of Yoga for the attainment of *saṁādhi* and *vipaśyanā*, abstract meditation and transcendental wisdom. The fundamental teaching, attributed to the Buddha himself, on which Buddhist idealism is based, is the following: "O! sons of the Victorious One! all these three planes³ are only consciousness.⁴ The teachers of this school also declare that this objective world is naught but an appearance....The objects do not exist apart from their percipients."⁵

The Vijñāna alone is real :

The *Vijñānavādin* maintains two propositions :⁶ (i) *Vijñāna* is real, not apparent ; (ii) *Vijñāna* alone is real. The first is urged against the *Mādhyamika* school of Buddhism for which neither the subject nor the object, being correlates, is independently real. The second is held against the realistic *Sautrāntika* who treats the subject and the object as equally real. The reality of *Vijñāna* is sought to be established by the argument that illusions imply a ground which sustains them and so outlives them. The world of illusory objects is sustained by consciousness, which, unlike these objects, can stand by itself, and, therefore, is real. On the other hand the illu-sioriness of the objects of cognitions may be inferred from the invariable concomitance in experience of cognitions and their

1. HPEW. P. 209 ;

2. Ibid., P. 180 ; IP. (i) P. 625 ;

3. Kāmaloka, Rūpaloka, and Arūpaloka. HPEW. P. 188,

4. Cf. Lankāvatāra, X, 15. 'There is no external thing as fancied by the unwise, the mind is moved by the *vāsanā* and objects appear ;

5. HPEW, P. 180 ;

6. Trisūkabhāṣya, P. 15.

objects,¹ the *sahopalambhaniyama*. An 'unknown object is inconceivable. That consciousness can create its own objects is proved by dream experience where the consciousness itself plays the part both of subject and object.

Three grades of Vijñāna :

Having affirmed that *Vijñāna* is the sole reality, the *Vijñānavādins* distinguish three strata in consciousness, viz., *viṣaya vijñāna* or *pravṛttivijñāna*, *manovijñāna* and *ālayavijñāna*. The first refers to the six kinds of objectivity of which we are aware, the five groups of external sense-data and the datum of the inner sense. The second or *manovijñāna* is the process of intellection in which the potentialities of the store-consciousness or *ālayavijñāna* are actualized. The last or the *ālayavijñāna* constitutes the distinctive concept of the *Vijñānavāda* School.²

Ālaya :

The *ālaya* in this school has been identified with the absolute *citta*-stuff and made the foundation of the whole *Vijñāna* group.³ It is regarded as the self, the object of the notion 'I'. Suzuki notes⁴ that the philosophers take the *Tathāgatagarbha* or the *ālayavijñāna* for the empirical ego or self, which, however, is not in keeping with the Buddha's teaching. "The philosophers think that the *ālaya* is the seat of thought and one with the self; but such are not the teachings declared by the Buddhas."⁵ That, in its inmost essence, the *ālaya* is not to be identified with the ego-substance or self also is set forth in the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*. "The *Adāna*⁶ *vijñāna* is deep and subtle, where all the seeds are evolved like a stream... the ignorant are apt to imagine it an ego-substance." But later psychologists came to designate

1. BSSB. II, 2, 28.

2. HPFW. pp. 210-211 ;

3. Studies in Laṅkāvatārasūtras, Suzuki, P. 254.

4. Ibid. p. 254;

5. Gaṭhā 748, Qd., p. 258, Ibid;

6. *Adāna*=*Ālaya*, Ibid, P. 258.

citta as *ālaya*.¹ In the *Lankāvatāra* itself, sometimes a distinction is made between the *Tathāgatagarbha* or the religious Absolute² and the *ālayavijñāna*, treating the latter as an impure phase of the former.³

The relation between the *ālaya* and other forms of mental functions is expressed thus: depending on the *ālaya*, there evolves the mind or *manas*; and depending on *manas* there evolves *Vijñāna*. From the *ālaya* are stirred up all the mental activities like waves, their cause being *vāsanās* or the impressions accumulated in the *ālaya* from times without beginning.⁴

The *ālaya*, with its internal duality of subject and object becomes itself a little world. The constantly changing stream of consciousness which is the *ālaya* may be contrasted with the static *Ātman* of the Upaniṣads. If the *pravṛttivijñāna* be taken to represent our waking cognitions, the *ālaya* may be treated as equivalent to the vast subconscious region of the mind of which the former is but a fragment.^{4a}

Ālaya, the sustainer of experiences :

It has already been said that *vijñāna* alone is real. The objects of relative experience, then, are regarded as superimpositions on states of consciousness or *vijñāna*, which are but waves of the mighty stream that *ālaya vijñāna* is.⁵ What keeps the continuity of mental life practically unbroken is the inexhaustibility of the *ālaya*. The distinctions of *māna*, the means of knowledge, *meṃ*, its object and *phala* the resulting knowledge are made within a whole of *vijñāna* and are illegitimate being the results of *vāsanā* or the habit-energy as

1. Ibid ; P. 258 ;

2. Ibid ; P. 254, F. N. 3 ;

3. Ibid. P; 262.

4. IP. i, P. 629 ;

4a. tarāṅgā hyudadheryadvat pavanapratyaayeritāḥ ;
nrtyamāṅgāḥ pravarttante vyucchedaścanavidyate ;
ālayaughastathānityaṃ viśayapavanaritaḥ ;
cittraistarangavijñānair nrtyamāṅgāḥ pravarttate ;

5. HPEW; P. 211 ;

LA. II, 99, 100, X, 56, 57.

Suzuki calls it.¹ The reality outside knowledge or consciousness is the creation of the mind. Thought is the only reality, at once what knows and what is known. *Ālaya Vijñāna* is the absolute totality, unconditioned by time and space, which are modes of existence of the empirical individuals.²

Three forms of truth :

In this school, object, i. e., thought, is viewed from three different points of view and is, thus, associated with three degrees of reality. Thought may have an imagined or *parikalpita* nature, a dependent or *paratantra* nature and an absolute or metaphysical, *pariniṣpanna* nature. Our dream experiences or illusory experiences such as of the rope-snake³ come in the first class. In these cases, thought externalizes itself and sets up imaginary objects. Even our so-called wakeful cognitions of trees, houses, etc., are *parikalpita* only, being as false as dream experiences.⁴ The modifications of consciousness are of the dependent or *paratantra* character. They are unreal because they depend on the objects which are unreal for their determinate character.⁵ Pure consciousness or the Absolute is the *pariniṣpanna* with which the *paratantra* modifications are essentially at one. The *pariniṣpanna* is also identified with *tathatā* or suchness, immanent in all things ; it is reality as it is or mind in itself which transcends all reasonings and discriminations.⁶ This is realized in transcendental consciousness, *jñānaṃlokottaram*. Being beyond all dualities, one may not claim to have realized the *tathatā*, for such a claim introduces the dual element. "So long as consciousness is not rooted in pure consciousness, the tendency to apprehend duality will not cease. Even the experience, 'This is all pure consciousness' is a process of objectification and so does not represent the highest state of pure consciousness." "When consciousness does not cognize any object, then it is pure consciousness. In the absence of the object, the subject as

1. Studies, P. 251 ;

2. IP. i, P. 631.

3. IP. i, 636 ; Buddhist Philosophy, PP. 242-3,

4. HPEW. P. 211 ;

5. Trisika, 21 ;

6. Studies, P. 99,

apprehending also ceases. How are we to describe that state of pure consciousness¹ ?” Even the *ālaya* ceases to function in the highest state of realization where is present only ‘the undefiled essence, the unthinkable, benign, eternal, blessed,—the free *dharmakāya* of the Buddha’²

Sūnyatā :

The *Vijñānavāda* does not deny the doctrine of the void of the *Mādhyamika* school. But it argues that illusions cannot exist by themselves. There must be thoughts which suffer from illusions. Again, the conception of the void connotes a receptacle without content. Hence the *Vijñānavāda* conception of pure thought free from all distinctions of subject, object and knowledge.³ Popularly, *Mahāyāna* Buddhism is identified with the Philosophy of *Sūnyatā*. It is right only in so far as the denial of the substance theory of the *Hīnayāna* schools is a distinguishing mark of the *Mahāyāna* schools.⁴ But these latter have their positive phases also. In the *Vijñānavāda* this positive side is represented by its doctrine of the *tathatā*. Thus the *Lankāvatāra* always balances the *śūnyatā* with *tathatā*, i. e., when the world is viewed as *śūnya* or empty, it is also to be grasped in its suchness. This combination of *śūnyatā* and *tathatā* really belongs to the realm of intuition, completely transcending the sphere of our normal discursive understanding.⁵ The supreme object of the yoga, after which

1. *Triṃśika*, 26 ; 2. *Ibid* ; 30.

3. *Buddhist Philosophy* p. 244 ;

4. The *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, Pp. 39-42. Non-existence or *Sūnyatā* is of 3 kinds ; (i) *Lakṣaṇa niḥsvabhāvatā*—non-existence of the signs, attributed to a thing and hence of the thing itself, i. e., *parikalpita* ; (ii) *Utpattiniḥsvabhāvatā* non-existence of a thing considered from the stand point of its origin, i. e., *paratantra* ; (iii) *paramārthanīḥsvabhāvatā* non-existence of a thing in the highest sense i. e., *pari-nispanna*,

5. *Lanka*, P. 196. *tathātvam ananyathātvam tattvam anāyūha-niryūhalakṣaṇam sarvaprapañcopaśamam*. *Anāyūha* = non-taking ; *Niryūha* = Nonrejection. vide *Aspects*. Dr. Dutta, P. 231 ;

this school is known, is precisely to lift the understanding to the realm of the intuition of *tathatā* and thus to deliver it for ever. The goal the *Vijñānavādins* set before themselves is to realize, not only the voidness of the *Pudgala* (the aim of the Hīnayānists), but also that of all elements ; *dharmasūnyatā*.¹

Bondage :

That bondage [depends primarily upon *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, or belief in the reality of the self is clear from the remarks in the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañcikā*, pages 491 and 492. To believe in the self is to be attached to the *skandhas* and *āyatanas* which are products, *samskṛtas*. To increase their comforts and remove discomforts, people act. What moves them is attachment to agreeable means and aversion to obstacles. What aids us becomes 'ours' or, even, 'us'. What opposes us is branded 'foe' and rouses hatred. Thus, gradually, the flood gates of suffering are thrown open. It is clear therefore, that egotism is the cause of suffering-egotism based on the *satkāyadṛṣṭi*. *ātmamohappravarttito duḥkhaḥeturaḥankārah*.²

Pre-bodhisattva stage :

The condition to be fulfilled for treading the path leading to the goal of deliverance is different in the *Mahāyāna* from that in the *Hīnayāna*. In the latter, the essential condition is the understanding of the four noble truths together with faith in the teachings of the Buddha. The Mahāyānists demand that one must develop the *bodhicitta* before one is entitled to commence the practices of the *bhūmis* culminating in the Buddhahood.³ By *bodhicitta* is meant the forming of a resolution to attain *bodhi* and save every being of the world

1. Aspects; Dr. Dutta P. 238 (Some of the seeds of action stored within the ālaya are full of defilement, sāsravabija and make for samsāra ; others are anāsrava and so tend to liberation).
2. *yahpaśyatyātmānam tatrāsyāhamiti sāsavatahsnehaḥ |
snehātsukheṣu tṛpyati tṛṣṇā dosāmsṭiraskurute |
ātmanisati parasamjñā svaparavibhāgāt parigrahadveṣau |
anayoh sampratibaddhā sarve doṣāḥ prajāyante ||*
3. BO. III, 22 ;

from misery by leading it to Nirvāṇa or *bodhi*. The immense importance attached to this may be judged from the extraordinary virtues associated with it.¹ Only one who, in numerous prior lives, has performed meritorious acts and has had many spiritual guides, *kalyāṇamitras*, is destined to attain *bodhi* though he may commence the career of the *bodhisattva*. Before becoming the *bodhisattva*, the aspirant must strenuously practise *adhimukti* or aspiration.² This period before the *bodhisattvahood* is styled *prakṛticaryā*. In this stage, the first attempts to cultivate the *bodhicitta* are made by practising the *bhāvanas* in a limited degree. One is expected to possess the power of discriminating knowledge, *pratisaṃkhyānabala*, and one applies oneself to the duties of a *bodhisattva*. As yet the aspirant is not above the five fears of livelihood, dispraise, death, evildestiny and censure by the assembly.³ Often he may be discouraged by the immensity of the work he has undertaken. Nonetheless, through persistent endeavour, he succeeds in developing the *bodhicitta*, at last, and thus discards his status as a worldly person, *pythagjana*, completely. Now, he is entitled to perform the duties of the stages of the *bodhisattvahood*.⁴

Bodhisattva :

While the conception of the *bodhisattvahood* is not entirely foreign to the *Hīnayāna*,⁵ the goal of spiritual life as Buddhahood, the climax of the career of the *bodhisattva*, is not entertained by it; rather, the *arhathood* is the goal of

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1. Ibid, P. 20. I, 13; 2. Aspects. Dr. Dutt. P. 243;
 3. Ibid, P. 245;
 4. Mahāyānism (including both the Vijñānāvāda and the Sūnyavāda) is chiefly associated with the following: The conception of the *Bodhisattva*; the practice of the *pāramitas*; the development of the *bodhicitta*; the ten stages of spiritual development; the conception of the *Trikāya* and that of *Dharmaśūnyatā* or *Tathatā*. *Bodhisattva* or the future Buddha need not necessarily be a monk, as is evident even from such *Hīnayāna* texts as the *Jātakas*.
 5. Aspects. Dr. Duttā, P. 35;

Hīnayāna practices. Powers, privileges, and even omniscience associated with the Buddha are held to be beyond the reach of the *arhat*, while the *Mahāyāna* proposes that every religiously inclined soul or aspirant should aim at Buddhahood *via* the bodhisattvahood. *Bodhisattva* is the aspirant to Buddhahood who has developed the *bodhicitta* and accumulated merit or *kuśalamūlas*.

His Progress :

The first stage of the *bodhisattva's* career to Buddhahood is styled *pramuditā*, since here he experiences joy, *prāmodya*; faith, *prasāda*; pleasure, *prīti*; elation, *utplavanī*; exaltation, *udagrī*; fragrance, *uśī*; energy, *utsāha*; freedom from pride, *asamrambha*; from malice, *avikimsā*; and from anger, *akrodha*. The status of a *Bodhisattva* is that of a member of the Tathāgata family and so he is styled a *jinaputra*, the son of the conqueror, the Buddha. He is conscious that he has vowed to work for the welfare and salvation of all beings and that he is within the direct gaze of all the Tathāgatas. Being rid of all love for self, the *Bodhisattva* is entirely fearless. He expects no service from others; rather, he is out to serve all. In fact, all the actions of the *Bodhisattva* are actuated by the supreme virtue of *mahākaruṇā*, great compassion and *maitrī*, love. The stress on these virtues of the *Bodhisattva* may well be deemed one of the major distinguishing marks of Mahāyānism.¹ Not only their own virtues, but the assistance of spiritual guides, *kalyāṇamitras*, also enable the *Bodhisattva* to establish himself in the first *bhūmi* or stage of sanctification. Among the resolutions formed in the first stage are: to preserve and protect the doctrines of Tathāgatās; to practise all the *bhūmis* along with the *pāramitas*; ² to help all beings reach omniscience; and to attain *bodhi* and ultimately reach *mahāparinirvāna*.³ In the first *bhūmi*, the *bodhisattva* develops compassion and love and applies himself to *mahātyāga* i.e.,

1. BC. yadāmaparesāṃcābhayaṃ duhkhamcanapriyaṃ |
tadātmanah ko viśeṣo yat tam raksāminetaram ||
2. The *pāramitas* are *dāna*, generosity; *śīla*, morality; *kṣānti*, endurance; *vīryā*, energy; *dhyāna*, meditation; *prajñā*, wisdom;
3. Aspects. P. 257, P. 258;

giving up of everything such as wealth, sons, wife, etc. The vow to help all beings implies that the *Bodhisattva* must be a *lokañña* to judge what is good and what is evil for them. By worship and observance of the doctrines, he acquires the ten virtues needed for the purification of the ten *bhūmis*, viz., faith, *śraddhā*; compassion, *karunā*; love, *maitrī*; sacrifice, *tyāga*; endurance, *kṛdasaḥiṣṇutā*; scriptural knowledge, *śāstraññatā*; knowledge of the world, *lokaññatā*; modesty; bashfulness; steadiness and the ability to worship the Tathāgatas.¹ Of the ten *pāramitas* or perfections, in this stage, the *dāna* or charity of the *bodhisattva* is the most developed.²

In the second stage, the *Bodhisattva* develops ten *cittāsayas* or mental attitudes, viz., plain, *ṛju*; soft, *mṛdu*; pliable, *karmanya*; submissive, *dama*; tranquil, *śama*; beneficent, *kalyāṇa*; unclogged, *asamṣṛṣṭa*; indifferent, *anapekṣa*; noble, *udāra*; magnanimous, *māhātmya*. When these are fully developed, he is established in the second *bhūmi*, *vimalā*. Here he avoids taking life, stealing, misconduct, lying, backbiting, harsh or frivolous talk; he becomes, rich, in right views, *samyagdrṣṭi*. Also, he seeks to persuade others to do the same as he clearly sees that their sufferings are due to their failure to cultivate these virtues.

To reach the third stage styled *prabhākārī*, the *Bodhisattva* must develop the following mental states or *cittāsayas*, pure, *śuddha*; firm, *sthira*; disgustful, *nirvid*; nondetached, *avirāga*; non-returning, *avinivṛtta*; strong, *drḍha*; energetic, *uttapta*; never satisfied, *atṛpta*; noble, *udāra*; magnanimous, *māhātmya*. In this stage the realization of the impermanence, sufferings of beings, comes to the *Bodhisattva*, as well as the fact that all things are subject to the causal law. He discovers that beings can be saved only by means of *anāvāranavimokṣaññāna*; the open knowledge of emancipation, which is attainable only through the practice of *dharma*, viz., *dhyānas* and the four *brahmavihāras*. He gets rid of *rāga*, *dveṣa*, and *moha* and pays special attention to the perfection of *kṣānti* or endurance.

1. Ibid; P. 258;

2. The Hīnayāna has no parallel to the first stage of the Mahāyāna, Aspects; P. 259.

After obtaining insight into the ten *dharmalokas*¹ or worlds, the *Bodhisattva* enters the fourth stage *arīṣmatī*. By acquiring virtues like unbending aspiration, faith in the three *ratnas*,² perception of the origin and decay of *samskāras*, etc., he becomes an accomplished member of the Tathāgata family. In this *bhūmi* he gets rid of the *sattvadyuṣṭi*, and performs acts leading to *sambodhi*, specially cultivating the *vīryapāramitā*, the perfection of energy.

By developing the uniformity and purity of intention,³ the fifth stage *sudurjayā* is reached. Here he understands the four *āryasatyas* and becomes proficient in the grasp of conventional truth or *samvṛti*, transcendental truth or *paramārtha*, the truth of signs by studying the generic and particular marks of things, *svasāmānyalakṣaṇa*, and the truth of analysis or *vibhāga*, etc. As a result he realizes the essencelessness of all things, renounces the world, and specially cultivates the perfection of *dhyāna* or meditation.

In the sixth stage, *abhimukhī*, the *Bodhisattva* realizes the sameness of all *dharma*s because they are baseless, signless, originless, etc. Due to his *mahākaruṇā* he feels for those who takes the things of the world as having origin, decay, and essence, behave wrongly and accumulate *abhisamskāras* or thought constructions. Due to his comprehension of the law of causation, *pratītyasamutpāda*, the *Bodhisattva* knows that there is no doer or creator; he fully realizes the *śūnyatā-vimokṣamukha*, the release of essencelessness. As he understands the *śūnyatā* and *animittatā* of the links of causation-chain, the *Bodhisattva* ceases to seek any release, though he apparently does so. Thus he gains the release of desirelessness, *apraṇihitavimokṣamukha*. In this stage, he practises the

1. The worlds referred to are: *sattvadhātu*; *lokadhātu*; *dharmadhātu*; *ākāśadhātu*; *vijñānadhātu*; *kāmadhātu*; *rūpadhātu*; *ārūpyadhātu*; *udārādhyāyādhimuktidhātu*; *māhātmyādhyāyādhimuktidhātu*; *Bodhisattvabhūmi*; PP. 14-5 – appendix to the *Daśabhūmikāśūtra*, Ed. by J. Rahder;
2. The three *ratnas* are the Buddha, Dharma & Saṃgha.
3. The uniformity and purity refer to the doctrines of the Buddhas, moral precepts, etc. Aspects, P. 271;

perfection of *prajñā*. By this time the *Bodhisattva* acquires all the qualities of an *arhat*; for, now, he is free from thought-constructions, *vikalpā* of *dhyāna*, meditation, *dhyeya*, objects of meditation, *saṃādhi*, *vimokṣa*, etc. ¹ The remaining four stages of the *bodhisattva*'s progress have nothing parallel to them in the *Hīnayāna* and are concerned with the development of the *Bodhisattva* into a perfect Tathāgata.

Before commencing the ascent to the Tathāgatahood, the *Bodhisattva* is in possession of a mind trained by the meditations of *sūnyatā*, *animittatā* and *apranihita* (essencelessness, baselessness, dissociation from worldly objects). He does not give up *karuṇā*, *maitrī*, etc. While acquiring merits, he is not attached to them. He realizes the non-duality of things which are like a mirage or an echo, and comprehends in one moment all time with its three fold division – *ekakṣaṇatryadhvānubodha*. In the seventh stage, *dāraṅgamā*, the *Bodhisattva* practises all the ten ² *pāramitas* and duly qualifies himself to be a teacher. For performing his tasks and duties he may not hesitate even to take to worldly rites or the enjoyments of the worlds and heavens.³ The special perfection he develops in the seventh stage is the *upāyakaūśalya*.

The result of completing the first seven stages of his career is that the *Bodhisattva* comprehends that all things are without origin, growth, sign, decay, change and are by nature non-existent; that their beginning, end, middle are all the same. In short, he comprehends the *tathatā* of all things. He establishes himself in the faith that things have no origination, *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*. And now he is in the eighth stage, *acalā*, above all enjoyments. He has no longer the need to practise the rules of conduct, *samudācāras* of *Buddhas*, *Bodhisattvas* and *śrāvakas*. In this stage, he is bidden by the *Buddhas* to strive to resemble them in respect of the immeasurable body, knowledge, worlds, and purity. The omniscience he acquires thus is necessary to enable him to help all beings in all conditions of life. The name of this stage signifies that from here the *Bodhisattva* cannot possibly fall back.

1. Lanka ; P. 120, Ed. by B. Nanjio ;
2. Over and above the 6 *pāramitas* enumerated above are *upāyakaūśalya* ; *pramīdhāna* ; *bala*, *jñāna* ;
3. Aspects ; P. 279.

In the ninth stage, *sādhumatī*, the *Bodhisattva* comes to know of the duties of the *Śrīcākas*, *pratyekabuddhas*, *Bodhisattvas* and the *Tathāgatabhūmi*. Besides, his omniscience enables him to help all beings in exactly the way most useful for them. Thus, he modifies his teachings to suit the needs of each being he decides to further in the religious life.

In the last state, *dharmamegha*, the *Bodhisattva* masters numerous forms of *samādhis*, finally establishing himself in that of omniscience, *sarvajña jñānaviśeṣābhīṣeka*. The rays from the *Tathāgatas* fall upon him, consecrating him as a *Samyaksaṃbuddha*. In this *bhūmi* the *jñānapāramitā* reaches its climax. Since, after the attainment of the tenth *bhūmi*, the *Bodhisattva* becomes a *Tathāgata*, the *Laṅkāvatāra* calls it the *Tathāgatabhūmi*. Whereas the *Hīnayāna* stresses the uniqueness of the Buddha, the *Mahāyāna* shows how each aspirant, progressing through the ten stages of spiritual discipline, may become a Buddha himself.¹

Nirvāṇa :

With the attainment of the Buddhahood, the aspirant has leaped from the dualistic shore of this individualistic world to the other shore of Nirvāṇa, where there are no egoistic impulses or desires. According to the *Vijñānavādin*s, Nirvāṇa consists in the mind's ceasing to dichotomize itself into subject and object and in realizing that *citta* or consciousness alone is. The *Laṅkāvatāra* holds that in Nirvāṇa, the intellect which imagines is eliminated.² Nirvāṇa is not the absence of any real existence; *bhāvasvabhāvābhāv*, or of the various forms of existence, *lakṣaṇavicitrabhāvābhāva*. But, in it, there is the transformation, *parāvṛtti* of *vijñānas* and mind. There the distinctions of existence and non-existence eternal and non-eternal do not obtain. It resembles neither death nor destruction.³ In Nirvāṇa, the *citta* or consciousness has no object or *ālambana*, and perceiving nothing, it rests in itself.

1. The account of the passage of the *Bodhisattva* through the ten *bhūmis* is a summary of the one given by Dr. Dutta in his *Aspects*, pp. 256—285 ;

2. *vikalpasya manovijñānasyavyāvṛttir nirvāṇamityucyate*, *Lanka* ; p. 126 ;

3. *Ibid*, p. 66.

Cf. *sthitam vijñanamātrātve*.¹ This state of the *citta* has been described as *lokottarajñāna* or transcendental knowledge and *āśraya-parāvṛtti* or the turning back of the *ālayavijñāna* to its natural state of *advayajñāna* or nondual knowledge. Again, in the characteristic language of the *Laṅkāvatāra*, Nirvāṇa may be described as *yathābhūtārthasthāna darśanam*² i. e., insight into the abode of suchness. To attain Nirvāṇa, then, is to see into the truth of things, *yathābhūtam*, as unaffected by the categories of understanding. Again, true Nirvāṇa in the *Mahāyāna* is realized in the oneness of Nirvāṇa and *saṃsāra* both being absolute or *śūnya* in its nature.³ The *Laṅkāvatāra*'s view of Nirvāṇa may be expressed thus: To attain Nirvāṇa is to be disengaged from the four propositions,⁴ to abide in the *yathābhūta* view of things, to be free from the errors of dualism, to abide in the realization of the truth revealed to one's in most consciousness, to perceive the two-fold truth of egolessness⁵ for ever to go beyond *citta*, *manas* and *mano-vijñāna*.⁶

The *vijñānavādins* recognize, over and above the well-known forms of Nirvāṇa – the *sopādiśeṣa*, and *Nirupādiśeṣa*, two more, viz., the *prakṛtisuddha Nirvāṇa* and the *apraṭiṣṭhita Nirvāṇa*. The first of these refers to the state of one whose *ālaya* has become completely purified, having undergone the revulsion away from the apparent world outside. The second is the state of one who after obtaining *sopādiśeṣa Nirvāṇa* develops *maitri*, benevolence or charity, for the suffering millions and chooses not to let himself automatically pass, as he otherwise might, into the *nirupādiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu*. Hence this form of Nirvāṇa has been styled altruistic Nirvāṇa.⁷ As the Bodhisattvas are full of compassion in this stage or *bhūmi* and do not fix their minds on their own Nirvāṇa, they are said to be in the *apraṭiṣṭhita Nirvāṇa*.

1. *Trimsikā*, 28;

2. *Lankā*; P. 200;

3. *Ibid*; P. 76, P. 216;

4. The *catuskoṭis* to be described in the next section.

5. *Pudgalanairātmya*; and *dharmanairātmya*

6. *Lanka*; PP. 182 ff.

Cf. MV. P. 541 - *atyantaparinirvṛta*.

7. *Nirvāṇa*, Stecherbatsky, P. 185.

THE MĀDHYAMIKA SCHOOL ON NIRVĀNA

The *Mādhyamika* Philosophy may be traced back to the original teachings of the Buddha himself. The name *Mādhyamika* harks back to the original designation of the ethical way, the *āryāṣṭāṅgikamārga*, taught by the Buddha¹ to reach Nirvāṇa, the way which steered clear of the extremes of asceticism and self indulgence,² and stuck to moderation, the *majjhimāpatipadā*. But in the *Mādhyamika* school, the middle path is not ethical in its significance; it refers to an ontology which avoids the extremes of existence and non-existence. "Those ignorant people who see existence and non-existence do not see the cessation of the visible which is blissful"³ declares Nāgārjuna. The *Mādhyamika* Philosophy is essentially what its greatest teacher, Nāgārjuna, made it. It is a complex of scepticism and mysticism,⁴ the former deriving from the relativity of the thought and the latter from the faith in an absolute reality. Nāgārjuna bases his philosophy on the teachings of the *Prajñāpāramitā*.

The Real in the Mādhyamika :

The *Mādhyamika* Philosophy is usually regarded as an expression of pessimism and scepticism 'a complete and pure nihilism.'⁵ It is accused of teaching that all our ideas are based on a non-entity or void.⁶ It is usually said that whereas in the *Advaita* Philosophy, negations have a positive counterpart, there is none such in the *Mādhyamika* system. Opponents of the system in India have also dubbed it, 'all-negating' *sarvavaināśika*.⁷ But a study of its main texts will reveal that these accusations are ill-founded.

The real, for this system, is what has a nature of its own, which is unproduced, *akṛta*, and not dependent on anything else, *paratranirapekṣam*. In the *Hīnayāna* the elements are

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| 1. Mahāvagga, I, 6, 17 ; | 2. Cf. BG .VI, 16 ; |
| 3. MK. V. 8 ; | 4. IP. i, P.644 ; |
| 5. Kern, Barth, Poussin ; | 6. AOJ. XXXI, P. 1, 7. |
| 7. SV. Nirālamba-vāda. | |

real, *vastu*, though they are interdependent, but in the *Mahāyāna* generally and especially in the *Mādhyamika*, they are unreal for precisely the same reason. For example, to say that the nature of fire, its *svabhāva*, is heat is not right in so far this heat is generated by causes and conditions, disappears in the absence of these causes and conditions and, thus, does not exist in its own right, independently. But apart from its heat, has fire any *svabhāva* of its own, which it is, unconditionally? Yes. This *svabhāva* is *dharmatā*, the state of being an element of existence. But what is *dharmatā*? *Dharmatā* is *svabhāva* or own being. What is this own being? Nature or *prakṛti*. And what is *prakṛti*? That which is called *śūnyatā* or void. What is *śūnyatā*? The state of being devoid of one's own being, *naiḥsvabhāvyā*, viz., suchness or *Tathatā*. What is *Tathatā*? The state of being not liable to change, *avikāritva* or *sadavasthāyitva* ¹

Nāgārjuna defines the real as follows: ² *Aparapratyayaṃ śāntaṃ prapañcāraprapañcitaṃ; Nirvikalpamanānārtthametattattvasyalakṣaṇaṃ;*

(i) It is *aparapratyaya*, i.e., it cannot be imparted by one to another. ³ The real has to be realized within oneself, *pratyātmaivedya*, and not from verbal instructions even of the wise, since they are bound to be replete with *samāropa* or superimpositions or interpretations of reality.

(ii) It is *śāntaṃ*, or *svabhāvavirahitaṃ*, ⁴ i.e., it has the nature of cessation, being undisturbed by origination or destruction.

(iii) It is *prapañcāraprapañcitaṃ* or undifferentiated in words or inexpressible. The point is that the sense of *śūnyatā* is not be formulated in words.

(iv) It is *nirvikalpa* or unrealizable in concepts. The real is not the object of thought-constructions.

1. HPEW. P. 185;

2. MK. XVIII, 9;

3. Stcherbatsky translates this as 'uncognizable from without.' Concept of Nirvāṇa P. 41; but Candrakīrti's comment does not bear it out;

4. Vide MV, P. 160;

(v) It is *anānīrtha* or devoid of different meanings. It follows from this verse that just as the real is the independent and the unique, ¹ the dependent existence cannot be real, even as borrowed money is not wealth.

The real has been equated with *śūnyatā* in this system and the definition of the real given above may be taken as describing *śūnyatā* as well. ² Formally, also, Nāgārjuna has defined it as: *yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatām tām pracakṣ-mahe* ³ – Dependent origination, we call *śūnyatā*. All phenomenal objects, like seeds, sprouts, cognitions, etc., are only relatively existent; hence, in reality, they have no origination and the fact of this non-origination in reality is *śūnyatā*. That which is really non-originated can neither be said to exist nor to vanish. Hence it is neither existent nor non-existent, and, as such, it is the middle path which keeps clear of the two extremes. ⁴

If the world were real, i. e., existed independently in its own right, no change, progress, or enlightenment would have been possible. Hence the orthodox position of all forms of Buddhism, viz., the world is *anattā* and *anicca*.

Two forms of truth :

Nāgārjuna's theory of *śūnyatā* does not make short work of all the categories of common sense. He makes provision for them by distinguishing two forms of truth with reference to which, he asserts, all the teachings of the Buddha are to be understood ⁵ – viz., *samvṛtisatya* and *paramārtha satya*. By

1. Cf. Spinoza's definition of substance: quod in se sedit et per concipitur,

2. Aspects, P. 214;

3. MK. XXIV, 18;

4. Ibid; *sā prajñaptirupādāya pratīpat saivamādhyamā*: The real has also been designated the Dharmakāya or the body of the law both in the Mādhyamika and the Vijñānavāda. It is defined as neither one nor multiple, of unmanifest nature, blessed, unique, etc. Buddhist Philosophy, pp. 267-269.

5. *dvesatye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā |
lokasamvṛti satyatvam satyam ca paramārthataḥ ||*

MK, P, 492; Cf. BC. IX, 2,

samvṛti is meant, in the first place, ignorance as it envelopes reality, i.e., it is the same as *avidyā*,¹ which superimposes the form of non-existent things and shuts off the vision of reality.² Secondly, *samvṛti* means an object which depends on another for its existence; i.e., whatever is subject to the law of dependent origination. It is thus a synonym for the phenomenal.³ Thirdly, *samvṛti* refers to words current in the world, denoting objects which the popular view recognizes, but which may turn out to be illusory, on examination. In the light of this elucidation, whatever the Buddha taught about *skandhas*, *dhātus*, etc., must be treated as conventional or *samvṛta* only, accepted for the purposes of instruction, from the point of view of the populace and not as final truths.

In contrast to the *samvṛtisatya* is the *paramārtha satya* or the Absolute Truth. It is truth as apprehended by the *Āryas* who see things, *yathābhūtam*, as they are. But on this level of Truth, distinctions of subject and object are irrelevant.⁴ It is indeterminable by speech. Hence the highest truth is inexpressible and must be realized within oneself.⁵ From the point of view of this Absolute Truth, objects of this world have no more existence than the creations of a magician. Thus *paramārthasatya* consists in the realization of the dreamlike or echo-like nature of *samvṛtisatya*. The object of preaching both is to enable the aspirant to make use of the latter to attain the former; for without having recourse to the conventional truths, the highest truth cannot be imparted.⁶

The self:

The general buddhist doctrine of the absence of the self is established by Nāgārjuna in his own way. "The subject of

1. BC. P. 352. *avidyāhisamvṛtirupapadyate*;

2. *tattve' pratipattirmithyāpratipattirajñānamavidyā*

s'ālistambasūtra qd. BC. P. 352.

3. BC. P. 352, *pratītyasamutpannaṃ vasturūpaṃ samvṛtiḥ*;

4. Ibid; P. 366 *paramārthasatyaṃsarvavyavahārasamati-kṛāntaṃ*, etc.

5. Ibid; 367. *Āryāṇāṃ eva pratyātmaavedyaṃ*.

6. MV. P. 494.

vyavahāramanāsrityaparamārthonadeṣyate |
paramārthamanāgamyanirvāṇaṃ nādhigamyate ||

seeing, hearing, etc., cannot exist prior to these acts. If the presumed subject or soul did exist prior, then the acts in question may very well take place without a subject at all. The soul and the acts of seeing presuppose each other. Again, if it did not exist prior to all these acts, how can it exist prior to each? If one and the same entity is the agent in all these acts, it must have existed prior to each. But the soul cannot be known before these acts take place. So it did not exist before them. Nor can it come into being after these acts; no purpose is served by such an entity. They cannot be simultaneous with each other, either. Unless they are independent of each other, how can they exist simultaneously?"¹

Again, the arguments which the *vijñāvēdins* employed to disprove the reality of external objects may be directed against that of an entitative self. The continuum of momentary conscious states is what we mean by the self, but what consciousness in itself is we do not know. The reality which the external objects lack cannot be ascribed to thought either; for, the reality of the subject is no greater than that of the object. Thus the concept of the *Ālayavijñāna* is as unsustainable as that of the external world.

Still, it is true that we admit the reality of the self for practical purposes. "The doer is called so in relation to the deed and the deed is so-called in relation to the doer. Absolutely speaking, there is neither doer nor doing."²

Means :

The practical steps leading to Nirvāṇa are the same as those set forth in the section on the *Vijñānavāda*. The *Mahāyāna* has its own characteristic interpretation of the four *āryasatyas*. "He who realizes that no *dharma*s have originated has known the truth about *duḥkha*. He who realizes the non-

1. MK. Ch. IX.

2. Ibid. XVI, 10; Though in *paramārtha*, there is neither bondage nor liberation, this *paramārtha* lies concealed in *samvṛti* or the conventions of our common life. To remove this veil, religious effort is necessary. vide, IP. i, P. 568. *vyavahāram anāsrtya paramārthanades'yate*. MK. CH. XXIV.

existence of all *dharmas* has suppressed the source of misery, *samudaya*. He who realizes that all *dharmas* are completely extinct, *parinirvṛta*, has grasped the truth of *nirodha* or cessation. He who realizes the means by which the absence of all things is known is said to have trodden the path or *mārga*.”¹ According to the explanation given by the *Pañcavimśati sūhasrika prajñāpāramitā*, the truth of *Duḥkha* consists in the attitude of detachment (i.e., neither *yukta* nor *ayukta*) on the part of the *Bodhisattva* to the *skandhas*, *āryasatyas*, definitions of *śūnyatā*, etc. The second truth regarding *samudaya* consists in his not considering whether *skandhas* have origination or destruction. He knows that one *dharma* cannot be converted into another, both being equally unreal, *prakṛtiśūnya*. The point is that the so-called objects of the world have really no existence and so the *bodhisattva* must remain unconcerned about their *samudaya*. The *nirodhasatya* is the knowledge that *śūnyatā* has no origin, decay, contamination, purification, etc. Thus, there is no room in it for *skandhas*, or *āryasatyas* or *sādhaka* or the Buddha. In other words, *nirodha* is the realization of the real nature of *śūnyatā*. Of course, in this interpretation of the matter, *mārga* has no place and so has been ignored in this text.

Nirvāṇa :

Nāgārjuna's conception of Nirvāṇa may be appreciated from his criticism of the Hīnayānist Nirvāṇa. The Hīnayānists, we saw, distinguish between a *sopadīṣeṣa Nirvāṇa* and a *nirupadīṣeṣa Nirvāṇa* and hold that it consists in the extinction, *nirodha*, of *kleśas* and *skandhas*. Now, Nāgārjuna asks how, if *kleśas* and *skandhas* be real, they can be destroyed at all? In view of the impossibility of destroying anything real, the *śūnyavādin's Nirvāṇa* is defined as :²

aprahīṇam asaṃprāptam anucchinnaṃ aśāśvataṃ |
Aniruddhamanutpannam etannirvāṇamucyate ||

Nirvāṇa is that which is neither discarded nor attained ; it is neither a thing destroyed nor a thing eternal ; it is not sup-

1. Mañjuśūpariṣeṣā, Qd. Aspects, p. 225.

2. MK. XXV, 3 ;

pressed nor does it arise. In his comment Candrakīrti says that like passion, etc., *rāgādi*, Nirvāṇa is not to be eradicated nor like the fruits of a saintly life, such as *srotaṅgīpati*, is it to be won. It is not eternal like the Nirvāṇa of the Hīnayānist or the *Pradhāna* of the *Śiṃkhyas*. By its very nature, it is without origin or decay. Its sole characteristic is that it does not admit of any descriptions. Nirvāṇa is realized only when all attempts at definitions cease.

But is it not enough to hold that *kleśas* and *skandhas* do not exist in Nirvāṇa? Why not admit their reality in the state of *samsāra*? Nāgārjuna's answer is that there is not the slightest difference, in truth, between what are called Nirvāṇa and *samsāra*.¹

Ya ajavam javibhāva upādāya pratītyavā |
So' pratītyānupādāya nirvāṇamupadiṣyate ||

Either with regard to causes or conditions, this phenomenal world is; the same world, i.e., *samsāra*, when causes and conditions are disregarded, is called Nirvāṇa. More explicitly still, is the identity of *samsāra* and Nirvāṇa affirmed in the following: ²

Na samsārasyanirvāṇātkimcidastiviśeṣaṇam |
Nanirvāṇasya samsārātkimcidastiviśeṣaṇam ||

The clue to this apparent paradox lies in the fact that the Absolute reality is non-dual and it is indifferent whether it is styled Nirvāṇa or *samsāra*. This identification also implies that the realization of Nirvāṇa requires, not the eradication of real entities (an impossible proposition), but the disappearance, *kṣaya*, of all figments of imagination such as *kleśas* and *skandhas*.³ The *sūnyatā* theory is designed just to promote this very elimination of figments. On the contrary, schools of thought like those of Kaṇāda, Kapila, the Vaibhūṣikas, which cherish the theory of the reality of objects, can never put an end to sufferings in as much these are conceived as real. Others, whose views on Nirvāṇa are rejected by Candrakīrti, the commentator of Nāgārjuna, are the Atheists, the *Sautrāntikas*,

1. MK. XXV, 9.

2. Ibid; P. 19.

3. Aspects, P. 187.

and the *Vijñānavādins*. The reason for condemning the last mentioned is that they admit the reality of the *parinispāna* or pure consciousness, *vijñaptimātratā*. What yields the Nirvāṇa of Nāgārjuna's conception is just the getting rid of the baseless fancy of bondage. It may be said to consist in the avoidance of the conception that anything exists. Nirvāṇa, in so far as it is unproduced or *asamskṛta*, cannot be said to be either existence or non-existence, *bhāva* or *abhāva*. In support of this, he quotes the Buddha as saying that desire for both existence and non-existence should be given up; thus Nirvāṇa which is the goal of life cannot be either the one or the other.

Comparing this account of Nirvāṇa with the definition of the real given above; ¹ it is clear that Nirvāṇa and the real are identical. Among the names of the real are *Idam tātā*, *Bhūtatahatā*, *Tathāgatagarbha*, *sūnya*, etc. Besides, the real is non-dual or monistic. Therefore, strictly speaking, predication of Nirvāṇa in the case of an individual is wrong. Cf. *yadisūnyam idaṃ sarvaṃ udayonāstinavyayaḥ | prahāṇādvānirodhādvākasya-nirvāṇamiṣyate?* ² Now it is possible to define the ultimate real or *Tathatā*, as has been done by the *Vijñānavādins* *tathābhāvo vikāritvam sadaivasthāyitā*, sameness, changelessness and everexistence; ³ But Nāgārjuna affirms that to the extent *Tathatā* has been defined at all, it is non-existent; i. e., it cannot be identified with Nirvāṇa. His sole point is that the latter is the inexpressible Absolute, and so should not be identified with aught definable such as *Tathatā* or *Tathāgata*. Candrakīrti quotes a stanza from the *Prajñāpāramitā* to the effect that *Tathāgata* is an image of good and pure *dharma*; in reality, there is neither *Tathatā* nor *Tathāgata*; -only images are visible in all the worlds. ⁴ If, in spite of the indescribability of the real or Nirvāṇa, descriptions have been attempted in the texts, the purpose is only *prajñapti* or communication. From such a procedure, it is clear that the object of Nāgārjuna

1. Supra, P. 145.

2. MK. XXV, 1;

3. MV. P. 265;

4. Ibid. PP. 449, 540.

Tathāgatohīpratibimbabhūtaḥ |
Kuśalasya dharmasaya anāsravasya ||
Naivātratathatā natathāgato 'sti |
Bimbam ca saṃdṛśyatisarvaloke ||

was to establish a unitary reality corresponding to the *Vedāntic* Absolute.¹ But, in Nāgārjuna's Absolute unity there is no bliss. It is only *S'ānta* and *S'iva*.² "The *vedāntic* metaphysicians could find no term to predicate of Brahman, the absolute, transcendental Reality, but 'nay', 'nay'! And it is rather in this sense that we should interpret the negations of the *Mahāyāna* philosophers".³

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1. Aspects, P. 194; 2. MK. XVIII, 19, XXV, 24.
 3. Dr. Barnett, Introduction to The Path of Light, Pp. 29-30. Qd. Aspects, P. 194; "when a being attains a state of mind in which he cannot distinguish himself from any other being of the world or from the Absolute, he is said to attain Nirvāṇa in the Mahāyānic sense."

A CRITICISM OF THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTS OF NIRVĀṆA.

The Vagueness of the Concept of Nirvāṇa :

The Concept or, rather, the concepts of Nirvāṇa have so much variety as to make them practically independent of one another. From the point of view of an aspirant, this variety is bewildering. So many conflicting instructions in regard to the supreme good of life seem to be addressed to him. Even in the Pāli canon itself, the concept of Nirvāṇa is not clear-cut or unequivocal; it remains open to opposing and rival interpretations. In the first place, it seems to have a purely negative import, as denoting an exit from the sphere of our sorrows, i. e., from *samsāra*;¹ or, as the extinction of consciousness, implying an eternal death. Now, it is obvious, that this purely negative concept regarding the goal of life cannot appeal to the imagination of thinking men. Nor can it claim, in any adequate measure, to meet the needs of man's head or heart.

The Concept of Nirvāṇa gives no room for worship :

Among these needs is the impulse innate in man to worship a something great and good and true, endowed with consciousness and ready to respond to the approaches of the meek and the lowly through aspiration and prayer. Early Buddhism takes no account of these vital needs; instead, it bids² man be a lamp and refuge unto himself and exert himself for achieving his deliverance. This command, however lofty and stimulating to the spirit of man's moral heroism, completely ignores the realities of his actual predicament – his weakness, blindness, and craving for a sure anchorage.

The refusal of the Buddha to speculate on the nature of the ultimate reality, his deliberate rejection of all metaphysics, again, ignores the philosophical hunger of the spirit of man. The Buddha, perhaps, had a very sound reason for his refusal.

1. Poussin, ERE. 2. Mahāparinibbāṇasutta

The Buddha's system is a *yāna*, not a 'philosophical system'; hence it leaves room for irresponsible speculations. He was only concerned to pluck out the poisoned arrow from the living flesh and, like a good doctor, would not endanger the patient's life by first trying to solve the irrelevant problems as to who shot the arrow or with what kind of poison it was smeared. The Buddha's exclusive pre-occupation with man's practical needs as he conceived them and his refusal to deviate from the four *āryasatyas* into the sphere of metaphysics have made the system of the Buddha a *yāna* or vehicle, a method leading to liberation and not a *darsāna* or philosophical system.¹ But the results have been far from reassuring. A veritable jungle of metaphysical theories sprung up to fill the void and divide the buddhist fold into rival sects. These latter have made confusion worse confounded in regard to the real, pristine, teachings of the master. Still the outstanding impression left by the Pāli canon on the mind of the attentive reader is that the Buddha's silence on metaphysical questions is due to his conviction that their solution is ethically unimportant, that ultimate deliverance or Nirvāṇa is more bound up with right conduct than with intellectual satisfaction. Nonetheless, while acclaiming his ethical fervour and accepting his ethical insights as an essential part of a satisfactory spiritual life, one cannot help deploring the studied vagueness in which the Buddha left such questions of perennial interest and importance as the nature of the ultimate reality, man's metaphysical Self and the character of the goal of his life or Nirvāṇa. If early Buddhism became identified with a negativist metaphysics it was due to the refusal of its founder to take an unequivocal stand on ultimate questions. In view of the fact that the Buddha claimed to know more² than he chose to reveal, his stern silence on the ultimate issues becomes all the more mysterious. Writers like Mrs. Rhy Davids argue that, in fact, the Buddha's view of man's self or Ātman was the same as that of the Upaniṣads. In that case it must be concluded that his silence indicates, as his brāhmanic opponents allege,³

1. IP. i, P. 464.

2. Cf. The illustration with the aid of the *śimsīpa* leaves. IP. i, P. 466;

3. BSS. II, 2, 32;

a certain lack of candour or, even, worse. Dr. Rādhākṛiṣṇan holds that the silence of the Buddha only implies his reluctance to shock and bewilder weak minds by announcing to them truths they cannot comprehend,¹ and he draws attention to the warning of the Gītā.² But, however laudable the motive behind it, the result of the reticence of the Buddha has been to cloud his message of Nirvāṇa in a haze of doubts and speculations. People at large, admittedly weak of understanding, expect clear guidance on the issue of life's goal and supreme good. A mere assurance of deliverance from sorrow, good as far as it goes, is clearly felt not to go far enough.

Does the delivered sage survive? :

The bewilderment grows with the Buddha's reluctance to answer the question whether the *nirupādiṣeṣa* Nirvāṇa involves the extinction of the Sage or not. Both Vacchagotta³ and Mālunkyāputta⁴ are left with their initial doubts about the survival of the Self in Nirvāṇa. The Buddha's firm refusal to help them on this point might be quite legitimate. The solution of their problems might in no way help to reach Nirvāṇa. But theirs was a philosophic problem which interests all thinking minds and the world has to go without the light which the Buddha might have shed on that problem.

Nirvāṇa in the schools of Buddhism :

That the difficulties about the precise nature of Nirvāṇa are quite real and serious is demonstrated by the treatment it receives in the later Hīnayānist and Mahāyānist schools. For the *Vaibhāṣikas*, Nirvāṇa means the full stop of all the manifestations of life, all elements or *dharma*s having spent their forces. What remains is a lifeless residue, an impersonal and eternal death, a view which closely resembles that of modern science in regard to the final end of the Universe.⁵ It is a separate reality of the elements in their death.⁶ This

1. IP. i, P. 466 ;

2. BG. III, 26 ;

3. Samukta. IV, 400 ;

4. Majjhima I, 426.

5. Concept of Nirvāṇa ; Stcherbatsky, P. 29 ;

6. Ibid ; P. 28 ;

is of course not a cheerful prospect and it is hardly different from the materialist *mokṣa - dehocchedo mokṣa*.¹ The only difference is that *Hīnayāna* Buddhism promises this annihilation as the reward for a virtuous life in numerous existences, while the materialist or *Cārvāka* offers it at the end of every life.

The Nirvāṇa of the *Sautrantikas* is hardly more attractive. If it is what Guṇaratna represents it to be, viz ; the cessation of the consciousness-continuum-*jñānasantāneccheda*,² Nirvāṇa is a blank of unconsciousness, *kṣayaṇaṃ kṣayaṇaṃ*³ without any positive counterpart. A purely negative ideal of the absence of passions is not a very stimulating one, unless it is made the adjunct of a life of active goodness, or, atleast, it is consciously experienced. The Nirvāṇa of the orthodox *sautrāntikas* has no room in it for anything of a positive kind.

That the ideal of Nirvāṇa held by the *Hīnayānists* is far from satisfactory also emerges from the criticisms to which it has been subjected by the *Mahāyānists*. They point out that the Nirvāṇa of the *Arhat* is not a perfect state in so far as it is the culmination of an ego-centric life aimed at the deliverance of the self from misery without taking into account the miseries of others. "The *S'rāvakās* and the *Pratyekabuddhas*, the followers of the *Hīnayāna*, being devoid of love, fix their minds on Nirvāṇa consisting in the cessation of all misery."⁴ The *Arhats* pass directly from the *Sopādiśeṣa* to the *Nirupādiśeṣa Nirvāṇa*; they are not entitled to seek the *Apratiṣṭhita Nirvāṇa* to which only the *Buddhas* may aspire. The inadequacy of the *Hīnayānist* ideal of Nirvāṇa is revealed also by their conception of the *Buddha* after Nirvāṇa. According to the *Milinda pañha*,⁵ the *Buddha* has neither love nor fellow-feeling. As one who has reached *parinirvāṇa*, the *Buddha* is extinct. It is not possible for ordinary people to fall in love with annihilation.

1. ŚDS. ;

2. ŚDS. P. 47;

3. Concept of Nirvāṇa P. 29.

4. The *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, PP. 126-7. Qd. Aspects, P. 200; F. N. ;

5. P. 160, *Vigatamṭathāgatassa pemaṃ vigatosineho* |

The Mahāyānist view of Nirvāṇa :

When we turn to the Mahāyānist ideal of Nirvāṇa, an entirely different picture comes into view. The grim self-centredness of the *arhat* is replaced by the world-wide sympathy of the *bodhisattva*. Together with the moral earnestness of the *śrāvaka*, the philanthropy of the *bodhisattva* must make for a healthy, even sublime, moral ideal. The *Mahāyāna* Buddhism gives us positive ideas of the human destiny. The very name *Mahāyāna* is significant; 'It offers to all beings in all worlds salvation by faith and love as well as by knowledge, whereas the *Hīnayāna* only avails to convey over the rough sea of becoming to the farther shore of *nibbāna* those few strong souls who require no external spiritual aid nor the consolation of worship. The *Hīnayāna*, like 'the unshown way' of those who seek the *Nirguṇa* Brahman,¹ is exceedingly hard, whereas the burden of the *Mahāyāna* is light and does not require that a man should immediately renounce the world and all the affections of humanity. The manifestation of the body of the Law, *dharmakāya*, says the *Mahāyāna*, is adapted to the various needs of the children of the Buddha; whereas the *Hīnayāna* is only of avail to those who have left their spiritual childhood far behind them. The *Hīnayāna* emphasizes the necessity of saving knowledge and aims at the salvation of the individual, and refuses to develop the mystery of *nibbāna* in a positive tense; the *Mahāyāna* lays as much or greater stress on love and aims at the salvation of every sentient being and finds in Nirvāṇa the one Reality, which is 'void' only in the sense that it is free from the limitations of every phase of the limited or contingent experience of which we have empirical knowledge."² The liberated man in the *Mahāyāna*, the Buddha, is a "guard" to them that have no protection, a guide unto the traveller, a ship, a well-spring, a bridge, for the seekers of that shore. He is a lamp to such as need a lamp, a bed for the weary that need a bed, the very slave of such as need service."³

1. Cf. BG. XII, 5 ;

2. Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism ; P. 226-27 ;
A. Coomaraswamy ;

3. BC, Qd. IP. i, P. 590.

The vijñānavādin's position examined :

Apart from the religion of the *Mahāyāna* which is hardly to be distinguished from that of the *Bhagavad Gīta*,¹ the metaphysics of its two schools is a challenge to the philosophic mind. Between them, the *Vijñānavādins* and the *Mādhyamikas* seem to indulge to its limits in a play of negations. While the former denies the world of objects, taking their stand on the reality of consciousness, the latter does one better by directing towards this lonely truth the same criticism which demolished the external world. The *Vijñānavāda* account of the world does not recognize that it is something more than the contents of this or that private consciousness. By maintaining that this so solid-seeming world is but a bundle of ideas of the finite mind, that, instead of objective entities, we have only mentities, the *Vijñānavāda* position becomes crudely subjectivist. In their eagerness to fight the naive realism of the *Hīnayāna*, the *Vijñānavādins* confused the psychological and the metaphysical points of view and came to uphold an immature mentalism. The confusion of their position is increased by using the same word *Vijñāna* to denote both the changing and stable aspects of our mental life. Though the existence of an absolute consciousness is entailed by the existence of objects, it is a logical leap to conclude that objects are nothing but consciousness. And *Vijñānavāda* is guilty of this logical leap.

With true philosophical insight, the *Vijñānavādins* go behind mind and matter, subject and object, into *Vijñāna* itself, and recognize that the distinctions of subject and object arise within this *Vijñāna*, which they style *Ālaya*. The *Ālaya Vijñāna* is the foundational fact of reality revealing itself in individual minds and things and containing within itself the knower and the known. At the same time, within this school is observable a tendency to identify the *Ālayavijñāna* with *skandha vijñāna*.² A good deal of needless confusion is due to the arbitrary way in which the *Vijñānavādins* make the *Ālaya Vijñāna* also as momentary as every other category of this school. To account for knowledge and memory, a continuous principle of cognition has got to be postulated.³ *Ālaya* could

1. IP. i, P. 599 ;

2. IP. i, P. 632 ;

3. Śāṅkara on BS. II, 2, 28 ;

fulfil this role if made stable; but then it would mean the acceptance of the Upaniṣadic theory of Self as *Vijñāna*.

The force of *avidyā* which this system, like other monistic systems, is obliged to assume for explaining the contingent world appearances is left without any explanation. "Though all modes of consciousness and mentation are *avidyā*, *avidyā* is, in its ultimate nature, identical and not identical with enlightenment. In one sense it is destructible, in another, it is not."¹ The consequence of this assumption is to leave the meaning of *Nirvāṇa* extremely equivocal. "Enlightenment and non-enlightenment are one, as all kinds of pottery, though different, are made of the same clay."² This is reminiscent of the *Mādhyamika* assertion that *Nirvāṇa* and *Samśāra* have nothing whatever to distinguish them. Commonsense naturally asks: Where then is the need for spiritual striving? What is the significance of the noble eight fold path?

The Madhyamika Theory of Nirvāṇa examined :

When we turn to the *śūnyavāda* of the *Mādhyamikas*, the metaphysical position seems to bristle with difficulties for the average mind. The main stumbling block is the very term *Śūnya*. A good deal of honest criticism has been evoked by it. For instance M. Poussin writes³ : "Ultimately, there cannot be true religious life, deliverance, as long as the faithful do not know that the Buddhas are mere names, the enlightened devotee adores celestial persons whom he knows to be pure phantoms, the enlightened giver pities beings while knowing that they do not exist." This criticism may sound somewhat exaggerated. But in the *Vajracchedikā* we read:⁴ "He who has entered on the path of the *bodhisattvas* must thus frame his thought: All beings must be delivered by me in the perfect world of *nirvāṇa*, yet, after I have delivered these beings, no being has been delivered. And why? Because, O! Subhūti, if a *bodhisattva* had any idea of beings, he could not be called a *bodhisattva*." The *Mādhyamika* school pushes its notion of *śūnyatā*, or void to impossible limits, indulging in a very orgy

1. Suzuki, P. 67, Qd. IP. i, 641;

2. Ibid; PP. 73-74.;

3. ERE. IX, P. 851.

4. SBE. XLIX, P. 132.

of negations, actuated, as it were, by the desire to give no foothold whatsoever to the acutest understanding. Suzuki writes ¹ about 18 different forms of *sūnyata* according to the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā* which include varieties such as *Adhyātma-sūnyatā*, *Bahirdhāsūnyatā*, *śūnyatāsūnyatā*, *Paramārtha-sūnyatā*, etc., and by way of comment, he adds: *Sūnyatā* or emptiness is not nothingness; it is not an object of thought. It is not relativity as Stecherbatsky translates the controversial word.² Now, it may be that the word *śūnyatā* is used to signify an absolutely ineffable reality which can only be experienced by the mystic.³ But, by applying it to all conceivable categories of life, religious life has been made incomprehensible for unsophisticated minds. The remark of Śaṅkara vis-a-vis this system, namely that it flies in the face of all means of right cognition,⁴ may be taken to represent a very intelligible reaction to the inordinate zest for negation displayed by it. For instance, Nāgārjuna condemns as unreal sufferings, bondage, liberation, and even the Tathāgata.⁵ In extenuation, it may be urged that the point of the *sūnyatā* doctrine is its demonstration of the untenability of all logical standpoints in regard to the Absolute. Nāgārjuna says that doctrine of *sūnyatā* is meant to destroy all theories and to establish the principle of direct, mystic, intuition: it is not to be taken as a new theory at all. Taken as a rival theory, he says, it is as bad as or worse than other theories. "If aught were other than the relative, then *sūnya*, i.e., the relative, would have made some sense. But, in fact, there is naught which is other than the relative: how, then, can there be anything

1. The Philosophy & Religion of the *Prajñāpāramitā*: Essays in Zen Buddhism; 3rd series PP. 21, ff.;

2. Concept of Nirvāṇa - P. 42;

3. Cf. "*sūnyamiti navaktavyamaśūnyam itivābhavet | ubhayaṃ nobhayaṃ cetiprajñaptiyartham* tukathyate ||

Ed. IP; P. 663;

"The truth is that the concept of Nirvāṇa is the Buddhist interpretation of what the Christian calls God"; Time and Eternity, New Jersey, 1952, W.T. Stace;

4. BSS. II, 2, 31. "*sarvaprāmāṇavipratīdharmaśūnyavādi-pakṣah.*"

5. MK. Chs. XII, XVI, XXII.

relative? ”¹ The question answered in the affirmative here is whether ‘relativity’ (*śūnyam*) itself is not ‘relative.’ This does not mean that we must reject the doctrine for it has been advanced by the *Jinas* only as a means of deliverance from bondage. Instead of treating it as a means, one should beware of taking it as an end, viz., as the one right theory. For such as do so are incurable indeed.² The position then would be as ludicrous as if one sought to purchase from a man, who said he had nothing to sell, that very nothing.³ The medicine itself should not prove a source of disease.⁴

However plausible this argument may be, the march of negations in the *Mādhyamika* system, though impressive as a dialectical display, completely fails to carry conviction. Incapacity to explain a thing is not a sufficient reason to deny its existence. Nāgārjuna’s theory of phenomenalism or ‘relativity’ requires us to abandon the whole scheme of values as an illusion. When everything becomes unreal, good and evil also are unreal. The effort to attain Nirvāṇa, to escape from the sorrows which do not exist, is obviously pointless and a mere waste of time. Moral life cannot be based on a detected illusion.⁵ Many of the statements of Nāgārjuna suggest that this world is no more real than the beauty of a barren woman’s daughter.

A concept such as the *śūnya* may appeal to a world-weary mind. As a description of the ultimate principle or the Absolute, it suggests the latter to be an immobile negation of all becoming. A pure being would require a principle of negation in itself to account for the world manifested by or in it. But Nāgārjuna’s absolute is completely frozen and can account for nothing, and so, hardly serves any philosophic purpose. The *Vijñānavāda* is historically held to have appeared as a reaction against the *śūnya* of the *Mādhyamikas*.⁶ The amendment which it thought out was to make the Absolute universal consciousness or *cit* or *Vijñāna*. As an answer to the negative absolute of Nāgārjuna and the fluctuating *Ālaya Vijñāna*, Advaita Philosophy formulates a stable and positive absolute.

1. MK. XIII, 7;

2. Ibid; XIII, 8;

3. MV. P. 247, 2. 6;

4. Concept of Nirvāṇa; P. 50;

5. IP. i, P. 657.

6. Ibid, P. 665;

It was pointed out above¹ that in Nāgārjuna's absolute unity there is no bliss. It is only, *Śānta* and *Siva*. Even consciousness or *cit* cannot be ascribed to it. Naturally, this absolute is Nirvāṇa as well. Nevertheless, Stcherbatsky states² that Śāṅkara is in full agreement with the *Mādhyamika* view of Reality and Nirvāṇa. No doubt for both *Advaita* and the *Mādhyamika sūnyavāda*, the Real is one without a second and the manifold is, from the point of view of the Absolute, a mirage. But the conception of this Absolute is far from being the same in the two cases. Śāṅkara's Absolute is *Saccidānanda* raised no matter to what ineffable degree it may be and it is atleast conceivable how such an Absolute may be the source of a world in which all these three factors of existence, consciousness and bliss are experienced side by side. Therefore it is not sheer hatred of Buddhism³ as Stcherbatsky affirms which prevents Śāṅkara from professing his agreement with *Mahāyāna metaphysics*.⁴ These points of agreement and profound difference must be held over for more detailed treatment in a later section.

1. P. 151, section on the *Mādhyamika* view of Nirvāṇa above.

2. Concept of Nirvāṇa, P. 38 ;

3. Ibid ;

4. Cf. Śāṅkara, BS. II, 2, 31.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONCEPT OF LIBERATION IN JAINISM

The Uniqueness of Jainism

Among the Indian concepts of the bondage and liberation of the self of man, those elaborated by the ancient school of Jainism are in several respects unique. Like Buddhism, Jainism also arose and developed outside the pale of vedic speculation and proceeded on lines opposed to the latter; but, unlike Buddhism, Jainism held fast to the concept of a persistent self or *ātman* which experiences both the states of bondage and liberation. Like the *Nyāyā-Vaiśeṣika* and *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* Schools, Jainism recognized realistically a multiplicity of selves, but the *Jaina* notion that these apparently spiritual entities are of limited and varied dimensions marks it out from all other views of the self. No other thinkers in India have associated the idea of a real change and development with *ātman*.¹ Equally unique is the conception of the bondage of this *ātman* as due to its envelopment in a *kārmic* stuff and its deliverance as escape therefrom into a space above, though continuous with, the region in which the universe of matter and bound souls is situated. As ancient as the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* systems and Buddhism, Jainism shares in their theoretical pessimism as also in their practical ideal, viz., deliverance or *mokṣa*. In its rejection of God-worship and acceptance, in its stead, of man-worship (i.e., of the *siddha*) in Jainism may be seen an anticipation of Positivism.²

The Jaina View of Reality.

Unlike the doctrine of the immutability and permanence of the Upaniṣadic Being, the *Jainas* hold that Being is joined to production, continuation, and destruction. This is the theory of *anekāntavāda* or indefiniteness of Being.³ This implies that existent things are permanent only as regards their substance: accidents or qualities originate and perish. Any material thing

1. IP. i, P 323;

2. The Heart of Jainism;

3. ERE. Vol. VII, P. 467.

continues to exist for ever, as matter; still, it may assume any shape and quality. *Jainas* evidently are not concerned with transcendental Being, but with being as given in common experience. Thus, to the *Jainas*, reality is a unity-in-difference. Theirs is a *bhedābheda-vāda*, i. e., difference in identity. Substance is what persists in and through its own qualities and modifications. It has infinite attributes: *anantadharma-makam-vastu* ¹ – “The relation between substance and qualities is one of coeval identity, unity, inseparability and essential simplicity” ²

The *anekāntavāda* of the *Jains* is upheld by the dialectic of *syādvāda*. ³

The *Jaina* Conception of the Universe

The concept of the Universe according to Jainism is expressed by Mahāvīra in reply to a question put by his disciple, Gautama Indrabūti: O Lord! What is this Universe? “Gautama! this universe is composed of the five extensive

1. ŚDS. S'l. 55, P. 204;

2. Pañcāstikāyasamayāsāra, P. 56, Qd. IP. i, P. 314;

3. *syādvāda* is defined as *anekāntāmākārthakathanam* – the expression in propositions of reality which is indefinite. It consists of seven forms of metaphysical propositions, *saptabhaṅgis*; The point stressed in *syādvāda* is that all knowledge is only probable, *syād*: may be. This dialectic points to the extremely complex nature of reality of which no one categorical prediction can be absolutely valid. Every proposition is true, but only hypothetically. There are seven such propositions. (i) *syādsti*. From the point of its own material, place, time and nature, a thing is or exists as itself. E. G., the jar exists as made of clay, in a given place, and time, as serviceable. (ii) *syādnāsti*. From the point of the material, etc., of another thing, say, a cloth, the jar is not (i. e. as made of thread, etc.); (iii) *syādstināsti*. From the point of view of the same 4 conditions of material, etc., relating to itself and cloth, it may be held that the jar is and is not; (iv) *syādavaktavya*. The two contrary propositions in (iii) may be asserted only successively and not simultaneously. This impossibility of simultaneous prediction of opposites is expressed in (iv). (v) *syādsti avaktavya*. The facts of the existence of the pot and its indescribability expressed in (iv) are combined here. The pot is and is indescribable; (vi) *syādnāsti avaktavya* combines (ii) and (iv), relative nonexistence of the pot and its indescribability as expressed in (iv); (viii) *syādstināsti avak-*

substances or *astikāyas*.¹ They are the medium of motion, *dharma*; the medium of rest, *adharma*; space, *ākāśa*; soul, *jīva*; and matter, *pudgala*.² In other chapters of the *Bhagavati-sūtra*³ time is mentioned as a separate entity. This two-fold enumeration, perhaps, shows that in the days of Mahāvīra there were two currents of thought in Jainism, according to one of which the universe consisted of five *astikāyas*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa*, *pudgala*, and *jīva*, while the other added the sixth, time, to this list.⁴ Time, however, is not regarded as an *astikāya*⁵ as it is not a spatially extended entity, *nirvibhāgatvāt*. A shorter, but exhaustive, way of describing the universe is to say that it is made up of the two categories, *Jīva* and *Ajīva*, the latter including all the five of the principles enumerated above.⁶

Jīva

Most important among the constituents of the universe for our present purpose is the *Jīva* or the living individual. The proof of the reality of the *Jīva* is direct introspection.⁷ *Jīva* has been defined as that whose characteristic is *Upayoga* or the power of consciousness.⁸ *Upayoga* is of two kinds, determinate and indeterminate,⁹ the first being identified with *Jñāna* or knowledge and the second with *darśana* or intuition.¹⁰ What knows and perceives the various objects, desires

tavya synthesizes (iii) and (iv). Pot exists, does not exist and is indescribable – all these, relatively. The high esteem in which their *syādvāda* is held by the Jains is expressed thus: *syādvāda* and *kevalajñāna* illumine the whole reality. Their difference is this: the former illumines objects indirectly; the latter does so directly. *Āptamīmāṃsā*, Qd. Outlines; P. 122;

1. *Astikāya* : Spatial existences, IP, i, P. 323 ;
2. *Bhagavati Sūtra*, XIII, 4, 481 ;
3. XXV, 2-4 ;
4. Guṇaratna's commentary on *ṢDS*. Calcutta, 1905, P. 162-163 ;
5. Idid ; P. 163 ;
6. Idid ; Sl. 47 & Comm ; on it. ;
7. HIP. Das Gupta, P. 189 ;
8. TAS. II, 8 ;
9. Idid ; II, 9 ;
10. *Studies in Jaina Philosophy* ; P. 71, N. Tatia, Banaras, 1951 ;

pleasures and dreads pains, acts beneficially or harmfully and experiences the fruits thereof that is *Jīva*.”¹

According to Jainism, there are infinite *Jīvas* in the world and each *Jīva* has innumerable *pradeśas*.² By *pradeśa* is meant the space occupied by a material atom.³ But *Jīva* is not all-pervasive. “By contraction and expansion of its *pradeśas*, *Jīva* or soul is capable of occupying varying proportions of the countless *pradeśas* of the universe, just like the flame of a lamp whose light can fill a small room as well as a big hall.”⁴ One or more of the countless parts of space the soul can occupy through contraction and expansion and, in special cases, a soul may fill the whole universe,⁵ i.e., a soul can occupy the smallest possible body as of a bacterium or the biggest body of a fish. This notion that the soul's size is equal to that of the body it occupies is peculiar to Jainism. The *Jaina* view that the soul is a changing entity may be traced to primitive notions reflected in the synonyms of the soul such as *sattva*, *prāṇa bhūta*.⁶

In its intrinsic nature, the soul is pure and perfect, its felt imperfections being due to its contact with *kārmic* matter.

Jīvas are infinite in number. The whole universe packed with souls resembles a box filled with powder. Each soul is an eternal substance, of indefinite size. Its characteristic mark of intelligence, *upayoga*, may be obscured but not destroyed. Among the attributes of the *jīva* are knowledge, intuition, conduct, pleasure, pain, energy, goodness, badness and emotions like anger, pride and greed.⁷ As for the relation between the soul and its attributes, it is held to be an identity indifference; for absolute difference is incompatible with perceptions such as: I know; I am happy; while total identity is incompatible with perceptions implying any distinctions. Knowledge, anger,

1. Pañcāstikāya samayasāra, Qd. IP i, P. 314;

2. TAS. V, 8;

3. TASB. V, 7

4. Tattvārthasāra, III, 14; Qd. Outlines of Jaina Philosophy P. 301, M. L. Mehta, J. M. Society, 1954;

5. TAS V. 15;

6. Studies; P. 229.

7. ŚDS. S'l. 48 and Comm: P. 138.

etc., are the attributes and the soul is the substance to which they belong. Thus, the truth is neither total difference between substance and attributes as the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* holds, nor identity as the Buddhists aver. This position of the *Jainas* is, of course, in conformity with their *anekāntavāda*, described above.

Again, the *Jīva* is subject to transmigration, is the agent of actions both good and bad, and the reaper of their consequences, viz., pleasure and pain. This, of course, implies that the *Jīva* undergoes real changes. It is the *upādānakāraṇa* or material cause of *bhāvas* or thoughts. Yet, throughout its modifications, the soul or *Jīva* maintains its identity. Birth and death also are only *paryāyas* or modifications of the soul. According to the theory of *anekāntavāda*, the liberated soul is one with the soul in bondage. This view is more natural than that of the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* school, viz., the *Jīva* is only the enjoyer, *bhoktā*, and not also the agent or *kartā*. The *Jaina* view of the inherent intelligence of the soul marks it off from the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* dogma that the *ātman* is inert in itself. The past existences of the *Jīva* is sought to be proved, as in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, with references to the instinctive reactions of new-born babies.¹

There are, quite uniquely, in Jainism nine classes of *Jīvas*,² viz., those living in the four elements, earth, water fire and air; those living in vegetable bodies; and these having, respectively, two, three, four or five sense-organs. Even the *Jainas* felt that the presence of the *Jīvas* in the four elements is not obvious and so they argue that their presence is unmanifest, just as the *Jīva* of a dead-drunk man is.³ Though other Indian thinkers also have maintained that plants have souls, the *Jaina* theory has certain peculiarities. The grosser plants, in each of which a single soul resides, exist in the habitable parts of the world. But there are invisible plants distributed all over the world each of which is a colony of plant lives. These subtle plants are called *nigodas*. They are composed of an infinite number of souls, forming a very small cluster with

1. ŚDS. P. 151;

2. Ibid; P. 153;

3. Ibid; P. 153

respiration and nutrition in common. The function of these *nigodas* is to supply souls in the vacancies created by the souls who attain liberation.¹

A more relevant division of the *Jīvas* is into the class of the liberated, *muktas*, and that of the worldly souls, *samsārins*.² Of the worldly *Jīvas*, only those dwelling in hells, gods and mammals are held to have minds. Other inferior orders of living beings are mindless.³ Jainism avoids the defects of both mentalism and materialism by recognizing the correlativity of mind and matter.

Bondage of the Jiva

The life of the *Jīvas* in *samsāra* or conditions of transmigration has no beginning in time. In fact, rebirth and *karman*, as pointed out in the very beginning of our study, are among the important presuppositions of all Indian Schools of thought. Obviously, the *sāmsāric* experiences of the *Jīvas* constitute their bondage. The ancient Indian felt that emancipation of the soul from bondage necessarily entailed numerous existences⁴ for its realization. This conviction must have led to the theory of rebirths.

Now, emancipation of course presupposes a corruption of the spirit or *ātman*, which, intrinsically, is pure and perfect. In Jainism also this basic corruption or bondage of the self is traced to the beginningless nescience or *avidyā* about truth. Thus *Jaina* thinkers also trace the malady of the *samsāric* soul to the same cause as thinkers of other schools. Just how or why the pure soul becomes impure is never asked; for, frankly, the question does not admit of an answer. The condition of bondage of the soul is accepted as a fact to be remedied. Still, the *Jaina* concept of *avidyā*, the cause of soul's bondage, is not the same as that of other schools. An elucidation of the *Jaina* concept of *avidyā* is thus necessary to make the bondage of the soul intelligible.

1. IP. i, P. 322;

2. TAS. II, 10;

3. Ibid; II, 11, and 25;

4. Cf. BG. VI, 45; VIII, 19,

The *Jaina* idea of the *Jīva's avidyā* may be gathered from the way the *Jīva* under its influence thinks and acts. "I am this, this is I, I am of this, mine is this—everything that is non-self, living, or non-living or mixed. Mine was all this formerly; I was all this in the past; again will this be mine and I shall again be thus. The deluded one, *sammūḍha*, possesses all these false notions about the Self."¹ The term generally used by the *Jains* to denote the idea of *avidyā* is *mithyātva*; other synonyms are *mithyādars'ana*, *mithyādṛṣṭi*, *dars'anamoha*, *moha*, etc. Now, *dars'anamoha* is one variety of *karmans* which attaches itself to the soul, and deludes and misguides it. Wrong notions about the truth and the reality to which the truth refers are due to *dars'anamoha*.

Avidyā or *mithyātva* may also be rendered as perversity of outlook. It is due to this perversity that *adharma* or wrong religion is taken for *dharma*, *amagga* or wrong path is taken for *magga*, the *ajīva* or non-soul is taken for *jīva*, the *asāhu* or sinner is taken for *sāhu*, the *amutta* or the unemancipated is taken for the *mutta*, and also, of course, *vice versa*.² *Umāsvāti* distinguishes two forms of nescience, viz., *abhigrhīta*, firmly held, and *anabhigrhīta*, lightly held.³ The former is the tenacious clinging to a wrong view once accepted, while the latter is acceptance without obstinate adherence. *Kundakunda* considers perversity, *mithyātva*, nescience, *ajñāna*, and attachment, *avirati*, to be the three timeless forms of deluded consciousness.⁴ Another noted *Jaina* writer, *Pūjyapāda Devanandi*, distinguishes between an inborn form of nescience and another, acquired from instructions by others. According to a more informative account he gives, five forms of nescience may be distinguished. Prejudice in favour of absolutism is the variety known as *ekānta*. A conviction to the contrary of truth is styled *viparīta*. Radical scepticism is the third called *sams'aya*. Indiscriminate faith in every god and scripture is

1. *Samayaprabhṛta* of *Kundakunda*, 25–27 Qd. SJP., 144;

2. *Sthānāṅgasūtra*, X, 1, 734, Qd. SJP. (PP. 144–45);

3. TASS. VIII, 1;

4. *Uvaogassa aṇāṇi pariṇāmaṃ tiṇṇi mohajuttassa |
Miccattam aṇṇānam aviradibhāvoya pādavvo ||
Samayasāra*, 96.

the fourth, *vaināyika*. Absence of discrimination between good and bad is the last, *ajñānika-mithyādarśana*¹. All these distinctions merely point to the various ways in which the same nescience or *mithyātva* operates. All bondage and sufferings consequent on it are ultimately traceable to nescience or *mithyādarśana*. *Samśāramūlabhām miccattam*.²

Once again, conformably to the unanimous Indian view of the matter, the Jaina thinkers hold that *mithyātva* or nescience has no origin in time. That is to say, *ātman* and *avidyā* are coevals in the sphere of *saṃsāra*. The subjection of the one to the other has to be accepted as a matter of fact, which does not admit of a why. It is one of the ultimate facts of life and a question regarding its why is no more reasonable than a 'why' regarding the *ātman*.

On the basis of unimpeachable fact, *mithyātva* has been indicated as the root-cause of the soul's bondage. But there are four more conditions promoting bondage, viz., *avirati*, or non-abstinence; *pramāda* or spiritual inertia; *kaṣāya* or passions; and *yoga* or activity.³ Of these the succeeding ones necessarily exist when the prior ones come into being, though the contrary is not necessarily true.⁴ Or, still more comprehensively, the causes of bondage may be counted as three, namely, *mithyādarśana*, perverse view; *mithyājñāna*, perverse knowledge; and *mithyācāritra*, preverse conduct. This is a conclusion which follows from the fact that in his very first aphorism, Umāsvatī⁵ enumerates the opposite of this trio *śamyag darśana jñāna cāritrāṇi*, as constituting the path leading to emancipation.⁶ The significance of this three-fold condition is that the *Jīva*'s bondage does not consist in a mere intellectual flaw or error, but affects his entire life - both thought and action. Illustrating the force of *mithyādarśana*, Umāsvatī writes that the three forms of knowledge known as *matī* (ordinary cognition born of normal sense perception) *śrūta* (cognition through signs, symbols and words) and *avadhi* (knowledge by clairvoyance), when informed by *mithyādarśana*, fail in their function

1. Quoted in SJP. P. 145;

2. Ibid;

3. TAS. VIII, 1;

4. TASB. VIII, I. 1;

5. TASB. I, 1; 6. Tattvārthaśloka-vārttika, Qd.SJP, P.147;

and become forms of wrong cognition or *ajñāna*.¹ Just as the knowledge of a mad man is necessarily *ajñāna*, notwithstanding its accidental correspondence to facts, the cognitions of one vitiated by *mithyādarśana* also are essentially ignorance.²

Bondage of the soul means that its many capacities like consciousness, vision, knowledge, energy, bliss, etc., are obstructed by different types of *karmans*; and are but imperfectly manifested in its *sāṃsāric* life. When its capacity for right vision is obstructed, there results *mithyādarśana*; when its capacity for right knowledge is shackled, there is *mithyājñāna*; and when its innate energy is stifled, there supervenes *mithyācāritra*. Thus, bondage in its essence consists in the obstruction and mutilation of the various capacities of the soul. It must be noted that the Jaina view is that the soul's bondage is the result, not of perverted knowledge alone, but also of the other two equally vital factors, viz., perverted attitude and perverted conduct, *mithyādarśana* and *mithyācāritra*. They argue that if *mithyājñāna* alone caused bondage, upon winning *tattvajñāna* or right knowledge the soul should forthwith become free, whereas, as a matter of fact, it remains embodied, reaping the fruits of operative *karmans*. On this latter point there is unanimity among the thinkers of the *Sāṃkhya*, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Buddhist* and *Advaitic* schools of thought. The experience of the world even after the dawn of right knowledge argues the presence in the soul of other factors which the Jainas identify as perverted attitude and perverted conduct.

The Karma theory

The basic cause of bondage has been traced to *avidyā* or *mithyātva*, wrongness, which characterizes the three factors of *darśana*, *jñāna* and *cāritra* and produces the life of limitations and sufferings. Another term for it, it was remarked above, is *dars'anamoha*, delusion of vision, a variety of *karmans* which attach themselves to the soul. In other words, the root of bondage may be said to be *karman*, according to the Jaina thinkers³, and an exposition of their theory of *karman*, "the

1. TASB. I, 32;

2. Ibid; I, 33.

3. ŚDS. s.l. 51; P. 180,

keystone of the 'Jaina system"', is necessary for an appreciation of the condition whence deliverance is sought.

In other Indian systems, by *karman* is understood an unseen potency, *adṛṣṭa*, a predisposition, *vāsanā*, energy, *śakti*, or even trap, *pāś'a* (e. g. in Śaivism). The theory of *karman* is the grand Indian hypothesis which explains the varieties and inequalities in the conditions and fortunes of human beings. The nature of the *vāsanās*, *kleśas* (afflictions), and *kaṣāyas* (passions) determines the character, quantity, duration and intensity of the *karman* or unseen potency, *adṛṣṭa*. This potency brings about life in *saṃsāra*, i. e., the relation between the soul and non-soul. All Indian systems which accept the doctrine of deliverance also recognize that the transmigrating soul is encased in a subtle body that mediates between the pure soul and gross matter. For the Jains this subtle body is made up of *karma*, which, therefore, must partake of the nature of subtle matter. The Jaina view that *karma* is material is the result of their conviction that emancipation means the emancipation of both matter and spirit. The various passions constitute the bondage of the spirit, while the change of the material atoms into *kārmic* material makes up the bondage of matter.²

We have already pointed out that the soul in Jainism is an everchanging principle. In its state of worldly existence, the changes of the soul are determined by the nature of the *karma* associated with it. On the other hand, according to the *jaina* theory, the nature of the *karma-pudgala* (or *karma* matter) is determined by that of the passions or *kaṣāyas* of the soul and the nature of the passions by that of *kārmic* matter. This mutual determination of *karma* and passions has no beginning in time. With a view to explain the crux of relation between a spiritual soul and material *karma*, the *Jaina* philosopher goes to the extent of saying that, in the *sāṃsāric* stage, the soul is partly corporeal or *mūrta*.³ Thus, due to its passions like

1. ERE. Vol. VII ; P. 469.

2. SJP., P. 228 ;

3. ŚDS. with Guṇaratna on s'l. 51, P. 181 ; Also, cf. ahavaṇe-ganto'yam saṃsāri savvahā amutto'tti | jam anādikammasantati pariṇāmāvannarūvoso || Dharmasaṅgrahaṇigāthā, 626, Qd. SJP., P. 227. ;

greed, aversion, etc., the soul is, as it were, sticky and *karma* matter sticks to it as dust to a wet or oily cloth. "Even as a lamp, by its temperature draws up the oil with its wick and converts the oil into its body, i. e., glow, the soul-lamp attracts the material aggregates by the wick of its activities and transforms it into *karman*."¹

The *Jainas* distinguish between the material *karman* called *dravyakarman* and its spiritual counterpart called *bhāvakarman*. The first is also called *avarāṇa* or cover and the second *doṣas* or defects. The *doṣas* are the passions, the privations, and the perversions of the soul's capacities. The *āvaraṇas* consist of the *kārmic* matter that produces the perversions of the soul. Thus material *karma* and its spiritual counterpart are related to each other as cause and effect.²

The *Jainas* hold that the relation between soul and *karman* is one of concrete identity in the soul's state of bondage. The *kārmic* matter mixes with the soul in much the same way as milk does with water or fire with iron.

Eight main classes of *karma* have been distinguished in Jainism. What obscures the innate omniscience of the soul and produces degrees of knowledge and ignorance is called *Jñānāvaraṇakarman*³. What obscures right intuition like sleep, e.g., is the second, the *darśanāvaraṇa*. The *karma* matter which obstructs the natural bliss of the soul is the third, *vedanīya*, which, thus, produces both pain and pleasure. The type that disturbs the right attitude of the soul with regard to faith, conduct, passions, etc., and produces doubt, error, passions and so forth is the fourth variety *mohanīya-karman*.

1. TASB, Qd., SJP., P. 232;

2. cf. *doṣāvaraṇyaorjīvapudgalapaṇḍīyāmayoranyonyakāryakāraṇabhāva* - *Aṣṭasāhasrī*, P. 51, Qd. SJP., P. 227;

3. Five kinds of *Jñāna* are recognized, *mati* or ordinary cognition; *s'ruti* or testimony; *avadhi* or supernatural cognition; *manahpāryāya*, direct knowledge of the thoughts of other minds; *kevala* or omniscience, cf. TAS. I, 9, 20, 21, 24 and X, 1.

The next four kinds of *karman* concern the individual status of a being. That which breaks up the continuity of immortal existence into so many mortal fragments of shorter or longer individual lives is *āyuska* or longevity-determining *karman*. The embodiment of the bodiless soul with the determination of faculties, etc., is the function of *nāmakarman*. The seventh, *gotrakarman* is what determines the differences of racial, social or genealogical status of the embodied souls. The last, *antarāyakarman* is the type which obstructs the infinite energy of the soul and handicaps the enjoyment of wealth and power. Each of these varieties of *karman* has its predetermined limits within which it must work itself out.

From among the numerous sub-divisions of these eight main varieties of *karman*, two classes of *mohanīya* or deluding *karman* may be noticed: (a) what deludes the right vision, *darśana mohanīya*¹ and (b) what deludes the right conduct, *cāritramohanīya*. The former has three sub-types, viz., (i) what, by its rise, makes the soul lose vision of truth, and see a thing as it is not, *mithātvmohanīya*; (ii) what is a state of purity of the sub-type (i); (iii) what is a mixed type of purity and impurity of the same.²

The length of duration, *sthiti* and intensity of fruition, *anubhāga* of the soul's bondage due to *kārmic* matter depend upon the nature of the passions of the soul³. The stronger the passions, the lengthier and intenser are the duration and fruition of the bondage. This applies only to the bondage of inauspicious or *aśubhakarmans* which produce sufferings. In the case of auspicious *karmans*, though the duration varies directly with the strength of the passions, the intensity of the fruition varies inversely with their strength; for, strength of passions means a small degree of soul's purity and a loose connection with auspicious *karmans*.

The Jainas hold that the maximum duration of *jīñānāvaraṇa*, *darśanāvaraṇa*, *vedanīya* and *antarāya-karmans* is thirty

1. Vide reference to this variety as cause of bondage, supra, P. 168

2. SJP. P. 233;

3. "Thi anubhāgaṃ kaṣāyo kuṇai-Śivaś'aramasūri's Śataka-karmagrantha, gāthā, 99, Qd. SJP., P. 235;

sagaropamakoti-koti years.¹ Equally formidable stretches of time are indicated during which the other forms of *kārmic* bondage also remain in operation.

The overpowering nature of the soul's bondage can be appreciated better when it is remembered that the space occupied by the souls is densely filled up with *kārmic* matter and that there is an incessant flow or *āsrava* of it into them from all sides so long as the souls are involved in activities, *yoga*, of one kind or other. Till complete freedom is won, the influx of *kārmic* matter must continue. The volume of the matter absorbed by the soul depends upon the measure of its activities or vibrations. The greater the soul's activities, the heavier the intake of *kārmic* material. It is obvious that the nature of these activities of the soul depends on its passions or *kaṣāyas*. Another factor contributing to bondage is *avirati*, non-renunciation. Thus the causes of bondage according to Jainism are perversity, *mithyātva*; non-renunciation, *avirati*, spiritual indolence, *pramāda*; passions, *kaṣāyas*; and activity *yoga*² (a technical use of this celebrated expression); still, the Jaina thinkers accord to *yoga* or activity of the soul a preponderant force in bringing about its bondage.²

Of the eight main types of *karman* enumerated above, the knowledge-covering, the intuition-covering, the deluding and the obstructive are styled obscuring or *ghātin* and the remaining four are non-obscuring or *aghātin*. The innate qualities of the soul are warped by *ghāti karmans*. Love of truth or *samyaktva*³ is the innate character of the soul and it is obscured by *mohanīyakarman* or *mithyātva*. Similarly omniscience or *kevalajñāna* is also obscured by *kārmic* material. Ofcourse, such obscuration of the innate virtues and perfections of the soul does not amount to their extirpation, as, in that case, the soul would cease to be soul and the question of its deliverance would not arise. A fraction of its original and immortal fire

1. TAS. VIII, 15-18; The *ṭikā* says *Koṭi-koti* is the result of multiplying one crore with another, while the simile of the sea, *sāgara*, suggests the immensity of the time involved.
2. TAS. VIII, 1;
3. SJP., P. 239, f.n. (i);

remains with it in all its conditions; hence its ceaseless craving and striving for perfection.

In dealing with the concept of bondage in Jainism, it is necessary also to refer to its characteristic dogma of *leśya* or transformation of the soul, due to the activity of the mind. It is a sort of transcendental colour or complexion taken by a soul through *karma* amalgamated by it.¹ There will be *leśya* so long as the soul retains its association with the mind. Actually, the transformations of the soul due to contact with mind are infinite; but, for convenience sake, these have been classified into six main types, viz., *kṛṣṇa* or black; *nīla* or blue; *kapola* or grey; *tejo* or red; *padma* or yellow, *śukla* or white. These colours are symbolic and have a moral bearing; the first three mark the bad and the last three the good character.²

The *karma* matter which mixes with the soul does not immediately yield its fruit; it remains inactive for a period. But when it matures and begins to produce its results, it is said to be in the state of *udaya* or rise, and the souls in the *audayika* state. When *karma* is prevented from producing its results for sometime by appropriate efforts of the soul, the *karma* thus held up is said to be in the *upasamita* state and the soul itself in the *upaśamita* state.³ It is through the holding up of the *mohanīya* or deluding *karma* that the soul gets a glimpse of the truth which saves. In its turn, the soul's inherent love of the truth helps its endeavours to hold up the functioning of the deluding *karma*. The *upaśama* or subsidence of the deluding *karma* is only a temporary state; its antithesis is the total dissociation of that *karma* from the soul which involves its disintegration or *kṣaya*. Now the soul is said to be in the *kṣāyika* state, one which it is necessary to maintain for reaching Nirvāṇa. There is a fourth state of the soul called *kṣayopāśamika* in which some *karma* is in the process of dissociation and others in subsidence. It is virtually a complex of the three preceding states, viz., dissociation, subsidence and rise of *karma* stuff.

The goal which the active aspirant to Nirvāṇa should keep in view is to get rid of all *karma* matter from the soul and

1. TASB on II, 3, says: *tattvaruciḥ samyaktvam*.

2. ERE. Vol. VII, P. 469;

3. TASB. II, 7,

4. ERE. Vol. VII, P. 469.

acquire no fresh matter from outside ; in other words, to achieve *samvara*, defined as the stopping of the four *āsravas*, *mithyātva*, *avirati*, *kaṣāya* and *yoga* by means of right knowledge, renunciation, vigilance, and *guptis* or controls like patience, etc.¹

Adhikarin

On the question of eligibility to *mokṣa* or deliverance, there are some noteworthy differences of views among the Jainas. According to the *Digambaras* or 'sky-clad' Jainas, women are not entitled to liberation², because they are inferior to men. But Guṇaratna demonstrates at great length that women are men's equals in their ability and readiness to stand the rigours of austerity and win liberation. Generally, the fit candidate for liberation is styled a *bhavya*, viz., one who is fit to wait upon a *siddha* or fully liberated man. This qualifying fitness, however, differs with time, place, teacher and other relevant circumstances; otherwise, all should achieve *mukti* at once. On the other hand, according to Jainism there are people who never become fit for deliverance from bondage. Such are styled *abhavyas*. No explanation is offered to throw light on this sharp division of human beings in to the *bhavyas* and *abhavyas*.³

The virtues which qualify the candidate are knowledge, intuition, and conduct, *jñāna*, *darśana* and *cāritra*.⁴ Their combination makes the candidate eligible for that liberation which consists in an infinitude of knowledge, intuition, bliss, energy. Neither mere knowledge nor mere activity on the part of the candidate will suffice to yield *mokṣa*. But all who wish to qualify for *mokṣa* must take up the life of the monk through renunciation ; for, the common man is asleep while the ascetic is always awake.⁵

Means of Liberation.

In all Indian disciplines leading to liberation, it is recognized that the final achievement is to be won through meditation or *yoga*. The object of this meditation is in most cases

1. Guṇaratna on ŚDS. P. 180 ; 2. Ibid ; PP. 197 ff.

3. SJP., P. 266, f. n. 5 ;

4. Guṇaratna on ŚDS. P. 203 ;

5. SJP., P. 19, *suttā amuṇi muṇinosayayaṃ-jāgaranti*, Qd. Ibid.

the nature of the self or *ātman*, or, in Buddhism, the absence of the *ātman*, *nairātmyabhāvanā*. This implies that the earnest aspirant cannot afford the luxury of scepticism and still hope for self-realization. Whatever the system he follows, he must have wholehearted faith in it, and with the strength of that faith carry out the practical steps it prescribes. Implicit faith in the truth, whether gathered from the words of the preceptor, or achieved through one's own intuition, is the starting point of spiritual life. Thus in Jainism is stressed *tattvārthasraddhāna* faith in the truth.¹ The process which in other systems is known by the term *yoga* is in Jainism referred to by the word *cāritra*.²

As bondage results from the influx of *kārmic* matter into the soul due to its activities and passions, it is obvious that their eradication is the means of stopping that inflow and securing liberation. By the activities of the soul in bondage are meant those of the mind, organ of speech and body. Therefore, the first condition for the arrest of the inflow of *kārmic* matter is control or *gupti*, of thought, speech, and bodily movements³ — *samyagyoganigrahoguptiḥ*. Other conditions have also been laid down for achieving the requisite arrest of *kārmic* matter, viz., (i) The five-fold regulation, *saṃiti*, for maintaining life;⁴ (ii) the acquisition of the ten moral virtues, viz., consummate forbearance, modesty, candour, contentment, truth, self-restraint, austerity, renunciation, non-attachment, and celibacy;⁵ (iii) contemplation, or *anupreksā* of twelve themes, viz., transience, helplessness in worldly life, the sorrowful nature of the world, the loneliness of the sojourn here below, the otherness of the self, physical impurities, the inflow of *kārmic* matter, its arrest, its destruction or *nirjara*, the constituents of the universe, the rarity of illumination, and the rightness of the path chosen for winning *mokṣa*;⁶ (iv) The uncomplaining endurance of afflictions or *pariśahas*⁷ such as hunger, thirst, cold, heat, mosquito-stings, etc., (v) the five-fold conduct, *cāritra*, viz., abstention from all harmful activities,

1. TAS. I, 2;

2. SJP., P. 262.

3. TAS. IX, 4;

4. Ibid; IX, 5;

5. Ibid; IX, 6;

6. Ibid; IX, 7;

7. Ibid; IX, 9.

sāmayika; reinitiation, *chedopasthapānā*, after rectifying rites due to carelessness or *pramāda*; austerity; conduct attended with only the subtlest passions, *sūkṣmasamparāya* and perfect conduct, *yathākhyāta*.¹ The six factors enumerated above, namely, self-control, *gupti*; self-regulation, *saṃiti*; moral virtues, *dharma*; contemplation, *anuprekṣā*; endurance and conquest of afflictions, *pariśahajaya*; and conduct, *cāritra*, are the means to secure *saṃvara* or arrest of the inflow of *kārmic* material. Besides, *tapas* both physical and mental is esteemed as a means to both *saṃvara* and *nirjarā*. The stress on the mortification of the flesh which Jainism prescribes as a means for the regeneration of the spirit is altogether its special characteristic. It comes out most vividly in the tremendous importance Jainism attaches to the vow or *vrata* of *ahimsā*, non-violence, which may rightly be regarded as the foundation of the entire edifice of Jaina ethics and morality. The four accompanying vows of truthfulness, non-stealing, celibacy, and non-possession, only help one fulfil the supreme vow of non-violence or *ahimsā*.

The Jaina ascetics are obliged to maintain these virtues as *mahāvratas* or great vows, and the rigour involved in so doing may be judged from the relevant sections of the *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*.² The first great vow runs thus: I renounce all killing of living beings whether subtle or gross, movable or immovable. Nor shall I myself kill living beings nor cause others to do it nor consent to it. As long as I live, I confess and blame, repent and exempt myself of these sins in the thrice three-fold way,³ in mind, speech and body. The carrying out of this vow involves carefulness in walking lest living beings be hurt, displaced, injured or killed; searchings of the mind to exclude all thoughts of inflicting injury and pain or of causing death; and guarding of speech to avoid all blamable and harsh sentiments. The Jaina ascetic or *Nirgrantha* must be careful in laying down his utensils for the same purpose, namely, avoiding injury to living beings. The same circumspection and vigilance must be exercised in regard to drinking, eating, etc.,

1. Ibid; IX, 18.

2. SBE. XXII, PP. 202 ff.

3. The three-fold way i.e., acting, commanding, consenting either in the past or the present, or the future,

also and with the same object in view. With regard to the vow of truthfulness, the monk i.e., the *Nirgrantha*, should speak with deliberation to avoid falsehood; he must renounce anger, for an angry man might utter falsehood; and, for the same reason, he must also give up greed, fear, and mirth. To keep the vow of non-stealing, he must beg for alms only with deliberation; he may consume his food and drink only with the permission of his superior; should take possession only of a limited part of ground and for a fixed time; and should constantly have his grant of ground renewed. To maintain the vow of celibacy, the monk should avoid all topics of discussion relating to women; should not contemplate the forms of women; should not recollect his previous relations with women; should avoid too much eating and highly seasoned dishes; and should avoid all proximity to women, eunuchs, etc. The monk who takes the vow of non-possession should not take delight in or be disturbed by agreeable and disagreeable sounds, agreeable or disagreeable forms, such as smells, tastes and touches. Only one who is faithful to all these vows in the manner indicated can be really regarded as Houseless, a true monk, who observes the *mahāvratas*.

But the members of the laity may keep them as *aṇuvratas* or minor vows with considerable relaxation.

The value of equanimity for the maintenance of the *mahāvratas* was recognised and as an aid to equanimity was prescribed the cultivation of *maitrī* or friendship for all living beings; of appreciation or *promoda* for superiors; of compassion or *kāruṇya* for the afflicted; and of indifference or *mādhyasthya* for the unruly.¹

Path to Mokṣa

Right attitude, right knowledge, and right conduct constitute the Jaina path to final deliverance – *samyag darsana jñana cāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ*.² Most Indian systems emphasize one or the other of these factors as of supreme importance for

1. TAS. VII, 6; cf. *Brahmavihāra* in Buddhism and the *viparītabhāvanā* in the Yoga system;

2. TAS. I, 1;

achieving the goal of life. The Jainas maintain that all these must be combined to produce the desired effect, viz, salvation. Even as a patient must have not only faith in the doctor's words, not only know the medicine prescribed, but also actually take it, in order to win health, the aspirant who would be delivered must cultivate all the three elements of the path alike.¹ Collectively they are known as the *ratnatraya*.² Though sometimes the influence and instruction of good people help the aspirant, the main urge to achieve *samyagdarśana* comes from within his own soul. "Man! Thou art thy own friend: Why wishest thou for a friend beyond thyself?.... exerting himself in the rule of truth, a wise man overcomes Māra."³ *Samyaktva* or rightness is a basic change of the soul's direction or *tattvaruci*, love of truth. When it takes place, the entire horizon of the soul changes. *Samyagdarśana* is a kind of purified state of consciousness in which things are comprehended as they are. This purified state is presupposed by right knowledge or *samyagjñāna*; for, without the attitude or faith being right, right knowledge cannot be attained. In the same way, both right attitude and right knowledge are presupposed by right conduct, *samyak cāritra*. Umāsvāti defines right attitude as *śraddhāna* for the truth⁴ explaining *śraddhāna* as *pratyayāvadkhāraṇa*, discursive determination. *Samyag darśana* is an 'invariable grasping of all the objects of the sense-organs and the mind.'⁵ In other words, it is a kind of knowledge. The two, *samyag darśana* and *samyag jñāna*, are born simultaneously and are related to each other as cause and effect. "Even as a lamp and its light, though simultaneously born, are separate as cause and effect, so is *samyaktva* the logical prius of right *jñāna*. Though born with *jñāna samyaktva* purifies it even as the powder of *kataka* purifies turbid rain water."⁶ *Samyag dars'ana* has been ranked above *samyag jñāna*, because the latter derives its rightness from the former; right attitude is the ground of right knowledge.

1. SDS. P. 66;

2. SDS. P. 62 & HPEW. P. 148;

3. Acārāṅgaūtra, SBE. XXII, P. 33;

4. TAS. I, 2;

5. avyabhiicāriṇīsarvendriyānindriyārthapṛāptih. TASB. I, 1;

6. Qd. SJP, Pp. 148-49;

Next comes right conduct or *samyag' cāritra*. The Jainas stress conduct as much as they do knowledge and attitude. When right attitude turns the soul in the right direction and right knowledge illumines its path, right conduct or rectified will leads it to the goal of deliverance. "One devoid of right attitude cannot have right knowledge; and there cannot be rectitude of will, *caraṇaguṇa*, without right knowledge. One devoid of the rectitude of will cannot have emancipation from evil will, and without such emancipation, one cannot attain the final deliverance."¹ According to the *Āvaśyaka-niryukti*, *caraṇa* is the fulfilment of scriptural knowledge or *śrutajñāna*, while Nirvāṇa or deliverance is the fulfilment of *caraṇa* or conduct-*tassavi sūrocaraṇam sāro caraṇassa nivvāṇam*. Training and discipline of the intellect without those of will do not lead to freedom. Without a disciplined will, the intellect, however wellcultivated, is a cripple, while will, without a cultivated intellect is blind. "A lame man was burnt inspite of his sight, while a blind man caught fire even though fleeing."² Knowledge enlightens, penance purifies, and restraint protects.³ According to Jinabhadra, right conduct is superior to right knowledge, for, with the achievement of perfect knowledge, one does not win emancipation while with that of consummate *saṃvara*, discipline, i.e., *cāritra*, one is emancipated. The Jainas contend that perfection of conduct is reached only in the last moment of worldly existence, when the soul is in the fourth stage of *śukladhyāna*.⁴

The earnest spiritual life of the aspirant begins with a compelling impulse to realize the truth of things. This impulse has been identified with a kind of manifestation of energy known as *yathāpravṛttikāraṇa*. This is not invariably effective. Its essence is a tendency to move away from the soul's normal life of self-contained or ego-centric narrowness. The *kārmic* forces which keep the soul shut up in its normal

1. *nādamasaṇissaanāṇaṃ nāṇenavināṇahunti caraṇaguṇa |
aguṇissa natthi mokkho natthi amokkhassanivvāṇam ||*
Uttara ; Sū. XXVIII, 30 ;

2. *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*. Qd. SJP. P. 150 ;

3. *Ibid* ; *nāṇaṃ payāsayāṃsohaotavo saṃjamoyaguttikaro ;*

4. SJP. P. 153.

narrowness have been picturesquely called 'a *granthi* or knot. Before the soul can begin its active spiritual life of progress towards *mokṣa*, this *granthi* has to be cut. The struggle to do so has two aspects each of which is known as *apūrvakaraṇa* and *anivṛttikaraṇa*. Both of these are spiritual impulses that push on the soul to fulfil its mission of self-deliverance. Only when these impulses are sufficiently strong can the soul initially succeed in cutting the knot of ego-centredness. The immediate effect of success is that the soul experiences the first dawn of spiritual vision known as *samyagdarśana*.

Apropos the progress to the goal of deliverance, the Jainas have developed the doctrine of *guṇasthānas* or stages of spiritual development of the aspirant.¹ Fourteen stages have been specified. The lowest is the stage of perversity of attitude towards truth – *mithyādr̥ṣṭigunasthāna*. Here the soul has the minimum possible degree of right vision; for, as has been said above, no soul can be completely bereft of all enlightenment. Even advanced *sādhakas* are liable to lapse into this lowest stage due to the influence of the relevant *kārmic* material.

The second stage is styled *sāsvādāna samygdṛṣṭi*. The soul does not actually pass on to this stage from the first, but halts here during its fall from a higher stage. But it is held that, having come to this stage, the falling soul must necessarily go lower down to the first stage. In the third *guṇasthāna* the soul combines the right and wrong attitudes and hence it is known as *samyagmithyādr̥ṣṭi*. The soul has to fall back to this, if, after the dawn of the first enlightenment, there rises up the semipure, vision deluding-*karman*. The fourth stage of spiritual development is called right vision without abstinence, *aviratasamyagdṛṣṭi*. Now the soul has right vision, but lacks spiritual strength; hence it fails to abstain from wrong lines of conduct. In other words, its self-control is not equal to its vision. On the contrary, real spiritual development implies strength of vision, knowledge and self-control. In the fifth stage, *desaviratasamyagdṛṣṭi*, the soul achieves right vision and capacity for partial abstinence. Here complete freedom

1. Cf. The doctrine of the Bodhisattvabhūmis in the mahāyāna.

from immoral acts remains to be achieved. A partial overcoming of this weakness is effected in the sixth stage, *pramattasāmyata*, where, nonetheless, remains spiritual inertia, *pramāda*. In the seventh stage, *apramattasāmyata*, spiritual inertia also is overcome. It is the stage of self-control with freedom. In the eighth *guṇasthāna* named *apūrvakaraṇa* or *nivṛtti*, the soul attains special purification and finds itself competent to reduce the duration and intensity of previously acquired *karmans*. Besides, now it absorbs new *karmans* of reduced duration and intensity. The final result at this stage is that the soul enhances its purity. The next stage is known as *anivṛtibādarasamparāya* wherein the soul performs the process of *anivṛttikaraṇa* or advance upto the point of spiritual vision. But even at this stage, the soul remains liable to attack by gross passions. In the tenth stage, *sūkṣmasamparāya*, only the subtle form of greed disturbs the soul now and then. This subtle greed may be the form of subconscious attachment to the body. The soul which has advanced so far by only suppressing the subtypes of deluding *karman* (*mohanīya*) now goes up to the eleventh stage of suppressed passions, *upaśāntakaśāya*. Now, even subtle greed is suppressed and the soul is free from all passions. But even so, it is subject to the influence of *karmans* other than *mohanīya*; hence it is said to be still *chadmastha*, or enveloped, though it is *vītarāga*, having suppressed all attachments.

The soul that has advanced by annihilating the subtypes of *mohanīyakarman*, proceeds straight from the tenth to the twelfth stage styled *kṣīṇakasāya* the stage of annihilated passions. In the last instant of this stage all the subtypes of *Jñānāvaraṇa*, *darśanāvaraṇa*, and *antarāyakarman* are annihilated. The soul is now free from all the four types of obscuring *karmans* (*ghāṭikarmans*).

As a result, the soul enters the thirteenth *guṇasthāna*, which in Jainism is equivalent to the *Jīvanmukti* state of other schools. The Jains call it *sayogakavali guṇasthāna*. By now four out of the five conditions of bondage, viz., perversity, non-abstinence, spiritual inertia, and passions have been totally annihilated; the last, namely activity, alone remains, whence

the qualification *sayoga* of this stage. The soul now is omniscient, *kevalin* and manifests perfect intuition and spiritual energy. But the four nonobscuring or *aghāti karmans* viz., *vedanīya*, *āyus*, *nāman* and *gotra* still keep rising. Freedom from embodied existence, which corresponds to *videhamukti* in Advaita, is attained only with the expiry of the *āyuskarman* which has already determined the *Jīva's* longevity. Though, now, the activities of the mind, sense-organs, and body take place, no bondage is possible. Existence in this stage covers a period from a *muhūrta* (less than 48 minutes) to a *pūrvakoti* (a huge number of years).

The entry of the soul into the final stage of absolute motionlessness is preceded by its efforts to stop all kinds of activities, gross and subtle. First the gross activities of the organ of speech and mind are stopped; then, the gross activity of the body and the subtle activity of the sense organ and mind are stopped by the subtle activity of the body. Next the soul enters upon the third type of *sukladhyāna*¹ which is steady, accompanied by subtle vibration (*sūkṣmakriyā*) and which stops the subtle bodily activity. As a result of *sukla-*

1. The Jains define *dhyāna* as 'the concentration of thought on a particular object'—*ekāgracintānīrodhodhyānam*. TAS. IX, 27. It may be either inauspicious, *aprasāsta*, or auspicious, *prasāsta*, each, respectively, leading to inflow of karmic matter and its destruction. The second or *prasāsta* consists of two types, viz., *dharmadhyāna* and *sukladhyāna*. Among the objects of the former are the fact of universal suffering, *apñya* and the nature of the fruition, *vipāka* of *karmans*. Umāsvāti defines *dharmadhyāna* as the collection of scattered thought, *smṛtisamvūhana*. Forbearance, humility, straight forwardness and freedom from greed are the conditions of the *sukla dhyāna*. In the *dharmadhyāna* the mind concentrates on the general features of worldly existence; but in the *sukla dhyāna* the mind narrows the field of concentration; it concentrates on the atom and becomes steady and motionless. It includes 4 types. The first two, *savitarka*, collect and concentrate the mind on the minutest entity. With success here, the soul attains enlightenment. Now no more is conceptual thought possible. The last two types, *sukṣmakriyānivartin* and *vyavacchinnakriyāpratipātin* of the *sukla dhyāna* stop the activities of the sense organ of speech and body.

dhyāna the soul contracts and fills the cavities created in the embodied state. It is now reduced in size. Then it enters the fourth stage of the *dhyāna* which is bereft of all vibration, *samucchinnakriya* and infallible, *apratipātin*. Now the soul is as motionless as a rock. Here all the remaining *karmans* are annihilated. This state of absolute motionlessness is the fourteenth *guṇasthāna*, styled *ayogakevalin*. This lasts only for the brief time needed to pronounce five short syllables. At the end of this period, the soul attains disembodied emancipation or *videhamukti*.¹

Mokṣa and Mukta

It was pointed out above that the aspirant who has reached the thirteenth *guṇasthāna* called *sayogakevalin* enjoys a state equivalent to that of *Jīvanmukti*. A picture of such a *kevalin* or liberated soul in the body may be gathered from the *Ācārāṅga sūtra* the first of the eleven *aṅgas*.²

Without discontent and pleasure he lives, giving up all gaiety, circumspect, and restrained. He has conquered wrath, pride, deceit, and greed and, of course, he injures no living beings. Offers of assistance he courteously refuses preferring to suffer.³ He may go to the extreme of vowing not to eat at all: practising thus, one becomes tranquil, averted from sin, guarded. This method of death he may well adopt without blame; but to the end, he remains truthful, passion-free, crossing *saṃsāra*, knowing all truth.⁴

On the other hand, 'the matchless sage' may choose to live on alms, though insulted with words; he remains unmoved like an elephant in battle.⁵ Sustaining the words and blows of hostile folk, he remains as a rock, not shaken by the wind. He never dreams of hurting, but bears all. "As the lustre of a burning flame increases, so increase the austerity, wisdom and glory of a steadfast sage who, with vanquished desires,

1. The account of the *guṇasthānas* and *dhyāna* has been adapted and largely summarised from SJP. Pp. 261-292.

2. SBE. XXII, P. XIVii.;

3. *Ācārāṅgasūtra* I, 7, 3, SBE, XXII, P. 67,

4. Ibid ; P. 73 ;

5. Ibid ; P. 211 ;

meditates on the supreme place of virtue, though suffering pain." The unbound one, living amongst the bound, (i.e., the house-holders) leads a life of celibacy. He speaks with reverence. Not desiring this or the next world, the learned one is not measured by the qualities of love. His previous sins have all vanished, as dirt on silver in a fire. As a snake casts off its old skin, so is the *Brāhmaṇa* freed from the bed of pain.¹ He has quitted the path of births.

Complete deliverance or *mokṣa* has been defined in Jainism as the annihilation of all *kārmic* matter,² or the final dissociation from the body – *ātyantikodehaviyogaḥ*³ meaning, of course, not only the gross body but also that made of the *kārmic* stuff. Thus final deliverance implies the emancipation both of soul and of matter.⁴ The defects of the *jīva* such as attachment and aversion, although beginningless, are cast out in *mokṣa*. What survive in the state of *mokṣa* are the innate attributes of the soul like *Jñāna*. After the fall of the body, the liberated soul shoots up to the end of the world called *Siddhaśila*⁵ or *alokākāśa* which is absolutely void and empty, an abyss of nothing.⁶ In fact, the Jaina *mokṣa* has been defined as the eternal upward movement of the soul – *nityordhvagamanaṁmuktih*.⁷ In explanation of this upward movement of the liberated soul, it is said that the momentum of its previous actions, the removal of the forces which bound it down to the world of matter, its native upward gravity, *ūrdhvagaurava*, will carry the soul to its destination in a trice. This movement has been likened to the upward rush in water of an empty submerged gourd, originally smeared thickly with mud.⁸

In the *alokākāśa*, the *mukta* dwells without visible shape, but is said to possess an immaterial dimension two-thirds of that which it had during its last existence.⁹ In this final state, the soul enjoys the infinite, indestructible, and incom-

1. cf. BU. IV, 4, 7;

2. TAS. X, 3;

3. ŚDS. Sl. 52;

4. SJP. P. 228;

5. IP. i, P. 333 & Outlines. P. 155;

6. ERE. Vol. VII, P. 468;

7. IP. i, P. 333;

8. TAS. X, 6;

9. Outlines. P. 155;

parable bliss of salvation.¹ Besides, it shines with infinite knowledge, intuition and power. Such a liberated soul is the only God Jainism recognizes. God is only a symbol of all that is great and good, moral and virtuous. Jains do not believe in a creator God or one who is the preserver and sustainer of the world. The *Jīva* who works his way to liberation – the *Jīva* as the liberated soul – is God.²

But the Jains distinguish between an ordinary omniscient and a *tīrthaṅkara*. The latter has the additional power, while on earth, of revealing and practising the truth and founding a religious community.³ But after the final Nirvāṇa, no *tīrthaṅkara* ever more cares for, or has any influence over, the world.⁴

The state of *mokṣa* admits of no more precise determination. In words which echo the upaniṣadic description of ultimate reality,⁵ the *Ācārāṅgasūtra*⁶ declares: All sounds recoil thence where speculations have no room; nor does the mind penetrate there. The saint knows well that which is without support. "The liberated is not long nor small, nor round nor triangular nor circular; he is not black, nor blue, nor red nor green nor white..... he is without body, resurrection, or contact (of matter); he has no distinctions of gender; he perceives, he knows, but there is no analogy. There is no condition of the unconditioned."⁷ Causality has no hold on the redeemed soul. "Know that from the ordinary point of view, perfect faith, knowledge, and conduct are the causes of liberation, while, in reality, one's own soul consisting of these three (is the cause of liberation)."⁸ While such is the ultimate truth about liberation, the positive descriptions given above are, of course, inconsistent. Their plurality, size, etc., also must be regarded as inconsistent features ascribed to the

1. ŚDS. P. 186. Cf.

na viatthi manussāṇaṃ tam sukkam neva savva devāṇaṃ |
jam siddhāṇaṃ sukkam avvāvāham uvagayāṇaṃ ||

Qd. Ibid;

2. SJP., P. 268.;

3. SJP. P. 269;

4. ERE. Vol. VII, P. 466;

5. TU. II. 4;

6. SBE. XXII, P. 52;

7. Ibid;

8. IP. i, P. 332;

liberated souls. They enjoy a kind of interpenetrating status, as they are all alike in the liberated state. But, perhaps, for retaining their identity with their pre-liberation state, it was held that the form of the last physical life of the soul persists in the *mukta* state.

A criticism of the Jaina view.

At the very outset, the Jaina view of a place above the *lokākāśa*, reminiscent of the vedic *paramēśvaram*, where the liberated souls dwell, may be treated as a naive one meant for popular understanding. The quality of the Jaina *mokṣa* must be evaluated, in the first place, from the Jaina conception of the *jīva*; for its *mokṣa* is nothing more than the recovery by the *jīva* of its essential and inalienable nature.

Now, initially, it may be observed that the theory of indefiniteness or *anekāntavāda* upheld by the Jainas makes it difficult to take their doctrines seriously. For, the validity of their doctrines may or may not be real, applying the dialectic of *syādvāda* to the Jaina position itself. For instance, the number of the constituents of the world may or may not be five or whatever the number they prescribe. Nor can they be indescribable; for, the Jainas themselves are describing them in some detail. No stable system of philosophy can invoke a system of dialectics such as the *syādvāda* and hope to escape from the consequences of the tables being turned against itself.¹

Secondly, the Jaina position on the variability of the *ātman* or soul is difficult to sustain. A finite entity is bound to be evanescent. The device of treating it as liable to expand and contract grossly materializes the spiritual self. The explanation that the *ātman* is partly corporeal, *mūrta*, aggravates the difficulty; for two such concepts as those of spirit and matter have nothing in common; they are mutually exclusive and the effort to mix them up is pathetic. No doubt the Jaina thinkers were driven to such desperate devices to make their *karma* theory and the relation of *ātman* and *karma* plausible. But in the result, they have brought together two

1. BSS. II, 2, 33;

impossibilities, a partly corporeal spirit and wholly corporeal *karman*s. From the point of view of the Jainas themselves it is illogical to hold that *ātman* is finite and yet has infinite parts.¹ The Jaina doctrine of the plurality of souls is the result of treating the empirical view of the world as final. The empirical view yields a pluralistic world, but a more critical look at the world may lead to other conclusions.

A *Jīva* for Jainism is whatever lives or is not mechanical. It does not seek to distinguish clearly between *Jīva* and *ātman*. *Jīva* liberated from matter is called the *ātman* which is pure consciousness, untainted by matter. Besides, it excludes all space and externality. *Ātman* is spirit or being, while matter is the negative principle of non-being. *Jīva* is a combination of the two—it is material-spiritual, a soul loaded with matter. Throughout experience, there is interaction between soul and matter and a struggle for domination by the one over the other. What makes the *Jīva* a centre of private interests, a limited expression of the omniscient soul, is its invasion by matter, the antithesis of spirit. It follows that what distinguishes the *Jīvas* on their varied levels of elements, plants, animals, men and gods is their varying embodiments, and not anything intrinsic to themselves. The spirit which inhabits them all is one and the same; the matter which limits it in various ways alone differs. "The separateness of individuality of a *Jīva* is only from the point of view of *vyavahāra* or experience. Truly speaking, the essence of all *Jīvas* is consciousness."²

Therefore, the plurality of *Jīvas* is a relative truth we reach when stress is laid on sensations, feelings, and bondage. These, of course, are not ultimate and are admittedly transcended in *mokṣa*. The Jaina theory of knowledge also points to the non-plurality of souls as its final implication. The subject is a persistent fact for which alone the world exists. Only through imperfect abstraction may the universal subject be reduced to a finite mind, conditioned by the limited organism. Thus, from the plurality of the adjuncts, we pass on to that of the subject qualified by them. Also, the doctrine

1. Ibid; II, 2, 34.

2. Dravyasaṃgraha, of Nemicandra, Quoted in IP. i, P. 337.

of the plurality of the *Jīvas* is arrived at by treating the knowing subject as something which may be objectified and known, an illegitimate procedure. On the contrary, if the subject is disentangled from all objectivity, it would be found to be only one in reality. Jainism did not press its enquiry to this logical conclusion and, hence, its doctrine of the plurality of souls.

Jainism argues against the oneness of the absolute, thus: If there were but one soul common to all beings, they could not be known from one another; nor could they experience different lots..... We thus make equal both those who lead bad or blameable life and those who, in this world, practise right conduct.¹ Now nobody denies plurality on the psychological level among the different subjects of experiences. But according to the Jainas, these psychological states of the soul are not permanent; they are shaken off in *mokṣa*. How, then, can plurality of soul substance in *mokṣa* be deemed as the final truth regarding the *ātman*? In other words, plurality of souls is merely actual and not real.

With the plurality must fall also the Jaina account of bondage, based that it is on this very doctrine and the materialistic notion of *karma*. If the spirit is in fact nondual, a very different account of its apparent bondage will have to be attempted, and, consequently, the concept of *mokṣa* also will undergo radical modification. Even according to rigorous Jaina thought, there is nothing in the state of *mokṣa*, to distinguish souls from one another. The *kevalajñāna* of the liberated also points to monism of spirit; for, in perfect and infinite knowledge, we transcend the psychological self which is exclusive and reach a unity of content and consciousness. When total freedom of spirit is achieved, no duality will remain to obstruct it. Perhaps, sensing this philosophic necessity, the Jainas have accommodated the liberated spirit in a region where there is nothing, not even *dharma* and *adharma*, so that neither movement nor rest could be predicated of it. The Jaina insistence on the perfections of the *kevalin* also, thus, suggests a monistic view of the soul for which the world of matter is a shadow and the spirit is all in all.

1. Sutrakṛtāṅga, ii, 7, 48, 51 Qd. in IP. i, P. 338.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CONCEPT OF MUKTI IN THE PŪRVA MĪMĀMSĀ SCHOOL

The early attitude of the school to this problem

According to the view that the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* and the *Uttara Mīmāṃsā* constitute but a single 'Śāstra' it is not fair to look for an independent solution of the problem of *mukti* in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* of Jaimini. As a matter of fact, in the earliest available text-book of this school of thought, viz., the *Sūtras* of Jaimini, no references are available either to the self *ātman*, world, or God, or to any of the problems of the self's bondage and deliverance. The work which this system sets itself to accomplish is to systematise the *Karmakāṇḍa* of the Vedic literature, i.e., all Vedic literature *minus* the upaniṣads, and clarify the concept of *dharma* understood as purposeful action enjoined by the Veda² Indeed, it goes further and claims that all that is significant in the Veda including the Upaniṣads has a bearing on action, and what has no bearing directly or indirectly on ritualistic action is null and void.³ According to the rigorous science of sacrifice, the content of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā sūtras*, the proper aim of life is the attainment of heaven.⁴ No higher aim is consistently contemplated even in the *Kalpa Sūtras*, though there are a few stray references in them⁵ to self-realization or *Ātmalābha* and *Brahmasāyujya*.⁶ If, nevertheless, in later texts of the

1. cf. The *Śeṣvara Mīmāṃsā* of Vedānta Deśika; Introduction to *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* of Paśupati-nātha Śāstri, P. 4.

2. Jaimini *Sūtras* I, 1, 2. (=JS) 3. Ibid. I, 2, 1.
āmnāyasyakriyārthatvāt anarthakya matadarthānām;
dṛṣṭohitasyārthatvāt karmāva bodhanaṃ - Śābara.

4. Yānna dukkheṇa sambhinnam na ca grahastamanantaram |
Abhilāṣopaniṭam ca tat padamsvahpadāspadam ||

Viṣṇu Purāṇa

cf. *Prakataṇa Pañcika* C. S. Series, Pp. 102-103.

5. Outlines of Indian Phyl. Hiriyanna, P. 300, FN. i, P. 90

6. Āpāstamba Dharma Sūtras I, 22, 2, ff. Gautama Dharma Sūtras, VIII, 22-3; III, 9,

Pūrvamīmāṃsā like the works of Prabhākara, Kumārila, Śālikanātha, Pārthasārathi Miśra and others, we actually see strictly philosophical problems like the nature of the self, world, God, bondage, liberation, etc., discussed and their characteristic solutions offered, it is due to a radical change of direction of the current of thought in this school, ascribable only to the desire of these later exponents to bring their school into line with other systems of Indian thought. To be a *darśana*, every school of thought has to tackle the perennial problems of Indian philosophy and propose solutions, one way or the other.

The World

The *Pūrvā Mīmāṃsā* in the *Sūtras* as well as in the works of its later exponents is a realistic school. This follows from the fact that according to the *Pūrvā Mīmāṃsā*, perception arises only when the sense organs come into contact with real objects.¹ All writers of this school including Śābara have vigorously repudiated the idealism which dissolves the world into a stream of ideas. Thus, Śābara says ² that because cognitions of walking life, and those in a state of dream are both cognitions, the former may not be condemned, though, of course, the latter are; for, dream cognitions are condemned, not because they are cognitions, but because they are sublated by the cognitions of the waking state. Again, the fact that all particular cognitions take the form of particular objects, far from proving the identity of objects and cognitions, (as *Vijñānavādins* contend) establishes the reality of a world of objects, existing independently of cognitions; for, in itself, cognition is formless. *Nirākārāhinobuddhiḥ*.³ But its forms it owes to the things it objectifies in the world outside. That a cognition must have as its object an external entity, and not just another cognition (as the Buddhist idealist insists) also follows from the fact that the Buddhist theory will not work; for the Buddhist theory makes all cognitions momentary. Thus, the cognition which knows cannot last till the cognition which is known appears on the scene. The reality of the

1. JS. I, 1. 4 satsamprayoge, &c.

2. Śābara on JS. I, 1, 5

3. Śābarabhāṣya on JS. I. 1, 5.

external objects is also proved by the fact that the cognition of a cloth, say, arises only when the cloth is out there, and not also when a pot is in its place. In short, the objective control exercised over our cognitions proves the reality of the objective world.

According to Prabhākara, the *samvit*, perception or objective ideation,¹ which is the result of *Jñāna* or cognition, appears with its object in every act of perception. Here *Jñāna* is postulated as the cause of *samvit*, and not the *ātman*, which, being eternal, would make *samvit* also eternal, were it the cause of the latter. It may be noted that the *Jñāna* or cognition is inferred from its effect, *samvit*, which is self-luminous;² but since the inferred *Jñāna* has the form of external objects, the reality of the latter must be conceded.

Kumārila establishes at great length the reality of the external world; for, were it purely ideal or an empty void, the activities that the Vedas enjoin, and their fruits, both here and hereafter, would all prove futile.³ He is not satisfied with the Buddhist concession of *samvṛti satyatā* or phenomenal reality to the world;⁴ for, he asks how truth can abide in what is essentially false.⁵ Kumārila rejects the theory of two classes of truth⁶ as essentially indefensible.⁷ His position is: whatever is is real, and whatever is not is unreal.⁸ The idea that cognitions have a real basis in the external world must be true,

1. Pūrva Mīmāṃsā in its Sources, P. 57; GN. Jha. BHU. 1943

2. Bṛhatī with Rjuvimalā, pp. 80 ff. Madras Edn. The argument leading to the postulation of *Jñāna* is: *Samvit* is an effect; so it must have a cause; this cause is *Jñāna* or cognition which is fleeting and so, not perceptible. Cf. PMS. P. 58.

3. S'loka-vārttika, Nirālambanavāda, śl. 3 and Nyāyaratnākara on it.

4. Ibid. śls. 5 ff.

5. Ibid. śls. 7, 8.

6. cf. *dvesatye samupāsṛitya buddhānāṃ dharmadesanā | lokasamvṛtisatyamca satyamca paramārthataḥ ||*

7. Nir. Vād. śl. 10.

8. Ibid - *tasmātyannāstināstyevayattvasti paramārthataḥ | 'tat satyamanyanmithyetye na satyadvayakalpanā ||*

because it is never sublated.¹ In sober truth, even dream cognitions have an objective reference, though their temporal and spatial relations are confused.²

The Categories of the World.

Sābara makes but a passing reference³ to the categories constituting the world. According to him they are substance *dravya*; quality, *guṇa*; action, *karma*; and constituent parts, *avayavas*. There is no indication that this list is exhaustive nor has any effort been made to define them.

The view of the Prābhākaras may be gleaned from the *Prakaraṇapañcika*.⁴ The categories enumerated there are substance, quality, action, generality, inherence and ultimate particularity – *dravyaguṇakarmasāmānya-samavāyaviseṣaḥ*. Of these *Vaiśeṣika* categories, the last is rejected as it is not acceptable to the masters of this science, i. e., *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*.⁵ On the other hand, the Prābhākaras add force, '*śakti*', similarity, *sādrśya*, and number, *samkhyā* to the list, thus admitting eight categories in all.⁶ *Abhāva* or non-existence is rejected as a distinct category on the ground that it is nothing apart from its basis in space where it is supposed to exist. The substances include the elements, *ātman* or self, *manas* or mind, time and space – the same as those admitted by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system.

Kumārila divides categories into positive and negative, *bhāva* and *abhāva*, the usual four kinds of the latter being admitted.⁷ The positive categories are four – substance, quality, action, and generality. Force, '*śakti*' and similarity, *sādrśya*, are subsumed under substance, while number is counted

1. Ibid. s'l. 79.

2. Ibid. s'ls. 107, 108.

3. JS. x, 3, 44.

4. P. 110, C. S. Series, 1904.

5. PP. P. 110.

6. *Viśeṣākhya*mtu padārthaṃ prāmāṇyavādinonānumanyamte. The inclusion of number is an error made by the Sarva siddhāntarahasya; for in the PP. P. 54, number is mentioned as a quality. of. PMS. P. 64.

7. The 4 kinds of *abhāva* are are prior, absolute, mutual and posterior.

as a quality. Over and above the nine substances admitted by the Prābhākaras, Kumārila recognizes darkness and sound as such.

God

The world as a whole has no absolute beginning according to the thinkers of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* school. Śābara contents himself by saying that the relation between word and its meaning has not been created by any one: *apauruṣeyaḥ s'abdasyārthenasahasambandah*.¹ What prompted these thinkers to deny the divine authorship of the Vedas, the *Naiyāyika* view of the matter, e.g., was their conviction regarding the self-sufficiency of the Vedas. But once the step was taken, it was natural to extend the view to cover the rest of the world, and assert that the world as a whole does not stand in need of a personal creator.

According to the Prābhākara view as set forth in the *Prakaranapañcikā*,² there is nothing to prove that all people were created at one and the same time or that they would all pass out together. Parts of the Universe may each rise and disappear at its appropriate time. The bodies of men and animals, for instance, are not brought into being by any external or supernatural agency. Merit and demerit, *dharma* and *adharma*, being unintelligent, are supposed to need intelligent, supervision by a deity, and this is used by the *Naiyāyikas*, e.g., as a basis to prove the reality of a personal God. But, however intelligent he may be, God cannot supervise or even know the *dharma* and *adharma* inhering in other beings. Nor can any contact between him and them, i. e., *dharmadharma*, be established, both conjunction and inherence being ruled out.³ Besides, supervision is possible only by an embodied being, judging from our experience in life and the atoms out of which the Universe is fashioned are not regarded as constituting the body of God. Again, why should God choose to supervise the

1. Śābara on JS. I. 1, 5

2. P. 137.

3. Contact is not possible with *dharma* and *adharma* as these are qualities, and inherence does not apply to the case, since *dharma* and *adharma* inhere not in God, but in individual beings.

functioning of atoms or merit and demerit? He, a perfect being, presumably, can have no motive for doing so. To make God an embodied being is to invite the question who is God's creator and so on, *ad infinitum*. Nor can God be regarded as omniscient, for there is no cause to make him that.¹ Thus a supervised creation being out of question, it has to be regarded as an endless process of things coming into existence and passing out of it under the influence of the *dharma* and the *adharma* of the *ātman*s.

Kumārila is equally emphatic in denying an absolute beginning of creation.² The idea of world-creation cannot be proved, and equally impossible is to prove the reality of a personal God.³ A period before creation, when all this world did not exist, is inconceivable. How could the Creator, Prajāpati, then exist? Had he a body or not? How could he, without a body, etc., desire to create? And he created a world full of sufferings, at a time when merits and demerits of souls did not exist! Creation could not have been motivated by compassion. For whom, where no *jīvas* as yet existed, could he feel it? Was God finite? Had he a purpose in creating the world? Of course, even a fool does not act without a purpose in view. Even *līlā* which might have at least furnished a motive for action suggests some lack and limitation on the part of the Creator. Why should he desire to dissolve the world after creating it? There is no means to know the actuality of such a Creator. None ever saw him in the act of creating the world. Without having created it at all, he might boast of having done it. If the world process depended upon the whim of the Creator, the basis of the doctrine of *karma* would disappear.⁴ A pure being such as God is assumed to be cannot put forth impure things out of himself.⁵ Therefore, Kumārila concludes, the Vedic references to creation and retraction of the world are not to be understood literally; they only serve to magnify the might of *karma* which brings forward or retracts parts of the world.⁶ No total creation or destruction

1. PP. P. 139. jñāna hetvabhāvena jñānābhāvanīścayāt.

2. Ā. Parihāra, śl. 42. tādṛkkālonavidyate (Ā = Ākṣepa.)

3. Ibid; P. 44

4. Ibid; śl. 72

5. Ibid; śl. 84

6. Ibid. śl. 112 & Nyāyaratnākara on it.

of the entire world is demonstrable.¹ There was never a time when the world order was not as it is at present.² *Jaiminīyas*, however, are not averse to the theory of *khīṇa pralaya* or partial retraction of the world.³

Kumārila's denial clearly refers only to God as world-creator, but whether it applies also to the Supreme Self or *Paramātman* is not clear. *Sarvasiddhāntasārasaṃgraha*,⁴ a comparatively recent work, ascribes to Kumārila the view that there is a *Paramātman*, one and eternal, in all the *jīvātman*s. But this is the teaching of the *Vedānta* also. Kumārila's *ātmavāda* ends with the declaration⁵ that sound knowledge of the *ātman* should be gathered from a thorough study of the *Vedānta*. From this it appears that Kumārila believed in the *Paramātman*, in its impersonal aspect, though he was opposed to the idea of a personal creator of the world. That Kumārila had some sort of faith in God seems also to follow from his invocation of God as *S'iva* in the beginning of the *ślokavārttika*,⁶ though this verse has been interpreted in the sense of a glorification of Vedic sacrifice.⁷

Self or ātman

The concept of the self in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, as in other schools of thought, has a decisive importance of its own in determining the nature of the goal it sets for human life. While, on the one hand, the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* firmly refuses to

1. Ibid. S'l. 113

tasmāt adyavadevātra sargapralayakalpanā |
samastakṣaya janmabhyām nasiddhyatyapramāṇikā ||
nakadvidanīdrśam jagad; the whole discussion above is summarised from the *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* chapter of the *Ślokavārttika*, śls. 42-113.

3. Bhāṭṭī, *Śāntānī*, CSS. 1900, P. 47, 4. 35-40

5. *Ātmavāda*, śl. 148: ityāhaṇṣatikyanirākarīṣṇurāt māstitāṃ
bhāṣyakṛd atrayuktyā | dṛghatvametaadvīṣayaśca bodhah
prayāti vedāntaniveśanena ||

6. *visuddhajñāna dehāya trivedīdivyacakṣuṣe |*
śreyah prāptinimittāyanamah somārdhadhārine ||

7. P. N. Sastri tries to explain away Kumārila's apparent atheism vide P. 11 of *An Introduction to the Pūrvamīmāṃsā*.

recognize God as the dispenser of the fruits of the sacrifices performed by eligible persons,¹ holding that *dharma* is competent to do that, on the other, it has to affirm faith in individual selves who will reap the consequences of their actions, sacrificial or other. The performance of a sacrifice will become pointless unless there is a self or *ātman* who will survive the dissolution of the body to enjoy the fruit of that sacrifice, viz., heaven, &c.

Śabara under Jaimini Sutra I, 1, 5 writes that in the body dwells an entity ensouling it who will reap the rewards of actions even after death. The presence of that entity is inferred from vital phenomena like breathing, winking and so forth, all of which are absent in the body after death. That certain qualities like pleasure and pain are cognized only by the individual concerned, while others like the colour and size of his body are cognized by all points to the reality of a cognizing agent in the body known only to itself. The self, in other words, dwelling in the body, is the agent of the act of cognition: *Jñānasyakartur abhidhānāmanena śabdenopapadyate*. Again, the act of desiring, which entails recollection of what is desired, points to an *ātman*: no mere momentary cognition by itself can recollect and desire - *kṣanikavijñānaskandhamātre smṛtiranupapannā*. The *ātman*, the agent of the acts of knowing, feeling, desiring, &c., can be directly cognized by each man for himself; for, it is *svasamvedya*, and not capable of being seen by anyone else.² The fact that the *ātman* cannot be demonstrated objectively to others no more justifies us in denying its reality then one's inability to make the blind see colour justifies the denial of its reality.³ Śabara quotes the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* to show that this *ātman* is self-luminous.⁴ To others, the *ātman* can be expounded only in the words of the same Upaniṣad, viz., 'neti, neti'. The *ātman* is not desire or feeling or body or anything else that is finite and determined. Just as one becomes aware of one's *ātman*, another's *ātman* may be inferred.

1. *dharmaṃjaiminirata eva* - BS. III, 2, 40

2. *svasamvedyah sabhavati nāsāvanyena s'akyate draṣṭum*; Śabara on JS. I, 1, 5

3. Ibid; P. 16, Śabara Bhāṣya, Benares Edn. Vol. I.

4. *Atmaivāsyajyotih*, BU. IV. 3, 6

This *ātman* is 'an eternal *puruṣa*.¹ In the words of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* it is indestructible,' but comes into contact with perishable things like the sense organs.²

Prabhākara in his *Bṛhati* makes it out that the *ātman* is doer and experiencer,³ altogether different from the body; sense-organs, and *buddhi*⁴; that it becomes manifest in all cognitions, and that it is eternal and omnipresent. In each body there is such a separate self, answering to the notion of 'I' and excluding all elements corresponding to 'this' or 'that'. The *ātman's* presence is proved by the notion of 'I' which is self-luminous,⁵ i.e., this notion is cognized by each person for himself.

That the agent of cognizing is different from *buddhi* or mind follows from the fact that in deep sleep, while *buddhi* does not function, cognition takes place.⁶ It is clear that neither the body nor the sense organs can be regarded as the cognizer, the body being inert in itself and the sense organs being only instruments of cognitions. To account for the fact that cognitions are intermittent though the *ātman* is eternally present, the Prabhākara posits its contact with the mind and the operations of the sense-organs as conditions of cognitions. But the common cause of all cognitions is the contact of mind and *ātman*. The *Prakaraṇa Pañcika* says that the self is the agent and experiencer, the body is the receptacle of experience, and the sense-organs are its instruments.⁷ After rejecting the view that the *ātman* is self-luminous (else in deep sleep also it should reveal itself).⁸ Śālikanātha writes that the view of those who know the truth, *tattva-vidāḥ*, is as follows: The *ātman* does not reveal itself without being related to objects nor are

1. Śābara Bhāṣya, P. 17.

2. Ibid, P. 18 *avināśi vāre'ya-mātmā anucchittidharma*
Qd. from BU. IV. 5, 14.

3. Bṛhati P. 235-237. Madras Edn.

4. Ibid, P. 231.

5. Ibid, P. 245.

6. Buddhi=Manas, says the Rjuvimalā, P. 75 Comm. on the Bṛhati.

7. PP. p. 151. *so'ya-mātmā bhoktā bhogāyatanam śarīram
Bhogasādhanaṃ indriyam, &c.*

8. Ibid, p. 152

the objects revealed without the cognizer shining forth. The proof of the reality of objects, viz., the perception, *samvit*, engendered by them, as it comes into being reveals the *ātman*, and the objects. Through thus sharing in the fruitfulness of perception, *ātman* does not become its object; it remains the subject, just as one who walks, though sharing in the fruits of the action of walking, is only its subject. ¹ Perhaps this view of the dependent revelation of the *ātman* is responsible for the ascription in the *Siddhānta Bindu* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī to Prabhākara of the view that the *ātman* is agent, experiencer, inert, and omnipresent *kartā bhoktā jādovibhuḥ*.

The plurality of *ātman*s follows from the differences of their qualities like pleasure and pain exhibited by different individuals. In the *Bṛhatī* ² Prabhākara says that the notions of 'I' and 'mine' imply misconceptions, such as mistaking the non-self for the self. But none who has not shaken off all impurities *amṛditakaṣāyah*, may assert this fact. Those who are addicted to actions are not entitled to take such a view of the matter. Hence the warning of the Lord in the *Gīta*: *na buddhibhedam janayet ajñānām karmasaṅginām*. ³ Therefore, Prabhākara adds, has Śābara not discussed this question which concerns only those who have transcended *karma*. ⁴

Kumārila conceives the *ātman* as an eternal, continuous, principle of the nature of consciousness, as a self-subsisting, self-revealing light. It is not distinct from *buddhi*, as the *Sāṃkhya* affirms. *Ātman* is a dynamic principle, ever changing with the changes of its states, but, nevertheless maintaining its identity. This dual character of change and identity is not

1. The object or karma is *parasamavetakriyāphalaśāli*.

Ibid, p. 153.

2. P. 256.

3. BG. III, 26.

4. P. N. S'astri on P. 16 of his book refers to a quotation in the *Nyāyaratnāvalī*, Comm; on the *Siddhāntabindu*, from an unspecified work of Prabhākara: *Niṣprapañcam Brahmaivātma, tathāpi karma prasaṅge na tathā vācayam. Uktam hikṣṇena bhagavatā: na buddhibhedam &c.* Perhaps the unknown source referred to is the *Bṛhatī* quoted above.

5. *Ātmavāda śl. var. śl. No. 142.*

incongruous. The *ātman* may be likened to a snake, which despite its changes of postures, remains the same.¹ The self does not totally disappear with its states as the Buddhists hold, nor does it remain completely unmodified as the *Naiyāyikas* maintain. For, in the first case, there is the contingency of unmerited rewards and sufferings, while in the second, no sort of experience on the part of the self is conceivable.² The agent and the enjoyer in all activities is the continuous self, and not the changing moods.³ The Buddhist theory of ideas cannot account for the experiences of the self. Two judgements like 'I knew' and 'I know' remain inexplicable upon such a hypothesis. The first idea which is now irrevocably past cannot entertain the second idea which occupies the present time. There must be a continuous knowing entity which owns both.⁴

Now if the self is eternal, cognitions must also be so. Kumārila says that self and cognitions are one and eternal. The cognitions are not outside the self; their plurality is due only to that of the objective data.⁵ *Nyāyaratnākara* explains that cognition is the power of the self, *citiśaktiḥ*, it is one and eternal, being of the nature of the self. Still if every self is not experienced as omniscient, it is due to the limitations imposed by the physical organism.⁶

The self is thus omnipresent, eternal, endowed with the power of cognition and capable of assuming, without moving, other bodies for the sake of reaping the rewards of its actions.⁷ Pārthasārathi on *sloka* 73, *Ātmavāda* writes that the self must be recognized as spiritual to account for the

1. *Ātmavāda* S'V. śl. 28.

2. *Ibid.* s'l. 23.

3. *Ibid.* śl. 29.

4. *Ibid.* S'l. 135.

tenāsmāt pratyabhijñānāt sarvalokāvadharitāt |
nairātmyavādadbadhah syāt (ete caprātihetavaḥ) ||

5. buddhīnāmapi caitanyasvābhāvyāt puruṣasya naḥ |
nityatvamekatā ceṣṭā bhedastu viśayāśrayaḥ ||

Sabdanityatvādhikaraṇam, S'V. śl. 404

6. *The Buddhist Theory of Universal Flux*, P. 157, S. Mookerjee

7. *Āt. vāda*, śl. 73

status as experiencer, *bhoktā*. Of course, the self is unlike the *puruṣa* of the *Sāṃkhya* system; it is also an agent.¹ Though in the common actions of daily life, the self acts through the body, there are actions such as existing, knowing, &c., of which it is directly the agent.²

Kumārila also holds that the self is apprehensible through the notion of 'I' - *aḥampratyaḃyagamyā*.³ The I-cognition, *aḥambuddhi*, has for its object the cognising self, or this latter is the substratum of that cognition.⁴ In the *Tantra Vārttika*, Kumārila argues that the self can neither be atomic nor of the size of the body (as, eg., the Jains hold); for were it atomic, it could not have cognitions all over the body, while the second alternative would involve gratuitous assumptions such as that the self has parts, and yet is eternal, &c.⁵ The plurality of the selves is upheld by Kumārila for the same reason as Prabhākara has advanced, viz, the variety of human experiences. The Upaniṣadic declaration that the Self is one only is explained as meaning that all selves are alike being of the nature of consciousness.⁶ Though the act of cognition involves some modification of the self, it does not militate against its eternity.⁷

Kumārila's concept of the self has undergone some alterations at the hands of his followers. In his *Śāstradīpikā* Pārthasārathimiśra first points out that the sense of 'I-ness' in the *ātman* is not to be regarded as false, even as the same sense with regard to the body sense-organs, &c., is; for, even

1. Ibid. śl. 8.

2. Ibid. śl. 76.

3. Ibid. śl. 107;

4. Ibid. śl. 110.

5. PMS., p. 34.

6. Tant. vār. qd. in PMS. pp. 34-35

7. *vikriyāññānarūpasya nanityatve virotsyate* - *Pratyakṣasūtra*, s/l. 53. Kumārila is answering the Buddhist objection that unless the self changes in its acts of cognition, it cannot be cognizer at all; but if it does, it is ephemeral. cf. *varṣātapābhyāṃ kiṃ vyomnaścarmanyaṣti tayoh phalaṃ | carmapamaścet so' nityah khatulyaścedasatsamah ||*

the greatest adept in yoga, even Kṛṣṇa, refers to his Self¹ as 'I'. But unlike Kumārila, Parthasārathi apparently treats the *ātman* both as a subject and object in the cognition and recognition of the self.² In the recollection of the self, self as related to the past time is the object, and as related to the present time is the subject - *tasmādahampratyayakarmatayaivātmanasiddhiḥ iti ramanīyam*. Nor is the self *svaprakāśa* or self-luminous; for, all objects including the self stand in need of being illumined by some other agency. Were the *ātman* self-luminous, it should have revealed itself in deep sleep, as well, which it does not.³ Further, he denies that in deep sleep, there is the revelation either of the self or of its bliss.⁴ The proof of this denial is that people regret having slept if, on awaking, they discover they lost opportunities of sense-enjoyments. This regret is unintelligible if in sleep they, in fact, enjoyed the bliss of the self. Therefore, the usual reference to the bliss of sleep only points to the absence of grief during that period. Indeed, on getting up from deep sleep, one may feel: I slept without knowing even myself. Pārthasārathi concludes, despite his statement in the Nyāyaratnākara quoted above,⁵ that the *ātman* is not self-luminous, but has to be perceived with the mind.⁶

It must have been due to such distortions by his own followers that Kumārila's view of the *ātman* came to be misrepresented in other schools of thought. Thus, eg., Vidyāranya in the *Pañca daśī*⁷ asserts that in the school of Bhāṭṭas the *ātman* is held to be a composite entity, partly conscious and partly inert, resembling a fire-fly - *aprakāśaprakāśābhyāmātmā-khadyotavadyutaḥ*. In this context it may be pointed out that the later writers of the Bhāṭṭa school like Gāgā Bhaṭṭa, author of the *Bhāṭṭacintāmani*, explain away Kumārila's reluctance to

1. BG. VII, 6; IX, 16; XVIII, 66 &c.

2. Sāstra Dipikā, p. 123, Nirayasagara Edn. 1915

3. acetayanneva suṣupta ityucyate. Ibid; p. 24

4. nahi suptānām ātmā sukhaṃ vā prakāśate, Ibid; P. 124

5. Supra, P. 193;

6. mānasapratyaksagamyā eva. ibid. P. 124

7. VI, 95-97; Vedāntakalpalatikā, Pp. 4 ff;

Advaita Brahmasiddhi, Pp. 170 ff.

recognize a personal God. According to Gāgā Kumārila's intention is to establish that the reality of God can be proved, not by inferences, but through Vedic statements only. ¹

Bondage.

Strictly speaking, the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* school cannot entertain the idea that man's life in the world is in a state of bondage; for it deals with actions, their agents, the fruits of those actions either here or hereafter, and so, naturally considers life's normal activities, as regulated by the Vedic injunctions, proper and healthy. Thus, in contradistinction to all other schools of thought, the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* is obliged to pursue the ideal of *dharma*, and not *mokṣa*. Till a certain point of its growth, it did not concern itself with the ideal of *mokṣa*. ² Thus Prabhākara in his *Bṛhati* ³ says that Śābara had the man addicted to Vedic action exclusively in view and not the one who renounced them. Hence Śābara did not deal with the theme of renunciation and liberation. During this early period of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*, apparently, the *trivarga-dharma*, *artha*, *kama* - were accepted as the only values of life ⁴. In the *Brahma Sūtras*, ⁵ Jaimini's view that renunciation and effort for liberation are non-obligatory, indeed, antivedic, is clearly stated. But later writers like Kumārila, Śālikanātha, Pārthasārathi miśra, &c., discuss the problem of *mokṣa*.

Śālikanātha says that bondage and the transmigration of the self result from merit and demerit, *dharmādharmau*, which inhere in it. ⁶ But Pārthasārathi has something more to say on this topic, though the general indifference of the *Pūrva*

1. The Bhāṭṭacintāmani, P. 43 CS. series, 1900; Arthasaṃgraha, P. 26; Also Max Müller in his Six systems.
2. Jaimini and Śābara did not face the problem of ultimate release - IP. ii. p. 422.
3. The Bṛhati, p. 256, Madras Edn.
4. The Nyāya Mañjarī, pp. 514 ff.
5. Parāmarśaṃ Jaiminiracodanāṃ cāpavadatihi BS. III. 4, 18 cf. virahāvā eṣa devānāṃ yo'gnimudvāsayate : prajātantuṃ mā vyavacchetiṣ, &c.
6. Prakarana Pañcikā, p. 156

mīmāṃsā writers to this topic once more proves how much of an afterthought the discussion of *mokṣā* was in this school. Bondage of the self, according to Pārthasārathi,¹ is threefold; i.e., the world of action, *prapañca* binds man in three different ways. The physical body as limited by which the self experiences pleasures and pains is its first fetter. Secondly, there are the sense-organs which mediate between the self and the world of objects outside. Lastly, there is the objective world itself which is experienced, pleasantly or otherwise, by the self. Bondage is the relation of the self with these three classes of entities. This relation is real, and not a result of *avidyā* or lack of discrimination, as in the *Advaita* or the *Sāṃkhya-yoga*. There is not even any question of false knowledge or *mithyājñāna* involved as, for instance, in the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* school. Why, then, should the three-fold relation of the self be regretted or abolished? Where is the compelling motive to seek liberation?

The truth is that normal men, according to the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*, are expected to carry out the injunctions of the Veda and thus accumulate *dharma*. Śabara writes that *dharma* which is a Vedic mandate impelling men to action² leads them to the supreme good, *nirāśreyasam*.³ Evidently, by the supreme good he means in this context nothing other than *svargah*. This result must needs follow from the performance of Vedic rites⁴ since the infallible Veda promises this result.

1. *Sāstra Dīpikā*, p. 125.

2. *Codanā iti kriyāyāḥ pravarttakam vacanam* - Śabara *Bhāṣya* P. 3

3. *Ibid.*

4. The Vedic rites or acts have been classified in several ways, but, the most important classification is as follows: First there are the *nityakarmas* or obligatory acts like the *Samdhya*, i.e., the devotional rites in the morning, midday, and evening. Secondly, there are the *naimittika* or contingent acts to be done when appropriate occasions arise, eg., the performance of the *ĵyotis* sacrifices on the advent of spring. Thirdly, there are *kāmya* or optional acts to be performed when special ends are sought to be won, eg., the *kāṛi* sacrifice for obtaining rain. Finally there are the forbidden acts, *niṣiddhakarmas*, like the killing of a *brahman*, which are to be avoided to escape punishments like hell &c., cf. PMS, P. 268.

Those people, then, who are content to take the Vedic promises literally, in faith, and carry out the injunctions hope to reach heaven after death through the agency of *apūrva*.¹

Adhikāri

But a time will come in the life of an individual when he becomes disgusted with the experiences of pleasure and pain; indeed, he is bound to find life predominantly painful.² Even the pleasures of life cease to interest a man at a certain stage, when he perceives that all pleasures are attended with pains. Indeed, men of discrimination, *vivekinah*, treat the pleasures of life as pains; for, they often depend on the painful process of securing the means of pleasures and they are evanescent.³ This realization turns their attention to the thought of liberation. Both the members of the three higher castes, the *traivarṇikas*, and the *Sūdras* are entitled to liberation.⁴

Means of Mokṣa.

As regards the means which the seeker after liberation should adopt, there seem to be general agreement between the *Prābhākaras* and the *Bhāṭṭas*. In the *Prakarana pañcīkā*,⁵ for instance, it is said that an aspirant for *mokṣa* must abstain from such acts as have been prohibited by the Veda, or as entail sin, or as lead to some sort of happiness here or in heaven - *niṣiddha*, *pratyavāyahetubhūta* and *abhyudayaśādhana*. He must cause the already acquired merit and demerit, *dharmādharmau*, to

1. *Apūrva* is the power presumed to arise from the correct performance of acts enjoined by the Veda; for, without such a presumption, the vedic promises of heaven, &c. will remain unfulfilled. This sacrifice itself perishes once it is completed, and so it must engender a force, an unprecedented potency or *apūrva*, to effectuate heaven by the time the sacrificer leaves the body and becomes ready to enjoy it. cf. PMS. p. 256.

2. *Prakarana Pañcīkā*; p. 156

3. cf. *samsārādūdvigante ye dṛṣṭalokaparāvarāḥ |
tā evakhaḥ mūryāntenatūyāḥ prakṛto jānaḥ ||*
Qd. SD, p. 129.

4. *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*; p. 58,

5. P. 157:

dwindle away by undergoing the experiences resulting therefrom. By means of self-knowledge (yielded by the philosophy of the Prābhākaras), aided and enhanced by qualities such as tranquility, self-control, celibacy, &c., must the accumulations of his *kārmic* potencies, *karmāśayas*, be entirely extirpated. The role assigned to self-knowledge here cannot be explained away; for this self-knowledge is enjoined by the *upaniṣads* in its own right, and therefore, must have its own independent fruit, viz., *mokṣa*.¹ Thus, according to the Prābhākaras, neither mere self-knowledge nor mere vedic action suffices to yield *mokṣa*. Knowledge prevents the further accumulation of merit and demerit.²

According to Kumārila, too, the procedure for the *mumukṣu* is, as above, the avoidance of *nīṣiddha* and *kāmyakarmas*; ³ for both would entail future embodiments and expiatory sufferings. But he should continue to perform the obligatory and occasional acts. Not to do so is to court the sin of omission or *pratyavāya*. *Nyāyaratnākara* ⁴ adds that the performance of the *nitya* and the *naimittika* acts also serve to liquidate the sins already committed, *pūrvakṛtādharmakṣayāya*. The worship of the self, *atmopāśanā*, also functions in the same way by exhausting karma already performed. It is to this *upāśanā*, not to discriminative knowledge, that Kṛṣṇa refers as the fire that reduces all actions to ashes'. ⁵ The question naturally arises whether the performance of *nityakarma* will not entail the reaping of fruits like life in heaven, &c. Kumārila answers ⁶ that the obligatory acts like the *agnihotra* will not yield their natural results like heaven, provided they are performed without the desire for their results ⁷

Unlike the *Sāṃkhyas* and the *Advaitins*, Kumārila holds that the knowledge of the self is not the direct cause of liberation. The Vedic injunction enjoining Self-knowledge, viz., *ātmā-jñātavyaḥ*, does not assert that this knowledge promotes the

1. Ibid; p. 157.

2. IP:ii. p. 428. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa adds that the non-accumulation of further merit and demerit is due to the performance of *nityakarmas*. Bhaṭṭa cintāmani, p. 57.

3. Sambandhākṣepa Parihāra S'V, s'l. 110

4. NR. S'Ṛ. 110.

5. BG. IV. 37.

6. S'V, s'l. 111;

7. BG. VI 1.

liberation of the Self. Self-knowledge here subserves Vedic actions for procuring heaven, &c., by setting forth an agent, viz., the self, which survives the death of the body to enjoy life in heaven. The declaration which follows in the Upaniṣads regarding the non-return of the knower of the Self to this world of men, *mānavamāivartam*, must, then be treated, as an *arīhāvāda* or eulogy, only.¹

There is only an apparent contradiction between what Kumārila says in the *Sambandhīksepaparikāra*,² viz., the knowledge of the Self is not meant for liberation, and the position he adopts in the *Tantravārttika*, given in F. N. 1. The *Nyāyaratnārikā* explains that there are two kinds of self-knowledge taught in the Upaniṣads. The first only discriminates the *ātman* from the body, &c., and the second helps in meditation. It is the former which fails to lead to *mokṣa*; for, its purpose is only to point to an entity which survives death and reaps the consequences of acts. The latter type of Self-knowledge leads to *mokṣa*.³

The position of the *Bhātta* school on the question of the means leading to *mokṣa* has been very clearly stated in the *Bhāttacintāmaṇi*.⁴ Both *Jñāna* and *Karma* combined yield *mokṣa*. What self-knowledge does is to destroy *dharma* and

1. SV, śl. 104. In his *Tantravārttika* (JS. I, 3, adhikaraṇa 9) Kumārila further clarifies his stand regarding knowledge of the Self. 'This knowledge is both *kratvartha*, helpful to sacrifice, and *puruṣārtha*, helpful to man. Unless one knows the self, one cannot undertake the performance of a sacrifice leading to results after death. Vedic texts such as: The self free from evil is to be sought after, CU. VIII, 7, 1 &c., which enjoin the knowing of the Self through reflection, &c., promise both happiness and liberation. Again the text, "He obtains all desires and passes beyond all sorrows" CU. VIII, 12, 6, &c., speaks of perfections accruing to the Self and the texts "Passing his life, thus, he reaches the regions of *Brahma* and thence never returns". CU. VIII, 15, 1. IV, 15, 6 &c., directly speak of liberation.
2. 'Śls. 103, 104.
3. *Nyāyaratnārikā* on 'Śls. 103, 104.
4. PP. 56-57

adharmas which have already been accomplished and have accumulated - *sañcitānām utpannadharmādharmāṇām*. The performance of *nityakarmas* (without the desire for the fruits thereof, as Kumārila himself has stated) prevents the further accumulation of *dharma* and *adharmas*. Their non-performance would entail the sin of omission and the consequent re-embodiment of the self. Thus, together, *Jñāna* and *Karma* prevent the re-embodiment of the self and promote *mokṣa*. As for the *karmas* which have already begun to bear fruits, *prārabdha karmas*, they have to be exhausted through the experience of their results. It is useless to quote the *Gītā* to the effect that the fire of knowledge burns up all *karmas*, and eliminate the role of *karmas* from the scheme of *mokṣa*. For, even the knower of the self is liable to commit the sin of omitting the enjoined acts and performing the forbidden ones.¹ Gāgā also refers to modern *Mīmāṃsakas*, *navyas*, who hold that *Jñāna* alone directly yields *mokṣa*. The function of *karmas* is only to purify the mind, *antaḥkaraṇa* and make it fit for *jñāna*. By *jñāna* is meant not merely the knowledge or the self, but also that of the contents of the sacred texts like *Purāṇas*.² The moderns also apparently hold that the knowers of the self need not and do not perform the *nityakarmas*, for the potency of their knowledge suffices to prevent the formation of the sin of non-performance, *pratyavāya*.³ By a scheme of doing *karmas* alone, viz., the destruction of accumulated *karmas* through expiatory acts, *prāyaścittas*, the exhaustion of *prārabdhas* through experience of their fruits; and the non-origination of *dharma* and *adharmas* through the performance of *nitya-karmas* - the need for the knowledge of the truth cannot be eliminated; for the latter is necessary to destroy the accumulated *dharmas* which, otherwise,

1. cf. sve svekarmaṇyabhirataḥ samsiddhim labhate narah |
svakarmaṇā tamabhyarcya siddhim vindati mānavah ||
BG. XVIII, 45.

Gāgā says abhyarcya = jñātvā Bhāṭṭa cintāmaṇi, P. 58
Also avidyayā mṛtyumtirtvā vidyayāmṛtamasnute

Īśa up. 11

tameva vedānuvacanena Brāhmaṇā vivrdiṣanti &c.

BU, IV, 14, 22

2. Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, P. 58
3. Ibid; P. 59.

may cause embodiments for the enjoyment of happiness. A minority view is that the knowledge of truth destroys *prārabdha karmas*, too; but *mokṣa* will come only after the dawn of a particular *tattvajñāna* entity, *tattvajñānavyaktiviśeṣa*. The theory of *jīvanmukti* is treated as merely figurative in this school.

In the *Arthasamgraha* of Laugākṣi Bhāskara, it is said that the vedic acts, *dharma*, performed in a spirit of dedication to God, will bring about *nihśreyasa*, the supreme good.¹

Mokṣa.

As explained above, dealing only with Vedic acts, Śābara had no occasion to discuss the nature of liberation. Prabhākara also did not discuss the problem, for, like Śābara, he also was dealing with the *Karmakāṇḍa* alone. But the views of thinkers of his school on *mokṣa* may be gathered from the *Prakaraṇa Pañcikā*.² They start with the repudiation of the Advaitic notion that *mokṣa* consists in the dispelling of *avidyā*, the cause of *samsāra* as we experience it. Non-dualism, the metaphysics behind this notion, is not proven. Perception yields a plurality of principles like colours, sounds, &c. Nor can the *āgama* or scripture be quoted in favour of Advaita; for, *āgama* deals exclusively with action, *kāryaikaviśayatā*, and has no validity with reference to accomplished reality, *siddhavastu*. Nor can 'neti', 'neti' be appealed to; for there can be no absolute negation, but relatively, an entity may be denied in regard to a limited substratum.³ And where the Veda comes in conflict with perception, the latter must prevail. *Avidyā* cannot set up a world which is altogether false.⁴

In fact, *mokṣa* consists in the absolute abolition of the body, consequent upon the total exhaustion of *dharma* and *adharmā*.⁵ As was said above transmigration and bondage of

1. Thibaut's edition, Banaras, 1882 P. 26

2. PP. 154 ff.

3. Ibid. 155;

4. Ibid; P. 156

5. ātyantikastu dehocchedo nihśeṣadharmādharmapārikṣaya-nibandhano mokṣah - Ibid; P. 156

the self result from *dharma* and *adharma*. When, therefore, these basic conditions are abolished, once for all, the bonds of the self, viz., the sorrows of the transmigrating life, are eradicated; the self is liberated.

An inference is adduced as evidence of the liberated state of the self. Whatever is real and uncaused is eternal, eg., ether or *ākāśa*. The self is both real and uncaused, and so is imperishable. But in this state of liberation, it has no qualities, whatsoever; for, the non-material cause of the qualities of the self is its contact with the mind, *manas*, which, situated in the body, is, of course, not in contact with the self in *mokṣa*.¹

But Saṅkaramiśra in his *Vādaṣaṭṭhi*² notes that according to Prabhākara liberation is the anterior absence, *prāgabhāva*, of pain, together with the total absence of pain, *atyantābhāva*. This amounts to saying that *mokṣa* is a state of the self in which there is no pain and no possibility of its appearance.³

Kumārila begins by saying that if *mokṣa* consisted in the enjoyment of happiness, it would only be a synonym for *Svarga* or heaven,⁴ and it would be evanescent. Besides, *mokṣa* is not a positive state of happiness brought about by self-knowledge.⁵ Were it so, it would, like pots, etc., be perishable. Therefore, *mokṣa* takes place with the exhaustion of all *karmas*. As bondage consists in the relation of the self to the body, liberation implies the absence of this relation, ie., the destruction of the present body and the non-production of future ones. Liberation can be eternal only if its nature is negative, and not, if it is held to be essentially bliss.⁶ The *Nyāyaraṭnāṅga* adds that in liberation the self has no contact with sense-organs and merit and demerit.⁷ The liberated self has no cognitions.⁸ This view makes Kumārila's concept

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| 1. Prakaraṇa Pañcīkā, P. 157. | 2. P. 40 |
| 3. PMS. P. 37 | 4. S'V. S'l. 105 |
| 5. NR. on s'l. 106 | 6. S'V. śl. 107 & NR. on it. |
| 7. Ātmavāda śl. 147, & NR. on it | |
| 8. NR. on śl. 147, Ātmavāda | |

of *mokṣa* identical with that of Prābhākaraś.¹ But, as already pointed out, according to Kumārila, *ātman* is self-luminous by nature and so, that essential nature must persist in *mokṣa* too. The *Nyāyaratnākara* notes² that the nature of the self is *nityaḥ celanaḥ*. In regard to the self, Prabhākara and Kumārilla do not agree. In case his view of self was that it is inert, Prabhākara's *mokṣa*, too, must be identical with that of *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* school - it is in effect, a petrification of the self.

In the *Sāstradīpikā*, the view of Parthasārathi Miśra is reasserted that *mokṣa* is the snapping of the self's relation to the world.³ He denies that the nature of the self is bliss; consequently there can be no bliss in *mokṣa*. But then, how can it be an end worth pursuing? The *prima facie* view is that the bliss of the Self is not a product of *dharma* in which case alone it would be perishable. The very essence of the Self is bliss which remains eclipsed in the *samsāric* state of bondage but shines forth in *mokṣa*. The proof of this is furnished by numerous upaniṣadic utterances like *ānandaṁ Brahma*,⁴ &c. On the other hand, statements like *aśarīraṁvāvasantaṁna priyāpriye sprṣataḥ*,⁵ &c., denying the Self's apprehension of pain and pleasure, refer to the absence of sense-born experiences only in the state of *mokṣa*. References to *ānanda* cannot be explained away as denoting only absence of pain; bliss is too valuable an attribute of the Self. The absence of the sense-organs need not destroy the reality of the Self's bliss; for it is self-luminous.

But the *mīmāṃsaka* will not accept this claim; for if the bliss of the *ātman* be self-luminous, does it or does it not shine forth in the *samsāric* state as well? "Well, it does shine forth; how else do we come to treat the Self as our dearest possession?" No, the *Pūrvamīmāṃsaka* will not hear the rash and impossible assertion that in the state of bondage, one

1. Karmamīmāṃsā; A. B. Keith, P. 73.

2. Ātmavāda, śl. 147 cf. Ibid; śl. 26

3. Sāstradīpikā P. 125.

4. BU. III, 9, 28

5. CU. VIII, 12, 1.

apprehends the blissful Self.¹ Also, if there were bliss-experience in *samsāra*, no motive would be left to pursue *mokṣa*; *mokṣa* becomes otiose.

In the other alternative, what is meant by the non-shining of bliss in *samsāra*? And why should such bliss suddenly shine forth in *mokṣa* alone? Only cognition, *viññāna*, can produce the effect known as revelation or shining forth. But *viññāna* depends on sense-organs, which do not exist in *mokṣa*. The upholder of the *ānanda* view may say that mind is present in *mokṣa*, and only external sense-organs are lacking. Witness upaniṣadic statements like, *na hiviññāturviññāterviparilopovidyate*,² &c. Thus, in *mokṣa*, bliss is apprehended with the mind *mānasapratyakṣeṇa*.³

Pārthasārathi's answer is that no cognition is possible in *mokṣa* and that the quotation given above only refers to the cognitive powers, *Jñānaśakti*, of the Self; otherwise, in the similar instance of deep sleep, why is no cognition experienced? That the reference is to the power of cognition follows from other upaniṣadic utterances,⁴ in which, expressions like *dyṣṭi*, *śruti*, *ghrāti* &c., refer to the respective powers of the sense-organs to have the appropriate sensations.⁵ In sleep as well as in *mokṣa*, the self retains the power of cognitions; but, due to the absence of auxiliary causes of perceptions such as the mind, senses and object contact, no such perceptions arise. Thus, references to Brahman or Self as *Viññāna* and so forth only denote the powers of the Self, not its essence. In *mokṣa*, the Self cannot know itself; for the mind is indispensable for Self-perception, and the mind is not present in the state of *mokṣa*. Hence, it follows that in *mokṣa* the self is completely isolated and devoid of bliss.⁶ In fact, the state of liberation may be likened to

1. S'āstradīpikā, P. 126 - tasyātisāhasikasya nottaram vācyam.

2. BU. IV. 3, 30;

3. S'āstra Dīpikā, p. 127. cf.

nijaṃ yattvāt-macaitanyaṃ ānandas'ceṣyate cayah |
yaccanitya vibhutvāditairātmā naivamucyate. || Qd. ibid.

4. BU. IV. 3, 23-30.

5. S'āstra Dīpikā, p. 128

6. Ibid. āsmānnihsambandhonirānandaśca mokṣaḥ.

that of sleep; ¹ only, in sleep the *sāṃsāric* stage is involved, while *mokṣa* is free from it.

It is the absence of pain in *mokṣa* which makes it the highest goal of human life. Hence the upaniṣadic statement, *navai saṣarīrasya sataḥ priyāpriyayorapahatirasti*. ² The liberated self, then, experiences neither pain or pleasure. The self has none of the fluctuating qualities which characterized it in its state of bondage. ³

But the *Mānameyodaya*, a manual of the *Bhāṭṭa* school of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, makes it out that *mokṣa* is a state of bliss. ⁴

While such is the view of *mokṣa* which may be gathered from the later writers of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* school, Jaimini's own views on the subject may be gauged, not indeed from the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā sūtras* which discuss the vedic actions, but from the *Brahmasūtras* in which references to them are to be met with. Thus, in IV, 3 12, ⁵ Jaimini is represented as holding the view that the liberated self is led to the Supreme Reality or Brahman. ⁶ His view is supported by Upaniṣadic passages referring to the departure of the liberated Self *via* the *suṣumnā nādi* ⁷ to enjoy the state of deliverance, *amṛtatva*. This passage suggests that Jaimini's own view of *mokṣa* was nearer to Bādarāṇa's view. ⁸ If so, surely, Prabhākara and Kumārila appear to have widely departed from Jaimini's ideas on *mokṣa*.

A criticism of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* view of *mokṣa*.

At the very outset, it may be noted that the views on *mokṣa* set forth above are strikingly similar to those of the

1. Ibid. p. 29. *ta etā prajāharāhrbrahrbrahmalokam yanti aharaharāgacchanti*. Brahmaloka here means sleep, *suṣupti*, explains Pārthasārathi
2. CU. VIII, 12; 1;
3. *tasmātsukhadukkhādisamastavaīśeṣikātmaguṇocchedo mokṣah*, *Sāstradīpikā* P. 130
4. TPH. Édition, Madras, PP. 57-59.
5. Param Jaiminir mukhyatvāt.
6. Saenān Brahma gamayati, CU. IV, 15, 6.
7. CU. VIII, 5, 6; KU. VI, 16.
8. The *Karmamīmāṃsā*; P. 77, A. B. Keith.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika 'school, and many of the objections urged against them hold good here also. Apart from it, the most striking feature of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* position is the excessive reliance on *karma*, i. e., ritualistic action, for the promotion of happiness and liberation, *svarga* and *apavarga*. Though the founders of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* attached some importance and reality to the deities to whom the sacrifices were offered, the excessive potency which later came to be imputed to the sacrifices pushed the deities out of the picture. The later theory was that the sacrificer has nothing to do with the gods, but should confine his attention to the *mantras* used in the sacrifices.¹ The reliance on *karma* means faith in the *apūrva*, an inert principle, held capable of achieving the harmonious and unerring results which justice demands.² But, for us, the question is can *karmas* be depended upon to yield liberation?

The *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* view that, by the judicious performance of certain vedic acts and the avoidance of others, *mokṣa* can be achieved seems to be extremely unsatisfactory. For one thing, there is no authority for recommending this method as adequate for the end in view, viz., *mokṣa*. No *śāstra* has advocated the proposed course of action as a path to *mokṣa*. But let us judge the worth of the *mīmāṃsaka* prescription on its own merits. Bondage, it is argued, is the consequence of acts and so with the abolition of its causes, viz., acts, bondage must disappear, and liberation ensue. This argument is extremely precarious. How are we to make sure that all the *karmas* which brought about *samsāra* have indeed been exhausted? The number of acts which have accumulated in the beginningless past is literally infinite, and each living being has to reap their results, good or bad. Such of the acts as bear results of a contradictory nature cannot, of course, simultaneously be exhausted through the experience of their results. Only a few of the acts which may, more or less, go together have brought about any given life of an individual; a countless host of others await their proper time and place for fructifica-

1. IP. ii. P. 426.

2. This was felt to be very unsatisfactory and slowly God came to be recognized by later writers like Āpadeva, Laugākṣi Bhāskara, Gāgā bhaṭṭa and others.

tion. How can all these be nullified by merely avoiding the forbidden acts or optional acts and performing the obligatory and occasional ones? Therefore, there is no guarantee whatsoever that further embodiments do not await the individual who dies after faithfully carrying out the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* prescription. But, may not the performance of the obligatory and occasional acts, *nityanaimittikakarmas*, destroy the accumulated store of unfructified acts? No, for there is no conflict between the two. What hostility can there be between the store of past virtuous acts and the obligatory and occasional acts of the current life? All of them are equally upright and pure. It is just conceivable that the evil acts of the past may get liquidated through the performance of the obligatory acts. But this, by itself, will not suffice to obviate the need for rebirth.

Besides, it is a mere conjecture that *all* the evil deeds of the past are destroyed through the doing of the *nitya* and *naimittika karmas*. Where is the proof for the assertion that the latter (viz., the performance of the *nitya*, &c.), will not produce independent results, besides saving the sacrificer from the sins of omission, or *pratyavāya*? As Āpastamba says,¹ just as shade and scent are produced by the mango tree though it was planted for the fruits, so *dharma* or righteous acts, performed, may be attended by other desirable results. In the course of a life-time, one cannot make sure that one has not done optional or forbidden acts. The best and the most skilful of us commit these subtle errors. If the self, as the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* holds, is both agent and experiencer of results, how can it, in any state whatsoever, be divested of its inherent character?² *Mokṣa* for the Self, then, must be ruled out logically. The inborn nature of the self is no more eliminable than heat from fire. Nor is the theory that the abidance of the self with its inborn powers is *mokṣa* any more tenable. For, to postulate powers of the self is to make their expression in appropriate effects inevitable. But powers, it may be argued, require their accessories to produce effects and,

1. tatyathārenimitechāyāgandhāvanūtpadyete
evam dharmam caryamāpamarthaṃ anūtpadyante.

2. PMS. P. 37

as these are absent in *mokṣa*, no question of effects can arise. This plea also is weak, for powers 'must be conceived of as relations, and so they imply the presence of their relata also. Therefore, to posit powers of the self is to affirm the existence also of those entities with which the powers are eternally linked. Thus, once more, the effects of these powers must become manifest in *mokṣa*. Therefore, its concept of *mokṣa* is entirely incompatible with the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* concept of a self, endowed with real powers of agency and experience of the fruits of acts.¹

And, small wonder; for we know that the basic spirit of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* is opposed to the very concept of liberation, and that the latter was an after thought introduced for establishing its claim to be treated as a full fledged *darśana*.

PART II

MUKTI IN VEDĀNTIC SYSTEMS

CHAPTER I

BRAHMAN OR THE REALITY IN ADVAITA

i. A resumé and plan

So far we have been studying the problem of *mukti* as tackled in some of the major schools of Indian thought with a view to set against the solutions they offer the Advaitic concept of *mukti* as historically evolved in the *Prasthānatraya*, viz., the major Upaniṣads, the *Brahma sūtras*, and the *Bhagavadgīta*. The conclusions regarding *mukti* set forth in Part I have an intimate bearing on our main theme; for, what Madhusūdana Sarasvatī says in his *Prasthāna bheda*¹ about Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and Sāṃkhya-Yoga may be extended to all Indian schools of thought. "The founders of these schools of thought, the Sages, were not deluded. All of them knew the full truth. But, since people preoccupied with the external world of objects cannot directly be initiated into the supreme good, and with a view to ward off crass materialism, those sages established different schools of thought (to suit the varying tastes and powers of various classes of inquirers.)" All schools, including that of the Cārvākas, represent efforts to solve the problem of the supreme goal of human life. They take more or less adequate views of the problems of reality, man, and the world. The solutions they offer of the question of the supreme goal of man or liberation, as seen in Part I, have obvious draw-backs. How far these have been rectified, and success has been attained in the formulation of an adequate view of the summum bonum in Advaitic thought are to be examined in Part II of the present thesis.²

In order to elucidate the Advaita view of *mukti*, not only shall we follow the lead of Śaṅkarācārya's commentaries on the

1. Anandasarma Edition, P. 10: *na hitemunayobhrāntāḥ; sarvajñatvātteṣāṃ; kiṃtu bahirviṣayapraṇānām āpātataḥ puruṣārthe praveśo na sambhavatīti nāstikyavāraṇāya taiḥ prakārabhedāḥ pradarsitāḥ.*
2. cf. *Darśanas mutually complete and elucidate one another - Man and his becoming*, P. 5; R. Guenon, London.

basic texts above cited, but also supplement his conclusions with the significant views of post-Śāṅkara thinkers of the Advaita school. Besides, Śāṅkara's conclusions on the subject in hand often represent a repudiation of the views of pre-Śāṅkara Advaitic thinkers like Bhartṛprapañca, Brahmadatta, and Maṇḍana Miśra. Therefore in developing the Śāṅkarite solutions of the relevant problems, reference to these thinkers becomes unavoidable. And, finally, the character and merits of the Advaitic concept of mukti can be exhibited best only by comparison and contrast with the parallel views of other schools of Vedānta, chiefly the Viśiṣṭādvaita and the Dvaita. Thus, in the course of the following pages, references to the thought of Rāmānuja, Madhva, and a few others will also prove advantageous in realizing the main purpose of the present undertaking, viz., the elucidation and assessment of the Advaitic concept of mukti. We shall start with the problem of reality in Advaita; for, in Advaita, more explicitly than in any other school of Indian thought, the supreme good of man has been identified with the absolute reality. Man's chief goal is, of course, also the highest truth; for a good which is not, at the same time, true is hardly worth pursuing. Thus an examination of the Advaitic view of truth is intimately bound up with the assessment of the Advaitic good; but, as Bradley observes ¹ "to seek to discuss the nature of truth apart from a theory of ultimate reality ends and must end in futile self-deception."

The reality in Advaita is styled Brahman or Ātman according as we approach it from the objective or the subjective point of view. These words represent the two fundamental ideas in the Upaniṣads. Usually they are used as synonyms. Where a difference appears, Brahman is the older, less intelligible, expression, while Ātman is later and more significant. Brahman is the first principle so far as it is grasped in the Universe as the enduring self of the latter. In the Upaniṣads, the expression Brahman may be regarded as denoting that eternal reality which was intuited and expressed in the Ṛg Veda in such passages as : *Ekam sad viprābahudhā vadanti Agnim*

1. Essays on Truth and Reality (= ETR.) 1st Edn : 1914 ; P. 149

Vamaṃ Mātariśvānamāhuḥ ¹; *Anīdavātaṃ svadhayātadekaṃ Tasmāddhānyanna parakiṃcanāsa*. ² Not only does Brahman denote the eternal Self or the reality of the external world: the inner Self of man, too, more often referred to as Ātman, is Brahman. ³ To get a full picture of the Advaitic concept of reality, i. e., Brahman or Ātman, we have to present it both from the objective and subjective points of view.

Two kinds of definitions of Brahman, the Advaitic Absolute, have been attempted in Advaita Philosophy. ⁴ The first is the *svarūpalakṣaṇa*, definition with reference to the essence, and the second is the *taṭasthalakṣaṇa*, definition with reference to accidents. ⁵ A preliminary doubt whether the essential nature of a thing may serve as its definition may be noticed. ⁶ Normally the definition of a thing should serve, by pointing to its differentia, to mark it off from others; or, in other words, its distinguishing attribute alone can serve to define it. But in what is called *svarūpalakṣaṇa*, the very essence of Brahman, and not its specific attribute, is chosen as the content of definition. This objection is met with the remark that the usual practice cannot be a bar to a special procedure in regard to Brahman. The mere denotation of the word Brahman present in the mental mode, may be deemed the object defined, while the meanings of expressions like *satyam jñānam*, ⁷ etc., may be treated as the definition proper. ⁸ As regards the

1. I, 164, 46.

2. X, 129, 2.

3. *S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa*; 10, 6, 3; CU., III, 14, - *sarvaṃkhalvidāṃ Brahma eṣama ātmāntarhrdaya etad Brahma*; *idaṃ sarvaṃyadyamātmā* BU. II, 4, 6, ; *savāyama ātmā Brahma* BU. IV. 4, 5; Yājñavalkya in his discourses refers to Brahman and Ātma as synonymous; *ayamātmā Brahmā Māu.* 2.

4. *Vedānta Paribhāṣa* (VP) PP. 278 ff., University of Calcutta Edn., 1930.

5. Ibid; P. 278 - *svarūpamevalakṣaṇam svarūpalakṣaṇam*; *yāvallakṣyakālanavasttitaṭve satiyadvyaṭvarttakam tat taṭasthalakṣaṇam*, Ibid., P. 281.

6. VP. PP. 279 ff.

7. TU. II, 1.

8. Vide, *Laghu Candrika* (=LC) of *Brahmāṇanda Sarasvatī*, quoted in his *Paribhāṣā Prakāśikā* by *Anantakṛṣṇa S'āstri* P, 279.

exact nature of the *svarūpalakṣana*, there are a few minor differences of views. All are agreed that Upaniṣadic affirmations such as *satyam jñānam anantam Brahma* ¹ *ānando Brahmeti vyajānāt* ², *viññānam ānandam Brahma* ³ constitute the essential definition of Brahman. But the question has been mooted whether all these are to be taken together as constituting a single definition of Brahman, or each of these like *Satyam*, *Jñānam*, and so on is to be treated as a separate definition. The view of Brahmanānanda Sarasvati, the author of the *Ratnāvali*, an authoritative gloss on the *Siddhāntabindu* is that the three expressions *Satyam*, etc., together constitute the essential definition of Brahman. To take each by itself is to suggest falsely that there are three reals. The author of the *Vedānta Paribhāṣa*, on the other hand, maintains that the question of a plurality of Brahman would not arise at all in view of the reference to one and the same world-cause in the TU III, 1. ⁴ and, so, the three expressions, *Satyam*, etc., may be deemed three independent definitions of one and the same Brahman. ⁵ But that these niceties did not weigh much with Śaṅkara is clear from his exposition of the essential definition of Brahman.

ii. Brahman as sat or Existence.

To begin with, Śaṅkara points out ⁶ that the word itself, derived from the root *brh-* to grow, denotes the unparalleled greatness of the *Advaitic* Absolute *vr̥ddhatamātvāt-Brahma* ⁷. The three words *satya*, etc., are functionally adjectives, the word Brahman being the substantive. It may be plausibly objected that Brahman being an entity without a second, ⁸ ought not to require any adjectives; for, adjectives

1. Deussen proposes to read *ānandam* in lieu of *anantam* with a view to bring this definition into line with the formula *saccidā-nanda* - vide 13 Principal Upaniṣads, E. R. Hume, P. 283, FN. i.

2. TU-III, 6.

3. BU. III, 9. 28.

4. *yatovā imāni Bhūtāni jāyante yena jātāni jīvanti &c.*

5. Vide *Paribhāṣaprakāśikā*, p. 279

6. Śaṅkara Bhāṣya on TU II. i.

7. *Vanamālā-Vāṇivilasam* Edn : of TU, with Bhāṣya p. 95.

8. *śaḍevasomyedamagraāsīt ekamevādvitiyaṃ* CU. VI, 2,1

serve to distinguish an entity from others of like nature,¹ whereas Brahman is absolutely unique, with nothing else like unto it. Śaṅkara meets this objection with the remark that the three words in question do not, strictly, qualify as adjectives do. Rather, they serve to indicate indirectly – *upalakṣaṇārthānitāni*. The *Vanamālā* on Śaṅkara's commentary² makes the point that the purpose served by the three expressions is to mark off Brahman, not from similar entities as adjectives do, but from all kinds of objects whatsoever. To rebut the original objection that no objects other than Brahman are there at all, similar or dissimilar, distinction from which may be aimed at, *Vanamālā* asserts that while a plurality of Brahman is, of course, ruled out, a number of illusory entities, *kalpitapadārthāḥ* like space, time, the unmanifest, *avyakta*, are there which may be mistaken for Brahman. To forestall such confusion, therefore, quasi-adjectival expressions like *satya* may very well be employed.

Another significant point made in this connection by the *Vanamālā* may be noticed. A proposition consisting of adjectives and a substantive conveys the idea of a relation between what qualifies and what is qualified. Sense-objects alone, in which substances and attributes may be analytically distinguished, lend themselves to such description. But there is a class of propositions like *So'yaṁ Devadattaḥ*³ whose purport is a simple notion of identity, eschewing all relations. The definition of Brahman we are examining belongs to this class. It conveys the simple, integral nature of an indivisible whole.

The three words are not mutually interrelated. They are severally and independently related to the substantive Brahman, so that, in effect, we have three affirmations here: *Satyaṁ Brahma : Jñānaṁ Brahma : Anantaṁ Brahma*.⁴

1. TUB. *saṁānājātiyebhya eva nivartakāni viśeṣanāni*.

2. TU. II. 1.

3. This is that Devadatta.

4. *Vanamālā* bears out this contention of Śaṅkara with reference to the Mīmāṃsā principle *sannidhānādākāṅkṣāyāḥ prābalyāt* i.e., not juxtaposition, but logical relation, decides the relation of words. Vide the P.M.S. *ānantaryam acodanā*; *guṇādhāmoḥ parārthatvādasambandhaḥ samatvātsyād*,

What is *Satya* or the real? It is the immutable tested nature of things, established as such after repeated verifications. Thus it is opposed to *anṛta* or what just appears but is subject to constant changes. It has been declared elsewhere *vācīrambhaṇam vikāro nīmadheyaṃ* ¹ in contrast to the relatively stable *mṛttikā* or clay. The expression *Satya* is meant to mark off *Brahman* from all kinds of appearances which, like unto a mirage, now are and now are not.

Further light on *Brahman* as *Sat* or *Satya* ² may be gathered from Śāṅkara's remarks on the text: *sadeva somyedamagra āsīd ekamevādvitīyam*. ³ He explains *sadeva* as pure undifferentiated being, *astitāmātraṃ vastu*. It is all-pervasive, one, unsullied, partless – thus declare all vedantas. Underlining his fundamental monism, Śāṅkara adds that, not only before world-manifestation, *agre*, but, even now, *Sat* alone is the real or the Absolute without a second. Only, *now*, i. e., in the state of world-manifestation, *Sat* is, as it were, qualified by 'name and form' or individuality. Thus it becomes the content of the notion 'this,' *idamśabdabuddhivisayaḥ*.⁴ But, in itself, apart from the world-manifestation, the Absolute is the object of the pure notion *Sat-kevala sacchabdabuddhimātra-gamyameva*.⁵ Just as in the state of deep sleep, so, apart from the world-manifestation also, there exists nothing marked by individuality and liable to objectification as 'this.' Of the condition of deep sleep, one who has woken up can only say that there is pure and simple being, bare existence, *sattvamātram*. *Ekameva*, one only, points to its freedom from distinctions either within or without – *sajātīyasvagatabhedaśūnyam*,⁶ and to the fact that it has no real effects or modes setting up a plurality – *svakāryapatitamanyannāstīti*. 'Without a second,' *advitīyam*, denotes the absence of all distinctions of the Absolute from dissimilar entities – *vi-jātīyabhedaśūnyam*.⁷ For

1. CU. VI, 4 – the modification is merely a verbal distinction, a name.

2. cf. *etasya Brahmanonāma satyamiti* CU. VIII, 3, 4.

3. CU. VI, 2, 1.

4. CUBA; Ānandāśrama Edn. p. 297.

5. Ibid;

6. Ibid; p. 298.

7. Cf. PD. II, 21.

example, a lump of clay depends upon a totally dissimilar entity like a potter for it to undergo modifications. No such 'second' may be conceived as existing side by side with the Absolute or *Sat*.

Such a view of *Sat* is obviously different from that of the *Vaiśeṣikas*, according to whom *Sat* or generality of existence is compatible with categories like substance, quality, etc. *satsāmānyādhikarnyamsarvasya*.¹ But this compatibility applies only to the actual world of objects. Before these objects came into being, *agre*, no effects could exist, according to the *Vaiśeṣika* metaphysics. They are *asat* or non-existent before their effectuation.²

Pure undifferentiated existence such as Brahman has been defined to be may very well be mistaken for pure emptiness or non-being. Hegel, for instance, has declared that pure being devoid of all predicates is not different from non-being.³ But the Advaitic concept of *Sat* is entirely different from an empty abstraction. This vital difference may be appreciated by noting that the concept of empty being or pure existence is reached by a process of abstraction from the concrete manifold given in sense-experience. But the Advaitic *Sat*, which is Brahman, is conceived as the source whence this concrete universe is derived. Far from being an empty nothing or a bloodless abstraction, the Advaitic *Sat* is the source of this so solid-seeming world, of the objective manifold. This idea is expressed in the *Chāndogya* by referring to the *Sat* as that by knowing which all else becomes known.⁴ This amounts to saying that there is nothing real other than the *Sat* which is one only without a second. The various particulars and universals constituting the world find their ultimate basis and receptacle in the most comprehensive of all universals, *Mahā-sāmānya*, viz., Brahman. As all waters meet in the sea, all sensations in their respective sense-organs, as a lump of salt

1. CUBA. P. 298.

2. of. The *ārambhavāda* or the *asatkāryavāda* of the NV. School, IP. ii pp. 96-97

3. Ibid. P. 538 & of. PD. II. 26

4. CU. VI. 1. 3. *yenāsautam s'rutam bhavtyamataṁ mataṁ avijñātam vijñātam*.

melts without remainder in water, so all forms of existence melt and merge in Brahman, the *Sat*.¹

There is a view current in European Philosophy which treats existence or *Sat* as something less than reality.² There a difference is made out among reality, existence, and unreality. The phenomenal space-time world is said to exist. The ultimate reality beyond space-time alone is reality. Imaginary or illusory things are unreal. What is beyond all contradictions is reality. For example, Bradley observes : ³ "Existence is not reality and reality must exist. Existence is, in other words, a form of the appearance of the real." That this view is not satisfactory can be easily shown. The fact that the phenomenal world is experienced can scarcely make it an existent; for, in that case, even an illusory object, say, a rope-snake, must exist, since it is unquestionably experienced. But most western thinkers would dismiss the rope-snake as imaginary or illusory, and not treat it as existent. Contradictions as of the illusory object, which is now experienced and later sublated, are present even in the phenomenal world. Therefore, true existence cannot be predicated of it. True existence, like reality in Western Philosophy, is beyond contradictions. Therefore, it may be equated with reality. When Brahman is defined as *Sat* or *Satya* what is meant is that it is beyond all contradictions, that it is reality. "The Vedānta regards existence neither as the appearance of reality, nor as a species of the real."⁴ Existence understood as elucidated by Śaṅkara is Brahman. Brahman, as pure existence never ceases to be; nor does the non-existent ever come into being.⁵ This idea of Brahman as reality or true existence, is expressed in the phrase that it is *traikālikābīdhya*, i. e., what remains uncontradicted

1. BU. II, 4, 2

2. Idealistic thought of India, p. 100, London, 1953.

3. Appearance and reality, p. 400, Qd. in the Philosophy of Advaita p. 108.

4. PA. p. 108.

5. cf. BG. II, 16. *nāsatovidyate bhāvonābhāvo vidyate satah.*

at all times, past, present and future.¹ It conveys the idea that the Vedantic Absolute is a timeless reality. With this may be compared the statement of Bradley.² "Ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself."

The significance of defining the Advaitic Absolute as Sat is not only that Brahman is pure uncontradicted existence but also that Brahman alone is such existence.³ Thus, wherever is experienced existence, Brahman or *Sat* may be identified. On the verse II, 16 of the *Bhagāvat Gītā*, Śāṅkara writes : In every single instance of phenomenal experience may be noted two cognitions, *dvebuddhī*, of an appositional character. It is not, however, parallel to the experience of the blue lotus (where, despite grammatical apposition between *nīlam* and *utpalam*, there obtains between them the relation of substance and attribute). Eg., the pot is, the cloth is, &c. In each of these instances, the cognitions of pot, cloth, &c. are variable factors, but the cognition of existence or *sadbuddhiḥ* is constant. Therefore, the cognition of the persistent existence in all such instances points to the eternal and true existence (which is Brahman), while the variable factors pot, cloth &c., are by the same token, unreal or superimposed, *kalpita*, as Ānanda Giri points out.⁴ Any single variable like a pot may perish, but the cognition of existence persists in other objects like cloth, &c. The case of the variables also is not parallel on the ground that though one of them perishes, its cognition is still possible in respect of another member of the same class ;⁵ for, their particularity and finitude may be clearly seen in the fact that a cognition of pot is impossible in respect of non-pots like cloth and so on. True, the cognition of existence also is impossible in regard to the pot destroyed. But, then, it is not due to the destruction of existence, as such, along with the pot ; rather it is a consequence of the fact that in the cognition, " the pot

1. *yadviṣayābuddhirna vyabhicarati tat sat* - Śāṅkara on BG. II 16. *sat kim ? kālatraye'pi tiṣṭhatīti sat* - Śāṅkara's *Tattva-bodha*, p. 27.
2. Appearance & reality, p. 136.
3. *PD*, II, 67, 68.
4. The BG. p. 58 ;
5. eg. When one pot is destroyed, a cognition of pot is possible in respect of another pot.

exists," existence appears as qualifying the pot, and, when the qualified entity, pot, is absent, the qualifying existence has no medium for self-manifestation. Ānanda Giri adds ¹ that the imperishable nature of existence is obvious from its appearing as the substratum of the negation of the very pot in the cognition—the negation of the pot exists.

The point so far made is that existence or *Sat* alone is imperishable, and the particulars like pot, &c., as qualifying which, it manifests itself, are contingent and, so far, false. But should not the appositional cognition, 'the pot exists' guarantee the coordinate reality of both pot and existence? Or, if one of them, pot, is unreal, should not 'existence' also be equally unreal? 'Sankara answers that an appositional cognition is quite compatible with the unreality of one of the members: eg., 'the rope-snake is', in which, of course, the rope-snake is false, while the 'isness' or existence is real. Even the *Mādhyamika* assertion that "non-existence of 'emptiness,' i. e., *Sūnya*, is" proves the irrefragable nature of existence; for, here as well, the notion of an emptiness is merely superimposed on Absolute Existence which is Brahman.²

From the above discussion, it is clear that Brahman alone is real existence, *Sat* or *Satya*, while all the objects of phenomenal experience appear to exist through association with it; or, in the technical language of Advaita, appear as superimposed on it. With this conclusion may be compared the remark of Dr. Calderwood in his *Limits of Religious Thought* (P. 200): "The Absolute is that which is free from all necessary relations, i. e., which is free from every relation as a condition of existence; but it *may* exist in relation provided that relation be not a necessary condition of its existence."³

Now, it may be objected that when Brahman has been identified with *Sat* or absolute existence, the expression *Sadāsīt* ⁴ is redundant or even meaningless, for no distinction

1. BGC. p. *58. ghaṭādīnāśadeśe taduparaktākāreṇa sattvābhāne'pi nāsattvam, ghaṭēdyabhāvādiṣṭhānatayā bhānāt.
2. PD. II, 34; also cf. PA. p. 113.
3. Mill in his *Hamilton* p. 116, observes that a better definition of an absolute being could scarcely be devised.
4. CU. VI. 2, 1.

can be made between existence, *Sat*, and, 'was' *āsīt* on pain of setting up a second, which is expressly denied in *ekamevādvitīyam*. The Advaitic answer is that the usage is not meant to be taken strictly, but is addressed to a world wedded to redundant phraseology, such as to 'dream a dream', to 'bear a burden' &c. The reference to time in *agre* and *āsīt* ¹ is not meant to subject Absolute Existence to the sway of time in any way, but is merely the result of addressing these words to the time-bound mind of man. ² The fact of the matter is that both questions and answers belong to empirical language whose sphere is the realm of duality. The language of the non-dual spirit does not lend itself to questions and answers, ³

1. Ibid;

2. PD. II. 36-38.

3. PD. II, 39, cf. PA. P. 115.

III. Brahman as consciousness or Intelligence : Cit or Vijñāna

Brahman as consciousness is best appreciated when approached subjectively, i. e., from the side of the thinking man, though the Upaniṣads do not entirely confine themselves to this approach. Thus in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, the essential definition of Brahman includes the expression *Jñāna*. This denotes a vital feature of the Advaitic concept of ultimate reality. In view of the *Chāndogya* declaration that *Sat* is one without a second, and the illustrations adduced there,¹ pure existence may be deemed as on a par with clay, an inert, causal stuff however refined. To obviate this contingency, Brahman is also described as *Jñāna* or intelligence. Brahman is not essentially the agent of knowing or *Jñātṛ*, which, like any other act, entails the alteration or *vikāra* of the agent; but is knowledge or intelligence itself. Thus Śankara says *bhāva-sādhanaḥśabdaḥ*.² Brahman is no mere accessory of the act of knowing. Were it the agent of knowing, it could not be *satya* or immutable and *ananta* or infinite; for, to be associated with any action is to change. Also, an infinite intelligence cannot conceivably indulge in an act of knowing which is suited to a finite intelligence which may seek to remove its native ignorance through such an act. Besides, an act of knowing is inconceivable without an object, *jñeya* but a real *jñeya* will limit Brahman and jeopardise its infinitude.³ The *Vanamāla* adds the important note that what undergoes transformation is material, *jada*, which, by definition, is what is superimposed on intelligence or *cit*.⁴

With a further refinement of thought, Śankara affirms that Brahman may not be said even to know itself; for, activity in regard to one's own self is self-contradictory, *nātmani-kriyāstivam*. If, somehow, Brahman is reduced to the status of an object

1. CU. VI. I, 4 ff. *mṛttiketyevasattiyam*.

2. V. p. 104.

3. cf. *yatranānyatpaśyati.....nānyatvijānātissa
bhūma'thānyat.....vijānātitalalpam*. CU. VII, 24, 1

4. V. p. 104.

of knowledge, there will be no knower, or *jñātā* to know it; for all intelligence is confined to Brahman. On the other hand, without a difference between the knower and the known, no knowledge can arise. The hypothesis of the Bhāṭṭas¹ that the self is partly sentient and partly inert is, of course, inadmissible; for Brahman is a partless, integral whole of intelligence - *Prajñānaghanah, ekātmapratyayasāra*². To have parts is to be transient³ whereas the expression *Satya* denotes that Brahman is pure, undifferentiated, existence, *sanmātram*.

Jñāna in its familiar empirical forms is a transient phenomenon.⁴ To describe Brahman as *jñāna* may seem to make Brahman also transient. To guard against this doubt, Brahman is further characterized as *ananta*, endless, i.e., infinite. An entity defined as pure Being without attributes, as intelligence without limits, may strike commonsense as an empty abstraction, an impossible myth, like the hero described in the verse :

mṛgaṭṛṣṇāmbhasi snātaḥ khapuspakṛtaśekharah |
eṣa vanḍhyasuto yāti śaśaśaṅgadhanurdharah ||⁵

But it must be noted that *Jñāna*, like *satya*, is not an adjective but the very essence of Brahman in which the dualism of the knower and the known has absolutely ceased to exist.⁶ "Every form of knowledge is different from every other in the degree of identification of the object in itself with the object for consciousness, and the only resting place for knowledge is where

1. Wrongly attributed to Kumārila Bhāṭṭa by his opponents, vide supra

2. BU. IV 5, 13; MU. 7;

3. V.P. 105

4. cf. The Buddhist theory of momentary cognitions.

Supra. Part I. section on the Buddhist concept of Nirvāṇa.

5. Here goes the barren woman's son, having bathed in the water of the mirage, decked himself with the flowers of the sky, and armed with the bow made of the hare's horns Qd. in V.

6. jñātrijñeya jñāna sūnyamanantam nirvikalpakam |
kevalākhandacinmatram paramtattvam vidurbudhān ||
Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, 241.

the agreement becomes absolute. Now, if knowledge deals solely with the self which knows, it is entirely self-constituted, self-determined, self-contained. To be completely self-sufficient, however, is precisely what is meant by being Absolute. Absolute knowledge is the presence to consciousness of its own self-thought".¹ It goes without saying that the presence of self to consciousness is not by way of its bifurcation into a subject and an object - *nātmani kriyāstītvam*. In fact, there is no distinction between the Brahman as *Sat* and Brahman as *Cit*; the *Sat*, which is Brahman, is identical with Brahman the *Cit*.²

If it is all Intelligence, Brahman cannot require an other to become conscious. To say that it does is to deprive it of its absoluteness and freedom. But, of course, the consciousness of Brahman is not to be understood as a relation between a subject and an object.³ Thus, in his commentary on the *Kena Upaniṣad*, Śaṅkara says that in regard to Brahman without attributes, there is neither itself nor knowing by another-*svasamvedyatā* and *parasamvedyatā*; for, it is of the essence of knowledge, *samvedanasvarūpam*,⁴ and therefore it stands in no need of further knowing of any kind.

The definition of Brahman as Intelligence is developed at great length in the BU.⁵ King Ajātaśatru explains how, in deep sleep, the self of intelligence, *viññānamayaḥ puruṣaḥ*, gathers the sensibilities of the sense-organs and rests in the space within the heart. It is characterized as the Real of

1. Hibbert Journal, Vol. I. pp. 609-610.

2. *S'attaiva bodho bodha eva ca sattā*; SB.

3. cf. Vivaraṇa p. 210 - anena sarvajñāśabdena sarvābhāsak-
samam viññāpatimātram aviśayopādhikam viññānamēva
brahmasvarūpa lakṣaṇam.

cf. *svayamevānubhavatvādyadyapyetasya nānubhāvyaṭvam*
sakṛdapyabhāvaśankā na bhaved bodhasvarūpatvāt ||
Svātmanirūpaṇam.

4. cf. Śaṅkara on the BS. III, 2, 16 āhacatanmātram. nāsyāt-
manontarbahirvācāitanyādanyadrūpamasti, caitanyamevatu
nirantaram asya svarūpam |

5. II. 1, 17.

the real-*satyaśyaśatyam*.¹ Śankara clarifies the idea as follows: ² "Brahman is, in the first place, the pure subject or seer *draṣṭā* who never becomes the object or seen, *dṛśya*. In the wakeful and dream states as well as in the sleep state is present Brahman as intelligence, 'like a ruler among servants'. But a distinct appreciation of Brahman as intelligence is possible only in the state of sleep. The point of the king is that Brahman is never an object and that no object can be treated as Brahman". The arguments implied in this passage have been reduced to a syllogism by Ānanda Giri³ thus: Sense-organs, &c., of the individual subserve a Seer other than themselves; for, they form a complex, *samhataśvāt*, just as houses, &c., do. This seer is none other than Brahman. All forms of knowing emanate from Brahman and the entire objective manifold exists for it. The reason for designating Brahman as *viśvānamaya* is that it appears in the *antaḥkaraṇa*, the internal organ of cognition and cognizes it as its witness.⁴

The nature of Brahman as intelligence may be further expanded in the light of the text *yat sākṣādaparokṣād brahma ya ātma sarvāntarah*.⁵ By its very nature it is not possible to objectify this self-luminous presence that is Brahman for Brahman in the Seer of seeing, the Hearer of hearing, the Thinker of thought, the Knower of knowing.⁶ Śankara explains that there are two kinds of seeing, one phenomenal and the other transcendental, *laukiki*, *pāramārthikīca*. The first is a mode of the internal organ, *antaḥkaraṇavṛttiḥ* in contact with, or induced by, the eye. Being an effect, it arises and perishes. The second is the native seeing or vision of Brahman, its very essence and nature, *svarūpa*, just as light and heat are of fire. Hence it is not a product, and, so is imperishable. It is, however, limited, as it were, by the effectuated vision or *vṛtti*. This apparent association with *vṛtti* is denoted by the expression seer, *draṣṭā*.⁷ The mode of seeing of the *antaḥkaraṇa*.

1. BU. II. i, 23.

2. BUB. p. 250, Anandasrama Edn.

3. Ibid ; p. 256.

4. Ibid ; 253.

5. BU. III, 4, 1, cf. AU. V. 4.

6. BU. III, 42 na dṛṣṭerdraṣṭārampaśye &c.

7. BUB. p. 423.

vyrttiḥ, even as it arises is, as it were, pervaded by the eternal sight of the seer. It is only a reflection of the latter and, in the very ken of the seer, it perishes too. This finitude of the mode – its rise and dissolution – is imputed to the eternal seer. Hence, though always seeing, the seer is said to see and not to see. The permanence of the seeing that is Brahman is later referred to in the passage: *dhyāyatīva lelāyatīva; nahi draṣṭur dīṣṭerviparīlōpo vidyate*.¹ In the expression the ‘seer of seeing’ seeing refers to the seeing mode of the inner organ, while the seer is Brahman. Obviously, the mode cannot pervade, i. e., objectify, the seer thereof. As pointed out earlier,² the very expressions seer, hearer, &c., involve a restatement, *anuvāda*, of empirical usage, and are not meant as precise determinations of Brahman.

The most impressive passage, perhaps, in which Brahman as intelligence is revealed occurs in answer to the query, *kimjyotirayaṃ purusaiti?*³ – what light does a person here have? After recounting the external aids by which man perceives, such as the sun, the moon &c., Yājñavalkya mentions Ātman⁴ (Brahman) as the light of all man’s seeing. This supreme light is distinguished from the rest, as it does not stand in need of yet another light. It shines in the *antaḥkāraṇa*. Being immaterial, it can not be grasped by the senses⁵. The immaterial nature of this light may be shown from a consideration of dream phenomena and memory. In dreams and memory, a percipient other than sense-organs and *antaḥkāraṇa* has to be postulated, for, these latter, as being objects of perception, are material⁶. The argument that only the like can cooperate, that only material light may aid the material organism, is entirely inconclusive. Fire, eg., is fed by fuel whose constitutive principle is earth, or even by water, in certain cases⁷. Distinct as it is, Brahman as intelligence vivifies the entire psycho-physical organism, just as ‘an

1. BU. IV. 3, 23.

2. Supra.

3. BU. IV. 3, 2.

4. BU. IV. 3, 9. *atrāyampuruṣaḥ svayamjyotirbhavati*. KU. V, 15; CU. III, 1, 42; BG. XIII, 33.

5. KeU. I, 2-5.

6. BUB. p. 530.

7. Ibid p. 530 Eg. Lightning and the gastric heat.

emerald or a ruby cast in a cup of milk renders it wholly blue or red' ¹. All lights other than Brahman subserve it and therefore, are entirely instrumental; for, without it there will be no intelligent being who sees with these lights.

The implication of the statement that Brahman is light or *svayamayotih* is that it is spirit, *caitanyāśvabhavam*. Can it then cease to know in any state? Yet, in deep sleep, it apparently knows nothing. Yājñavalkya explains this paradox thus: While in sleep it (Brahman as intelligence) does not see, it is verily seeing, for the seeing of the seer ceases not, being imperishable ². Brahman, then, is like the sun which shines even when there is nothing to shine on ³. In the state of deep sleep what is absent is the object of seeing, not the intelligence that is Brahman ⁴.

In the passage ⁵ explicating Brahman as intelligence, functions such as seeing, hearing, and so on have been referred to. These are not to be regarded, along with the *bhedābheda* ⁶, as different functions or properties of Brahman. For the *bhedābheda* theorists Brahman is at once one and many, just as a cow, eg., is one as a substantial entity, but has several parts like the dew-lap, horns, etc. But this view of the nature of Brahman is based altogether on analogy and ignores the vital distinction between material and spiritual entities. Śankara points out that references in this passage to seeing, hearing, &c., have an entirely different purport, viz., to set

1. Ibid, p. 535, of. *yathāprakāśayatyekḥkṛtsnaṁ lokam imam raviḥ*. BṚ. XIII, 33; *yena sūryastapati tejaseddhah*; *tamevabhāntamanubhāti sarvam tasyabhāṣā sarvamidamvibhāti* MuU. II. 2, 10 &c.

2. BU. IV. 3, 23.

3. BSS. I, 1, 5. *asatyapikarmaṇi savitā prakāśata iti kartṛtvavyapadeśadarśanāt*. *evamasatyapi jñānakarmaṇi Brahmanah tadaikṣata iti kartṛtvavyapadeśopapattih*. Vide also CUB. p. 308.

4. *Natudvītyamasti tato'nyadvibhaktam* BU. IV. 3, 29.

5. BU. IV. 3, 23-30.

6. *Bhedābheda* ⁶ has been espoused by Bhartṛprapañca, eg., before Śankara, and Bhāskara, &c. after him. The expression means Identity-cum-difference.

aside the objection that Brahman or Self, being sight, must exercise the function of seeing even in sleep. The sensory activities referred to serve only to connote cognition-*vijnānas'ablavīcyatā*¹.

Brahman as intelligence may be appreciated in its integrity if we examine the three states of consciousness, viz., waking, dream, and sleep. Just as we found in the case of existence, which runs like an infinite thread through all particulars of experience², intelligence also remains one and indivisible, despite the plurality of its objects in the states of waking and dream³. Sights, sounds, touches, &c., differ, of course, among themselves and from the intelligence which apprehends them; but that intelligence itself, styled *samvid* in the *Pañcadaśī*, remains homogeneous and integral. No distinction in that intelligence, clearly, may be made out without associating it with adjuncts like sound, &c., which form its objects⁴. The same is true of dream cognitions. What differentiates waking from dream is not any distinction in intelligence or awareness, but the nature of the objects cognized in these states. "If it were one intelligence that was awake and another that dreamt, there would be no case of identity at all".⁵ The persistence of intelligence in dreamless sleep is borne out by the recollection on waking. "I knew nothing." What is recollected must have been experienced.⁶ Thus, unaffected by time, without rising or setting, shines forth the steady light of the intelligence that is Brahman.⁷

This intelligence, of course, is self-luminous. Self-luminosity consists in the fitness to be treated empirically as immediately

1. BUB. p. 595.
2. cf. *Bhāmati-yeṣuvyāvarttamāneṣu yādanuvarttate tattebhyo bhinnam yathā kusumbhyah sūtram - Bhā* on the *Adhyāsabhāṣya*;
3. PD. I, 3.
4. PD. I. 3 vide Rama'krishna's comm. on it. *ekasyāḥ samvido viśayavisesāḥ sambahdhānām utpattivinaśabhyamevatat-siddhāu samvidopyutapattivinaśayorgauravāt. VPS.P.70.*
5. PA. p. 117
6. PD. I. 5
7. Ibid. I, 7-no'detiṅṣtametyakā samvideṣā śvayamprabhā,

present, while not being an object of cognition. ¹ None doubts self's reality, much less denies it - a fact, which can be justified only by its self-luminosity.² When Brahman is said to be fit to be treated as immediately present empirically, the point is not that this fitness is eternally coexistent with it; for, evidently, in the state of *mukti* or release, where no empirical usage obtains, the fitness as above defined would not hold good. What it means, then, is that Brahman or Self is the non-locus of the absolute non-existence of fitness, just as substance or *dravya*, according to the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* is the non-locus of the absolute non-existence of quality.³ The fitness in question is imputed to Brahman as intelligence only phenomenally, with a view to make a useful distinction between it and all other entities which are inert.⁴ This procedure of phenomenal imputation may also be looked at in the light of Sureśvara's observation: Why are you impatient at the explicatory assumptions we make? Do you not realize that the whole world is superimposed on Brahman through nescience?⁵

1. TP. p. 9, Bombay 1915-avedyātve satyaparokṣavyavahārayogyatvam; also pp. 21-22. cidrūpatvādakarmatvāt svyamjyotirīti śrutehātmanah svaprakāśatvam konivāyitum kṣamam ||
2. BU. IV. 5, 15-vijñātāramarekena vijāniyat. cf. Cogito ergo sum sounds like a syllogism, but is the embodiment of a self-evident truth. Also, cf. The man who calls this a syllogism must know little more about a syllogism save that word 'ergo' occurs in it. Where shall we look for the middle term? It was as a self-evident or immediate truth that the cogito ergo sum, the maxim on which the whole history of modern philosophy was built, was started by its author - Hegel. Qd. in PA. p.120. Also, cf. To be real is to be indissolubly one thing with sentience. Being and reality are one thing with sentience. Appearance & Reality, p. 146, 2nd Edn.
3. TP. p.9. yogyatvātyantābhāvānadhikaranatvasya tattvātguṇavattvātyantābhāvānadhikaranatvasya dravyatvavat.
4. cf. ānando viśayānubhavo nityatvam ceti santidharmāha-pancapādikā. "What is believed in and understood as literally unspeakable may be said to be self-revealing". K. C. Bhattacharya, Contemporary Indian philosophy. p. 84; What is meant by svayamprakāśata comes to this, viz., "There shines no light save its own light to itself unto itself"-Qd. Headquarters of reality, Holmes p. 107.
5. BV. I.4; 1279 akṣamābhavatah keyam, &c.

Thus, though at the time of *mokṣa*, Brahman will own no attributes at all, viewing life as a whole, Brahman may be deemed the non-locus of the absolute non-existence of attributes like the fitness defined above.

IV. Brahman as Bliss.

Brahman we have seen is existence that is intelligence; besides it is bliss also. The emendation suggested by Deussen that in Brahman's essential definition *ananta* should be read as *Ananda* has already been referred to.¹ Even taking the expression as it stands, *ananta* may be understood as referring to Brahman's nature as bliss. Thus in the CU. IV. 10, 5 the sacred fires teach Upakosala Kāmalāyana: *prāno Brahma kam Brahmakham Brahmeti*; ie. Brahman is life, Brahman is joy, Brahman is space. But joy as empirically experienced is brief and fugitive, while space is well-known to be inert or material. How then can either of them be identified with Brahman? S'ankara explains² that the terms *kam* and *kham*, joy and space, must be understood as mutually qualifying each other. Joy as qualified by space ceases to be the brief, sensuous, pleasures of common life; the infinitude of space thus comes to distinguish joy. Similarly, space qualified by joy is no longer inert, elemental, space. The sense of this teaching is, obviously, that Brahman, which is existence and intelligence, is, at the same time, joy infinite.

This grand idea is most elaborately worked out by Sanat-kumāra in the graduated instruction he imparts to Nārada³. Nārada approached Kumāra in search of the knowledge of Brahman or Self. The teacher offers him a series of ideas on Brahman increasingly subtler and more comprehensive. Finally, they culminate in the sublime idea of the *bhūmā* or infinitude. Name, speech, mind, conception (*Samkalpa*) thought (*citta*), meditation, understanding (*viññāna*), strength, food, water, heat, space, memory, hope, life, truth (*phenomenal*), faith, growing-forth (*niṣṭhā*), activity, pleasure (*sukha*) are the ideas thrown together in no recognizable order and offered as closer

1. Vide supra;

2. CUB. p. 206

3. CU. VII, i, &c.

and closer approximations to Brahman. Finally, the teacher declares: *yo vai bhūmā tat sukham, nālperukhamasti*.¹ "Verily a plenum (ie., infinitude) is pleasure: there is no pleasure in the small". The plenum thus identified with pleasure is further explicated thus. "Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the plenum".² But any state which is characterized by dualities, subject-object relations, as of the seer and the seen, is finite, exclusive and petty. In such states there being limits and unresolved oppositions, of course, there can be no unalloyed joy.

S'ankara raises the question³ whether Brahman as joy is characterised by the non-perception of objects of any kind or whether there is self-apprehension involved in it. Briefly, is the joy of the plenum known or unknown? If all objective perceptions are totally negated in respect of plenum, it becomes altogether transcendental, having nothing in common with life as we know it—*dvaitasamvyavahāravilakṣaṇabhūmā*⁴. But if the plenum knows itself, its self-identity will be shattered by introducing into it elements of plurality, such as actions, accessories and fruits of action. In other words, the plenum, too, would be infected by the conditions of phenomenal life. S'ankara disposes of this argument by reaffirming the strict monism expressed in such passages as, *yatranānyat pas'yati nānyatvijānāti*, &c.⁵ Even the expressions used here, *yatra nānyat*, which verbally set up a distinction between the container and the contained, *adhikaranādhikartavyabhedaḥ*,⁶ are supposititious; for, they are based on the empirical usages of daily life. The point of this passage is the negation, in regard to Brahman as bliss, of distinctions which distinguish empirical life. Nothing characteristic of empirical usage finds lodgement in Brahman the plenum⁷. Still, it is pertinent to ask whether Brahman as bliss is cognizable as such; else, a statement affirming their identity must remain a dogmatic expression of faith. There are Upaniṣadic statements (some already noticed) denying all possibilities of

1. CU. VII, 23, i. cf. KUV. 14 anirdeśyam paramam sukham

2. Ibid. VII, 24, 1

3. CUB. p. 398.

4. Ibid. p. 399.

5. CU. VII, 24, 1.

6. CUB. p. 399.

7. Ibid, p. 400.

perception in the Absolute¹. On the otherhand, schools of thought like the *Sāṃkhya* and the *Yoga* and the *Nyāyavaisesika* hold that Ātman in itself is devoid of bliss². In the absence of body and sense organs, no cognition of bliss is conceivable. The argument that the intelligence that is Brahman can cognize its bliss is fallacious; for Brahman is a homogeneous integral whole and its division into subject and object is out of question. Again, if Brahman is perennially aware of its own bliss, there is no sense in talking about its cognizing that bliss. The idea of cognition makes sense only where the possibility of ignorance is real as in the case of a finite mind, which, being ignorant, makes a cognitive effort to know. But Brahman is an eternally ceaseless blaze of knowledge; hence, the question of a specific act of knowing on its part does not arise. To imagine that Brahman that is intelligence functions intermittently is to make it mutable and perishable.³ Therefore, Brahman as bliss is not cognizable as though it could be objectified; rather, Brahman must be understood as real, self-luminous, bliss.⁴

The nature of Brahman as bliss may be further elucidated in the light of Yājñavalkya's discourse on the subject addressed to Maitreyī.⁵ He explains that the various objects held dear in life - husband, wife, children, wealth, social rank, worlds of men and gods, etc., etc., are dear, not for what they are in themselves, but for the sake of the self; ie., Brahman or Ātmān; *ātmanastukāmāya sarvaṃ priyam bhavati*⁶. This affirmation is an echo of the earlier teaching - *tadetatpreyaḥ putrāt preyovittātprevyonyasmāt sarvasmā dantarātaram yadaya. mātāmā*⁷. That Self, subservience to which makes all other objects instrumental to joy and so desirable, must itself be essentially blissful. While these yield conditional joy, the Self, dear for its own sake, felt and accepted as the supreme end of

1. BU. IV. 4, 15, II, 4, 14 - *yatratvasyā sarvamatmaivābhut tat kenakaṃ paśyet, &c.*, also, cf BU. IV, 3, 21.

2. Supra, part I.

3. BUB. p. 500.

4. Ibid, of. PD. XI, 23.

5. BU. II, 4, 4 & 5.

6. BU. II, 4, 5.

7. Ibid; I, 4, 8- That self is dearer than a son, is dearer than wealth, is dearer than all else, since this self is nearer,

all possessions, must be unconditional bliss and the final goal of life. That the self is of the nature of bliss follows from the fact of craving for self-persistence, for immortality¹. Attempts at suicide, due to pressure of abnormal circumstances, are aimed, not at the self, but at the body which imprisons and fetters the self². That Brahman which is existence and intelligence is also bliss is expressly affirmed. *vijñānamānandaṁ Brahma*³. S'ankara explains that Brahman transcends the dualities of the pleasant and the unpleasant which characterize all instances of empirical cognitions. It is transparent, *prasanna*; good, *siva*; unparalleled, free, perennially content and homogeneous⁴.

Even as all real existence and intelligence is Brahman, all bliss, in whatever disguises it may appear, is also Brahman—Brahman is the highest bliss; on a tiny fraction of this Brāhmic bliss, all living beings subsist⁵. It is autonomous, necessary, and eternal, whereas, joys born of sense-contacts with objects, being contingent and ephemeral, are miserable, *ārtta*⁶. The wholly transcendental and transfiguring character of Brāhmic bliss is sought to be conveyed in certain eloquent passages of the BU⁷. No breath of desire disturbs the hallowed joy. In it the self becomes the sole object of desire, *ātmakāma*, beyond cravings and sufferings, good and evil.

That Brahman is bliss is expressed in yet another significant way in the TU⁸—*raso vaisaḥ*. Brahman is the essence. *Rasa* or essence has been identified with *ānanda* or bliss. It does not denote the highest common factor of all forms of pleasant feelings, something abstract and universal, a mere *jāti* or class notion. As one with Brahman, this *rasa* is the most concrete of all realities, determinations of which by contingent factors being the particular instances of empirical joy. All forms of sense pleasures, *viśayasukha* are in essence

1. TP. p. 358.

2. PD. XII, 28, 29.

3. BU. III, 9, 28.

4. BUB. p. 495.

5. BU. IV, 3, 32—*eso'sya paramaānanda etasyāivānandasyānyāni bhūtāni mātrāmupajīvanti*.

6. cf. BG. V, 22.

7. IV, 3, 19–33.

8. TU. II, 7.

this *rasa*. They take their specific forms through association with concrete modes of the internal organ induced by the objects concerned.

All activities of life are ultimately aimed at satisfactions of various kinds - these being the states of the *anantaḥkaraṇa* in which the bliss of Brahman shines forth. Not all satisfactions are bound up with external objects; for, minds which practise detachment are often marked by serene contentment and profound joy.¹ In fact the greater the detachment from external objects, the purer, intenser, and more enduring is the inner joy. The secret source of this inexhaustible joy is Brahman which is *rasa* or *ānanda*. Thus Ś'ankara writes: *bāhyānandasādhanarahitā api nirīhā nireṣaṇā brāhmaṇā bāhyarasalābhādivā sānandā dṛśyante vidvāṃśah*.² So unshakable is the seer's intuition of Brahman as bliss that he exclaims: *kohyevānyāt kaḥ prāpyāt yadesa ākāśa ānandona syāt*.³ "Who, indeed, would breathe' who would live, if there were not this bliss in ether?" *Ākāśa* in this passage refers to the ether present in the living core of all living beings.⁴ There dwells Brahman the bliss in all, sustained and inspired by which life goes on all round. This fountain-head of bliss keeps all the world in unfailing joy - *eṣahyevānandayāti*.⁵

An idea of the intensity and supremacy of the bliss of Brahman is sought to be conveyed in the section styled *ānanda-sya mīmāṃsā*⁶ - an inquiry into bliss. Pleasures of different grades of living beings are arranged in a hierarchy of intensity and purity. The starting point for human purposes is the joy of a cultured youth, well-read, quick of understanding, firm and strong, at whose command is the whole earth full of wealth. His joy is defined as one human bliss. There follow, in due order, human *gandharvas*, divine *gandharvas*, the manes, the

1. cf. Bhartṛhari, Vairagyaśataka 12.

2. "The Brāhmaṇa sages are observed to be blissful, as though they possess object-born joy, while, in fact, they have not the means to secure it and are free from desires and cravings" TUB.

3. TU. II. 7

4. V. p. 186 - ākāśa ānanda - parame vyomani guhāyām nihitah

5. TU. II. 7

6. Ibid; II, 8;

gods by birth, the gods by work, gods, Indra, Bṛhaspati and Prajāpati. The bliss of each of the succeeding beings surpasses that of the preceding by a hundredfold. Finally, it is asserted that a hundred blisses of Prajāpati is one bliss of Brahman. Deussen calculates¹ that a human bliss is just a hundred billionth part of the bliss of Brahman. This, of course, is but a vivid way of affirming that the bliss of Brahman surpasses all human reckonings and conceptions – that the eye has not seen nor ear heard nor hath it entered into the mind of man to conceive the bliss that is Brahman. But at the same time, it is not beyond the experience of the right type of man; for it is reiterated ten times that this bliss is also of a man who is versed in the scriptures and is not smitten with desires. In other words, by rightly disciplining oneself, every man can realize within himself the Bliss that is Brahman; for, as was pointed out above, Brahman is not other than the Self of all the world². Of this sea that is Brāhmic bliss, one and indivisible, all forms of pleasure are the drops³.

The significance of Brahman as bliss is even more far-reaching. The entire manifested world with its endless variety of joy is declared to be an overflow, an expression, of that infinite and immutable bliss⁴. This raises the problem how, nonetheless, much suffering and sorrow is experienced empirically. But the contention of the seer is that one who knows Brahman as bliss has vanquished all fear⁵, and is lifted above all moral self-reproach.

The question whether Brahman is bliss or only *has* it in superabundant measure has assumed great importance in Vedāntic discussions. The Advaitic position may be clarified in the light of Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Ānandamayādhikāraṇa* of the *Bṛama sūtras*⁶. After explaining these *sūtras* in the sense of an affirmation that Brahman is predominantly

1. PUD.

2. Supra.

3. BU. IV, 3, 32.

4. TU. III, 6, ānando brahmeti vyajānāt, ānandādhyeva khalvimāni bhūtāni jāyante, &c.

5. Ibid, II, 9. ānandam Brahmano vidvānnabibheti kutaścana.

6. I, 1, 12-19.

blissful,¹ S'ankara "critically reviews the entire question starting with the remark: *idamtvihā vaktavyam*.² The suffix *mayat* in 'ānandamaya' ought not to differ in sense from what it means in the expressions *annamaya*, *prāṇamaya*, &c., for 'ānandamaya' occurs in the same context³. In all these earlier expressions, "mayat" means only transformation, *vikāra*. No distinction in sense may be based on the plea that 'ānandamaya' is the last of the series and so should denote Brahman; for, in regard to this *ānandamaya* it is said: Pleasure is its head, delight the right-side, great delight the left side; bliss the body; Brahman the lower part, the foundation⁴. Brahman, the theme of the entire passage with which the section opened is referred to, not as *ānandamaya*, but as *puccha*, the lower part, the foundation. By foundation is meant that all forms of phenomenal joy are based on, or culminate in Brahman, that is bliss. Besides, if *ānandamaya* is taken as Brahman it becomes a complex whole with attributes; for pleasure, etc., are indicated as its parts. But the upaniṣad, in fact, concludes with reference to that Brahman 'whence words together with the mind recoil'⁵. In other words, it is Brahman without attributes or parts. Also, to say that Brahman is predominantly blissful is to admit that in it is some little alloy of pain, the opposite of bliss. This is an impossible admission regarding Brahman which is *bhāmā* or plenum. Therefore, *ānandamaya* does not refer to Brahman as bliss. On the contrary, Brahman as bliss is altogether beyond predicates, it is transcendental.⁶

1. In 'ānandamaya' 'maya' denotes abundance—*prācurya*; see BSS. I, 1, 13.

2. BSS. I, 1, 19.

3. TU. II, 1-5.

4. TU. II, 5.

5. Ibid; II, 9.

6. S'ankara on BS. I, 1, 19—*naceha saṁsāraṁ Brahman pratipīḍayīṣitam vānmanasagocarātikramasrutē* p. 128.

V. Brahman is 'nameless'.

So far we have examined the contents of the essential definition of Brahman as Existence, Intelligence and Bliss. The celebrated expression *saccidānanda*, positively connoting Brahman and summing up the essential definition, occurs for the first time in the *Nṛsimhottaratīpanīyopanīśad*.¹ But these positive definitions ought not to mislead us into the assumption that the Advaitic Absolute is capable of determinations of any kind. Descriptions like Brahman is existence, intelligence, &c., are only approximations, at best, to a reality that defies the power of words and thought, a reality that is, strictly, transcendental. Words like *Satya* are at best symbolic and only serve to tell us what Brahman is not. Or, these words indicate the fact that Brahman is other than non-existence, non-intelligence, and non-bliss.² It would not answer to anything less than the concepts denoted by these words but it is, in itself, infinitely more.

In the Upanīśads, therefore, two kinds of descriptions of Brahman may be met with: in one, positive traits are attributed to it,³ while, in the other, all positive traits are negated.⁴ The purport of the first set will be considered in another section of the present chapter. It is with the second that we are immediately concerned. Brahman in itself should be regarded as free from all anthropomorphic attributes.⁵ Hence, the Advaitic

1. Sections 6, 7 &c.

2. cf. Rāmānuja Bhāṣyam on BS. p. 14, Reprint from the Pandit, 1915 and IP. ii. p. 537. Also HIP. vol. IV, pp. 208 209 & TP. P. III, Suresvara's vārttika on TU. Qd. P. 112 in TP.

3. CU. III, 14, 2-saravakaramā sarvakāmāh &c.

4. BU. III, 1, 8; KU. III, 15; MukU. II, 72 &c.

5. cf. Saṅkara on BS. III, 2, II ff:— anyataralīṅga parigrahepi samsta viśeśarहितam nirvikalpakameva Brahmapratipattitvayam, na tatviparitām. BS/S. P. 641, also cf. Spinoza saying "the intellect which would constitute the essence of God must differ toto coelo from our will and intellect; nor can they agree in anything save in name, nor any more than the dog as a celestial constellation and the dog as barking animal agree Ethics i, 17, Scholium, Qd. IP. ii. p. 536, FN. 2,

Absolute is most adequately expressed in the language of silence. To this summit of vision, Yajnavalkya leads step by step.¹ Sankara reports in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra III, 2, 17,² that Bādhva, asked by Bāṣkali for a definition of Brahman, expounded it in the language of silence. But when he was repeatedly pressed for it, Bādhva exclaimed: We are telling you; only you do not understand. This Atman is silence *Upasānto yamātmā*.³ Such negative expressions, in fact, represent the inability of the human mind to conceive the transcendental essence of the Absolute. "Brahman, free from space attributes, motion, fruition, difference, being in the highest sense and without a second, seems to the slow of mind no more than non-being."⁴

That the divine Absolute is Nothing (*no thing* no object of apprehension) is a refrain occurring in the religious literature of the world. In Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism, Christianity, the Absolute or God is referred to as Nothing, Non-being, Emptiness, the void, the Abyss.⁵ But no grosser error can be made than

1. BU. II. 3, 6 &c. *athāta ādesoneti neti*, cf. KeU I, 3 *anyadevatad vidad a tho aviditādadhi* &c.
2. *darśayaticātho apismaryate*
3. cf. TU II. 4 & 9. MuU. II, 2, 10.
4. *digdeśagunagatiphalabhedasūnyam hi paramārthasādhvayam brahma mānabuddhīnām asād iva pratibhāti*, CUB. III, 1, 1
5. Eckhardt, for instance avers: "God is as void as if He were not". "Thou shalt love God as He is, a non-God, a non-spirit, a non-person, a non-form". "The end of all things is the hidden darkness of the eternal Godhead". Again Dioysius the Areopagite speaks of 'the divine darkness'. Augustine asserts that God is best described by negatives, 'that we can know what God is not, but not what He is'. Quoted in *Time & Eternity* pp. 9 ff. W. T. Stace, Princeton, 1952. and IP. ii. p. 538, fn. 2; cf. S'ankara, the last verse of the *Daśaśloki* & Sri Rāmākṛṣṇa, to Isvara Candra Vidyasygara. "All things in the world-the Vedas, the Puranas, the Tantras, the six systems of philosophy, have been defiled, like food that has been touched by the tongue. Only one thing has not been defiled in this way, and that is Brahman. No one has ever been able to say what Brahman is". The gospel of Sri Ramakrishna p. 28, Madras Edn. 1947 Eckhart: "Would thou be perfect, do not yelp about God". Qd. *Mysticism East & West*, R. Otto p. 5.

to suppose that this Nothing, this nameless Brahman, is a mere negation. For everything that is experienced,—the worlds of facts, dreams, thoughts—has sprung out of it, without, however, diminishing or damaging it in anywise.¹ It and its expression are equally infinite, and yet there are not two infinities. It is Brahman that appears as the world.² This great truth about the Advaitic Absolute finds expression in the celebrated verse: The yon is fulness; fulness, this; withdrawing fulness fulness off. E'en fulness then itself remains.³ Brahman is all in all, integral, infinite and eternal; there are not two spheres of reality "*yadeveha tadamutra, yad amutra tadanviha*."⁴ No one experiences two infinities; when the world is experienced, Brahman is not, and when Brahman is experienced, the world is not. To say that Brahman is eternal does not mean that it persists in time, like the motionless being of Parmenides, "the mindless, unmoving structure."⁵ The point is Brahman is timeless, and incorruptible, pure and unpierced by evil.⁶ It is eternal because its completeness, *pūrṇatā*, is not related to time.⁷

We started with the observation that in the *Advaita* philosophy, the real or the Absolute is denoted by both the terms Brahman and Ātmā, though Brahman more often refers to the Self of the Universe and Ātmā to the Self of man. Thus, the purely objective is also the purely subjective. In other words, the Self of man is Brahman whose best available positive definition is *Saccidānanda*, but which is strictly absolutely

1. nirguṇoguṇī; sūnyamevatarhitat, nā, mithyāvikalpasya nir-nimittatvānupapattēh—S'on GPK. also cf. "The Infinite in India was not a thin non-entity void of all content. Know Him by realizing Him in nature, family, society, state". Tagore, *Sādhana* P. 20.

2. Vide infra.

3. BU. V. 1, 1.

4. KU. IV, 10

5. IP. ii. p. 537.

6. IU. 8;

7. of. Spinoza. Eternity cannot be defined in terms of time, nor can it have any relation to time. Ethics V, i Scholium, Qd. IP. ii. p. 537

beyond all determinations. ¹ being 'neither personal, nor moral nor beautiful, nor true'.²

VI. *Saguṇa Brahman* or *Īśvara*.

We saw that, in itself, Brahman is other than non-existence, non-intelligence, non-bliss and that, as absolute reality without a second, it defies all verbal determinations. But from the point of view of man in the phenomenal world, Brahman appears as the cause of the world. ³ Being the non-dual reality, in so far as the world of plurality may be said to have a cause at all, Brahman is bound to be that cause. But a cause which does not undergo changes in producing its effect is no cause at all. On the other hand, if Brahman, the Advaitic Absolute, changes, it ceases to be Brahman. Remaining entirely transcendental, i.e., above the sphere of space, time and casuality, Brahman cannot serve to explain the experienced world of phenomena. Nor can the world be traced to an unintelligent principle like the *Prakṛti* of the *Sāṃkhya*s.⁴ True, *Prakṛti* is the principle of ceaseless change or becoming as against Brahman which is immutable being. But to posit *Prakṛti* by the side of Brahman which is one without a second is to limit it and finitise it. Without a second, however, the solution of the world-problem is impossible. The way out of this impasse was to recognize a *saguṇa* Brahman or Brahman answering to a *taṭasthalakṣaṇa*. Such is the logical origin of the concept of *Īśvara* in the Advaita system. The essence of *Īśvara* is a synthesis of the Being of the Absolute and the becoming of *Prakṛti*. Thus the self-subsistent Absolute becomes a personal God, the cause of the world of flux, *jagat* or *samsāra*. Pure Brahman beyond all attributes, considered in relation to

1. cf. *niṣkalam niṣkriyam s̄ntam niravadyam nirañjanam divyohyamūrtah Puruṣah sabāhyābhyānttaro hyajah.*

2. Bradley, qd. IP. ii, p. 540

cf. *dr̥ṣṭāguṇakriyājāti sambandhāḥ śabdahetavah |
nātmanyanyatamo hyeṣām tenātmānābhidhiyate ||*
Vartika, qd in ABS; P. 105
ajahkalpitasamvṛtya paramarthe nanapyajah.
GPK. IV, 74

3. IP ii, p. 555.

4. BS. II. 2, 1.

the principle of becoming, becomes a subject dealing with an object. This principle of becoming, *Prakṛti* or *māyā* apart from and independently of God, is a blank; as such, it has no existence or meaning. For, by itself, it can accomplish nothing. But, as the other and object of the self-conscious *Īśvara*, it becomes the fecund source of the world of phenomena.

A vital point has to be clarified in this connection. How can we, in the light of strict Advaita even talk of a principle of becoming styled *Prakṛti* or *māyā*? On the other hand without such a principle, how can a transition be effected from *nirguṇa* Brahman to *saṅguṇa* Brahman? The answer is that in discussing *nirguṇa* Brahman we are adopting a transcendental point of view, that of *paravidyā*, for which no dualities exist and the sole, non-dual reality is the Advaitic Brahman. But in talking about the world and God, we are shifting our position to the world of space-time in which casuality reigns and which demands a cause for its own existence. From this latter position the world of *prakṛti* or *māyā* is without beginning, *anādi*. By abstracting from it, a principle of change and becoming, the most characteristic feature of the world, may justly be postulated. In attempting to trace the genesis of the world we are not positing an absolute beginning, a creation out of nothing or from pre-existing matter. We seek rather to account for the system of phenomena which appears as the world of experience. From this empirical standpoint³ the Advaitin contends that this world must be credited to the association of Brahman and *māyā*, the principle of intelligence and that of change. It may be noted that in viewing the absolute from the empirical stand-point, three principal factors are simultaneously posited *māyā*, *jīva*, and *Īśvara*.⁴ Their interdependence in *Advaita* philosophy is a factor of the greatest importance.

1. cf. *tadaikṣata* CU. VI. 2, 3.

2. *māyāntuprakṛtiṃ vidyāt* S'U.

3. cf. To consider Brahman in relation to the world is to adopt the point of view of *avidyā* PUD. p. 159,

4. PD. V. 55; NTU. 9 *egāmāyā jīvesāvābhāsenā karoti, māyā cāvidyācā savayamevabhavati* cf. The world was not created in time but together with time, St. Augustine, Qd. by P. Pattison, *Idea of God*, p. 303.

The definition *per accidens* which the Upanisads offer is meant to apply to Brahman associated with *māyā* viz., *Īśvara*. The principle of *māyā* which constitutes the mark of *Īśvara* has been defined by Sankara thus:—There are names and forms conceived in nescience, which constitute the very essence of *Īśvara* and which are incapable of determination either as true or false-names and forms, which are the seeds of this world of flux and are called *prakṛti* or the power of *māyā* of the omniscient Lord¹. This conception of *māyā* shows just how *Īśvara* may be defined *per accidens* as *Janmādyasyayatah*.² The origin, sustentation, and retraction of the world are solely due to him. Such a definition as this is arrived at only in the light of the *śruti* and not by independent ratiocination. Reliance on *śruti*, i.e., the spiritual insight of the seers as recorded in the scriptures, is our sole guide to certainty regarding God, because the reality of God transcends our finite powers of understanding.³

The incapacity of unaided reason to establish God may be briefly elucidated. The epistemological argument points to the necessity of a perfect subject for whom all existence is an object. Both common sense and science assume that the intelligible world is a system of interconnected events; else, all hope of knowledge will have to be renounced. But, actually, no finite intelligence can experience the entire world as a unified whole

1. BSS. II. 1 14. With S'ankara's idea of the status of *Nāmarūpe* names and forms which are non-different from God, *ātmabhūte*, may be compared Plato's notion of Ideas. The latter are not the creative conceptions of God. God knows the Ideas existing independently of Him. God thus is secondary in Plato's system. Ideas, not God, are the *ens realissimum* for Plato. In S'ankara's Advaita, *nāmarūpe*, apart from God, are nothing, and the essence of God is the supreme reality. See Plato pp. 44 ff. A.E. Taylor. London, 1908.
2. BS. I. 1, 2.
3. cf. Schweitzer: If we take the world as it is, it is impossible to explain it in any way which will give meaning to the ends and aims of the activities of men and of humanity. We can discover no trace in the world of any purposive development which might lend significance to our action. Preface xii Civilization and Ethics, Part II. Qd. IP. ii. p. 545, FN. 1.

since there is far too much of the world which ~~must be beyond~~ the range of any finite intelligence. Even the knowledge we actually have is scrappy compared with the richness of reality. Only a complete knowledge of reality as a whole can justify the proposition that God is, and is the creator of all. The finite mode of thinking itself rules out the possibility of an integral knowledge of reality; for, we know through an opposition between subject and object. Even when all the objective world is reduced to a single concept such as of the *prakṛti* of the *sāṃkhya*, the knower or the subject must remain outside and opposed to it. Thus, it cannot be proved that the whole world including the thinker is a logical whole expressing the mind of God, though scientific thinkers like Sir James Jeans ventured to advance such a hypothesis.¹

The Cosmological argument turns on the concept of a world cause. What we do here is to apply to the entire world a concept derived from our limited experience within it. In our experience every event is caused, and there is no room for an uncaused cause. Must, therefore, the world as a whole have an absolute beginning in time? Time, obviously, is a part of phenomena, and to assume that the whole including it can be expressed in terms of that part is clearly illogical. All systems of Indian Philosophy have held that the world has no absolute beginning, and so the question of God creating it out of nothing does not rise at all.

The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* inference of God based on the assumption that the world is an effect like a pot is unavailing. Assuming that it is a finite effect, the inference takes us only to a finite creator or creators. The nature of the cause inferred is bound to share with the effect its finitude, for, the effect is related to the cause. Thus, if *Is'vara* be the cause, he must fall with in space-time. He will be only a magnified potter and will be far from being either infinite or omnipotent.

The moral argument is equally fallacious. It is hard to make out that a good and omnipotent God has made the world of experience in which evils and sorrows abound. It is futile to

1. The Mysterious Universe.

place responsibility for them either on men's free-will or on a satan who will prove a formidable rival to the good God. A beginningless opposition between the good God and the wicked devil at once reduces God to the status of a finite being. The device of making individual souls parts of God will subject him to the experiences of the parts, and, in a predominantly sorrowful world, God's sufferings must be immense. No finite being in these circumstances could desire to hold communion with him, much less to seek identity. Again, if God is perfect, why should he create the world? Also, perfection militates against all action which points to unsatisfied needs and imperfection on the part of the agent. A God with personality, with likes and dislikes, can hardly be perfect. He will, like the rest of us, be a *samsārin*, however exalted.

Nor can the ontological argument help us to reach the reality of God. Because we have the idea of perfection, according to this argument, perfection actually must exist. Of course, that in which it exists is God. But the fact of the idea need not prove the fact of its reality. For, surely, an idea may be put together from elements taken from various sources. Such a synthetic product cannot prove that its counterpart exists outside the mind that entertains it. Thus the ontological argument cannot prove the reality of perfect being or God.¹

The conclusion from the failure of unaided reason to establish the reality of God who will satisfy the religious temper is not that there is no God, but that other means than mere ratiocination should be sought to reach him.² At best arguments may point to the possibility of God; at the worst, they make atheism plausible. Thus, Advaita falls back upon the direct experience of the sages recorded in the *s'ruti* as the foundation for our belief in God.³ This faith in the *s'ruti* is not necessarily irrational, for the *s'ruti* which is significant is

1. Appearance & Reality, pp. 149 ff.

2. BS.I. 1, 3. *sāstrayonitvāt*.

3. The only strong argument for the reality of God is one that appeals to the reality of the intuitions of mankind. No logical proof is available. Form & Spirit; p. 151. J.H. Badley.

the record of the experiences of specialists in the life of the spirit. As such, *s'ruti* will not contradict reason, though it may transcend it. The teaching of the *s'ruti* on God being the source and ground of the world is not opposed to reason, much less is it contradicted by it. Only, adequate rational demonstration of it is not practicable¹. Above all, acceptance of the *s'ruti* does no violence to the spirit of genuine inquiry in so far as it is meant strictly to be tentative; the position of *s'ruti* on *Is'vara*, eg., is to be tested in spiritual experience by every earnest seeker after truth.²

In the light of these premises, we may examine the Advaitic concept of God. Explaining the definition, *janmādyasya yatah*³ Śankara writes: The cause from which proceed the origin sustentation and dissolution of the world which is extended in names and forms, which includes many agents and enjoyers, contains the fruit of works, specially determined according to space, time and cause—a world which is formed after an arrangement inconceivable even for the mind—this omniscient and omnipotent cause in Brahman (i. e., *saguna* or *Is'vara*).⁴ That *Is'rvara* is both the material and efficient cause of the world is both directly expressed⁵ and metaphorically suggested⁶ in the upaniṣads. The significance of this contention may be brought out by contrasting it with the dualistic notion of a personal God who creates the world out of nothing and remains outside it. In his *Idea of God* Pringle-Pattison observes⁷ “The idea of creation as a special act or event that took place once upon a time represents the universe as in no way organic to divine life... such a conception of creation belongs to the same circle of ideas as the waving of a magician's wand.” All metaphysical and moral perfections are ascribed to *Is'vara* in Advaita⁸.

1. IP. ii. p. 545.

2. Śankara-anubhavāvasānatvāt-Brahmajñānasya. BSS. p. 52.

3. BS. I, 1, 2.

4. BS. on the above. pp. 47-48;

5. TU. III, 1; 6. MU I, 1, 7; II, 1, 1, 3;

7. PP. 302, 303. Qd. in PA. P. 181

8. eg. *Isvara* is sinless or good: CU, VIII, 7, 1—*yaātmā apahatapāpmā*, etc. IU. 8. BS. I, 1, 20-21; He is blissful, I, 1 12-19, III, 3. 11-13; He is free from all causality, III, 3, 36, he is life I, 1, 28-31; I, 4, 16-18.;

A consequence of his being both the material and the efficient cause of the world¹ is that *Is'vara* in Advaita is also the immanent Self of the world, the *antaryāmin*². In a series of symmetrical passages, Yājñavalkya proclaims God the indweller and the inner-controller, immortal. "He who dwells in the earth, yet is other than the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, who controls earth from within, is the self, the inner-controller the immortal." Similar statements are made with regard to all typical members of the objective and subjective worlds. Commenting on B.U. III, 7, 3, Śāṅkara says that the reference in this passage is to God, *Is'varo Nārāyaṇākhyah* who has neither body nor sense-organs, but whose mere presence as witness causes other beings to act. He is free from traits of transmigratory life.³ The implications of the immanence of God in the world, especially in man, is of the utmost importance in our study. By the fact of immence, God ceases to be an unapproachable being beyond the reach of man; he can be a fit object of worship and emulation. Perfection such as God's becomes attainable, howsoever difficult⁴. That God and the individual are in essence one is the implication of the doctrine of immanence⁵.

Having accepted the reality of God, both immanent and transcendent⁶, on the basis of *s'ruti*, Śāṅkara fervently argues to establish his reality. "For the *aparā vidyā* Śāṅkara is a passionate theist. His references to *Parames'vara* are fervent⁷." Śāṅkara seeks to show that God alone can be the cause of the world; neither the atoms of the *Nyayā-Vaiśeṣika* theory, nor the *Pradhāna* of the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* system. *Is'vara* is the first

1. BS. I, 4, 23-27;

2. BU. III, 8, 3, etc.; BG. XVI, 15; S'U. VI, 11.

3. sarvasaṃsāradharmavarjitah. BUB. P. 450.

4. cf. The remarks on 'Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect', Mathew 5 48 on P. 1, supra Introdn. Pt. I.

5. In Advaita God is not a principle separate from the jiva, BU. III, 7, 16-23; CU. VI, 3, 2; by means of this ātmā, this jiva, God enters the world of phenomena. Cf. BU. II, 5; 18; Upadeśa Sāhasrī, IX, 4; BG. XIII, 2.

6. cf. pādo'sya viśvā bhūtāni tripādasyāmṛtam divi.

7. R. Otto. Mysticism East & West, P. 106. Mac. & Co. 1932.

cause, for he in his turn can have no origin¹. Being essentially pure being, *sad-ātmakā*, *Īśvara* cannot have another source of origin. Pure *sat* cannot be imagined as arising from another *sat*, for without some excess one entity cannot be the cause of another. In other words, since nothing superior to *Īśvara* can be conceived, he is uncaused. No differentiated being, *sadvīṣeṣa* can give rise to God; for, particulars spring from general causes and not vice versa. *Asat* or non-being, of course, cannot give rise to God who is *sadātmaka*; for, how can being proceed from non-being?² *Īśvara* cannot be a modification; for this would require an endless search for cause, an infinite regress³. If *Īśvara* also be an effect, all effects from *ākāśa* downwards would be empty alike and the result would be nihilism⁴. What gives reality to the entire world of effect is *Īśvara*.

An objection to the Advaitic theory of *Īśvara* being the material and efficient cause of the world may be considered. Normally, material causes are not intelligent, only efficient cause are so. "True", answers Śaṅkara, "but it is not necessary that in the matter of world causation normal experience should furnish any analogue; for, this subject is known only by revelation and not inference"⁵. But the whole question will be clarified later.

How far may the Advaitic *Īśvara* be held responsible for the moral and physical imperfections that loom so large in the world which is caused by him? A full answer must await consideration of the status of the world, but here it may be pointed out that *Īśvara* is not regarded as bringing about these inequalities and imperfections irrespective of the moral deserts

1. BS. II, 3, 9. *asambhavastu satonupapetteh*.
2. CU. VI, 2, 2, cf. S'U. VI, 9, *sakārṇaṁ karaṇādhipādhīponacāsyakaścijjanītanacādhīpaḥ*.
3. *mūlaprakṛtyanabhyupagame 'navasthāprasāṅgāt*, BSS. P. 514.
4. *yadihyātmāpivikārahśyāttasmādanyana śrutamiti ākāśaḥ sarvaṁ kāryaṁ niratmakam syād*, BSS. P. 508.
5. *'nalokavadiha bhavitavyaṁ na hyayamanumānagamyorthaḥ śabdagamyatvāttvayārthasya yathāśabdhamihabhavitavyaṁ* Śaṅkara on BS. I, 4, 27.

of the individuals concerned¹. Śankara compares *Is'vara* to rain which helps the plants to grow, while what they grow into depends not on the rain, but on the nature of the seeds.² To account for the multiplicity of the effects he manifests, *Isvara* is held to possess an infinite variety of powers.³

But why should *Isvara* bring forth a world at all? He is perfect and so may not be moved to any activity, which presupposes a prior want. He can have no unfulfilled desires⁴. But if he created without a definite aim, his action would be irresponsible and erratic⁵. The answer is that God's creative activity need not be regarded as determined from without by an as yet unrealized purpose. It is best to picture it on the model of sheer sport⁶, in which all motives are intrinsic to the activity itself. Thus, Śankara says that the activity of the Lord may be supposed to be a mere sport, *Līlā*, proceeding from his own nature, without reference to any purpose.⁷ The implications of the concept of divine sport are noteworthy. The creation of the world becomes, instead of a particular act in time, an eternal and continuous act of self expression on the part of the Lord,

1. BS. II, 1, 34.

2. 'Isvarastu parjanyaavaddraṣṭavyah. Yathā hiparjanyo vṛhiyavādisṛṣṭau sādharāṇakāraṇam bhavati, vṛhiyavādivaiṣamyetu tattadbijagatānyevāsadhāraṇāni sāmartyānikāraṇāni bhavanti, evamiśvaro devamanuṣyadisṛṣṭau sādharāṇam kāraṇam'. BSS. PP. 407, 408.

3. CU. III, 14, 4; VIII, 7, 1, MuU. I, 1, 9; BU. III, 8, 9, S'U. VI. 8

4. Cf. āptakamasyakāṣṛhā? GPK. I, 9.

5. BSS. II, 1, 32. unmatto buddhyaparādhādantrenaivātmaprayojanam pravartamānodṛṣṭah. P. 405.

6. BU. II, 1, 33.

7. S'. On II, 1, 33. evamiśvarsyāpyanapekṣyakiñcitprayojanam svabhāvalavalīlārūpā pravṛttirbhaviṣyati. Cf. Purpose implies (i) a desire for an as yet non-existent state of affairs; (ii) the conception of a plan for bringing the desired state into existence by selection of appropriate means, (iii) the act of will proper which carries out the plan. Only a life in time can have purpose in this sense; so a finite individual alone can have it. Idea of God. P. 323.

unmotivated by any selfish interests.¹ This concept harmonizes with the TU² which affirms that the entire world is born of *ānada* or bliss of Brahman, sustained by it and returns to it. Like the respiration of man is the spontaneous overflow of Brāhmic bliss. The Lord cannot help expressing himself in creative activity. There is neither chance nor thoughtlessness at the back of the world. Out of the fulness of his joy, *Is'vara* creates worlds on worlds.

By insisting on the blissfulness of God as the secret source of his activities, an ideal is set before the aspirant to emulate and realize, the picture of a dynamic perfection to spur one in one's spiritual life³. The creative expression of God makes him and the world one in essence, though, as forms and modifications, the world seems to differ from him.⁴

Is'vara has forms corresponding to the states of *Jīva* of the individual, a consequence which follows from the *māyic* association of both. Corresponding to the wakeful state of the *Jīva*, technically called *Vis'va*, is the state of the cosmic self which owns and sustains the entire gross universe as its body. The cosmic self as exclusively associated with the gross world is known as the *Virāt* or the *Vais'vānara*⁵. The form of the *Virāt*, is the fully developed universe. In the *Vis'varūpādhyāya* of the *Yajurveda* and in the *Puruṣasūkta*⁶. *Virāt* is described as having a cosmic form. Corresponding to the dream state of the *Jīva* or the *taijasa* is the *sūtrātmā* or *Hiraṇyagarbha* aspect of the cosmic self. *Hiraṇyagarbha* is associated with the subtle universe⁷ and is regarded as the

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1. Cf. Creation is the expression on the plane of spacetime of what exists already in God, IP. II, P. 551.
 2. III, 5.
 3. Cf. BG. III, 22-25, where the divine Teacher asks Arjuna to follow the example of his own ceaseless, selfless, activity.
 4. *astibhātipriyam rūpaṃ nāmacetyamaṣaṇcakaṃ; ādyatrayam brahmarūpaṃ jagatrūpaṃ tatodvayaṃ; Vākyasudhā*, Cf. PD. XIII, 62.
 5. CU. V, 18; MuU. II, 1, 14.
 6. Rg. V. X; BG. XI, PD. VI, 204, 205.
 7. VP. P. 301.

unity of all *aijasa*. Ānandagiri in his gloss on Śankara's commentary on the Muṇḍakaverse I, 1, 8 remarks that *Hiraṇyagarbha* arises from the *avyākṛta* or the adjunct of *Is'varā*.¹ He is called the *sūtrātman* also as he pervades the subtle world as its self; the world, then, is said to be experienced as indistinct, as though seen through a veil of light darkness². The *Is'vara* state proper is the *saguṇa Brahman*, the cause of the world or its seed-state. This state corresponds to that of the *Jīva* in deep sleep state when he is associated with the causal body of nescience and is known as *Prājña*³. When the world is retracted in *pralaya* or dissolution, *Is'vara* is related to the seedform the world, as the *Jīva* in deep sleep is to nescience.

The concept of *Is'vara* so far dealt with gains in breadth and depth of significance in the *Bhagavat Gītā*, which Śankara interprets on strictly Advaitic lines. From the way he develops the different aspects of this concept, so vital for the practical realization of the Advaitic ideal of liberation, one may assert with Otto that Śankara's standpoint is not the exclusive one of the old monistic upaniṣads and that his Advaitic philosophy, in its substructure, represents theism of high type.⁴

In the *Gītābhāṣya*, Śankara develops the concept of God already formulated in the Upaniṣads, and the *Brahmasūtras*. The fresh advances he makes on the earlier upaniṣadic position may be described under two broad headings, (i) God's metaphysical nature and powers; (ii) his activities both as he is in himself and as *avatār*. Earlier, it was stated that *nirguṇa Brahman* in association with *māyā* or *prakṛti* is *saguṇa Brahman* or God. In the *Gītā* a clarification of this associated power is given in Chapter VII, 4-6. Two powers or *prakṛtis* of God are distinguished, one lower & the other higher. The *Prakṛiti* of the *Sāṃkhya*s, the source of the inorganic world and the faculties of the mind, is the lower of the two. It is lower because it binds

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1. Hiraṇyagarbha is the world-soul, the first born of God S'U, III. 4; IV, 12, VI, 18.
 2. PD. IV, 201.
 3. VS. PP.
 4. Mysticism East & West, PP. 103-105.

the spirit of man and subjects him to the travails of trans-migratory life.¹ The higher is what constitutes the living principle in all the world. Śāṅkara interprets the expression *meparām*² to mean my very self-*mamātmabhūtāṁ*. Thus, the living principle in all living beings is the same as the Lord himself. But, it has become embodied, the knower of the field, *kṣetrajña*. The inorganic world is held in being by the principle of life which has entered it as *Jīva Jagadantahpraviṣṭayā*. For the Advaitin, the *prakṛti* that is the source of the objective world is not an independent principle as in the Sāṅkhya but implicated in the being of *Īśvara*.³ The designation of *prakṛti* assigned to immortal principle of *Jīva* is explained by Āṇandagiri as due to the *Jīva* being a limitation of *caitanya* or intelligence by *avidyā* or nescience.⁴ Thus, through the instrumentality of these two powers, inert and intelligent, *Īśvara* operates as the cause of the empirical world.⁵

A notable reaffirmation of the nature and status of *Īśvara* may be noticed in the *Gītā* XVI, 16-18. The two principles of this fleeting world of phenomena and its persistent cause, named *kṣara* and *akṣara*, have been designated persons, *puruṣas*, because, as Āṇandagiri points out, they from adjuncts of the *puruṣa* or intelligence proper.⁶ But *Īśvara* is other than both and altogether unaffected by their flaws like inertness, transience, etc. He is eternally pure, intelligent, and free, *nityaśuddhabuddhamukutasvabhāvaḥ*. He is the inner intelligent self, the *pratyakcetana*, of all living beings and also the sovereign Lord who, by his mere presence, upholds and rules the cosmos.⁷ Due to his real transcendence of both the realms of effects and

1. Cf. *aparā napaṛā nikṛṣṭā śuddhānarthakarīṣamsārabandhanātmīkeyam*. BGC. P. 346.

2. BG. VII, 5.

3. Cf. The Caturdharī of Nīlakaṇṭha on BG. VII, 5 ; *tasmādayaktamutpmannam igriguṇamdvijasattamā ; avyaktampuruṣe Brahmanniṣkale pravīḥyate* BGC. P. 346.

4. Ibid., P. 346.

5. BG. VII, 6 & 7.

6. BGC. P. 627. *Puruṣopādhitvāṣ puruṣattvaṁnasākṣāt*.

7. *samyuktametad kṣāramaksaram cavyaktavyaktam bharate viśvamiśaḥ*—Qd. by Gīrl, BGC. P. 629 ; *sa uttamapuruṣaḥ* CU.

causes, i. e., the phenomenal world and *māyā*, is the Lord styled *uttamapurusa*, the best and highest intelligence ¹

Throughout the *Gītā* the divine teacher represents God. In Chapter XIV, 27 ², he makes an affirmation which has an important bearing on the nature and status of God and his relation to Brahman. Apparently, the assertion is that God is the support of Brahman, immortal and immutable as well as the seat of eternal *dharma* and absolute bliss. Understood thus, the verse seems to invert the relation between Brahman and God as Advaita conceives it. But S'ankara explains it in keeping with his own metaphysics. '*Aham*' in the verse, viz., the Lord is identified with the *pratyagātmā*, the inner self of all the world. This agrees with the sense of *uttama puruṣa* given earlier ³. Brahman, the supreme self, the *paramātmā*

1. Aksarāt paratah parah. cf. The interpretation which Sri Aurobindo placed on these three verses is entirely different and in several respects noteworthy. He holds that they refer to a triple consciousness, three and yet one present in the whole scale of existence. The *kṣara* refers to the spirit visible to us as all natural existence; it moves and acts pervadingly in the immobile and eternal *Akṣara*. The *Akṣara* is, in effect, the same as the *nirguṇa*, Brahman of S'ankara. Aurobindo holds that it exceeds even the highest subjective principle of nature in our being. The final experience is of a unity of all beings a oneness in the spirit, an identity of conscious being beyond all plurality. The *kṣara* and *Akṣara* are a dual status of one eternal and universal existence. This principle of oneness, is the vision of the *Puruṣottama*. *Akṣara* is *Puruṣottama* in the freedom of his self-existence unaffected by the action of his own power in Nature. *Puruṣottama* is the Lord in the *ksara* as well in the heart of all creatures. In short, what is *Isvara* and *antaryāmi* to S'ankara is *Puruṣottama* to Aurobindo. What is Brahman *Nirguṇam* to S'ankara is *Akṣara* to Aurobindo. This reversal of views has its bearing on their views of *mukti*, too. Vide *Essays on the Gita* (II series) PP. 229 ff.
2. *Brahmapohipratisthāhamamṛtasyavyayāsyaca; S'āvatasyaca-dharmasyasukhasyaikantikasyaca.*
3. *Supra.*

identified with the *nirguṇa Brahman* ¹ is established in 'me' i.e., abides in the Lord, the inner Self. Of course, expressions like *amṛta* and *avyaya* will admirably suit this sense of Brahman. What is meant is that the inner Self or *Īśvara*, may, by right knowledge, be identified with the supreme reality. Brahman can act only through the power of *Īśvara* and in so far as power and its possessor are identical, *Īśvara* and Brahman are one. It is noteworthy that in this important passage, *Īśvara* is identified with a power of Brahman, but this Brahman can hardly be the *nirguṇa Brahman* of Advaita Vedānta. That Śāṅkara felt some difficulty over this passage is shown by the alternative explanation he offers in which the Teacher, i.e., Śrīkṛṣṇa as *Īśvara* is identified with the supreme reality—*nirvikalpako'hamēva* and Brahman is taken as *savikalpaka* i.e., *Īśvara*. The upshot of the whole passage is, for Śāṅkara, that *Īśvara* is an immense reality, essentially one with the Absolute; he is the abode of values like external righteousness and absolute bliss.

In the genuine spirit of the Advaitic doctrine, all this is Brahman ², the Gīta declares that the phenomenal world is but partial manifestation of God ³. But this is not to deny the fact of inequalities, of high and low, which we meet everywhere in life. In accordance with the gradation of powers and capacities of the phenomenal objects, divine manifestations in them also are held to differ in degree, but never in kind. The foremost in each class of phenomena more adequately represents the Lord than the lesser members of the same. This applies as much to the so-called inorganic realm as to the sphere of life and intelligence. Most of the tenth chapter of the Gīta is devoted to an enumeration of such phenomena in nature as impress the mind with their majesty and uplifting power, which are nothing but a reflection of those of the Lord. In keeping with his infinitude, it is declared that there is no exhausting the list of his *vibhūti*s — the manifest powers of the Divine.

1. Anandagiri : Brahmasabdasyāstibādhakemukhyārthagrāhanam BGC. P. 606.

2. CU. III, 14, 1. sarvam khalvidam Brahma.

3. BG. X, 42—viṣṭabhyāhamidam kṛtsnamekāśaṇa sthito jagat.

but whatever has power, glory and energy may be taken as an expression of a fraction of the divine prowess¹

As the culminating concept of the doctrine of the *Vibhūti* and its natural fulfilment may be regarded the idea of the divine Avatār, which is, perhaps, the most epoch-making revelation of the Gīta. The idea of the Avatar brings God down from divine transcendence into the life of man groping for guidance and strength in his spiritual endeavours; it sets face to face the God who is hidden in the heart.² The fervour and spirit of adoration evident in S'ankara's interpretation of the Avatār serve to indicate the place of *Īśvara* in the life of the Advaitin. Still, S'ankara's religion does not force him to compromise his philosophy. The Avatār as much as God is a vision of reality caught through *māyā*'s distorting medium. The Lord styled *Baghvān*³ resorts to his all pervasive creative power, *sāmprakṛti* which is of the nature of the three *guṇas* and appears embodied, as it were, and to be taking birth, as it were⁴. In these terms 'Sankara is expressing the mystery of the transcendent and infinite Lord disguising himself in the forms and circumstances of finitude. Here is recognized the fact of the direct intervention of God in history testifying to the Advaitin's awareness of the purposefulness, within limits, of the historical process of life. What motivates such intervention is, of course, not any selfish end of the Lord himself. He has neither unrealized nor yet-to-be realized ends⁵. But the divine compassion for all living beings, *bhūtānuyighṛkṣa*⁶ and need to safeguard the the cosmic law of righteousness, *dharma*, explain the phenomenon of the

1. Ibid, X, 41—yadyadvibhūtimatsattvam śrīmadūrjitamevavā; tattadevavagachatvam mama tejomśasāmbhavam.

2. Cf. KU. I, 2, 12. tāmduṛdarśam gudhamanupraviṣṭamguha-hitamgahvarestham puranam.

3. Cf. BGC. P. 5. The word Bhagavan denotes the possession by the Lord of 6 inseparable attributes—jñānaiśvaryaśakti-balaviryatejamsi—knowledge, freedom, executive power, strength, energy, grandour.

4. BGC. P. 5, S'ankara—svamāyayā dehavānīvajātaivaca.

5. BG. III, 22. 6. BGC. P. 5.

Avatār¹. There is a spiritual law, according to the Gītā which expresses itself in the apparent embodiment of the Lord when moral forces decline and the forces of unrighteousness threaten to gain the upper hand. The philosophic truth of the phenomenal quality of the world is no bar to the uttermost precision in the operation of this law².

As regards the divine incarnation and the way the Avatār functions, the following remarks of Aurobindo may be cited. In the Avatār the real substance (of divinity) shines through the coating, the mark of the seal is there only for form—the vision is that of the secret Godhead. The Avatār is also meant to leave the influence of the manifestation vibrating in the earth-nature. The Avatār is always a dual phenomenon of divinity and humanity, the object being to show that the human birth can be made a means of divine birth and realization. He is the divine leader of huminity. The Avatār comes as the divine power and love which calls men to itself so that they may take refuge in that.³

The bias which Śāṅkara reveals towards treating the *saguṇa* Brahman as a truth of the greatest spiritual significance is equally present in several later Advaitins. It finds expression in the cognate doctrine of devotion to and grace of the teacher, *guru*⁴, who plays a decisive part in leading the aspirant from darkness to light. As typical of them all may be taken the utterance of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the author of the classic, *Advaitasiddhi*: I know of no greater reality than Kṛṣṇa.⁵

1. BG. IV, 7 & 8.

2. IU. 8. yāthātathyathānyadadhāt gāṣvatībhyahsamabhyah.

3. Adapted from The Essays on the Gita; Ch. XVI, PP. 232 ff. Cf. Incarnations are the crests, so to speak, of waves in the tide of spiritual evolution. They furnish a divine ideal for humanity. Form & Spirit, P. 147. J.H. Badley.

4. Cf. Iṣvaro guruvātmetimūrtibhedavibhagine; Vyomavad-vyāptadehāyadakṣiṇāmūrtaye nama; yasya deve parābhaktir-yathā deve tathāgurau—S'U. VI, 23.

5. Vamsivibhūsitakarānnavaniradabhat pitāmbarādarūṇabimba-phalādharoṣṭhat Puṇendusundaramukhādaravindanetrāt kṛṣṇātparaṃ kimapi tātvaṃham najāne.

Thus, it follows that *saguṇa* Brahman or *Īśvara* in Advaita is a spiritually significant principle from which derive all life and its values.

(VII) *Nirguṇa* Brahman and *Īśvara*.

The question whether there is room and justification for the distinction between *nirguṇa* Brahman and *saguṇa* Brahman may be briefly examined. In the first place it is vital to note that the Advaitin does not maintain that there are two Brahmans; his position is that there are two angles of vision from which the nondual reality of Brahman may be viewed. *Nirguṇa* Brahman or the Absolute refers to reality as it is in itself without distortion by the power of *māyā* or its product, the logical, discursive mind of man. The description of the same reality, logically conceived as the world-cause, yields the concept of the *saguṇa* Brahman.¹ On this question Śāṅkara has important remarks to make. In the introduction to his comment on *Brahmasūtra*, I, 1, 12, he writes that in the upaniṣads Brahman has been depicted in two different ways; (i) as qualified by the adjuncts of names and forms; (ii) as devoid of them all.² In the sphere of the empirical life or *avidyā*, Brahman or the Absolute becomes an object of religious activities like worship. However much the forms of worship may differ, they are all directed to the same *Īśvara*.³

The *nirguṇa* Brahman is distinct from *Īśvara* in as much as the former is beyond the sphere of all activities.⁴ It cannot be related to time, space, cause, etc.⁵ The multiple powers associated with *Īśvara* do not apply to the Absolute whose freedom from all adjuncts is unqualified.

In the case of *Īśvara*, on the contrary, attributes such as the authorship of the world, are meant to aid the effort of the mind

1. BSS. P. 117; Cf. *Pañca Padikāvivarāṇa* PP. 222-223.
2. BU. IV, 5, 15; II, 3, 6; III, 8, 8, etc. CU. VII. 24, 1; T Ar. III, 2, 7—'SU. VI, 19.
3. *ekaevatuparamātmā īśvarastaistairguṇaviseṣairviśiṣṭa upāsayah*—BSS. P. 118.
4. BSS. PP. 883 ff.
5. *na deśakālādiviśeṣayogah paramātmanikalpayitums'akyate*. BSS. P. 884.

to comprehend the ultimate unity of the real,¹ and not to be taken as the final truth about the real. This position cannot be reversed and the teachings on *nirguṇa* Brahman subordinated to those on *Iśvara*, because, on realizing the former as the final truth of things, no further need, cognitive, conative, or emotive, remains to be satisfied — *nirākankṣṣārthatvāt*². In other words, the knowledge of Brahman is the supreme end of life³, whereas the perception of difference, entailed in the awareness of God, leads to bondage and transmigration⁴. Besides, in the *Brahmasūtras*⁵, it is clearly laid down that the Absolute cannot be regarded as both having and not having differences and distinctions. To do so would be self-contradictory. Mere contact with adjuncts cannot alter the nature of reality. For example the proximity of the hibiscus flower does not make the crystal red; the cognition of it as red is an illusion. Even the *upādhis*, or adjuncts of Brahman are false, being the products of nescience. That Brahman is free from all attributes is the ultimate truth.⁶

1. Ibid. ekatvapratiṭipādanaparātvaṭ. 2. Ibid.

3. Cf. IU. 7; BU. IV, 2, 4; TU. II, 9, 1.

4. mṛtyoh sa mṛtyumāpnotiyaihanānevapaśyati. KU. II, 1, 10.

5. III, 2, 11–21; na svata eva parasya brahmaṇa ubhayalingatvamupapadyate, BSS. P. 641.

6. samastaviśeṣarahitaṁ nirvikalpakameva Brahmapratipattavayam na tadviparītaṁ. BSS. P. 641. Kokilesvara Sastry in his 'An Introduction to Advaita Philosophy', Calcutta University, 1926, asserts (P. 5) that *nirguṇa* Brahman and *saguṇa* Brahman are the transcendental and immanent aspects of Brahman. The *saguṇa* is revealed partially in *prāṇa*'s activities. What is present behind these activities as their infinite source is the *nirguṇa* Brahman. For him, this is the meaning of the statement that Brahman is both the material and efficient cause of the world. But that this does not represent S'ankara's position is clear from numerous passages in his commentaries. Here is one, for example. Avidyātmakanāmarūpabijavyākaranāpekṣaṭvāt sarvajñatvasya. Natātvikam aiśvaryam sarvajñatvamca Brahmanah, kimtu avidyopādhikamiti. Avidyātmakopādhiparicchedāpekṣasamēve-svarasyesvaratvam sarvajñatvam sarvas'ktivamca na paramārthatah, etc. BSS. on II, 1. 14 and Bhāmati on it. Sastry denies that Sankara's final doctrine relates to a pure undifferentiated Being (P. 5). But this is unavailing in the teeth of S'ankara's repeated affirmations to the contrary cited above. Sastry quotes a passage from S'B on I, 4, 26—Pūrvasiddhohisannātmā viśeṣena vikāratmanā parinamayāmāsātmā—

As regards the purpose served by the postulations of two points of view towards reality, we may quote the traditional Advaitic opinion.

Nirviśeṣam parabrahman sākṣātkartumanis'varāḥ ; |
Ye mandāste' nukampyante saviśeṣā nirūpanaiḥ ; ||

The doctrine of *saguṇa* Brahman or *Īśvara* is taught in order to assist the slow-witted who find it too difficult to realize the attributeless reality. Therefore in Śankara's philosophy, *Īśvara*, is only an empirical postulate, of the greatest practical consequences, but, nonetheless, distinct from the plenary reality. For him, personality, even of *Īśvara*, is not the ultimate truth; it is but a feature of the empirical world. To reach the absolute truth, personality has to be transcended. *Īśvara* may be conceived as the self-assertion of Brahman, the pure light, in the darkness of *māyā*,¹ He is *Nārāyaṇa* the spirit brooding over the face of the primeval waters.² *Īśvara* must be conceived as the principle which mediates between the phenomenal world and the plenary reality. In essence the same as *parabrahman*, *Īśvara* is related to the world, he is the bridge of immortality³, by which one reaches the goal of life.

nam—but ignores S'ankara's clear reservation—Puna'scetad sarvam visterena prativakṣyāmah, I, 4, 27, BSS. as well as what Vācaspati and A. Giri have to say on it. Of a *pariṇāmah* Sankara speaks only in the sphere of phenomena. World is the *parinama* of *Īśvara* and the *vivarta* of Brahman. Sastry seems to have ignored the basic significance of the standpoints of *paravidyā* and *aparavidyā* in S'ankara's teachings. For Sastry, Brahman is pure being, but he would not face the question whether this pure Brahman or *Īśvara* is the world-cause. On P. 22, when he says that *namarūpe* are always in Brahman, he ignores that para Brahman is *ekamevādvitīyam* and so is *svagatabhedasūnyam* for Advaita. Cf. The Vedanta of Sankara. PP. 127 ff. But Singh contradicts himself on P. 390 when he asserts that for S'ankara Brahman and *Īśvara* are synonymous. Vol. I, R.P. Singh. Jaipur, 1949.

1. Cf. And the Light Shineth in darkness, St. John I, 5.
2. Cf. āponārāṭtiproktā āpovainarasūnavah ;
ayanamtasya tāḥ pūrvam tena Nārāyaṇaḥ smṛtāḥ ;
Qd. by A. Giri, in his gloss on BGC. P. i.
3. CU. VIII, 4, 1, sasetuh naitamsetumahorātre tarataḥ
MuU II, 2, 5—amṛtasyaiśasētuḥ.

"There is, thus, a gap between intuited Brahman which is devoid of logical determinations and the conceived Brahman (i.e. *Īśvara*) which is the productive principle. The highest for thought is absolute subject with the object in it, but behind the subject and the object, we have Brahman."¹

(VIII) Brahman as Value.

We have seen that the nondual Brahman, the Absolute beyond all concepts, becomes *saguṇa* or *Īśvara*, when associated with the principle of becoming. Thus, it becomes the source and ground of the world; by a fraction of his devine power does *Īśvara* manifest the world which, for man, is full of good and evil, beauty and ugliness, truth and error, happiness and misery. These value-concepts are, of course, the products of of the mind of man who contemplates, experiences, and seeks to comprehend the world. But, still, he does not spin them out of his mind as the spider emits its thread wholly from within; they arise when the mind reacts to the world whose source, ground and substance is *Īśvara*. In other words, for the Advaitin, the values are not wholly subjective; they are bound upwith the given world, the objective manifestation of the divine Being². Thus, in an important sense, is *Īśvara* the essence of values whose perception and cultivation may be said to constitute the spiritual evolution of man's mind. In this section we shall consider the nature of *Īśvara* from the point of view of human values and show that, in so far as religion is a belief in the ultimate conservation of values³ or, rather, of what has value⁴, *Īśvara* in Advaita is the inspirer and goal of the most fervent religious life. An objective idealism, such as Sankara's Advaita, is bound to attach the highest importance to the concept of *Īśvara* as the abode and secure ground of values for Idealism, as such, stands on the conviction that 'values; are real, that the higher forms cannot be explained by the lower, that beauty and goodness are not born of the clash of

1. IP. II, P. 561.

2. Sankara repudiates the subjective idealism of the vijñānavāda Buddhism - vide BSS. on the BS. II, 2, 28 and 29.

3. The Philosophy of Religion—Höfding.

4. Introduction to the Problems of Philosophy, by Höfding P. xiii, W. James.

atoms, but that they are effluences of something more perfect and more divine ¹.

"Philosophy is concerned not with phenomena but with their meaning, not with facts but with values, not with what is but with what ought to be, not with means, but with ends. ² This view of the function of philosophy is pre-eminently true of Śaṅkara's Advaita whose sole theme is the *parama-puruṣārtha* - the supreme end of life or value, viz: *mokṣa* or emancipation. In a recent book ³ the contention that Śaṅkara's system is above all a philosophy of values has been advanced and maintained. It is pointed out that the traditional assessment of Śaṅkara's philosophy fails to do it full justice precisely because it has ignored "the great truth that Śaṅkara's is a philosophy of values primarily and not an existential system. He concerns himself with the problem of appearances and reality only to bring out the value side of the universe. For him the truth of the universe is constituted by the value it possesses" ⁴. Before showing how in Advaita the concepts of reality and values coincide as they must in a rigorous non-dual system, we shall elucidate to the extent required for our purposes, the highly controversial notion of value itself; for, the determination of its exact significance is indispensable for interpreting the Advaitic reality in terms of value.

Two basically different types of theories regarding value may be noticed, viz., the idealistic and the realistic ⁵. Both

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1. Idea of God; P. 421, Pattison.
 2. Philosophy for our Times, P. 25, C.E.M. Joad, 1940.
 3. The Vedānta of Śaṅkara, A metaphysics of value, Vol. I, R. P. Singh, Jaipur, 1949.
 4. Ibid, P. 11.
 5. True, an out and out naturalistic philosophy may very well describe the whole of existence without referring to the concept of value at all. Indeed the sciences which are solely concerned with the determination of phenomenal facts and their inter-relation cannot and do not concern themselves with values. The remarks in the text refer to those who recognize values as the chief objects of human concern. Cf. The philosophy of value, PP. 16-21, H. Osborne, Cambridge. 1933.

hold that value is a non-natural, unanalysable, quality. According to one of them it is a pure quality, while the other deems it a relational quality. The Idealistic theory of value maintains that it is a non-naturalistic relational quality, whereas for the realistic theory, value is a non-naturalistic and non-relational, i.e., pure, quality. A typical champion of the realistic theory of value is Mr. G. E. Moore for whom "value, though *not* itself intrinsic, yet shares with intrinsic properties, the characteristic of depending solely on the intrinsic nature of what possesses it."¹ It may be noticed, however, that Moore's position is not altogether free from ambiguity. For instance on the same page he remarks that predicates of value alone are non-intrinsic properties which share with intrinsic properties the characteristic of depending solely on the intrinsic nature of what possesses them. But he cannot see what distinguishes intrinsic properties from predicates of value². Perhaps, the recognition that the concept of value cannot make any sense without noting that all values are values *for* some evaluating mind may be the simple explanation of Moore's difficulty. The realists are obliged to postulate two irreducible concepts—one of value which is non-relational and the other, of the moral ought which is relative to a moral agent. Further, for the realists, the moral ought is synthetically entailed by value, i.e., value is what a moral agent ought to maintain in being. Realism in this sense tends to picture the universe as a manifold of scattered existents each with its own index of value, irrespective of their relation to man. Leaving man out of the picture as they do; it is not surprising that for the realists, "value is a simple, indefinable, unanalysable object of thought," of whose concrete nature we have immediate non-sensuous perception.³ On the whole, the realists seem to agree that only mental states, or states of affairs which contain mental constituents, have intrinsic value. But actually, we have an immense diversity of intuitions of intrinsic value and of these the realistic theory is unable to furnish an explanation. It is inconceivable that there should be value judgements which are

1. Philosophical studies, P. 273, G. E. Moore, London, 1922.

2. Ibid. P. 274.

3: The Philosophy of value, P. 66.

not expressions of subjective responses on the part of the assessors of values. Therefore, the theory that values are objective qualities of things independent of the relations of valuebearers to valuing minds rests upon an alogical and non-provable basis.

In contrast, the idealistic theories acknowledge only one ultimate concept, viz., oughtness, in terms of which value is defined. 'Oughtness' is an underived factor in the structure of reality, in virtue of which somethings are said to be 'more fitting to exist' or 'ought rather to exist' than others. That is to say, where existence of things at all depends upon the voluntary action of a moral being, he is morally obliged to act in a way that will further the existence of the thing which is 'most fitting' or 'ought most' to exist. A valuable thing thus means that the thing ought to be valued, or actively desired to exist, by moral beings.

This view involves, clearly, the recognition of a moral obligation. It is a non-natural relation between moral beings and the rest of existence and may be treated as a non-natural quality. Besides, to the idealistic theory man as a moral agent is central. The idealistic theory defines value in terms of right or ought; e.g., "we call something good when the love relating to it is right". As already said, the notion of right or ought is ultimate, unanalysable, normative, and antecedent to particular mental processes³. *Ultimate ethical norms are to be intuited immediately.*

Among value-philosophers who hold that value is indefinable is W. M. Urban for whom, "value is not a quality of objects. Value is not a *what* at all, either quality or relation. It is a

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1. The Philosophy of value, P. 78.
 2. Brentano, Qd. The Philosophy of value, H. Qsborne, P. 92.
 3. Is 'ought' necessarily ultimate? All propositions asserting an ought are but as pecies of propositions asserting *matters of fact*. Ought becomes a form of *is*: "You ought not to do this" implies "in view of the consequences to you as far as can be foreseen into the future." The problem of 'ought' has been illuminatingly thrashed out in 'The Forms of value's PP. 130 ff. Hilliard.

that. Value is 'never part of the nature of anything.'¹ Without defining it, he points out that 'to feel the qualities, the good, the true, etc., is one thing; but to judge: 'the object ought to be so', or 'is worthy to be so felt' is another. The latter is value. Value is thus not an adjectival predicate. That a thing is valuable is no new quality of it. The value predicate corresponds to a notion we understand but not to a concept we can define. Following the lead of Urban, R. P. Singh also affirms² that 'value is an ultimate and underivable concept with which we understand the world. It is no more definable than are the concepts of being, existence, reality'. But we cannot help feeling that this is a highly unsatisfactory position. It needlessly mystifies the significant concept of value. As for Urban's position regarding value, viz., that it consists in the judgement, 'the object ought to be so', it hardly makes sense. As D. Warren Fisher has pointed out:³ "An object ought to be is meaningless. Objects do not, cannot, possess the obligation to be. They have no ear for an imperative." We, therefore, deem it proper to turn to a class of value-philosophers for whom value is both intelligible and definable, and who are likely to help interpret Advaitic reality in terms of value.

R. B. Perry in his latest work,⁴ while recognising that value has no established sense, offers the following definition. A thing, anything, has value or is valuable in the original and generic sense when it is the object of an interest, any interest. Or, whatever is object of interest is *ipso facto* valuable. By interest is meant a train of events determined by expectation of its outcome. Münsterberg also recognizes that the word value is often used for the things desired (i.e. in which we are interested). He draws a distinction, however, between the relative and absolute values, the latter being such as are valuable in themselves, without reference to this or that individual or his wishes.⁵ But the concept of value can be

1. The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific methods, Vol. XIII, 1916, P. 458.
2. The Vedanta of S'āṅkara, P. 22.
3. J.P.P.S. Vol. XIV, P. 573.
4. Realms of values, PP. 2, 3; Massachussets, 1954.
5. The Eternal values, PP. 26 ff. H. Münsterberg, London, 1911.

still better elucidated in the light of a definition such as the following: Value is an affectivity occurring in the relational contexture determined by the reaction of an organism to a stimulus object.¹ Affectivity, in the definition, is a class of which the sole members are pleasantness, indifference, and unpleasantness.² Pleasantness, e.g., denotes that quality attaching to experienced events in virtue of which they are reacted to as pleasant. This definition of value has the merit of bringing the concept down to the level of wide intelligibility. The salient points of this view of value may be noted. Every object in the universe according to this definition *has* value, (and not *is* value), actual or potential, for every organism capable of response to it. Again, all value is basically of one sort, viz., affectivity. Thus, all instances of values are commensurable. A well-known distinction made regarding values as instrumental and terminal may be expressed, in the light of the definition given above, thus. An object is said to have terminal value when the affectivity determined by a reaction to it is for its own sake, i.e., when the object is a *last means* to the end of affectivity. An object has instrumental value when the affectivity determined by a reaction to it is in reality 'for the sake of' some consequent object proximate or remote. The positive end in all cases is the pleasure of the individual concerned and, as such, is 'beyond good and evil.' But, is there not good pleasure and bad pleasure and shall it not be laid down that only good pleasure ought to be pursued? If the distinction between the two is granted, would it not follow that pleasure is not the final 'end' or 'value'? An important distinction has to be made in this connection. In itself, pleasantness or positive affectivity has nothing bad about it. It leads to no results³. Except in respect of

1. The Forms of value, P. 42, A. L. Hilliard, New York, 1950. To make value essentially a form of happiness or pleasure is not to make it no more than a psychological feeling of pleasure; this latter, according to Advaita, is but a reflection of the whole reality which is bliss or bhūmā. Cf. Can there be ethics without metaphysics? The I.P.C. 1952., P. 130. T. M. P. Mahadevan.

2. The Forms of Value, P. 14.

3. Cf. All pleasure in itself is probably more or less good, but pleasures are not good in proportion to their intensity—Philosophical Essays, P. 56, Bertrand Russel.

degrees of intensity, affectivities do not differ. But it is indisputable that the attendant circumstances of one pleasure may be better or worse than those of another, meaning they may lead in the sequel to further pleasure or displeasure.¹ *Bad* pleasure, thus, refers only to objects or actions which lead to the specific pleasure in question. But the objects and events are means only, and pleasure alone is the end, here, as in all cases.²

Value as defined above is relative ; it depends not only on the object or event of which value is predicated, but also on the individual for whom value exists. It may be remarked that *value* is always and only *value for*, so that if the reacting and evaluating individuals are removed from a given context, it

1. Cf. BG. XVIII, 36-39.

2. The view of value above adumbrated is based on what is known as psychological hedonism. This is distinct from the ethical hedonism which contends that man ought to pursue pleasure as the sole or chief end. Psychological hedonism maintains that, as a matter of indisputable fact, human beings (as well as other sentient beings) pursue pleasure as their sole end. There is a universalistic or altruistic hedonism which asserts that it is primarily the pleasure of others which may and ought to be the end of conduct. But, with more scrupulous regard for facts, psychological hedonism, which may also be called egoistic hedonism, maintains that man can and does act only to the end of his own pleasure. Cf. Kumārila's remark : *Prayojanamanuddiśya namandopipravartate*. Epicurus, for instance, holding this view also taught that pleasures of the mind and of friendship are greater and of more value than bodily pleasures. Even martyrs are impelled by the desire for satisfying the impulse to secure some rare forms of pleasure. But vis-a-vis this theory, J. S. Mill remarks : It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied (Qd. in Joad's *Philosophy for our Times* P. 266). The remark is not seriously meant, it would seem. The differences between a man and a pig are not confined to the former being dissatisfied and the latter being satisfied, so that a preference may be shown by the man for the state of the pig. To make it fairer and to the point, the choice must lie between a satisfied man and dissatisfied man, *other things being equal*. Dissatisfaction is not, in itself, attractive. The prospect of perpetual dissatisfaction, perhaps may even make the status of the satisfied pig worthy of consideration. Vide *The Forms of Value* P. 262.

will cease to have any value.¹ In this sense, value may be regarded as a tertiary quality as distinct from spatial properties which are primary and *sensa* which are secondary qualities². Further, the definition of value adopted above makes happiness not only identical with value, but with the highest form of value. All other time-honoured forms of value, such as truth, goodness, beauty become the last means to happiness, the highest form of value. As ordinarily understood, happiness implies a balance of pleasure over a considerable period of time. But in its highest and most enduring form, happiness implies non-dependence on any extraneous factors. The more an individual becomes sufficient unto himself, the more happy, the richer in values, he is bound to be. The means to such happiness consists, as Aristotle has pointed out, in the actualization of the potentialities of the individual concerned.

With these general ideas of value for guidance, we may turn to the main question regarding Brahman (*saguna*) as the abode of value in general and all its varied forms. According to the definition that value is an object of interest, we shall show not only that *Isvara* is or ought to be an object of interest, but also that, in so far as any object has any interest at all, it owes to *Isvara* its power to excite that interest. Or, again, according to the second definition of value as an affectivity, we shall show that feelings of pleasure, etc., point to *Isvara* as their final source and reality.

An Advaitic definition of value is furnished by the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* in the following words. That which, being known, is sought to be realized in one's experience is end or value—*yadavagataṃsatśvavṛttitayā iṣyate tatprayojanam*³. The same work proceeds to explain that this end is two fold. The first and foremost end is happiness or *sukha* and absence of unpleasantness, *duḥkhābhāva*; the second is the means which

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1. It is the truth in the soul, the mental state of clearheadedness, insight, etc., that is the value. Mind and Deity, P. 211; John Laird, Allen and Unwin, 1941.
 2. Reality and Value, P. 176. A. Campbell Garnett, Allen & Unwin, 1937.
 3. VP. PP. 366-338.

leads to the result chiefly desired. Or, in the terminology adopted above, the terminal end is always happiness and absence of unpleasantness, while the instrumental ends are objects or actions, which, directly or indirectly, bring about the final end.¹ Happiness also is chiefly of two kinds: (i) those forms of happiness which admit of higher and lower degrees and which, therefore, may be arranged in a scale of increasing quality, (ii) what is unsurpassable, absolute—*sātiśayaṃ*, *niratiśayaṃ*. The happiness which admits of a more or less is the bliss of Brahman manifested in the mould of the internal organ, *antaḥkaraṇa*, due to contact with objects,² whereas unsurpassable or absolute happiness is Brahman itself³

In sections (ii) to (iv) we showed that Brahman is essentially absolute existence, intelligence and bliss and that *Is'vara* is the same Brahman associated with the power of *māyā*. Further, it was pointed out that the terms *sat*, *cit*, *ānanda* do not stand for three mutually distinct concepts; rather, they indicate that *nirguṇa* Brahman cannot be less than these. *Nirguṇa* Brahman is other than *asat*, *acit*, or *anānanda*. The reason for insisting on these negative forms of description is that, being a strictly non-dual reality, Brahman does not lend itself to conceptualization at all whereas *Is'vara* or Brahman associated with *māyā*, and posited simultaneously with the *Jīva* or individual self, may be conceptualized. The significance of conceptualizing Brahman, i.e., viewing it from the human end through the medium of *māyā* is that, then, Brahman appears as *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* under optimum conditions (i.e., when the contemplating mind is perfectly *sāttvic* or pure). In other words, *Is'vara* in Advaita is *saccidānanda*, essentially, despite his association with *māyā*. In so far as *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* are human concepts, they represent *Is'vara* par excellence, while, as applied to *nirguṇa* Brahman, they should be understood symbolically only. Now we shall proceed to interpret the significance of these concepts in terms of value.

1. Cf. Siddhāntamuktāvali, stanza 146.

2. *ctasyaivānandsyānyānibhūtāni mātrāmupajīvanti*, BU. IV, 3, 32.

3. *Vijñāpamānandaṃ Brahma*, BU. III, 9, 28; *Ānando Brahmeti vyajānāt*, TU. III, 6.

The True :

In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* ¹, it is said : It is with the mind truly that one sees...that one hears. Desire, imagination, doubt, faith, lack of faith, steadfastness, lack of steadfastness, shame, meditation, fear - all this is truly mind - *sarvaṃ mana eva*. Śaṅkara also frequently likens the world to the rope-snake, thus making it out that the world is superimposed on Brahman that is pure consciousness and therefore is, in [itself, false ². These trends of thought in Advaita may suggest that Śaṅkara's philosophy is an epistemological idealism - a view which will be reinforced by the *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivāda* ³ - the theory that to perceive is to create. But that the significance of the theory of *adhyāsa* or superimposition is not exclusively epistemological will be evident if we ask what Śaṅkara intends to convey by it. His point is that the world has no more independent truth than the rope-snake, and whatever truth it seems to have it owes to its substrate Brahman which is *saccidānanda* or, as he insists times without number, *nityas'uddabuddhamuktasvabhāva*. ⁴ In other words, the *adhyāsa* theory points to an axiological approach to the problem of reality as well. This point is well brought out by the definitions of falsity given by the *Advaitasiddhi*, all of which add up to the preposition that what is *mithyā* or false has the same locus as that of its own absolute negation. ⁵ The world of facts, in other words, is an appearance through which shines the reality and truth of Brahman. When once Brahman is completely realized, as the rope is in the case of the rope-snake, like the snake, the world will have vanished. Then comes the realization that Brahman alone was, is, and will be real and true. The Advaitin is interested

1. I, 5, 3.

2. Cf. The *Adhyāsabhāṣya*.

3. Vide *Infra*.

4. ever pure, awake, free.

5. *brahmapramāṭiriktābādhyatve sati sattvenapratityarham*, P. 20, Cf. PP. 94 ; 160, 182 and 195.

in the logical aspect of the rope-snake simile. The logical relation between the snake and the rope is the same as between the world and Brahman. It is not implied that just as the illusory snake may be ignored as harmless, the world and its values also may be neglected as useless. The world is not *asat*, viz., that which nowhere appears existent, or imaginary¹; it is only *mithyā*. The sky flower or the horns of the hare are imaginary, but the rope-snake is *mithyā*. The non-existent is *asat*, while the *mithyā* exists; only it is liable to be sublated. But the point is whatever reality the world has is derived entirely from its substrate Brahman.

In Advaita real *sattva* or existence is the same as reality and reality is identical with truth². *Satyam* and *sattvam* are the same. We have already noticed the difference in this regard obtaining in western philosophy. There, we pointed out that true existence, like reality in western philosophy, is beyond contradictions and so is identical with it. Thus Brahman is *trikālābādhyam*³, or the ultimate truth which knows no change. The full significance of this position may be brought out by a statement such as Gandhiji's⁴. Denial of God we have known; denial of truth we have not. I hold not that God is Truth, but Truth is God.

The point is that in Advaita the truth that is Brahman may be reached logically from the falsity of the world, which consists in its liability to sublation or *bādhyatā*. Even those who are not prepared to accept the intuitions of '*śruti*' regarding Brahman as uncontradicted reality or *sat* may logically satisfy themselves about the need for such a conception of the noumenal reality⁵. For, if to be contradictory is to be false,

1. kvacidapyupādhanu sattvenapratīyamānatvānadhikarāṇatvaṃ asattvaṃ—AS. PP. 50-51.
2. Cf. One cannot defend truth which is external to knowledge; or knowledge which is external to reality. Reality is not outside truth. The identity of these three is necessary and fundamental. *Essays on Truth and Reality*. P. 113; Bradley, 1st Edn.
3. P. 232, *supra*. 4. AS. P. 50.
5. *Contemporary Indian Phil.*, P. 1.
6. I.O.C. 1937, *The Empirical and Noumenal Truth in Śaṅkara's Philosophy*, P.T. Raju.

then the categories of the phenomenal world like cause, substance, relations, etc., are false, being contradictory¹. But what is false implies something non-contradictory and true with reference to which the falsity of the false stands exposed; for, an illusion without a real basis, *niradhiṣṭhānabhrama*, makes no sense. This real basis in Advaita is Brahman whose realization exposes the falsity of the phenomenal world. Now, logically, morally and aesthetically, the world is experienced as imperfect. This means we have glimpses of perfection in all these directions - the ideas of an uncontradicted, self-contained whole, or realized perfection, and of undisturbed restfulness. Do we actually perceive the falsity, etc., of the phenomenal world? Rather, it is a conclusion drawn through *manana* or reflection upon temporal experiences guided by normative considerations. We critically look for self-consistency and endurance in phenomena. No idea of the world is found to be self-sufficient. All objects in it are seen to be self-discrepant and to tend to transcend themselves. Hence they are treated as unreal, for we have a natural intuition that the real or true must not contradict itself but be a self-consistent whole².

Thus when Brahman is said to be true in relation to the world what is meant is that it is the absolute criterion of reality or truth with reference to which phenomena must be judged to be more or less true.³ The Advaitic view of perfect Truth as reality or Brahman implies that irreconcilable opposition between error and truth is unwarranted. As Vivekānanda says⁴, man never progresses from error to truth, but from truth to truth, from lesser truth to higher truth.⁵

1. Vide Infra.

2. Cf. Ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself this is an absolute criterion also, for, in doubting it, we tacitly assume its validity. Appearance & Reality.

3. Cf. BU. II, 1. 20, *asmādātmanah sarveprāṇāḥ sarvelokāḥ... satyasyasatyamiti prāṇāvaisatyam teṣāmeṣasatyam*.

4. Complete works, Vol. II, PP. 363-364.

5. Cf. That the truth itself is one and whole and complete and that all the thinking and all experience move within its recognition and subject to its manifold authority—this I have never doubted; The nature of truth P, 178, Joachim.

In other words, nothing is wholly true except the whole truth or Brahman; isolated truths such as the Sciences embody are true only in the sense that they form part of the whole and implicate it. When isolated, they become false, i.e., partial; for, thus, they are deprived of aspects and relations which make them organic to the whole.¹

One important consequence of the Advaitic concept of truth, as primarily and fully *saguṇa* Brahman or *Īśvara* and only derivatively applicable to phenomena is that there can be neither Truth, nor falsehood, unless there are minds to apprehend them. This does not make truth altogether subjective; for, it is not determined by the apprehending mind, but by the phenomena apprehended². But judgements of phenomena which are but isolated appearance of *Īśvara* represent only partial truths which, as such, point beyond themselves to that whole of which they are appearances. Thus every partial truth may be said to demand of the cognitive subject an effort to complete it by including more and more of reality within the sphere of his cognitive activity. The systematic effort to do so is the cognitive discipline which passes in Advaita under the name of *Jñānayoga*. Besides, in so far as reality and truth are ultimately identical, cognitive activity may be deemed, at the same time, a valuational activity as well. For, the effort to comprehend more and more of reality is guided by the primary intuition that reality and truth are basically one. An important distinction must in this connection be made between truth that is instrumental and truth that is identical with the terminal value of Brahmic bliss. What is called *vyrttiṅgāna* or truth in the form of the mould of the internal organ determined according to the law of validity is always instrumental in Advaita Philosophy³. The

1. Cf. Philosophical Essays, P. 151, B. Russel; also Cf. There is no truth which is entirely true and no error which is totally false. AR. P. 362.

2. Cf. BSS. on I, 1, 4. *atojñānam kartumakartumanyathāhvā kartumaśakyam kevalavastutantramevatat.*

3. Strictly speaking truth is a property or characteristic of *pramā* as opposed to *bhrama* or illusion. *Pramā* is cognition whose object is both novel and unsublated - *anadhigatābādhitārthaviśayakajñānam* (VP. P. 15) But what is truth which characterizes *pramā*? Four views may be distinguished; (i) Truth consists in its practical utility—Cf.

less inclusive or ephemeral *vṛttis* are sublated by the more inclusive or enduring ones¹ till the most inclusive, viz., *brahmākārāvṛtti* is generated. It is the last means for attaining the supreme end or value, viz., Brahman as *sat* identical with *cit* and *ānanda*. When, therefore, truth or *jñāna* (*pramā*) is deemed instrumental to the final end directly, what is meant is this final *vṛtti* which objectifies Brahman². Thus when it is affirmed "That Indian Philosophy does not stop with the discovery of truth, but utilizes it for a higher end³ there should be no mistake about the kind of truth that is meant—it is the *vṛtti jñāna* alone that can be subordinated to the supreme goal of life, viz., the realization of *saccidānanda* or *Is'vara* who is non-different from the Absolute. Thus, the *Brahma-jijñāsā* with which the *Brahma sūtras* open is inquiry into the nature of Brahman or Truth as end. In the light of this elucidation, it is philosophically sound that *sūtras* should open with a definition of *Is'vara*, for only *Is'vara*, posited simultaneously with *māyā* and *jīva* can properly become an object of *brahmākārāvṛtti*.⁴ As a result of the operation of this *vṛtti*

arthakriyāsamarthavastupradarśakam samyakjñānam or *yataścārtha siddhistadsamyakjñānam*—Nyāyabindu Ch. I, (ii) *yatrayadastitratadanubhavah* or *tadvatitatprakāraṇubhavah*, i.e. what predicates of something a character owned by it. *Tattvacintāmani Pratyakṣa*. (iii) *saṃvāda* or harmony of experience is the mark of truth. This resembles the coherence theory of truth in western philosophy. (iv) For Advaita, truth of *pramā* consists in its non-contradictedness. This criterion holds good only in the sphere of phenomena; for all phenomenal truths are sublated or transmuted by the knowledge or *pramā* of *Is'vara* or *saṃvāda Brahman* cf. *dehātmapratyayoyadvat-pramāṇatvenakalpitaḥ laukikaṃtādvadevedam pramāṇam tvātmaniś-cayāt* BSS. P. 99. Vide The Six ways of knowing, D.M. Datta.

1. Cf. The three-fold knowledge set forth in the BG. XVIII, 20–22. *sāttvika* refers to the most inclusive and *tāmāsa* to the most exclusive type of cognition.
2. Vide Infra. Cf. *tattvajñānātnihśreyasādhigamah*. NS. I, 1, 1: *tameva viditvātīmṛtyumeti*. S'U. VI, 15.
3. The Quest after Perfection, P. 27; Hiriyanā.
4. Remarks of Thibaut on this point, vide P. 92 may be seen to be wide of the mark Cf. 'Sāṅkara on BS. III, 3, 59. *satyakāmahsatyasamkalpahityevamādyā is'varapratipattiphalalākṣyate*. BSS. P. 776; AS. P. 886 and *Candrikā* on it. SLS. III, P. 97.

and its subsequent spontaneous self-abolition¹, there remains the Absolute or *nirguṇa Brahman* beyond all possibilities of conceptualization, whence "the mind and words turn back baffled"—a point we shall elaborate later in its proper place.

The Beautiful

The place of beauty as a value has not been directly discussed by the thinkers of the Advaita school, but an Advaitic approach to the problem of beauty is feasible in view of the nature of Brahman as bliss². Now, beauty may be predicated of objects which occasion us pleasure 'for their own sakes' immediately, and not because of their causal connections, real or imagined, to other valuable objects. Whatever delights us irrespective of consequential considerations is beautiful.³ Disinterested delight, according to Kant, is the feeling for the beautiful. There are objects which chase away all eagerness of temporary desires, subdue the egoistic will's proneness to self-assertion and possession, induce in the mind the contemplative mood, and bathe it in the calm joy which makes it oblivious of time itself. Such are recognized as beautiful. When Plato writes⁴ that beauty alone among the forms is seen in the world of becoming as she really is, he is referring to this power it has in ampler measure than either truth or goodness to liberate the mind, however temporarily, from the grip of the egoistic will. What morality achieves through a prolonged discipline of negating the egostic claims of will, beauty achieves immediately, by inducing a temporary mood of disinterested.

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1. SLS. III, P. 105.
 2. Hiriyanna writes (vide Quest after Perfection PP. 31. ff) that Indian Philosophers do not recognize the value of beauty, except for their use of similes of artistic values as in the SK. 59. Some of the rhetoricians busied themselves with this question on the basis of the Upaniṣadic teachings. Cf. The Rasagāṅgādhara.
 3. The Forms of Value. P. 276. Any material object which can give us pleasure in the simple contemplation of its outward qualities without direct, definite, exertion of the intellect is in some way beautiful. Ruskin, Qd. Beauty and other forms of value, P. 22. Alexander.
 4. Phaëdrus, P. 250.

ness. The attitude appropriate towards beauty is perfectly expressed in the verse : *Prakṛtiṃ paśyati puruṣaḥ prekṣakavada-vasthitaḥ svasthaḥ* ¹.

In Advaita Philosophy, however, the world of objects as well as the sentient individuals who contemplate it are only the objective and subjective self-formulations of causal Brahman or *Is'vara* ². The delight which aesthetic contemplation engenders is, therefore, none other than the delight which is Brahman's very essence. Again, for Advaita, the world of objects and subjects has been specifically held to be manifestatations of that *ānanda* which is Brahman. ³ Further, Brahman has been identified with *rasa* ⁴ which denotes in later theory, aesthetic delight whose differentia is disinterestedness or absence of all egoistic reference. ⁵ The significant point involved in the concept of *rasa* may be elucidated thus : The cultured man or the *sahṛdaya* ⁶ contemplates a work of art or a character in a drama ; by an exercise of imagination, he eschews the particularities or purely private *upādhis* which distinguish them from himself as spectator and thus participates in the universalized emotions embodied in them. This imaginative participation or commingling of emotions is experienced as aesthetic delight or *rasa*, which as seen above, is the essence of Brahman. Thus, traditionally, aesthetic delight has been esteemed as close kin to the delight that is *Brahma-Brahmāsvādasahodara* ⁷.

1. S K. 65.

2. sarvajñodeva ātmānameva ātmāntaratvenajagadrūpena nirmimite ; tat gṛṣtvā tadevānuprāviśat, tadanuprāviśayasaccatyaccābhavat, vijñānam cāvijñānamca...yadidam kiṃca. TU. II, 6. Also vide S'aṅkara's comm. on this - tābhyām copādhibhyām jñātṛjneyajñānasabdārthādis arvasamvyavahārabhāg Brahma.

3. T U. III, 6.

4. rasovaisah-TU. 11, 7,

5. Cf. " bhāvanāviśeṣamahimnāvigalitaduṣyantaramaniyatvādi-bhi...nijasavarupānandenasaha gocariṅkriamāṇoratyādirevarasah. Rasa-gaṅgādhara, P.P. 21.22.

6. Cf. yesāṃ kāvyanuśīlanābhyasāvāsātviśadibhūtemanomukure varṇanīyatanmayībhanayogyatāte hrdayasmvādabhājah sahrdayāh. Dhvanyālokalocana. P. 11. Kāvya-mala series, 1891.

7. Sāhityadarpaṇa P. 72. Sl. 2. Bombay Edn. 1910.
Cf. Sattvodrekādakhaṇḍasvaprakāśānandacinmyah |

Vedyāntaras'pars'as'unyo Brahmāsvādasahodarah ||

For our present purpose, the following points may be emphasized. Every object may be contemplated disinterestedly and made the occasion of aesthetic enjoyment. Of course, as a matter of empirical experience, the Advaitin recognizes ugliness in the world, but, with Alexander, he is inclined to treat it as a form of difficult beauty¹. In other words there is no object in the world which will fail to yield aesthetic pleasure, i. e., appear beautiful, if contemplated with sufficient, enlightened, disinterestedness. It is the conflict of the egoistic will of the spectator and the will of the object (whether in nature or in art) that is experienced as ugliness or aesthetic unpleasantness. When the egoistic will is laid aside or the attitude becomes more and more objective, more and more aesthetic pleasure also becomes available. This explains how lags in art and toads, etc., in nature may be contemplated with aesthetic satisfaction by the enlightened art-critic and naturalist. But objects more commonly recognized as beautiful induce the contemplative, objective attitude in the spectator without his having consciously to exercise his imagination and will. As was said with reference to truth, for the Advaitin all examples of beauty are cases of the delegated beauty of the divine source of things. No object may be discarded by him as entirely bereft of the value of beauty. Or, in more technical language, variations of beauty in objects are due to the qualitative differences of the *upādhis* (conditions of manifestations) which body forth the divine essence. Also, the forms of beauty in the world of phenomena are instrumental to the realization of the supreme exemplar and source of them all, namely Brahman himself. All finite forms of beauty may be regarded only as fragments or reflections of the full-orbed beauty that is God, so that, as with truths, beautiful objects also must be treated as means to reach him by following the hints and suggestions they throw out. Thus, the famous words of the *Gītā*² may be understood in a non-traditional way as proclaiming God, the mighty, ancient, poet and the world as his work of art, produced effortlessly³, in a spirit of play⁴.

1. Beauty and other forms of Value, p. 164.

2. VIII, 9. kavimpurāṇamnuṣāsītārāmaṇoraṇiyāmsamanuṣmare-dyah, etc.

3. BU. II, 4, 10. BSS. I, 1, 3. 4. S. B. II, I, 33.

The interpretation of the world as a work of art has certain advantages when we turn to the consideration of the problem of evil, physical, moral and aesthetic.

In yet another way, the world may be treated from an aesthetic point of view. The declaration in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* ¹ – People see his pleasure-ground, Him no one sees at all – is suggestive of an aesthetic solution of the problem of the relation between Brahman and the world; these words need not be taken exclusively as referring to the relation between the self and the dream state. The world which is the self-manifestation of God is a wonderful garden in whose charm and beauty the spectators get lost, completely oblivious of him whose glory it proclaims. On the other hand, the objects of the world severally or in group may very well serve to guide the susceptible mind to the experience of the transcendent glory and bliss which is God. To the seeker after God, or *mumukṣu* the entire world in its aspect of beauty is meant to serve as an *upalakṣaṇa* or index of God, as a *dhvani* or suggestion, whose reference is God ². But, as a matter of fact, the fair visage of beauty revealed in phenomena tends to arrest spiritual evolution by inducing premature self-satisfaction. Hence the warning in the *Isopaniṣad* followed by the petition to discover the divine essence disguised in beauty. ³

The Holy

A writer in the Hibbert Journal ⁴ points out that R. Otto has discovered in his book, *The Idea of the Holy*, a new value, viz., holiness, the specific religious value. "Holiness, the holy, is a category of interpretation and valuation peculiar to the sphere of religion." ⁵ Otto proposes the term 'numinous' to denote the value of holiness which is not exhausted by the

1. arāṃmamasya paśyanti nataṃ paśyanti kaścana, 1V, 3, 14.
2. Cf. The Parable of 'Sri Ramakrishna';
3. Hiraṇmayena pātreṇa satyasyāpihitaṃ mukham: tattvaṃ pūṣannapāvṛṇu satyadharmāya dṛṣṭaye; IU. 15;
4. Vol. XXVIII, 1929-30, PP. 493 ff;
5. *The Idea of the Holy*, P. 5, E. T., 1926;

concept of goodness. Being an ultimate category, it is not capable of definition in terms of simpler concepts, but it may be evoked by a consideration of the experience of the Holy set forth in religious literature ¹. Among the elements constituting the numinous may be mentioned the following :—(i) The creaturely feeling and the sense of dependence consequent on experiencing the 'numen' as e. g. Arjuna felt during the vision of the *Viśvarūpa* in the 11th chapter of the *Gītā* (ii) The *mysterium tremendum* consisting of the elements of awfulness, over-poweringness or majestas and the sense of the wholly other, (iii) The sense of fascination. On the rational side of this non-rational element of fascination may be noted love, mercy, pity and comfort raised to the highest conceivable degree. ² Further, Otto adds that the experience of the value of the holy is invariably accompanied by moral self-depreciation on the part of the experiencer which he may express thus: Thou alone art holy. He affirms ³ that the consciousness of moral delinquency is a condition for feeling the numinous value. Whatever may be the truth of the last assertion, in the light of the remarks made above, it can be demonstrated that the holy as a category of value finds a prominent place in the Vadāntic conception of Brahman. In the *Rgveda* itself, the unique majesty of the divine 'whose greatness is proclaimed by the snowy Himalayas ⁴' was recognized and trumpeted in various forms. Thus it is said 'that the great divinity of all the Gods is one' - *mahaddevānām asuratvamekam*. ⁵ In several passages in the *Upaniṣads*, the awe-inspiring character of the divine is stressed : e. g. "Through fear of Him the Wind doth blow, Through fear of Him the sun doth rise ; Through fear of Him both Agni and Indra And Death as fifth do speed along" ⁶. Again the *Kaṭha* declares ⁷ :

He for whom the priesthood and the nobility
Both are as food, And Death is a sauce -
Who really knows where He is ?

No passage brings out the majesty and sublimity of the divine better, perhaps, than the description in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* ⁸

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| 1. Op. Cit. P. 7; | 5. Ibid ; P. III, 55, 1 |
| 2. Ibid ; P. 31; | 6. TU. II, 8, VI, 3; |
| 3. Ibid, P. 55, | 7. II, 25; Cf. also VI, 2. |
| 4. Rg. V. 10; 121; 4; 1; | 8. III, 8, 9, and 10. |

of the cosmic order in which the divine expresses itself. "Verily, O Gārgi, at the command of that Imperishable the sun and the moon stand apart... the earth and the sky, the moments, hours, the days, the nights and the years stand apart. Verily, O Gārgi, at the command of that Imperishable some rivers flow from the snowy mountains to the east, others to the west, in whatever direction each flows. Verily, O Gārgi, he who departs from this world without knowing that Imperishable is pitiable."

The complete otherness and transcendence of the divine is brought out in expressions like *akṣarāt parataḥ paraḥ* Higher than the high imperishable¹.

The sense of overpoweringness or majesty of the divine is best illustrated with reference to that 'theophany of terrific grandeur which seeks to give a feeling of the unapproachable essence of the divine'², unfolded in the 11th chapter of the *Gītā*. The whole universe, moving and un-moving, was seen solely lodged in the divine form, whose glory was such as though a thousand suns rose all at once in the heavens. "As many currents of rivers flow to meet the sea, so these warriors of the world pass into His blazing mouths." Upon beholding the vision Arjuna is smitten with amazement; with hair standing on end, he bowed his head and with clasped hands spoke to God.³ The combination of the sense of fascination and awe is expressed thus: Beholding this form never seen before I am thrilled; at the same time, my mind is gripped with fear—let me look on they familiar figure. Arjuna's petition to comprehend the incomprehensible remains, of course, unfulfilled, but the Deity's love, mercy, pity find vent in the comforting assurance:—He who does what he does for Me alone, who is given over to Me, who is devoted to Me, void of attachment, without hatred, to any born being, O son of Pāṇḍu. comes to Me.⁴

1. MU. III, 2; Cf. BG. XV, 18;

2. The Idea of the Holy, P. 191;

3. BG. XI, 7, 12, 28, 14;

4. BG. XI, 45, 46, 31, 55;

Examples could be multiplied to illustrate the separate elements of the value of the numinous present in Brahman or Vedāntic *Iśvara*. The *Kena* represents him as a wonderful Being, *yakṣa*, as also the *Bhagavad Gītā* ¹. The sense of dependence, helplessness, of an urgent need for succour such as overwhelmed Arjuna ² is certainly a *sine qua non* of the experience, of the numen in the divine Being; but, whether a sense of moral delinquency is also necessary, as Otto asserts in the light of Biblical examples, may be doubted ³. The essence of the numen as revealed in the Vedāntic Literature is the apprehension of utter transcendence of the Deity in relation to all phenomena. Hence the expressions such as in the *Kaṭha* repeated in the *Mundaka*: The sun shines not there, nor the moon and stars; These lightnings shine not, much less this fire; After Him, as He shines, doth everything shine, The whole world is illumined with His light. ⁴ Perhaps the most eloquent description in the whole range of this literature is the *Taittirīya* text: Where from words turn back together with the mind, not having attained. ⁵ Of course, in the Advaita Philosophy whose foundation and crown is the sense of absolute identity between the self of man and the self of the universe, the negative sense of delinquency and creatureliness can at best be only temporary and unreal. Nonetheless, the holy as a category of value as Otto expounds it is most indubitably felt and expressed in regard to the divine Being as the illustrations cited above amply demonstrate.

The Good

The Good is the most comprehensive value in Advaita and, as such, it is identified with Brahman as *Śānta* and *Śiva*, ⁶ just as truth or *Sat* has been. In fact the term *sat* denotes not merely the true but also the good. But a distinction

1. KeU III, 7; BG, II, 29.

2. Ibid, II, 7 - Kāraṇyadoṣopahatasvabhāvaḥ, dharmatām-mūdhacetāḥ;

3. Cf. St. Luke VII. 1-10; The Idea of the Holy, PP. 58 ff.

4. KU. V, 15, MuU, IV, 10;

5. TU II, 4 & 9.

6. MU. 7, Śāntaṃ śivam advaitam caturtham manyante,

between the true and the good may be drawn. The concept of the good is wider than that of the true; the supreme good is not mere *sat* or truth, but Brahman as *saccidānanda*.¹ For instance, among the four *puruṣārthas* or ends of life, viz., *dharma*, the moral good, *artha*, the economic good, *kāma* the psychological good and *mokṣa*, the spiritual good, the last is supreme; and as such, it has been identified, not with *sat* only, but with Brahman, the unity of *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*.² Of these four values, it is obvious that wealth and love, *artha* and *kāma*, cannot be ultimate ends or values being neither sure, *anaiikāntika*, nor stable, *anātyantika*.³ *Dharma* and *mokṣa* the moral good and the spiritual good are in a different class. In his commentary on the *Nyāya Sūtra*. I, 1, 2, Vātsyāyana represents *dharma* or merit born of right conduct as a means to a higher form of good. The instrumental status of *dharma* was also recognized by Kumārila for whom it is a means to procure *svarga*.⁴ But Prabhākara and his followers sought to raise *dharma* to the status of a final end by insisting that vedic injunctions should be carried out in utter disregard of their fruits. The sense of duty induced by the *niyoga* alone should suffice to enforce obedience to the vedic imperative. Thus they upheld the idea of duty for duty's sake, though the scope of

1. Cf. The Platonic concept of the Good, i.e., the Idea of the Good which is to the world of concepts what 'its offspring' the sun is to the sensible world. The Good is not itself Being or Truth, but the transcendent source of both—Plato. P. 58. A. E. Taylor, London, 1908. When Bradley, (Appearance and Reality, P. 411) writes that the Good is not the whole and the whole as such is not the Good, he is positing a finite will over against the totality which may contain features unmeaning and painful to such a will. But where the destiny of the individual is to realize in itself the divine unity which alone is ultimately true and good the whole must needs be the Good 'in which one can rest with contentment.'

2. BSS. I, 1, 4, P. 82 & 74; also vide Quest after Perfection, P. 27.

3. Kama = Love for finite things; even when directed to Atman, it is obviously instrumental.

4. *Dharma* for the Pūrva Mināmsā of both the Bhāṭṭas and Prabhākaras is the right accomplishment of the Vedic imperatives

duty was confined to that of vedic injunctions¹. But in their zeal, Prābhākaraś ignore the plain fact that, however disinterested human activity may be, its total divorce from all forms of satisfaction of the agent is impractical. In a word, it is not feasible to ignore the basic truth of psychological hedonism. Action divorced from purpose, which implies fulfilment of desire, is impossible; then it becomes sheer drudgery². Therefore, even the moral good or *dharma* has to be subordinated to a more comprehensive good, which, unlike *svarga*, is not ephemeral, but eternal and absolute.³ This supreme good in Advaita is *mokṣa* conceived as identical with Brahman or *saccidānanda*. In its instrumental character *dharma* is held to promote the purity of the mind which conditions the achievement of *mokṣa*.⁴

A detailed account of the good in Advaita, viz., *mokṣa* is not undertaken at this stage; for that is the theme of this entire thesis and its full picture will emerge in the course of this work. But how *saṅga* Brahman or God is the good from the human end may be indicated here. Good and evil, as categories of moral life, are a condition of ethical endeavour. Good is the tendency

1. Cf. Kant's view of the categorical imperative in its final form: Act so that you use humanity in your own person as well as in any other always as an end, and never as a means only. — The misinterpretation of man, P. 22, Paul Roubiczek, 1949.

2. *vihitasyakaraṇākaranayordupkhamātraphalatvāt* — S'ankarā's Introduction to the B.G. III, 1.

3. Cf. *prāṇināṃ sākṣādabhyudayanitśreyasaheturyahsadharmah* — S'ankara's introduction to the *Gītā Bhāṣya*. This of course implies that *dharma* is a means not only to *mokṣa* but also to *abhyudaya* or worldly prosperity—

Cf. *Ūrdhvaḥvirāmaṃyēṣa nacakascicchṛnotimām* |
Dharmādarthaścakāmaśca sadharmah kiṃ na sevyate ||

As. a means to *mokṣa*, *dharma* produces purity of [Ma.Bh. XVIII, 5, 62] mind or *cittasuddhih*.

4. There is an important sense in which *dharma* is regarded as equal to *rita* or cosmic order. What sustains this order is identical with *satya*. Cf. BU. I, 4, 14; II, 5, 11; *tasmāt dharmāt param nāsti yovai sa dharma satyam vaitat*, etc. But the Advaitic Good in its wholeness is more than *dharma*; Cf. KU. II, 14—*anyatra dharmādanyatrādharmāt*, etc.

towards unification and evil the proneness to division and conflict. As was observed in regard to error and truth, ugliness and beauty, so evil and good also are not utter contradictories. Rather, their opposition is the effective means of producing higher grades of good. As all oppositions, this ethical opposition also belongs to the realm of appearances; it implies the failure to manifest the harmonious nature of the divine who is the good beyond all partial goods and evils¹, and who is immanent in all moral agents. The so-called evil is what is ever becoming good.² Keats made the celebrated remark that this world is a vale of 'soul-making', at the same time rejecting the pessimistic notion that it is a vale of tears³. His point was that pain and trouble are essential for the evolution of a mature soul. Understanding the word soul to mean mind (as Bosanquet does), the Advaitin will fully endorse this statement. He sees in evils of all kinds nothing but the ineluctable conditions for the progressive refinement and development of the mind, the instrument of spiritual apprehension.⁴ The process of converting evil into good is the same as affirming in one's own life the infinite will of God present as *antaryāmin*. It implies the abjuration of the private will, or, in the language of the Gita, its sacrifice in the will of God—a process of converting the ego-centric life of the moral agent into a theo-centric

1. KU. II, 14.

2. Cf. The article on the Vedantic Good; Mind, Vol. XXIV, P. Narasimha. Cf. Also Russel's remarks in *Philosophical essays*, PP. 12-16. He quotes Spinoza:—"By reality and perfection I mean the same thing", and Abt Vogler; "The evil is null, is nought, is silence implying sound", and remarks that all this seems like special pleading. Pain, hatred, envy do exist. Nor is the Buddhist view that all existence is evil right. Both these are extreme views, and equally wrong. The Advaitin does not deny the phenomenal reality of evil, neither does he suspend judgement as Russel prescribes. He affirms that it is feasible to transcend the evils and goods of life and makes it his life's business to do so.

3. The value and destiny of the Individual—Second series, Lecture III, B. Bosanquet.

4. Cf. *dhīyate tvagryayābuddhyāsūkṣmayā*. KU. III, 12 Cf. Evil is a condition of good, not a mere necessary accompaniment of it—Ideals of Religion P. 267. A. C. Bradley, Gifford Lectures, 1907.

one¹. The private will is basically divisive; it is a separatist force, while in its denial is automatically manifested the divine force of harmony, unity, and continuity. The effort thus to lift the lower mind with the higher mind² is a solution, at best, only of the moral problem. The question of the evil in nature - nature red in tooth and claw - remains. The Advaitin would face it with the stoic spirit inculcated by the Gītā,³ for he recognizes in 'all sorrows of life the will of God' - and that is to get rid of them⁴. The Vedāntic ethics consist in training an individual involved in the dualities of life to rise to a state of monistic realization. The Advaitin's duty is to assert more and more the God in him, his real self, as suggested by the sense of universal kinship and unity of spirit. The practical ideal of the Vedāntic ethic is the divine solidarity of of the world-life as a fact of one's immediate consciousness⁵. With this end unflinchingly kept in view, the Advaitin stresses his duties, leaving the rights to take care of themselves.⁶ The idea of rights implies their enforcement against opposition and denial. The Vedāntic ideal implies, rather, the denial of the self-will, true *ahimsā* and this coincides with the ethics preached by higher Christianity. Man is regarded in the Vedāntic discipline as an evolving spiritual unit, realizing his ultimate self through countless pseudo-selves. The difference between the Vedāntic and the Christian ethics is metaphysical. *Tattvamasi*, the identity of the human self and the divine Being and, therefore, of all selves, is the fountain-head of the Vedāntic ethics; the sense of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man is that of Christianity. As a transitional idea, the fatherhood of God as well as his motherhood is

1. Ibid.: P. 220. To deny evil with the whole self, to will it away, not merely to know it away is to be religious, Cf. also the BG. IV, 27.

2. BG. VI, 5. 3. Ibid.; II, 14, 15.

4. Cf. Ideals of Religion P. 267: and Gandhi's comment on the Bihar Earthquake of 1934. Bradley exclaims: how few can do it - i.e., take all sorrows as God's will.

5. Hence the command to work for the welfare of the world, 'lokasaṃgraha'. Cf. BG. III, 20.

6. Cf. Gandhiji's reaction to H. G. Wells's formulation of the 'universal rights of man'.

acceptable to the Advaitin¹. In all cases of doubt and conflict between wills, 'the ought' for the Advaitin is self-denial which is negative only in form, its implication being highly affirmative; for this involves the extension of the limits of his interests, and the inclusion of a greater stretch of reality within them². The moral rule for the Advaitin is: begin to act as if you have already realized unity, or atonement with God³. This implies the slaying at every step of *kāma*, self-will, whose affirmation posits differences. Therefore, *kāma* has been declared to be the foe of the higher life leading to spiritual unity⁴. To reach this unity is to go beyond all forms of empirical good and evil, beyond truth and error, beauty and ugliness⁵. When we study the nature of the *mukta* or the emancipated Self, we shall show that the status of being beyond good and evil does not imply moral indifference or any sort of antinomianism.

Religion is the apprehension of the Divine *sub specie valoris*, as the Being who is felt to be supremely satisfying and good, the Being who satisfies the profoundest desires of the human heart. For Bradley inclusiveness or internal coherence as a necessary feature of his Absolute is a purely logical principle which he erects into a metaphysical principle of perfection. That reality satisfies one's whole being is only an assumption, an act of faith, for Bradley⁶. But the Advaitin takes his stand on the realized identity of Brahman and Ātman and makes no assumption in this respect⁷. God is the supreme value demanded by the needs of man's mind - its inherent craving for truth, beauty, and goodness. These values are in

1. BG. IX, 17.

2. Cf. *ayamnijah paroveti gaṇanā laghucetasām |*
udāracaritānāmtu vasudhaivakuṭumbakam ||

Eluttaccha, a māṭṛyālam Poet, prays: May I never assert the egoistic sense of 'I'; or if I do, let me feel that I am the whole. *Harināmakīrtana*.

3. Cf. *sarvatraiva hi adhyātmagāstre kṛtārthalakṣaṇāniyāni tānyeva sādhanānyupadiśyante, yainasādhyatvāt-Gītā Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara on II, 55;

4. BG. III, 37. 5. BU. IV. 4, 22 & 23.

6. AR. pp. 159 ff.

7. *The Vedānta of Śaṅkara*; p. 77, R. P. Singh.

fact the visions of God which the mind of man obtains in its varied approaches to reality¹. Religion for the Advaitin is not merely a faith in 'the conservation of values', but realized and realizable fact in the life of man. For Kant religion is 'the recognition of our duties as divine commands'², and his proof for the reality of God is stated thus: There is a God, for there is a categorical imperative of duty before which all knees do bow³. But in such a view of the matter no room for any metaphysical elements remains. Nor can religion be a form of knowledge, a relation between a subject and an object⁴. Religion must be understood as realization of God as the value of all values, the supreme Good, which is identical with *bhūmā* or infinite bliss, besides being the non-dual peace which passeth understanding.⁵

It may be remarked that the holy need not be regarded as a fourth value, coordinate with truth, beauty, and goodness; rather, it may be conceived as "the common plasm from which the others are differentiated and derived, their common fons et origo."⁶ The holy, the characteristic religious value, is the richest and most inclusive of all the human values. The traditional triad of values may be treated as exhausting the entire province of psychic activity, with its cognitive, conative, and emotive compliments⁷. Each type of value experience is, so far as it goes, a valid way of approach to the religious experience of God. The three human values of truth, beauty, and goodness when elevated to the plane of the Divine, become sacred or holy. They are parallel lines that meet in God. Raised to their highest power, these values come to partake

1. cf. God and Evil, p. 235, Joad.

2. The critique of practical reason.

3. Opus Postumum, p. 197 Kant.

4. cf. We must affirm that religion, so far as it is truth is identical with philosophy, or, as can also be said, that philosophy is the true religion. When religion does not dissolve into philosophy it reveals itself as effective error. Croce, Logic, ET. pp. 439-447.

5. CU. VII, 23, MU. 7

6. Hibbert Journal Vol XXVIII, pp. 493 ff.

7. Ethics p. 72. A. C. Ewing, London, 1953.

of the numinous quality; they become intrinsic elements in holiness. Each value emanates from God and partakes of his nature - hence its value character. The pleasure its contemplation and possession yields is no mere feeling of the moment, a mundane excitement which accentuates the feverish passion for further excitements, but the tranquillising, impersonalising, divinising, joy, that is God's essence¹. Considered as the unity and fusion of the true, the beautiful and the good, *saccidānanda* or God in Advaita is the highest good or *mokṣa* itself. Of God or the real Self of man alone can it be said, not that He has value, but that He is value, for here there is no finite self enjoying God as an object. He is ever the supreme subject, and being eternal, conscious bliss, is the end-value whose echoes and reflections make human values valuable². All through the growth and evolution of the mind, it was the empirical self that, through the discipline entailed by the cultivation of values, strove to triumph over the world of distractions and reach the summit of all values, viz., God. There the individuating medium of the finite mind disappears, and the highest value or God is attained³. Thus is reached the *summum bonum* or emancipation of the individual.

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1. cf. *ātmanastukamāya sarvam priyam bhavati* BU. II, 4, 5
najātukāmah kāmānām upabhogena śāmyati |
haviṣākṛsnavaartmeva bhūya evābhivardhate || Manu II
 2. BU. III, 6, 23
 3. MuU. III, 1, 1-3

IX. Rāmānuja's concept of Brahman.

With a view to throw into relief the Advaitic concept of Brahman, we propose to bring together in this and the following sections the salient features of the *Viśiṣṭādvaitic* and *Dvaitic* concepts of the Supreme Reality. In the course of this brief survey we shall make but occasional references to relevant points held by certain other schools of Vedānta also, since limitations of space forbid a more detailed exposition of the same.

Rāmānuja interprets the *Brahmasūtras* in the light of the now lost *vṛtti* of Bodhāyana, the *Pāñcarātra Āgamas*, and the devotional literature of the *Alvars*.¹ Unlike Śāṅkara, he does not make any distinction between Brahman with attributes and the same without them. Therefore he ignores the conceptions of a *svarūpalakṣaṇa* and *tatasthalakṣaṇa* of Brahman. *Janmādyasya yataḥ*,² thus, is the only definition of Brahman or God in the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* system of Rāmānuja. He believes that Brahman is the sovereign Lord, the repository of auspicious qualities like omniscience, bliss, truthful volitions, omnipotence, supreme mercy, and, of course, he is the cause of the origination, sustentation, and retraction of the world.³ Whereas in Advaita *satyam jñānaṁ anantaṁ*⁴ constitutes the essential definition of Brahman, Rāmānuja explains it as follows. 'Satyam' denotes that Brahman alone has 'unconditional existence' – *nirupādhikasattāyogi*.⁵ and marks him off from matter, *acit*, which is mutable, and from individuals, *cit* associated with matter. These latter are subject to real changes of states and so cannot be said to own unconditional existence. *Jñānaṁ* denotes the eternally constant knowledge-nature of the Lord – *nityāsamkucita-jñānaikākāra*, and thus it marks off the liberated souls whose cognitions were for some-time subject to contraction. *Ananta* denotes the freedom of Brahman from the limitations of space, time and objects. Since, however, Brahman has qualities his infinitude refers both

1. Rāmānuja bhāṣya – P. 1, Benares, 1915; HIP. Vol. III, P. 105

2. BS. I. 1, 2

3. RB. on I, 1, 2

4. TŪ. II, 'i.

5. RB. p. 92.

to his substance and qualities. ¹ Only *śāstru* can reveal this Brahman, and not any other means of cognition. The fact that Brahman pervades all space and time does not mean that his is the only reality or that he is identical with world-reality, all else being false. The *Śrutaprākāśikā* ² points out that what is implied is that there is no measure with which the Lord may be limited by any spatial relation. But Venkaṇātha interprets all-pervasiveness to signify the absence of any limit to the qualities of Brahman. ³

Brahman or *Is'varah* is Lord over all, is the whole, *Śeṣi*, of which all others are parts, is to be adored by means of all acts, is the awarder of their fruits, and is the ground of all. Everything save himself and his self-cognition constitutes his body. ⁴ In the ultimate reality of God there is determination, limitation, difference, held together and harmonized. In other words, Brahman has internal differences unlike the Advaitic Brahman which eschews *svagatabheda* as well. Rāmānuja's Brahman is a synthetic whole with souls and matter, *cit* and *acit*, as his adjectives. ⁵ Souls and matter are thus comprehended within the unity of the Lord and are related to him as attributes to a substance, parts to a whole or body to a soul which animates it. ⁶ Again they have been described as *prakāras* or modes, *śeṣa* or accessories, *niyāmya* or the controlled, ⁷ while God is what has modes, the *prakārin*, the controller, *niyantā*, and the principal, *śeṣin*.

The relation between God and the rest of the world, animate and inanimate, is best brought out by the analogy of soul and the body it animates. Rāmānuja defines a body as

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1. Saguṇatvāt svarūpasya svarupeṇa svagunaishcā nantyam - RB. P. 92
 2. On RB. on I, 1, 2, Qd. HIP. Vol. III, p. 157
 3. Nyāyasiddhāṇjana - iyadgunaka iti paricchedarahitah - Qd. Ibid.
 4. Yatīndramatadīpikā IX, i.
 5. Cidacidvastuśarīratayā Brahmahiva tatprakāram II, 1, 15 RB. p. 312.
 6. Jagaccharīrī Is'varah - YMD. IX. 13.
 7. niyāmyatvam - tatsamkalapādhīnasattā sthiti pravṛttika tvam-Vedāntadeśika, Qd. IP. ii. p. 684

that which may, as a whole, be held fast and prevented from falling by the volitional efforts of spirit.¹ The body has only a derivative being. Its movements are subject to the will of the soul. So does the world derive its being from God and is subject to his will. A distinction may be made in this connection. The living individuals or *Jīvas* constitute the inner body of God, while the inanimate world or *acit* is his outer body.² The unity of the world is accounted for by the supreme spirit which organically unifies the plurality of spirits and matter. While the three elements of reality, *bhoktā*, the individual soul, *bhogyā*, matter, and *preritā*, God, are distinct from one another due to natural differences or *svarūpabheda*, they form a unity due to their mutual relations as modes and substance, *prakāra* and *prakārin*.³ The unity of the three elements implies only their inseparability or *apṛathaksiddhi*.

The relation between God and the other two elements of reality has been further elucidated by Rāmānuja in the light of the upaniṣadic concept of the *antaryāmin* or the inner ruler.⁴ The Lord is present in all worlds, all beings, all divinities, all vedas, all sacrifices, as their inner self and rules them all⁵.

The causality associated with Brahman in the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* brings out the equal reality of the world and Brahman, the effect and cause. As cause, Brahman is characterized by a body consisting of *cit* and *acit* in their subtle state, when they cannot be properly referred to as earth, water, &c. As effect, the same Brahman is characterized by *cit* and *acit* in their gross or evolved state of elements such as earth, &c.⁶ The conscious and unconscious elements of the Universe coexist with God, but, still, they owe their reality to him and are sustained by him. Though God is immanent in *cit* and *acit*, he is not immanent only; for, then, he would have

1. *yasya cetanasya yaddravyam sarvātmanā dhārayitumśakyam tat tasya gaurāṇam*—Qd. HIP. Vol. III, p. 298 FN. 4.
2. IP. ii, p. 685.
3. *bhoktābhogyampreritāramca matvāsarvamproktamtrividham Brahmametad*—SU. I, 12.
4. BU. III, 7, 3-23.
5. RB.I, 2, 19; cf. BG. XV, 15.
6. RB. II. 1, 15, pp. 312-313.

been wholly dissipated into the many. God is also a transcendent spirit. 'God is a person, and not a mere totality of other persons.'¹ As qualified by *cit* and *acit* in their subtle state, God is not only the material cause of the world,² but, also, at the same time, the efficient cause, a unique feature of Brahman alone.³ The body of God is the material cause and his soul the efficient cause; thus it is that God is said to be the material and efficient causes of the world in one⁴. The *Yatīndramatadīpikā* adds⁵ that Brahman is, moreover, the cooperant cause also, *sahakārikāraṇamca*.

The fact that *cit* and *acit* constitute the body of God does not entail his participation in the impurities of that body, viz., the evils and sufferings associated with *cit* and *acit*. Commenting on the Brahma Sūtra II, 1, 14,⁶ Rāmānuja says that what necessitates sufferings is not mere embodiedness, but the same brought about by *karma*, either good or evil, and since God's body is not the result of good or bad actions, the questions of his sufferings and impurities can hardly arise⁷. Rāmānuja quotes Dramiḍa, an earlier commentator, in this connection with approval. As a king, though he finds himself in a place infested with snakes, &c., is not pestered by them as he is well protected and, at the same time, he protects others whom he desires to do so, enjoying special pleasures of perfumes and so forth, so the Lord of the world also, being possessed of his special powers, is untouched by evil, protects all the worlds, and enjoys unique pleasures.⁸

God may be envisaged in several ways. He may denote the central unity when *cit* and *acit* are regarded as his

1. IP. ii. p. 686.

2. tatāpyavibhaktanāmarūpaṃ kāraṇāvastham brahmaivaprakṛtiśabdenābhidhiyate, RB. I. 4, 23, p. 271.

3. sakaletaravilakṣaṇasyaparasya brahmaṇah sarvasakteh sarvajñasyaikasyaiva sarvaṃ upapadyate, RB. p. 273.

4. IP. ii. p. 715; BS. I, 4, 26; CU. VI, 2, 3.

5. IX, 27.

6. bhoktrāpatteravibhāgaścetsyāllokavat.

7. apahatapāpmanastu paramātmanah sthūlasūkṣmarūpakṛtsna-jagaccharirakatve'pi karmasambandhagandhonāstīti natarām apuruṣārthagandhaprasaṅgah—RB. II, 1, 14; IH, 3, 11.

8. Ibid.

attributes or he may stand for the complex whole when reality is said to be Brahman alone, without a second¹. The world of *cit* and *acit* may be manifest as in creation or unmanifest as in *pralaya* or retraction when both *cit* and *acit* exist in a subtle state.

The Upaniṣadic passages which explicitly assert that Brahman is devoid of attributes and that he is beyond the reach of words and thoughts² Rāmānuja seeks to explain in a manner of his own. Of course, he rejects the advaitic distinction between the *saguṇa Brahman* and *nirguṇa Brahman*. He explains that the denial of Brahman's attributes means only the denial of finite and undesirable attributes, and not of all attributes, as such³. Interpreting the *Brahma Sūtra* III, 2, 21⁴, Rāmānuja writes that Upaniṣadic expressions like *neti neti*⁵ do not entirely negative Brahman's attributes but only deny that Brahman is exclusively qualified. In other words, Brahman has not only the attributes previously ascribed but countless others as yet unspecified⁶. In contrast, Śankara affirms in this context that what is denied here is the entire world superimposed on Brahman⁷. Rāmānuja argues that the denial cannot envisage Brahman's attributes, for, first to teach them and then to negative them is nothing short of madness.⁸ God, understood as Rāmānuja teaches, is experienced directly⁹ by the devotee as the *bhūmā* or plenum in which one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, and knows nothing else¹⁰. Rāmānuja explains that

1. CU. VI, 2, 1.

2. KU. III, 15; IV, 10, 11, MuU. II, 1, 2; II, 2, 10; SU. VI, 14, 19; BU. III, 8, 8, &c.

3. nirastanikhiladoṣatvakalyāṇaguṇākaratvalaksanopetam. RB. on III, 2, 11, P. 429.

4. Prakṛtāitāvattvaṃ hi pratiṣedhati tato bravitiṣa bhūyah.

5. BU. II, 3, 6, &c.

6. ye brahmaṇo viśeṣāḥ prakṛtāstadviśiṣṭatayaḥ brahmaṇaḥ pratiyamāneyattā neti netiti pratisiddhyate. Uktaprakāramātaraviśiṣṭam nabhavati brahma—RB. p. 436.

7. BS. 656-57.

8. RB. p. 436.

9. BS. III, 2, 23.

10. CU. VIII, 24, 1; BS. I, 3, 7.

“When the devotee experiences Brahman whose essence is supreme bliss, nothing else falls within the scope of his consciousness; for the entire world, *kṛtsnam vastujātam* is included in the nature and powers of Brahman.”¹

Unlike the Advaitin, in strict accord with the letter of the *sūtra* II, 1, 22,² Rāmānuja holds that Brahman is not identical with, but more than, the individual soul or *jīva*, and, in support, quotes the well-known *antaryāmi* texts³. On the other hand, the text ‘*tattvamasi*’ is explained by Rāmānuja in accordance with his theory of knowledge. Every judgment, for him, is a synthesis of distincts. *Tat* and *tvam*, Brahman and *jīva* are placed here in the relation of subject and predicate or *sāmānādhikaraṇyām*⁴. Thus, there is a difference between the two. The subject and predicate are *distinct* meanings referred to the same substance. The text ‘*tattvamasi*’ thus brings out the complex nature of the ultimate reality in which the *jīvas* inhere. Brahman and *jīva* are related as substance and attribute or soul and body⁵. Without difference between the two, one cannot be the other. Indra’s statement “Meditate on me” and Vāmadeva’s affirmations “I am Manu, I am Sūrya”, according to Rāmānuja, mean only that Brahman is the innermost of all.⁶ As the infinite Brahman dwells in each *jīva*, with Prahlāda one may say that each *jīva* is the source of all, each *jīva* is all, in each *jīva* is all⁷.

Theologically, Rāmānuja’s system identifies Brahman with Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu⁸. As this system is based on the Vedas, the *Pancārātrāgamas*, the *Purāṇās* and the *Drāviḍa*

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1. RB. p. 195.
 2. *adhikamtu, bhedanirdeśāt*.
 3. BU. III, 7, 22; S’U. I, 6; MuU. III, 1, i.
 4. *samānamekam adhikaraṇam - viśeṣanānāmādhārabhūtam viśeṣyam*.
 5. *jivaparamātmanoh sarīrātmabhāvena tādātmyam na viruddham—vide the Vedārthasamgraha, pp. 32, 38, 44, &c.*
 6. BS. I, 1, 31.
 7. *sarvagatvādanantasya sa evāhmavastitah | mattah sarvamaham sarvam mayi sarvam sanātane | Viṣṇu purāṇa, I, 19, 15; Qd. RB. I, 1, 31.*
 8. YMD. XI, 4.

Prabandhas of the *Alvārs*, which respectively refer to the Absolute and the inner ruler, the *Vyūhas* or manifestations, *avatārs* like Rāma and Kṛṣṇa, and the images in the South Indian shrines, the *Viṣiṣṭādvaita* holds that the Absolute as identified with Viṣṇu exists in five different modes. (i) *Para* or the highest mode is *Nārāyaṇa* otherwise known also as *prabrahman*, *paravāsudeva*, &c. (ii) *Vyūha* or manifestations consist of Vāsudeva, Saṃkarsaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha ¹. (iii) *Vibhava* refers to the incarnations of Viṣṇu like Rāma and Kṛṣṇa. In the *Gītā Bhāṣya*, Rāmānuja writes that God incarnates himself without sacrificing his godlike nature, both for relieving the burden of the earth and to be accessible to men such as we are. The *avatārs* descend from the supernatural, *aprākṛta*, to the natural or *prākṛta* order. (iv) The form of the Lord as *antaryāmin* is ever present in the *jīva*, whether he dwell in heaven or hell, as his friend and is visible to the yogin in meditation. Though, thus, present in the *Jīva*, the Lord is undefiled by the impurities of the *jīva* ². The God in man is like a flash of lightning in the heart of a blue cloud ³.

(v) The *arcā* refers to the Lord as present in the duly consecrated images. Thus, he makes himself immediately available to the devotee, accepting a tangible form such as the devotee chooses, depending altogether on his services, with infinite tolerance ⁴.

1. YMD. points out that the concept of the *vyūha* is related to the needs of meditation as well as creation, &c. of the world. Vāsudeva possesses all the six divine attributes Saṃkarsana has *jñāna* and *bala*; Pradyumna, *aśvarya* and *vīrya*; Aniruddha *śakti* and *tejaś*. The last three *vyūhas* are respectively the rulers of the *jīva*, mind, and egoity. IX, 19.
2. Ibid; IX, 26.
3. *nīlatoyadamadhyasthā vidyullekheva bhāśvarā*—MNU, 11, 12.
4. YMD. XI, 27. cf. "Though omniscient, he appears as ignorant, though spirit as non-spirit, though his own master as one in the power of men, though omnipotent as powerless, though entirely free from needs as having needs, though all-protecting as helpless, though lord like servant, though invisible as visible, though unseizable as seizable." Qd. IP. ii. P. 690, FN. 2.

Thus it is obvious that Rāmānuja's God or *saguṇa* Brahman is not an impassive absolute unrelated to aught else due to the very absence of things other than itself; but is a personal being who joins us in the experiences of our life¹, shares our ends, and works for the well-being of all the world². However plausible Rāmānuja's picture of God may be from the point of view of a devotee, the question may well be asked how far it agrees with the Vedāntic texts and how far it is logically sustainable in itself. In the first place, the fact that the *Pañcarātra* views are included in the second book of the second *Adhyāya* of the *Brahmasūtras* by Bādārāyaṇa suggests that like the others in that book of animadversions, the *Pancarātra* also found no favour with him. Again Rāmānuja's view that Brahman with differentiated names and forms qualifying him is the effect³ is incompatible with the contents of the section on 'Divergence of the nature of effect from that of cause,'⁴ for, Brahman as effect is *not* divergent, essentially, from the same Brahman as cause⁵. A palpable inconsistency resulting from the concept of Brahman with subtle *cit* and *acit* as body may also be noticed. In *Brahmasūtra* II, 1, 26⁶, an objector points out that in case Brahman transforms himself into the world of effects, either Brahman as a whole will pass into the effect state, or, he will have to be deemed to possess parts, while the Upaniṣads declare him to be partless. Now this objection is utterly irrelevant to Rāmānuja's position; for Brahman, according to him, has always a body consisting of *cit* and *acit*, and in the actual transformation also, not Brahman, but only the *acit* part of his body, undergoes transformation⁷. From these and similar considerations, we cannot help concluding that the *Bhāgavata* system which Rāmānuja upholds is far from being the system

1. Cf. *suhṛdam sarvabhūtanām* BG. V. 39

2. *Ibid*; III, 24.

3. *Yadāvibhaktanāmarūpam tadā tatdeva bahutvenakāryatvena cōcyate* RB. on I, 4, 23, p. 271.

4. BS. II, 1, 4-12.

5. Vide Introduction to the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* by Mr. A. K. Sastry, Cal. Uny. Edn. 1930, p. 3.

6. *kṛtsnāprasaktir niravayavatvaśabdakopovā*.

7. Vide VP. Introduction, p.9.

of the *Brahmasūtras* ¹, and, by the same token, the concept of Brahman which Rāmānuja sets forth in his system is not true to the Vedāntic texts taken as a whole.

Apart from textual inconsistencies, there are also insuperable logical difficulties in Rāmānuja's concept of Brahman. The relation of attributes like *Satyam Jñānam*, &c., and substance, viz., Brahman, is of course, left entirely vague. If substance and attributes are really identical the distinction made between them serves no useful purpose; if, however, they are different, their relation must be purely external, demanding other relations in an infinite regressus. Nor can the relation in question be an internal one like *samvāya*; for, even so, this *samvāya* itself requires to be related to the two relata, substance and attributes.

The question of the relation of souls and matter to Brahman is a special case of the problem of relations. Their eternal dependence on Brahman suggests that they are essential to him, *svarūpānubandhi* ². Thus, in fact, the world is not a mere attribute of God, but a manifestation of his inner determination. To admit *cit* and *acit*, as coeternal with Brahman is to limit his infinitude. Besides, *cit* and *acit* also are infinite in time and, thus, we have three classes of infinities held together in an inexplicable mystery.

For Rāmānuja, Brahman is a perfect personality which includes all finite selves with their distinct personalities. But no sense can be made of inclusion of one self in another; thus all distinctiveness of selves must be abolished and a single super-self must emerge, eventually. The status of the Absolute predicated of God alone is unsustainable so long as *cit* and *acit* are distinguished from him and assigned a unique status of their own.

The distinction which Rāmānuja makes between the Self of God and his body, the former being immutable and the latter changing, cannot, in fact, safeguard God's immutability. Real

1. The Vedānta, P. 181. V. S. Ghate, Poona 1926.

2. RB. of II, 4, 14.

agency entails the change of Self as much as the transformation of the body means the change of the latter. To assert otherwise is to hold that one half of a fowl may be used for cooking while the other half may be kept for laying eggs. ¹

Ascription of contradictory features like *cit* and *acit*, consciousness and matter, to the same reality, viz., God is an illogical procedure; for, then, either the unity of that reality or the distinction between the attributes, must be sacrificed. There is no means of verifying the reality of such a concept of God. It remains unintelligible how the immutable perfection of God is compatible with the mutability of his body. In fact, Rāmānuja's position is no sounder than Bhāskara's whom he so severely criticises. ² For, according to Bhāskara also, God, though partless, transforms himself into the world by means of his varied powers which get modified according to his will. ³



1. Ānanda Giri on BS. I. 2, 8.

2. Cf. Vedārthasamgraha

3. According to Bhāskara, God has two powers, *bhogyasakti* and *bhoktrśakti*. By virtue of the former, God becomes the world of experience and, through the latter he becomes the individual souls who experience the world. None the less, Bhāskara asserts God remains unchanged in his purity; for, his powers alone are involved in modifications. It is obvious that in the place of Rāmānuja's *cit* and *acit* in Bhāskara we have the *Bhoktrśakti* and *bhogyasakti* of God. Logical incomprehensibility equally characterizes both. cf. The Bhāskara Bhāṣya on II, 1, 18.

X. Madhva's Concept of Brahman.

Madhva's Concept of Brahman has the unique distinction of being based, not on the *Prasthānatraya*, but "on the entire range of Hindu sacred scriptures from the Vedas to the upaniṣads and from the semi-vedic expositions thereon to the *Purāṇas* and *samhitas*" ¹. But, in fact, Madhva's effort shows notable disregard of the major upaniṣads and the wording of the *Brahma Sūtras*; so much so that Dr. Bhandarkar has observed that "all the *sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa which set forth the doctrine of Brahman being the material cause have been interpreted by Madhva in an entirely different way. Probably, he would have set aside the *Brahma Sūtras* altogether; but he could not do so, since the work had acquired an uncontested authoritativeness. He had, therefore, to show that his system did not go against the *Brahma Sūtras* and accepted them and interpreted them in almost a fantastic manner. Texts from the upaniṣads which did not agree with his doctrines he treats similarly" ². In extenuation, Madhva's followers plead with some justice that no commentator is altogether free from text-torturing ³. However, let us bring together the chief features of Madhva's concept of Brahman whom he expressly identifies with Viṣṇu. ⁴ Madhva and his followers are very much concerned to establish Viṣṇu's claims as the supreme God above all other gods, both vedic and non-vedic and they cite in support a large mass of quotations from scriptures. But, for our present purposes, we shall confine ourselves to the philosophic ideas involved in this concept of the supreme Lord, whatever the sectarian name assigned to him.

God is defined by Madhva as the source of eight categories, adding five more to the usual three, viz., origination, sustenance and retraction. The additional ones are: control

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1. CSB. P. IV;
 2. Vaisnavism, 'Saivism &c. P. 58. Bhandarkar, Strasburg, 1913;
 3. CSB. P. XVIII;
 4. *Brahma śabdas'ca viṣṇāveva ... tanno viṣṇuritivacanāt*. Ibid; PP. 41, 43.

niyamana; knowledge, *jñāna*; ignorance, *ajñāna*; bondage, *bandha*; and liberation, *mokṣa* ¹. The main characteristic of the Lord, apart from his activities, is that he is a plenum of infinite excellences ². Commenting on the definition of the *Paramātmān* in the *Madhvasiddhāntasāra*, Padmanābha writes that each of the Lord's excellences has to be deemed perfect, *paripūrṇa*, i.e., without limits and, therefore, unsurpassable ³. Among the qualities of the Lord are knowledge, bliss and prowess. The proof of his omniscience is *śruti* ⁴. Though the supreme being and his qualities are identical, they may be spoken of in different terms. The *Madhvasiddhāntasāra* writes ⁵: *bhedābhāve'pibhedavyavahāranirvāhakā anantā eva viśeṣāḥ*. That is to say, there are infinite particularities, *viśeṣāḥ*, distinguishing the countless excellences of the Lord which make it possible to refer to them as distinct, though there are no differences, *bhedābhāve'pi*, in fact ⁶.

1. CSB. P. 54 utpattisthitisamhārā niyatirjñāmāvṛthih |
bandhamokṣauca puruṣādyasmad sa harirekarāṭ ||
Skanda, ii, '7, 19, 8.

2. tatraparamātmānantaguṇapari pūrṇah M.S.S 59.

3. Cf. mayyanantaguṇe' nanteguṇato' nantavigrāhe-Bhāgavata, VI

4. Cf. MuU. II, 2, 7.

5. MSS. 21.

6. In this connection reference may be made to the characteristic *Dvaita* theory of *viśeṣas*. *Viśeṣa* is defined as the particularity which enables one to refer to a substance and its quality as different, while, in fact, they are identical

Cf. *bhedābhāve tvaparyāyaśabdāntarānīyāmakah* |
viśeṣonāmākathitah so stivastusvageṣatah ||

Madhāva, Qd. Reign of Realism p. 102; Particularity is not difference. Were it so we could not have experienced substance and quality as identical, e.g. a cloth and its whiteness. Now this *viśeṣa* is the core of reality. Everything is what it is due to *viśeṣa*. To explain the properties and aspects of things, resort must be had to *viśeṣas*. It is obvious that to attribute a *viśeṣa* to each quality and aspect of a thing is to load it with fresh attributes. But the *Dvaitin* denies it by the assertion that *viśeṣas* are those that explain the presence of the attributes of a thing without making them different from it. Cf. *Dvaita Philosophy*. pp. 181-184. But that this is a mere verbal device which does not touch the problem of substance and attributes goes without saying.

Unlike the Advaitins, the Dvaitins object to treating Brahman as knowledge, bliss, etc. Brahman cannot be pure knowledge or consciousness, argues Vyāsātīrtha, for such a concept is meaningless. Knowledge which does not reveal its object makes no sense. In the state of *mukti*, it is well-known there are no objects distinct from Brahman as knowledge to be revealed. Brahman cannot be pure bliss either, if bliss means agreeable consciousness *anukūlavedanatva*—for, obviously, such agreeableness depends on extraneous factors.¹ To both these contentions, Madhusūdana in his *Advaitasiddhi* answers that pure illumination without objects and bliss as sheer desirability, *nirupādhikēṣṭarūpatvaṃ*, as forming the essence of Brahman are beyond cavil. As a matter of fact, objectless knowledge is pure bliss—*etena viśayānullekhiñnānamevānandam ityapiyuktaṃ*². The very fullness of Brahman's qualities distinguishes him from matter, individual souls and *prakṛti*, identified, in this system, with Mahālakṣmi³.

The body of the Lord, according to Dvaita, is constituted by his auspicious qualities like knowledge, bliss, etc., hence, unlike material bodies, it is imperishable. Indeed, Brahman's very perfection is his body.

Perhaps the most distinctive of the Madhva doctrines is that the Lord alone is absolutely independent, while all *Jīvas*, and material objects are dependent on him.⁴ The independent is that which has *sattā pravṛtti* and *pramiti*⁵ irrespective of other objects. In the light of this doctrine Madhva interprets the upaniṣadic phrase *ekamevādvitīyam*, i.e., there is no God but God who is Viṣṇu⁶. At the same time, he is capable of assuming countless forms, unlike the *Jīvas*. His infinitude, *ānantya* is said to be with respect to space, time, and excellences⁷.

1. HIP. Vol. IV, P. 306;

2. AS. P. 751;

3. BG. XV, 16-18;

4. MSS. 65;

5. Existence, activity & knowledge;

6. Cf. *svatantrobhagavān viṣṇureka eva na saṁśayah. Bhāgavata, VII, 7.*

7. *ānantyam ca deś'atahkālatagunataśca. MSS, P. 25.*

As regards the causality of God, the Dvaitins hold that it must be conceived as due to an overflow of his perfection, especially, of his joy ¹. God is regarded as the ground of the world which is dependent on him. But on the question, what kind of cause is God vis-a-vis the world, the Dvaitins take up a position of their own. *Brahmasūtra* I, 4, 24 ² is an unequivocal statement that Brahman is both the material and efficient cause of the world. But according to the *Mādhvite* interpretation of it, the *sūtra* merely states that the word *prakṛti* denotes Viṣṇu ³. The explanation of this view is that God being independent, his being must remain unaffected by the mutations of the world and so he cannot be its material cause ⁴. So God is only the efficient cause of the world. A passage in the *Nyāyasūdhā* of Jayatīrtha explains what exactly is meant by the immanence of God in the world, though He is only its efficient cause. God's immanence is more than the mere fact that he is the controller of the world; besides, he imparts to it its *sattā*, *pravṛtti* and *pramiti*. ⁵ Raghavendrācār in his *Dvaita Philosophy* comments on this passage that this Mādhvite view makes this Vedānta *Brahmādvaita* or *Svatantrādvaita* ⁶, but he does not explain, how, without being its material cause, Brahman can impart to the world its *sattā*.

In directing the world, God [is said to follow the lines of the *karmas* of the *Jīvas*. An obvious objection is that this view deprives God of all his independence. *Vanamali* ⁷ feels it to be so; still, he asserts that God's dependence on *karma* does not deprive him of his independence. Madhava himself adds that the very existence of *karma* and other things depends on the Lord. ⁸ Again, the eight-fold activity of God means that

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1. B.S.S.M. II, 1, 34;
 2. *Prakṛtisca pratijnādṛṣṭantānuparodhāt*; B.S.S.M.
 3. B.S.S.M. on I, 4, 24.
 4. The Dvaita Philosophy, p. 202.
 5. *Nyāyasūdhā* on I, 2, 5 *narājādivatniyāmakatvamātram antar yāmitvam, apitarhi, sattādipradatvam ityuktam bhavati*.
 6. Dvaita philosophy. p. 202 F.N. 1;
 7. B.S. II, 1, 35;
 8. BS. Bhāṣya, II, 1, 37 and III, 2, 39-42.

he is the author of both the bondage and liberation of *Jīvas*. Being *svatantra*, he is not obliged to do anything; still all his actions are for the good of the world¹. This assertion rests on faith alone and no arguments are available in support of it. Similarly, the assertion that without his favour nothing can be good² together with actual presence of evil in the world suggests that the *Dvaitins'* God is indifferent to the problem of good and evil. But they explain away this indifference on the plea that badness is necessary for spiritual advancement³. What is even more remarkable is the *dvaita* doctrine that the bondage of the *Jīvas* is due to the fact that so far they have had not the favour of God. What can save them is his grace.

The *dvaitins* admit that here and there upaniṣadic passages like *tattvamasi* seem to teach the identity of God and the individual⁴, but the obvious meaning is rejected on the ground that the context in which the teaching occurs requires the difference between the two to be stressed. Hence it is suggested that the passage be read as '*atattvamasi*'. Indeed, even in *mukti*, the difference between God and *Jīva* will persist according to the *Mādhvaite* teaching⁵. Nonetheless, some modern exponents of *mādhvaite* teachings feel rather diffident about the suggested emendation of *tattvamasi* and content themselves by saying that this suggestion must be carefully considered⁶. It appears that even Madhva did not expect full agreement with his view⁷. So he explains the passage as it stands, thus: God and *Jīvā* resemble each other as proved by *Jīva's* guidance by God. The expression of identity is merely meant to 'cajole and encourage man in his spiritual endeavours'⁸. As regards those upaniṣadic passages which assert that Brahman is beyond words and thoughts⁹,

1. Dvaita Philosophy. p. 203;

2. Ibid; 3. Ibid;

4. Ibid; p. 204;

5. *ato jivaikyamapi sa nirācakre jagatprabhuh | na hijanmādhīhetutvam jīvasya jagatobhavet || Anuvyākhyānam*, p. 5.

6. *Religion of realism* p. 72, Nagarajasarma, Madras, 1931;

7. Ibid; 8. Ibid; p. 73.

9. TU. II, 4; KU. I, 3, 13; NUT 7; *avacanenaivaprovāca*; KeU. I, 4, 7, etc.

Madhva's view is that they only point to the reconditeness of Brahman — *avācyatvādikamtvaprasiddhatvāt*.¹ In fact, Brahman is visible, *ikṣanīya* and so may be delineated in words, *vācyameva*².

Theologically, the devaitins attach much importance to the concept of Lakṣmī, the consort of Viṣṇu. She is described as dependent solely on him while being different from him³. Like the Lord, she also is eternally free, *nityamuktā* and is capable of assuming diverse forms. Again, like him, she has a body which is non-material or spiritual. Both the Lord and his consort are denoted by all words, *sarvaśabdavācya* and are copervasive⁴. In fact the distinction between Viṣṇu and Lakṣmī is more or less poetical and the one may be conceived as the expressive power of the other.

The Mādhva concept of Brahman presents a basic difficulty as regards his alleged independence. True independence is incompatible with the co-presence of the principles of *Jīvas* and matter which are entirely different from God and which must, therefore, limit him from without. A radical pluralism such as Madhva's makes the independence of God impossible⁵. The mere assertion that *Jīvas* and matter depend on Viṣṇu is unavailing so long as there is nothing in the nature of either *Jīvas* or the world of matter to make such dependence necessary or even plausible. Neither *Jīvas* nor matter proceeds from the Lord. They are entirely different⁶ from him. To make God the source of both bondage and liberation, and, further, to think of *Jīvas* as essentially three-fold⁷ is to depict him as an irresponsible despot for whom justice, not to speak of mercy and love, has little value. We have already referred, at the outset, to the violation by Madhva of both the spirit and letter of the *Brahma Sūtras* and *upanīśads*.

1. CSB. p. 80 ;

2. Ibid ;

3. *Pramātmabhinnātanmātrādhinā Lakṣmih* MSS. 70 ;

4. *deśakālābhyāmeva paramātmanā samavyāptā*, 74, Ibid ;

5. Vide IP. ii 750 ;

6. *sarvejivāh parasparam paramātmanā ca bhinnāh*, MSS, 85 ;

7. *muktiyogyā nityasaṁsāriṣtamogyāseti*, Ibid ; 79.

CHAPTER II

Māyā

In the section on God or *saguṇa* Brahman it was pointed out that viewing *nirguṇa* Brahman from the human end entails the simultaneous positing of *māyā*, *Īśvara* and *Jīva*. In fact, the entire world of phenomena, the sphere of multiplicity, the scene of life, its bondage, sufferings, and liberation falls within the boundless realm of *māyā*, according to the Advaita system. Thus it is obvious that the concept of *māyā* occupies a pivotal position in Advaita. This section we shall devote to an examination of its salient features.

Historically, the word has had different meanings at different times. While Yāska's *Nighaṇṭu*¹ equates it with *prajñā* or intelligence, Sāyaṇa notes that its most common meanings in the *Rg Veda* are *prajñā* and *kapāṭa* (deceit)². In many ancient hymns, *māyā* is praised as a world-sustaining intellectual power.³ In the oft-quoted *Rg Vedic* verse, VI, 47, 18⁴, *māyā* means the power to transform oneself into or assume strange forms — *anekarūpagrahaṇasāmarthyam*⁵. Striking resemblance to the later meaning it bears in Advaitic writings may be found in the use of the word *māyā* in the *Rg Vedic* verse X, 54, 2: "When grown to fulness by bodily form, thou didst wander among mankind proclaiming thy strength, O, Indra; then all thy battles of which men tell were but a product, a creation of *māyā*. For never hast thou

1. I, 6, 4.

2. *mimite jāñite, karmamiyate anayā it vā māyā*. Sāyaṇa on *Rg. V. III, 27, 7*. On *Rg. V. IV-30-21* and *V, 30, 6*, Sāyaṇa gives *śakti*-power as the meaning of *māyā* Cf.—NTU—III, 1—*tasmānmāyāmetām śaktim vidyāt*. Generally in the *Rgveda* the word *māyā* indicates the supernatural power attributed to the gods, especially to Varuṇa, Mītra and Indra.

3. *Rg. V. III, 38, 7*; *IX, 83, 3*; *I, 159, 4*; *V, 85, 5*.

4. *BU. II, 5, 19—rūpaṃ rūpaṃ pratirūpo bābhūva tadāyarūpaṃ pratiçakṣanāya* |

Indro māyābhih pururūpmiṣate yuktā hyasya harayaḥ sataśa ||

5. cf. Sāyaṇa on *Rg. V. III, 53, 8*.

yet, either today or in former times, found an enemy" ¹. The Rg Vedic verses III, 53, 8 and VI, 47, 18 ² illustrate the use of the term *māyā* to connote the distinction between the one and the many, the possibility of one becoming many, deceptively, through a mysterious power ³. Again a striking anticipation of the later concept of *māyā* may be seen in the opening words of the celebrated hymn on creation *nāsadāsīt nosadāsīt tadānīm* ⁴. This phrase, 'neither non-existent nor existent', is the same as the later definition of *māyā* as a *tertiumquid* other than *sat* and *asat* ⁵. In the late *Sarvasāropaniṣad*, ⁶ the description of *māyā* is practically identical with what it is in the fully developed Advaita philosophy. "*Anādirantarvatnī pramāṇāpramāṇasādhāraṇā nasatī nāsatī*".—It is without beginning, big with (the world of effects) common to both the proven and the unproven, neither real nor unreal. It is explained that not being subject to real change, *svayamavikārāt*, *māyā* turns out to be non-existent, when the cause of observed changes is inquired into; but, superficially, it seems to be existent or *satī*. Thus in itself it is indefinable, *lakṣaṇasūnyā*.

Gauṇapāda's use of the term ⁷ crystallizes the meaning of *māyā* as an illusive power which, in reality, does not exist ⁸. In the Gītā the meaning of this term is naturally disputed by

1. yadācarastanvā vāvṛdhāno balānīndra prabruvāṇo janaṣu | māyetsā teyāni yuddhānyāhurnādya sātṛuṇṇānu purāvivitse ||
2. VI, 47, 18 is quoted above, vide N. 4. III, 53, 8 is; rūpaṃ rūpaṃ maghavā bobhavīti māyāḥ kṛṇvāṇstanvaṃ parivṣvām | triryaddivah parimuhūrtamāgāt svairmitrai ranṭupā ṛtāvā ||
3. Other important upaniṣadic references to *māyā* are: PU. I, 16; SU. I, 10; IV. 9, IV, 10; In the later Upaniṣads among notable references to *māyā* are the following NPU. III; V, 1; NTU. 9. The teachings of Yājñavalkya in the BU. are obviously based on the perception of the nature of *māyā*.
4. Rg V. X. 129, 1; cf. A. Giri on the BUBV. I, 182 & PD. II, 50.
5. Sāyaṇa understands by the phrase in question *māyā* or the *mūlakāraṇam* of the world; vide his comm. on it.
6. Section IV.
7. He uses it 16 times thus—I, 16 & 17; II, 12, 19, 31; III, 10, 19, 24, 27, 28, 29; IV. 44, 58, 59 61, 69.
8. cf. IV, 58.

the exponents of rival schools. In two cases ¹; Śaṅkara interprets it as meaning God's power whose essence is the three qualities of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* and which deludes all living beings - *sarvabhūtamohinī*. In the *Gitā* verses IV, 6 and XVIII, 61, he takes *māyā* to mean the power of mere appearance, *naparamāṛthataḥ*, *chadmanā* ². In the *Brahma-sūtras* the word occurs but once ³ where Śaṅkara takes it to mean the utterly unreal - *naparamāṛthagandhopyasti* - being devoid of stable relations in regard to time, space and cause and being liable to sublation. ⁴ But Rāmānuja understands by *māyā* in this *sūtra* *āścarya* or the marvellous. ⁵

In his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras* Śaṅkara often uses the terms *mithyājñāna*, *ajñāna*, *māyā* and *avidyā* more or less interchangeably. Thus on *Brahma Sūtra* I, 3, 9 he explicitly identifies *māyā* and *avidyā*. ⁶ The power of the world-seed, i.e., the world-cause whose essence is *avidyā* and which depends on God *parameśvarāśraya* is otherwise called *avyakta*, *akṣara māyā*, &c. ⁷ *Māyā* is *avyaktā* or unmanifest being neither real nor unreal *tattvānyattvanirūpaṇasyāśakyatvāt* ⁸. Similarly, *avidyā* also is *avyakta* ⁹. Śaṅkara offers a description of *māyā* ¹⁰ which makes it out that it is a power of God consisting of 'name and form' which are falsely superimposed

1. BG. VII, 14 & 15.

2. S'B on the verses referred to above.

3. BS. III, 2, 3.

4. BSS. on III, 2, 3.

5. RB. on III, 2, 3.

6. *avidyayā māyāvivadane kadhā vibhāvya* S'B. p. 238. Rātna-prabhā writes: *māyāvidyayoraiikyād*—BSS. p. 9 & P. 624—Again Śaṅkara writes: *avidyātmikā hi bijaśaktiravyakta śabdānirdeśyā parameśvarāśryā māyāmayī*. BSS. p. 297.

7. Ibid.

8. BS'S. p. 298. cf. VC. v. 110. *avyaktanāmni parameśaśaktirānādyavidyā triguṇātmikā parā |*

kāryānumeyā sudhiyaiva māyā yayā jagat sarvamidaṁ prasūyate ||

9. Ibid. *avidyāhyavyaktam*. A. Giri in his *Nyāya Nirṇaya* on S'B. I, 4, 3, p. 297, points out that *avidyā* is not many but one only; as for the manifold results it produces, they may be referred to its inherent capacity—*avaśaktyā vicitrakārya-kāratvam*.

10. Qd. *supra*; p. 256 ff.

on him; which are, as it were, his very self, and which cannot be defined as either real or unreal¹ *Nāmarūpe* constituting, as it were, the essence of God or *Īśvara* are of course material, *jaḍa*, while God himself is a spirit². In this sense *māyā* is often referred to as *Prakṛti*³. Through the instrumentality of *māyā* which literally means measure as we saw above⁴, the *nirguṇa* Brahman or the Absolute appears to be measured out or finitised; it enshrouds Brahman and the objective manifold takes the place of Brahman⁵. Thus associated with *māyā*, the Absolute is more appositely styled *Īśvara*, and *māyā* in relation to him may be deemed his energy. Commenting on the *Brahma Sūtra* I, 1, 17⁶ Śāṅkara writes: "Just as the real juggler, *māyāvī*, standing on the ground is different from the juggler who, sword and shield in hand climbs into the sky on a rope" (God is different from the *Jīva*). While it is clear that in this last instance by *māyā* Śāṅkara means wizardry or illusion, in the earlier cases cited above it is by no means obvious that *māyā* means illusion. Rather, it denotes a material power of *Īśvara*, a power to produce material effects. The conclusion seems to be that for Śāṅkara *māyā* signifies both an illusive and a creative power which the *Śvetā'svātara Upaniṣad* calls *devātmas'akti*⁷. In the *Viveka-vadāmaṇi*⁸, Śāṅkara further amplifies the concept of *māyā* by distinguishing two powers of it, rather, two ways in which it operates. By its dynamic operation, initiated by its component of *rajas*, *māyā*, projects the cosmic manifold. It is otherwise known as the *Vikṣepaśakti* of *māyā*. By its static function due to its component of *taṃas*, *māyā* conceals the nature of reality, thus opening the door for the full play of its dynamism⁹.

1. BSS. on II, 1, 14, p. 382. cf. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, I, 18.
2. tābhyāmanyah sarvajña īśvarah, BSS. on II, 1, 14. p. 382.
3. SU. IV. 10.
4. Śāyana on Ṛg. V. III, 27, 7.
5. cf. God has covered all with His māyā. "God revealed to me that saccidānanda is covered by the scum of māyā." The gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, p. 199, Madras 1947.
6. bhedavyapadeśacca.
7. I, 3.
8. Sls. 113-115.
9. cf. Some think creation's meant to show him forth; I say it's meant to hide him all it can—Browning: Bishop Blougram's Apology. Qd. IP. ii, p. 571.

The divine power of *māyā* inheres in God even as heat does in fire. Its presence is inferred from its effects.¹ That for S'ankara *māyā* is not a mere illusion, but a divine power also follows from his description of it as the consort of *Parabrahmā*, though its power of creating illusions is fully recognized².

It was stated above that 'Sankara often uses the terms *māyā*, *avidyā*, *ajñāna*, &c., as synonyms³. But an important distinction which he makes deserves notice. In his introduction to the commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* S'ankara explains how, due to false knowledge, *mithyājñāna* by combining the true and the false, objects and their attributes are naturally superimposed on the subject and

1. PD. II, 47—*nistattvā kāryagamyāśya śaktir māyāgnisaktivat*.

2. *tvamasi paramabrahmamahiṣi*. Ānandalahari, verse 97—Dr. P.D. Sastri in his *Doctrine of Māyā*, London, 1911, concludes after an examination of the instances of S'ankara's use of the word that for S'ankara *māyā* means illusion only. pp. 25 ff. But such a conclusion is not borne out by the elaborate care S'ankara bestows upon the effect of *māyā*, viz., the manifestation of the world by God. True, when S'ankara wishes to emphasize the fact that the rounded perfection of Brahman is unaffected by the world-appearance, he likens the latter to a mirage, city in the sky, &c. But S'ankara also speaks of the world as *manasūpyacintyāracanārūpa*, of inconceivably grand workmanship, BSS. I. 1, 2; *sambhāvitatamaṁ s'lipibhirmanasāpyālocayitumāśakyam*—beyond the imagination of the most consummate architects. BSS. II. 1, 2; He speaks of the truth of the world as 'a profound mystery—*atigambhitam bhāvayāthātmyam*, BS. II, 1, 11, and does not just dismiss it as mere legerdemain. His elaborate and spirited refutation of the *Vijñānavāda* of the Buddhist (BSS. II, 2, 28) also points in the same direction. Therefore to do S'ankara's real intentions greater justice, the term *māyā* as he uses it in this connection must be taken to denote the creative power of God, no less real than God himself, without which, indeed, he would be no God. Hence to say with Dr. Sastri that *māyā* in 'the Upaniṣads meant illusion and S'ankara fixed on this sense of it (vide p. 29 *ibid*) would not suit all cases or even the most important cases of S'ankara's use of the word. cf. 'In general *māyā* means a mysterious principle of creation, and rarely, even in S'ankara, absolute unreality'. Idealistic thought of India, p. 404. P. T. Raju. That *māyā*, for S'ankara, is some thing more than mere illusion is brought out in the *Upadeśasābhāṣī* II, 17, 26–28 Vide *comm.* of Rāmānirṭha also.

3. Supra, p. 307.

vice versa despite the gulf of difference that separates the object from the subject. "Enlightened men style this superimposition *avidyā*." ¹ Here *avidyā* is treated as an effect of *mithyājñāna* which Anandagiri explains as 'false knowledge'; i.e., it is beginningless, other than negative, and yet liable to sublation through *jñāna* ². From this it follows that S'ankara sometimes conceived *māyā* and *avidyā* as cause and effect. This impression is strengthened by the declaration in the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* ³ that *avidyā* is the same as *manas*, which is a product of the world-cause, *māyā*. In the Upaniṣads themselves, the expression *avidyā* occurs ⁴ which Śankara interprets variously to suit the different contexts. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* *avidyā* is understood as the cognition of difference from the Self or the experience of the objective manifold in one case ⁵ and ignorance in another ⁶. In the *Kaṭha* II, 4, S'ankara understands *avidyā* to mean attachment to pleasure, while in the next *mantra* it is taken as a sort of dense darkness, *ghanībhūtamtamas*, suggesting the later idea of a positive ignorance. ⁷ In the *Īśa* where the term occurs in three *mantras*, Śankara interprets it as ritual acts, *agnihotrādilakṣaṇam karma* or acts opposed to *vidyā* or knowledge *vidyāvirodhitvāt karmaṇah* ⁸. But these special interpretations apart, Śankara's use of *avidyā* as synonymous with *adhyāsa* or superimposition is of fundamental importance in Advaita philosophy. It must be noted how he makes, in the description of *māyā* quoted above, ⁹ the essence of *māyā*, viz., *nīmarūpe*, a product of superimposition due to *avidyā-avidyākalpate*. "Thus *avidyā*

1. B'SS. p. 9 & p. 19. *tametam evamlakṣaṇam adhyāsam paṇḍitāvidyetr manyante*; cf. US. I, 50 & 51.

2. B'SS. p. 10. *tenānirvācyatvenābhāvavilakṣaṇam jñānanivarty-amanādyajñānam*.

3. s'l. 171.

4. BU. IV, 3, 20; IV. 4, 3; CU. I, 1, 10; KU. II, 4 & 5; IU. 9, 10, 11.

5. IV. 3. 20 *yathāvalāgṛamātramapyanyatvena drśyate nāham- mititadavasthāvidyā*. BUS. p. 356 Poona Edn. 1918.

6. IV, 4, 3.

7. 'SB. on KU. II, 4 & 5.

8. 'SB. on IU. 9, 10, & 11.

9. P. 307 *supra*.

becomes the force that launches us into the dream of life" ¹. It is the 'innate obscuration of our knowledge' - the knowledge or light that is the Ātman. ² In another place ³ Deussen describes it as the realism innate in man due to the nature of our cognitive faculty, of which space, time, and causality are the forms. This implies that, however far we penetrate infinity on all sides, we remain for ever in the desolate cage of empirical reality. The term *avidyā* expresses the fact of this inability of the mind of man, as it is at present constituted, to escape from its inherent forms. Consequently, it ranges all sense-impressions on the thread of time. ⁴ Then, by means of its inherent causality, the mind treats each impression as an effect and refers it to a cause; and, finally, projects the complex of causes and effects into space, where it appears as material objects. ⁵ The importance of the fact that causality is a form of *avidyā* is that it is vain to seek for its cause; it has no cause. This is expressed by saying that the cause of a given act of *adhyāsa* (*avidya*) is a tendency or *samskāra* engendered by a similar prior act and so on backwards into a beginningless past. No proof of this innate *avidyā*, defined as beginningless *adhyāsa* is called for; for it is patent to all. ⁶ In other words, *avidyā* as a subjective phenomenon is identical with the current fact of man's finitude.

Such is Śāṅkara's account of *māyā* and *avidyā*. But the problem implied by them was felt to require further elucidation. Writers on Advaita subsequent to Śāṅkara have attempted to throw further light on them. We shall briefly refer to their discussions and the solutions they offer, treating *avidyā*, *māyā*, and *ajñāna* as practically synonymous.

1. IP. ii. p. 574.
2. System of Vedānta, Deussen, p. 302.
3. Ibid, pp. 100 & 109.
4. The Elements of metaphysics P. 50, Macmillan & co., 1894. Deussen; cf. Time is *avidyā* only—Siddhānta Bindu, p. 379 KSS. No. 65, 1928.
5. The Elements, p. 53; cf. Comparative studies in Vedāntism, p. 63; Sircar, Oxford University Press, 1927.
6. B'SS. p. 25. *ayamanādīrananto mithyāpratyayarūpāḥ..... sarvalokapratyakāḥ.*

The difficulty about the expression *avidyā* is its negative form; it seems to be a negative entity, a mere absence of knowledge, *abhāvopādānam ajñānam* ¹. But really it is nothing of the kind as the following definitions will show ². Madhusūdanaśarasvatī, the author of the *Advaita siddhi* offers two definitions of *avidyā*. According to the first, *avidyā* is a positive entity without beginning, but sublata by knowledge; or it may be defined as the material cause of illusory perceptions. ³ All forms of ignorance including even that of a given piece of nacre which has apparently a beginning in time, are, strictly speaking, beginningless. For the ignorance of nacre which, in fact, engenders the illusory silver is held to have for its locus timeless consciousness, delimited by the nacre. By its *bhāvarūpa* or positivity is meant only its difference from being a mere nullity. ⁴ Citsukha explains that while *avidyā* is other than being either positive or negative, describing it as positive is figurative and meant to stress its difference from mere nullity ⁵. In fact, the philosophical significance of describing *avidyā* as a positive entity seems to be that, thereby, a degree of reality is lent to the objective world of which *avidyā* is the

1. AS. p. 544.

2. Cf. The expression *avidyā*, especially if translated as Nescience, conceals the essence of the conception; for, the negative expression leads us in a wrong direction, as if the word signified something negative and indicated merely a defect. This is an error. *Avidyā* is a mighty power, for, through it arise the *Upādhis* (limiting adjuncts); from which again come the aggregates of names and forms, and the instruments of our activity, and hence also suffering, birth, death, age, sickness, and so on. Happel, *Grundanschauung der Inder*, p. 89, Qd. The Concept of *Māyā*, p. 103. Devanandan, Y.M.C.A. Publishing House, Calcutta, 1954.

3. anādhāvarūpatve sati jñānanivartyā avidyā; or bhramopādānamajñānam. AS. p. 544.

cf. anādhāvarūpamyad vijñānena vilīyate | tadajñānamiti prajñālakṣaṇaṁ sampracakṣate || TP. p. 57.

or sadasadbhyanirvacanīyam triguṇātmakam jñānavirodhi bhāvarūpam yat kimcit, VeS.

4. bhāvatvaṁ cātrābhāvavilakṣaṇatvmātram vivakṣitam AS. p. 544.

5. TP. p. 57.

material cause. To treat it as merely negative is to dismiss the world as a phantasm and to opt for solipsism. The Advaitic writers from Śāṅkara onwards, with but few exceptions, have maintained the empirical reality of the world, which entails that of its material cause, *avidyā*, also. Hence their insistence that *avidyā* is *bhāvarūpa*.

The proof of *avidyā*, according to *Advaitasiddhi* is direct perception, *pratyakṣa*, both when awake and asleep — “I am ignorant, I know neither me nor others”, or again the preception “I don’t grasp the idea you expressed”. “So far I slept well and knew nothing.” These perceptions are said to testify to the presence before the witness-consciousness (*sākṣicaitanya* — see below) of positive beginningless ignorance.¹

1. AS. pp. 548, 550; also TP. P. 59. In addition to direct perception, other proofs also have been advanced to establish positive *avidyā*. Vivaraṇa p. 13 Viz., Edn. has the following inference: *vivādagocarāpannam pramāṇajñanām svaprāgabhbhāvavyatiriktasvaviṣayāvarana-svanivarttya - svadeśagatavastvantarapūrvakam bhavitumarhati aprakāsitārthaprakāśavatvāt andhakāre prathamoppannapradīpaprabhāvat*. Right cognition is preceded by some positive entity other than its own prior negation, this entity, having veiled (so far) the object of this right cognition, being removable by it, and having the same locus as itself; because, the right cognition reveals an object, so far concealed, just as the fresh light of a lamp reveals objects so far shrouded in darkness. The force of this inference depends on the Advaitic view that *tamas* or darkness is a positive entity—vide VPS. p. 13 Edited by Sastry and Sen, 1941. *Arthāpatti* or implication is also advanced to prove the fact of positive nescience. The expression ‘what is the nature of that thing? I don’t know it’ is taken to imply that the questioner is aware of the thing in question as *unknown*, according to the dictum, *sarvam vastu jñātayatā ajñānatayā va sākṣicaitanyasya viṣaya eva* — VPS. p. 20. This unknownness of which the questioner is aware is not a mere absence of knowledge, but rather of full and specific knowledge. Thus it implies a general positive nescience of which particular ignorances are more determinations. Again, the fact of illusion implies positive nescience as its material or substance—a fact which is brought out by Madhusūdana’s definition of it as *bhramopādānam*. AS. p. 544. Quotations from the Vedas and Upanisads, given at the beginning of this section also point to the same conclusion; of them the following may be repeated. Rg. V. X, 129, 3; CU. VIII, 2, 3; SU. IV, 5; I, 3.

Avidyā is held by Vācaspatiśra to have two forms known as *mūla* or primevel, and *tūla* or temporary¹ of which the first is beginningless and positive, while the second is the impression left in the mind by a prior illusory experience.² Vācaspati further maintains that *Jīva* or the individual is the locus of *avidyā*, its object being Brahman³. More precisely Vācaspati's view is that *avidyā* is bipolar, that it belongs to the *Jīva* in the sense that *Jīva* is aware of his ignorance; But it is of God or *Īśvara* that he is ignorant, ie., God is the content of his ignorance. *Jīvī*, nevertheless, cannot control his *avidyā*. That only *Īśvara* can do⁴. Is there not mutual dependence, *anyonyāśraya*, in Vācaspati's position? The phenomenon of *Jīva* is the result of *avidyā*'s operation, and yet *Jīva* is said to lodge it. The answer is 'no' for though nescience depends on *cit* or the consciousness of *Jīva* for its appearance, the later is self-luminous and does not owe its essential nature to nescience. As for their origin, both *Jīva* and *avidyā* are held to be beginningless. As a spiritual entity the *Jīva* owes nothing to *avidyā*⁵. Another point about the *mūlāvidyā* is that it is not a transphenomenal category—a fact that will be evident if we remember that it is posited by man in a state of ignorance to account for the apparent stability and beginning-

1. Bhāmati verse i — *anirvācyāvidyādvitāyāsacivācyā*, &c.
2. Kalpataru on the above. Here it may be noted that Vācaspati's view on *avidyā* are largely, if not wholly, borrowed from Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi*, cf. *tasmatagrahaṇaviparyaya-grahe dve avidye kāryakāranabhāvenasthite*. p. 149–50. Madras Edn, 1937. We noted above that Śaṅkara also used *avidyā* as though it were an effect of *mithyājñāna* which corresponds to *mūlāvidyā*. On the other hand, Maṇḍana ignores this distinction and treats all *avidyā* as one.
3. SLS. I. p. 22 SSS. Edn. Madras, 1937—*najñānam sūddha-caitanyāśrayam kimtu jivāśrayam Brahmaniṣyam*. This again is Maṇḍana's view also. cf. *kasyavidyeti jivānāmiti brūmah*—AS. pp. 10, 11.
4. Introduction to Bhāmatī, Catuhsūtrī, p. XXXVI, TPH. Edn. 1933.
5. *ajñānasya cidbhāsyatve'pi citeh svaprakāśatvena tadbhāsyatvāt. ajñānasya cidāśrayatve cidadhīnasthitikatve'pi oiti avidyāśritatvatadadhīnasthitikatvayorabhāvāt*. AS. p. 585.

lessness of the world. The causal relation between *tūlāvidyā* and its products is different from that between *mūlāvidyā* and *tūlāvidyās*; for *mūlāvidyā* is not a cause in time. Time falls within it as an aspect of it, and it is the logical ground of *tūlāvidyās*. While *mūlāvidyā* is one, its effects, *tūlāvidyās* are multiple.

This view of the difference between *mūlāvidyā* and *tūlāvidyās* is vehemently opposed by Sureśvarācārya who maintains that Brahman is itself both the locus and object, *āśraya* and *viśaya* of *avidyā*.¹ In developing his arguments he also throws light upon the ontological status of this disputed category of *avidyā*.² Sureśvara brings out the fact that *avidyā* is not a real entity, which may be determined by any valid means of cognition; only the real may be so determined³. In its indeterminability consists its status as *avidyā*.⁴ It is posited only as an empirical category on the basis of current experience *anubhavasamśrayā*.⁵ The proof that *avidyā*'s object is Brahman is that knowledge of Brahman is enjoined by the *sāstras*, as also the common experience of ignorance in regard to Brahman. But its locus also can be none other than Brahman, in other words, Brahman must also be deemed ignorant. This sounds paradoxical that the omniscient Lord, Brahman is at the same time ignorant. Sureśvara's reply is that in view of the unreality of *avidyā*, the contingency noted above has no real significance⁶. But when *avidyā* is figuratively regarded as an entity, it cannot possibly be imputed to any one other than Brahman, none other being metaphysically there to own it — *tadanyāsambhavādiha*.⁷ All actions and their accessories, real or unreal, have to be deemed as Brahman so long as its truth has not been fully comprehended⁸. It is this view of Sureśvara that was later

1. Naiṣkarmyasiddhi, p. 105—p 106. Hiriyanna Edn. 1925 BV. I, verses 175-182; Pt. II, 1215-1227.

2. In the whole discussion *avidyā*, its locus, and its object, the object referred to is *Īśvara* or *saguṇa* Brahman. cf. A. Giri on BV. II, 1218.

3. BV. I, 180.

4. Ibid; verses 180, 181.

5. Ibid; verse 182-cf. YPS. p. 19, Sec. 31.

6. BV. II, 1220.

7. Ibid; 1221-22.

8. Ibid; 1223.

echoed by his disciple Sarvajñātmamuni¹ and attained celebrity in Advaita as the position of the Vivaraṇa school². The position of the Vivaraṇa, more precisely, is that nescience is located in pure consciousness; but at the same time it is partial to the individual self or *Jīva*. This partiality accounts for the popular view that *Jīva* and not Brahman is ignorant³.

As a matter of fact, the question of *avidyā's* locus need not be unduly pressed. Being essentially unreal, it cannot and need not have a real residence. Clearly, it appears to reside in the *Jīva* who perceives the objective manifold. But is not *Jīva* one with Brahman? Thus it is equally true to hold that *Jīva* or Brahman is the locus of *avidyā*⁴.

To the account of nescience as set forth above a number of objections have been advanced, and, in more recent times, some apparent modifications and amendments of it have also been suggested. We shall pass the more important of them under rapid survey⁵. Some of the most plausible objections

1. Saṃkṣepasāriraka I, 20 & 319 — āsrayatvaviṣayatvabhāginī nirvibhāgacitireva kevalā |

pūrvasiddhatamaso hi paścimo nāśrayo bhavati nāpi gocarah ||

2. Introdn. to BrS. p. XXVII.

3. VPS. I, 81. p. 59. ataścinmātrāśritam ajnānam jīvapakṣapātitvājīvāśritamityucyate.

4. cf. vide Ajnāna, p. 21. G. R. Malkani.

5. We shall briefly notice an attempt by Mr. Subba Rao, in his Sanskrit work *Mūlavidyanirūpa*, to discredit the hypothesis of positive Nescience as set forth above. In an introduction to the work Mr. K. A. Krishnaswamy Iyer, the author of *Vedānta or the Science of Reality*, maintains that it was post-Sāṅkarite authors other than Sureśvara who invented the notion of positive nescience, and that earlier Advaitic thinkers from Yājñavalkya to Sureśvara were unaware of it. Both the author of the introduction and Mr. Rao contend that Sāṅkara does not believe in the persistence of Nescience in the dreamless sleep. (p. 4). But Sāṅkara writes on BS. III, 2, 9 that the reason why the same individual gets up from dreamless sleep is the persistence there of *kāma* and *avidyā* - ihatu vidyate vivekakāraṇaṃ karma cāvidyā ca..... sa evāyamupādhiśvāpaprabodhayor bijānkura nyāyena BSS. p. 637. Both Iyer and Rao dismiss the world of the waking state as merely private to the percipient, and deny its presence during sleep. In this respect, they are obliged to ignore, such BS. as I, 1, 2; I, 4, 23, and II, 1, 14 as well as Sāṅkara's comment on

are those raised by Rāmānuja¹. He observes that *avidyā* cannot have *jīva* as the basis of its operations and produce illusions; for the *jīva*hood itself is a product of *avidyā*. Nor may it be associated with Brahman as the latter is self-luminous knowledge and, as such, opposed to nescience. This is the so-called *āśrayānupapatti* or inconsistency as regards the locus.

In answer, it may be observed that this objection is based on the misconception that there are two distinct reals Brahman and *Jīva* and that *avidyā* itself is a third independent entity. In Advaita, however, *jīva* is Brahman associated with the limiting adjuncts or *upādhis*, the products of *avidyā*. The latter is opposed, not to *cit* or pure consciousness as such, but only to *ṛttijñāna* or *cit* reflected in the mental mould. Even here the opposition lies between *avidyā* and *cit* as related to, or reflected in, the *ṛtti*². Therefore pure *cit* or Brahman may very well serve as the locus of *avidyā*. It may be observed that even *jīvī* in Advaita may be deemed the locus of *avidyā* as pointed out above³, for the phenomena of *jīva* and *avidyā* are equally beginningless⁴, and neither, in regard to its origin, depends on the other.

them. They both aver that for S'āṅkara *avidyā* means only *adhyāsa* and thereby ignore such passage as have been quoted Both affirm that 'S'āṅkara does not recognize *jīvanmukti* in order to suggest that he denies the survival of traces of *avidyā* in that stage. But S'āṅkara unequivocally asks in his comment on IV, 1, 15 *katham hyekasya svahṛdayapratyam Brahmavedanam dehadhāraṇam caparena paratikṣeptum śakyate?* BSS. p. 851. cf. also 848. Finally, in their eagerness to disprove the unreality of positive *avidyā* in sleep, they both affirm that liberation is attained in dreamless sleep. To be sure, S'āṅkara does not subscribe to such a notion which will obviate need for *sādhana* and make *mokṣa* both cheap and worthless. Needless to add that neither Iyer nor Rao explains how after liberation in deep sleep, the *jīva* wakes up to find himself the same bound Self that went to sleep.

1. RB. pp. 58 ff. Benares 1916.

2. *ṛttiphalitacaitanyasyājñānavirodhitveca ṛttisambandha eva kāraṇam, nātu caitanyatvam*; VP; Introduction p. 42

3. P. 314 supra.

4. cf. *Jīva iśo viśuddhā cit tathā jīves'ayorbhidā | avidyātaccitryogah śaḍasmākamanādayah ||*

The second objection is styled *tirodhānānupapatti* or the inconsistency of Brahman being obscured. "To hold that *avidyā* obscures Brahman, which is nothing but light, is to affirm that the own nature of Brahman is destroyed-*svarūpanāśa evoktaḥ syād*. Obscuring of light must mean either the obstruction of the birth of light or destruction of the light that exists. But the light of Brahman is without beginning, eternal, and so its obscuration entails its destruction". This objection is due to the wrong notion that obscuration refers to an actual blotting out of the light that is Brahman, i.e., pure consciousness. Actually *tirodhāna* means the *jīvā's* non-apprehension of the full light of Brahman which, of course, no more affects the latter than a blind man's failure to see the sun affects the sun¹. In fact, in Advaita nescience is credited with three functions: (i) to create the illusion that Brahman does not exist; (ii) that it does not shine; and (iii) that it is not bliss as *attvāpādakābhānāpadanānandatapadakaṃ ca*.² The point of saying that Brahma-light does not shine forth in regard to the *jīva* is that the *jīva* does not realize himself as Brahman.

The substance of Rāmānuja's third objection, styled *svarūpānupapatti* or unintelligibility of the nature of *avidyā* is as follows. *Avidyā* must be of the nature either of the percipient, or the perceived, or of perception - *drṣṭriva, drśyatvena, drsitvenavā*, these three exhausting all possible objects. But it can be none of these; for, to say that either the percipient or the perceived is of the nature of *avidyā* is to make them superimposed entities like nacre-silver, and such superimposition requires a prior nescience as its cause. Thus, obviously, a *regressus ad infinitum* results. And, perception itself is not regarded as nescience by the Advaitins.

The Advaitic answer is that *avidyā* may very well be regarded as an object of perception, *drśya*, though not either as the percipient or perception. By an object is meant what

1. cf. *ghanaecchannadṛṣtirghanacchannamarkam yathā manyate niṣprabhamcātimuḍhah tathābaddhāvadbhāti yo mūḍhadṛṣteḥ*Hastāmālaka

2. VP. Introduction, p. 43.

is identified with, i.e., superimposed on, consciousness delimited by a *vr̥tti* or mental mould¹, and neścience answers precisely to this definition, it being superimposed on consciousness. This, of course, makes the concept of *avidyā* unique, being caused by a prior instance, of *adhyāsa* or its residual impression. The mutual dependence involved is of the logically tenable variety since *avidyā* is a beginningless force or entity. It may be reiterated that the demand for a cause of *avidyā* is futile in view of the fact that the notion of cause itself is an expression of *avidyā*, a mere form of mind (*avidya*'s product), and so inapplicable to the parent thereof, viz., *avidyā* itself³. In his fourth objection, *anirvacanīyatānupap̥tti*, Rāmānja affirms that the status of *avidyā* as a category neither real or unreal, i.e., indeterminable, is untenable. All categories must be based on experience, *pratīti*, and all experience points to entities, real or unreal. Experience being such can not have as its object something neither real nor unreal. One may as well say that any cognition may objectify anything whatsoever⁴. But the Advaitins maintain that the definition of *avidyā* as *sadasadvilakṣṇa*—being different from *sad* or *asad* is valid enough. But the senses in which these terms are used must be carefully noted. By *sad* or real is meant *trikālābādhyam*, what is unsublatable at any time, past, present, or future, viz., the timeless, and by *asad* is meant what does not appear real in any substrate, whatever. Rāmānja's commentator in the *Sr̥utaprakāśikā* observes that there is contradiction between *sad* and *asad* and so they cannot coexist in an object like the rope-snake, but, evidently, he was not thinking of the Advaitic concepts of *sad* and *asad* as set forth above. The appearance of the rope-serpent as real in illusory experience

1. *dīśyatvamāma vr̥t̥tyavacchinnacaitanyatādātmyam*; Ibid.
2. Vide Sankara's equation, *avidya adhyasa*. Introduction to BSS.
3. cf. "Casuality is the universal law of the empirical world"—Kant, Qd. by Dr. Sastri, *The Doctrine of maya*, p. 125. As a matter of fact, even in the empirical world, as shown by the quantum Theory, the sway of the casual law is not universal, vide. Einstein's remarks on the subject.
4. cf. *sadasadākārayāṇ pratīteh sadasadvilakṣaṇam viśaya ityabhūpagaṃyamāṇe sarvam sarvapratītervisayah syād*, RB. p. 60.

makes it different from *asad* (such as, eg., the hare's horn), while its subsequent sublation proclaims it is not *sad* like Brahman. Thus, in terms of the Advaitic definition, *avidyā* may very well be seen to be *anirvacanīya* or *sadadviaslakṣaṇa*.

Fifthly, Rāmānuja advances *pramāṇānūpapatti* against *āvidyā*. *Avidyā* cannot be established by any valid means of cognition. But advaitins assert that perception, inference, implication and scripture are available to establish the category of *avidyā*¹. According to Rāmānuja the direct perception, 'I am ignorant, &c.' denotes only the prior negation, *prāgabhāva*, of knowledge, and not positive nescience. In this perception, clearly, the Self or *pratygartha* either shines forth or not. If it does, nescience must vanish in the light of that very perception. If it does not, how can nescience, minus its locus and object, appear at all? It would not do to say that in the perception, 'I am ignorant', Self shines forth only vaguely, and so may will be treated as both locus and object of positive nescience. For, the view that the prior negation of knowledge alone is involved in the perception in question may also be substantiated in a like manner. It might be said that the prior negation abides in the Self but is indistinctly perceived, while its correlate, *pratiyogi*, is a memory-percept (of this or that entity). Rāmānuja's point is that the ignorance in question is nothing *suigeneris* and positive, but merely the prior negation of that valid knowledge which will suffice to dispel it.

The Advaitin points out that Rāmānuja makes a mistake in thinking that prior negation is a category acceptable to him (ie., the Advaitin)². In the expression, 'the pot will come into being', what is experienced is not the prior negation of the pot, but only its present non-existence. If the pot were not in some sense real now, how could it come into being at any time³. Again, prior negation being a single category it should be appropriate to say of a pot to be manufactured tomorrow that it will brought into being today. Besides, nescience is not experienced by us as opposed to knowledge,

1. vide pp. 312-313 & FN. 1 on P. 313

2. cf. Jñānaprāgabhavastu bhavatāpyabhyupagamyate. RB. p. 62

3. cf. nāsato vidyaṭe bhāvo, BG. II. 16.

but only in itself as a distinct empirical category, just like darkness. Hence it has no necessary reference to a correlate. Further no cognition of absence involving a memory percept is a case of direct perception ¹. It is precisely for the cognition of absence that the Advaitins, along with the Bhāṭṭas, accept non-perception *anupalabdhi*, as the sixth means of valid knowledge. Therefore, the apprehension 'I am ignorant', understood as a prior negation of knowledge, cannot become an object of perception or *pratyakṣa*. Thus the apprehension in question must be treated as revealing positive nescience. Rāmānuja also challenges the inference advanced by the Advaitins to establish positive ignorance ². His main point is that since this very inference is supposed to remove ignorance regarding positive nescience and thus establish its reality, this nescience itself must be supposed to be shrouded in a further and different positive nescience, and so, the first nescience would not be revealed by the *sākṣin*; thus it will be irremovable by the knowledge of Brahman ³. But this objection rests on a complete misunderstanding. The inference in question is not meant to establish beginningless, positive nescience, as it has already been by direct *sākṣi pratyakṣa*. What the inference does is to establish the positivity and sublatability of that nescience. Both these latter are held to be shrouded by ignorance and this is removed by the valid inference.

The sixth objection of Rāmānuja-*nivartakānupapatti*- refers to the incapacity, according to him, of Brahman knowledge to sublimate positive nescience. For the Advaitin this knowledge must be of the attributeless Brahman. But Rāmānuja says that Brahman is never without attributes - *Brahmaṇah-saviśeṣatvādeva* ⁴, and, in support, quotes passages describing Brahman as a personal being with exalted attributes ⁵. We have already dwelt on the way in which Rāmānuja explains

1. cf. *gr̥hītvā vastusadbhāvam smṛtvā capratīyoginam* |
mānasam nāsti tājñānam jāyate kṣāṇapekṣaṇāt || ŚV.

2. Qd. P. 312, supra, FN. 1

3. RB. pp. 64 ff.

4. Ibid; p. 75

5. TA. III, 13, 1; MNU. I, 8, 10-11 &c.

even explicitly advaitic texts to suit his contention that Brahman has attributes¹. The point at issue is mainly one of textual interpretation and it is enough to refer to the verdict of a scholar like G. Thibaut who is no partisan of Śankara: "But the task once given, we are quite ready to admit that Śankara's system is most probably the best which can be devised. Śankara's fundamental doctrines are manifestly in greater harmony with the essential teaching of the Upaniṣad than those of other Vedāntic systems"².

The last objection, *nivṛtīyanupapatti*, urged against the doctrine of positive nescience, is that it cannot be abolished at all. Rāmānuja argues that since bondage is real, the knowledge of the identity of Brahman and Ātman cannot abolish *avidyā*. Only the grace of God, *paramapuruṣa*, moved by devotion, can abolish real bondage. Of course, this position also is dogmatic and turns on the concept of bondage. As a matter of fact, Rāmānuja's position involves all the inconsistencies and difficulties of the concept of a personal God. That it does not tally with the Upanisadic view of absolute reality has already been noted. The Advaitic view of the Absolute has also been set forth above³. That the Advaitins, too, empirically recognize the value of divine grace, the reality of bondage, and so forth will be evident from sequel. But they insist that ultimate and total liberation through the abolition of nescience must ensue from saving knowledge alone.

Following in the wake of Rāmānuja, Venkaṭanātha in his *Satadūṣaṇī* asks⁴ whether *avidyā* is different from Brahman or not. If different, Advaita breaks down, and if not different Brahman can never free itself from it. But the Advaitic answer to this dilemma is that *avidyā* is a category *sui generis*, not real enough to set itself up as a rival to Brahman, and yet not unreal like the hare's horn. In short, whereas Brahman is a transcendental and eternal reality, *avidyā* is an empirical fact. The man in the street considers the world of *avidyā* as

1. PP. 304 ff supra.

2. SBE. Vol. XXXIV, Intrdn. pp. cxxii & cxxiv.

3. Supra, pp. 272 ff.

4. 18th objection.

real. One who is learned in the *śāstras*, viz, the man of the spiritual insight, regards it as unreal or *tuccha* while the metaphysician, intellectually, accounts it neither real nor unreal¹. The failure to grasp the relativity of *avidyā* is at the root of all *Viśiṣṭādvaitic* and *dvaitic* objections against this Advaitic category. Again Venkaṭanātha² commits the error of taking the *avidyā* to be nothing but a psychological state - a lack of knowledge. Hence his reasoning that Brahman cannot be a knower and so cannot have nescience. Actually, psychological ignorance is only a function of *avidyā*, its operation of *āvaraṇa* or obscuration; it has a universal reference and status, albeit empirical, in the context of its association with *Īśvara*, when it is better known as *māyā*.

Some of the typical objections urged by Dvaitins against the concept of nescience may also be briefly noticed. Vyāsātīrtha in his *Nyāyāmṛta*³ asserts that a *jñāna* has no other meaning than then negation of knowledge. Therefore, to know *ajñāna*, it is necessary to know the correlate of the negated knowledge. In the case of the nescience described as primeval and positive the correlate is *Brahmajñāna*, which, being eternal, rules out all possibility of its negation⁴. The Advaitin replies that the above suggestion is untenable, for, the knowledge 'there is no knowledge in me' (*ahamajñāh*), according to the Dvaitia, must refer to knowledge, implying a knowledge of knowledge - which, of course, contradicts the initial knowledge. Therefore the experience of negation of knowledge which does not involve reference to a correlate is possible only when the object of experience is positive *ajñāna*⁵.

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1. cf. *tucchānirvaccanīyā cavāstavi cetyasau tridhā | jñeyā māyā tribhir bodhaiḥ śrāuta-yauktikalaukikaiḥ ||*
PD VI 130.
 2. 19th objection.
 3. HIP. vol. IV. p. 266.
 4. *apica bhāvarūpājñānāvacchedakaviṣaysayājñāne ajñānājñānā-yogāt jñāneca ajñānasyaivābhāvāt katham bhāvarūpājñānā-jñānam ? - Nyāyāmṛta P. 313 Qd. HIP. vol. IV. p. 266.*
 5. *Ibid*, p. 269.

Vyāsatīrtha objects that the objects of the world being in time, the ignorance that limits the consciousness underlying the world cannot be beginningless. But why a beginningless entity cannot produce effects in time is not clear. In fact without some difference between cause and effect, it is impossible to distinguish them. As between cases of illusions and their cause, viz., beginningless nescience, there can be a causal link, since this nescience is other than merely negative. On the other hand, Vyāsatīrtha's contention that the unreal may be, then, the effect of the real is invalid, since utter dissimilarity between cause and effect is unthinkable. His further contention that *ajñāna* cannot be beginningless being other than knowledge and negation is also untenable, for, the Advaitin recognizes also a category which is neither the one nor the other. Nor is it true that what is beginningless must be endless like the Self or Ātman - for, this is true only of the Self. Again, the fact that knowledge cast in the mould of *vṛtti* cannot intuit Brahman does not imply that ignorance regarding Brahman is irremovable, for, as a matter of fact, in so far as ignorance relates to Brahman, it is removed by the final *vṛtti*. Finally, the fact that *ajñāna* is manifested by the *sākṣi* - consciousness would not make it eternal like the latter; for strictly, the *sākṣi* consciousness which reveals nescience is consciousness limited by the nescience, and with the cessation of the latter, that *sākṣi* ¹ also may be held to have ceased.

Above have been given some of the major objections urged against the doctrine of *māyā* or *avidyā* by two major, traditional, opponents of Advaita. Latterly, Sri Aurobindo has written much on this subject. He is a *tāntric* thinker ², and naturally he disagrees with Śankara's interpretation of *māyā*. He writes: *Māyā* is one realization, an important one, which Śankara over-stressed, because it was most vivid to his own experience. For yourselves, have the word for subordinate use and fix rather on the idea of *līlā*, a deeper and more penetrating word than *māyā*. *Māyā* means nothing more than the freedom of Brahman from the circumstances through

1. *ajñānavṛttipratibimbitacaitanyasaiva sākṣipadārahāt* - AS. p. 557

2. *Yogic Sādhana*, p. 33. Qd. *Idealistic Thought of India*, p. 299.

which he express himself. . . . We must escape from the māyā of ignorance which takes things as separately existent and not God, illimitable for the really limited, the free for the bounded¹. But Aurobindo does not face the problem of a non-dual Brahman really becoming many, whether 'the circumstances' referred to 'through which Brahman expresses himself' are real or not. In the *Life Divine*² he writes that infinite consciousness in its infinite action can produce only infinite results. To produce a world of fixed truths, a selective faculty of knowledge commissioned to shape finite appearance is necessary, and that faculty or power is *māyā*. But he does not raise the question whether any action is consistent with an absolutely perfect and infinite consciousness, such as the non-dual Brahman of the Upanisads is³. It is to reconcile the actionless perfection of Brahman with the dynamisms of the world of sense-experience that Śāṅkara postulates *māyā* as an adjunct of *saguṇa* Brahman, i. e., as strictly relative to the percipient consciousness of the *jīva*. Aurobindo is either unaware of this aspect of the question or ignores it, with the result that he has to rest in the dogma of a real and unintelligible 'obscuration of its own plenary light and power by a peculiar self-diminishing or self-effacing action of conscious force in the Being.'⁴ Notwithstanding his effort to deduce the world of matter from an 'indivisible existence,'⁵ he feels that in 'a certain sense Matter is unreal and non-existent'. It is precisely this apparent existence of unreal and non-existent matter in indivisible *saccidānanda* that Śāṅkara refers to as *Māyā*. Thus Aurobindo's criticism of Śāṅkara's *māyā* seems to be very unconvincing.

A reaffirmation of the Advaitic doctrine of *māyā* by Vivekānanda, "the inaugurator of the neo-vedāntic movement

1. The Yoga and its objects, pp. 55-57 ;
2. P. 174, Vol. I, Calcutta, 1939.
3. cf. Nothing perfect can move. AR. P. 500, "To attribute emotions to God conflicts with the very definite religious intuition that God is unchanging. He is without shadow of turning." Time & Eternity, p. 50 ; Stace.
4. Life Divine, p. 414.
5. Ibid; p. 361.

in India " ¹ may also be noticed in this context. He points out that *māyā* is not a theory of explanation of the world. It is purely and simply a statement of the fact of the paradoxes of thought and action as also of the startling vicissitudes of nature around ². *Māyā* is the word for the way in which the Universe is going on. M. Rolland adds that *Māyā* is a fact of observation insufficiently explained, if not actually unexplained ³. Again, with remarkable insight Vivekananda points out that the essence of *māyā* is relativity ⁴. It is the relative link between absolute being and utter non-being. In other words, *māyā*, the Hindu sphinx, represents the answer to the question, How the Infinite became the finite. *Māyā* is the screen seen through which the infinite appears as the finite. "The infinite never changes, all that changes is *māyā*" ⁵. Ultimately, on the question of *māyā*, one can only appeal to experience of the Infinite and Illusion ⁶. The memory and the influence of the tremendous moment of experience never leave the great mystic and cause him to attribute to the world a shadowy half reality. Accordingly, Brahman alone, the content of the pure mystic moment, is absolutely real; other things, in comparison, are more or less real according as they are nearer or further away from the divine order. Of course, in pure Advaita, there is no lapse from the ultimate experience of the Absolute and so no question of a shadowy reality by the side of its full-orbed reality arises. But the hypothesis of *māyā* or *avidyā* or *ajñānā* is propounded to reconcile the mystic experience of the sole reality of Brahman and the empiric experience of plurality. In the words of Vidyāraṇya, it is a metaphysician's account of the empirical world of shadows ⁷. As such an intellectual account of facts, it may

1. IPC. 1952-D.M.Datta.

2. Jñānayoga, Vol. II, pp. 39 ff.

3. Prophets of the New India, p. 375, F. N. 12 Cassel, London, 1932.

4. IVth Lecture on *Māyā* in Jñānayoga, Vol. II.

5. Ibid.

6. of That the world is unreal is a mystical proposition, not a factual one and derives from the mystical vision of the eternal and infinite moment-Time and Eternity, p. 78.

7. PD. VI, 130, Qd. above P. 323. cf. PA. p. 246.

fail to convince those who have not themselves experienced the vanity of the world. Thus Deussen says: In reality there is nothing else besides Brahman. If we imagine that we perceive transformation of him into the world, a division of him into a plurality of individuals, this depends on *avidyā*. But how does this happen? How do we manage to deceive ourselves into seeing a transformation and plurality, where in reality, Brahman alone is? On this question our authors are silent¹. Rādhākṛishṇan comments that "they give no information, simply because no information is possible"².

1. DSV. p. 302.

2. IP. ii. p. 578; cf. That experience should take place in finite centres and should wear the form of finite thickness is, in the end, inexplicable, AR. p. 225, 2nd Edn. .

CHAPTER III

THE CONCEPT OF JIVA IN ADVAITA

(i) Jiva in the Upaniṣads or the real nature of Jivas

Due to the association of *māyā* or *avidyā* with Brahman, we pointed out, the individual self or *jīvātman* and God or *Iśvara*, the *paramātman*, are simultaneously posited. We also sought to elucidate the precise nature of *māyā* which characterises, though in two different ways, both *Iśvarā* and *Jiva* ¹. Now we shall proceed to examine the nature and status of the *jīva* in Advaita before taking up the problem of the world in which he lives his life of bondage and attains liberation.

In the upaniṣads various views in regard to the nature of the *jīva* are found expressed. The principle of their interpretation followed by Śāṅkara is that the basic truth of the non-dualism of the real shall not be violated, this being the specific and distinctive teaching of the upaniṣads, as well as the *neplus ultra* of spiritual experience. In the older upaniṣads like the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya*, the view firmly maintained is that the *jīva* and the supreme reality, *Sat*, are essentially one. Explaining the passage, *anena jīven ātmānānupraviśya* ², Śāṅkara writes that the phrase *anena jīvena* refers to the real or *Sat*, which, in an earlier cycle of creation, underwent embodiment, and which, as such, is present in the cosmic mind of the creative Absolute or *Iśvara* ³. That which underwent individuation and became *jīva*, i.e. the *prāṇadhāraṇakartṛ*, is of course none other than the *Sat* which in itself is pure consciousness, *caitanyasvarūpam*. Its embodiment is denoted by the term *anupraviśya*, i.e., having entered into the *upādhis* or inorganic element of world-manifestation ⁴. This *ansupraves'a* or entry means no more

1. eṣāmāyā svāvyatirikṭānikṣetrāṇidarsayitvā jīvesarāvābhāsenā karoti, māyā cāvidyā ca svayamevabhavati. NTU. IX.
2. CU. VI, 3, 2.
3. svabuddhisthaṃ pūrvasṛṣṭyanubhūtaprāṇadhāraṇam ātmānameva smarantyaḥ. CUB. P. 311.
4. CU. VI, 2.

than the development of particular cognitions through contact with elements of the world of objects *labdhaviśeṣaviñāna*. Discussing the question further¹, 'Sankara asks why an all pervading principle like the creative Absolute should 'enter', to be in a given body. He explains that 'entry' does not mean the association of an omniscient principle with specific properties as in the case, say, of the milk in the cocoanut. Phrases echoing the same idea elsewhere also³ imply that without suffering any sort of mutations, the creator enters the complexes of effects. Of course, no sort of movements on the part of *Iśvara* is conceivable from one place to another; for, He is a partless spirit⁴. Nor may this entry be likened to the formation of a reflection⁵, for, pure consciousness is not remote from the effects in which reflection is supposed to be formed. Nor can the *praveśa* in question be similar to the 'entry' of qualities into substance; for, God, unlike qualities, is absolutely independent. Hence *anupraveśa* is no more than the association of the *Sat* i.e., God with organisms which differ only in their objective structures. In them all the same pure consciousness is present⁶. That the supreme reality is cognizable in the inner organ or *antahkaraṇa* of the *jīva* is the sense of the *anupraveśa* referred to above. The individual or *jīva* is the supreme reality present in the psycho-physical complex, apparently undergoing all its experiences.⁷

1. Sankara's comm. on BU. 1, 4, 7.

2. BUB. P. 112.

3. TU. II, 6, *tat sṛṣṭvātadevānuprāviśat*.

4. BUB. P. 113.

5. In view of this clear statement, it is questionable to hold that Sankara is in favour on the so-called *pratibimbavāda* which, later, found favour with several Advaitic thinkers as an explanation of the *jīva's* status. Cf. The views of the *Prakāṣārthakāra*, the *Tattvavivekain* PD. the *Samkṣepasārīraka* and partly of the *Vivaraṇa*; vide VP. pp. 94, 95.

6. SU. VI, 11.

7. Cf. BSS. P. 234. On BS. I, 3, 19. Sankara writes : *yadasya pāramārthikam svarūpam param Brahma tadrūpāyanam jīvam vyācāṣṭe*; also Cf. P. 528, BSS. on II, 317—*avikṛtasyaivabrahmaṇo jivabhāvābhyupagamāt*; BSS. P. 537—538 *caitanyameva hyasya svarūpamagnerivauṣṇyaprakāśau*; BSS. P. 559 *tasmāt para evaikaḥ sarveṣāṃ bhūtānāmāntarātmā jivabhāvenāvashitah*, BSS. II, 3, 47.

Discussing the views of the three teachers *Āsmarathya*, *Audulomi*, and *Kāśakṛtsna*¹ on the nature of the *jīva*, Śankara points out that *Kāśakṛtsna* represents the true upaniṣadic position, viz, the *paramātmān* is present in the body as *jīva* or, as he is otherwise called, *viññānātmān*². *Āsmarathya* would introduce a casual relation between God and *jīva*, while *Audulomi* stands for *bhedābheda*, identity-cum-difference, between them. The names denoting God and *jīva* are, in truth, synonyms³.

Above it was noted that *jīva* is the designation of *Sat* or the creative Absolute in association with *upādhis* or psycho-physical complexes. This term is of prime importance in Advaita as it is invoked to account for all kinds of appearances, organic and inorganic. Śankara explains the term in two different contexts. The *upādhis*, psychologically, consist of *vāsanās*, or tendencies which constitute the mind of the *Jīva*⁴. The form of the mind which limits the pure light of consciousness is a product of the interplay of the formed and formless *vāsanās*, on the one hand, and the determinate ideas on the other⁵. Metaphysically the limiting adjunct is less than real. *māyendrajāla mṛgatṛṣṇīkopamam*⁶. That the

1. BS. I, 4, 20-22.

2. asyaiva paramātmānō nenāpivijñānātmabhāvenāvasthānāt. BSS. P. 332 Cf. sarvāṇirūpāṇivicitṛya dhīro nāmānikṛtvābhivadanyadāste, avikṛtaḥ Parameśvaro jīvonānya itimatam, BSS. P. 332.

3. sthitekṣetrajañnaparamātmāikatvaviśaye śamyagdarśane kṣetrajañnah paramātmēti nāmamātrabhedāt. B'SS. P. 336. Cf. S.U. IV, 3;

tvamstrītvampumānasitvamkumārautavākumārī |
tvamjirno dandēnavāñcasi tvamjāto bhavasivīśvato mukhaḥ ||
Also, S'U. IV, 4; US. I, 23; cf. brahmadāśā brahmadāśā
brahmaivemekitavāh—Qd. in BSS. P. 555.

4. BUB. p. 308.

5. mūrtāmūrtavāsanāvijñānasamyogajanitam lingasya rūpam. Ibid.

6. Madhusūdanasarasvatī offers the following definition of the term *upādhi*: yah svadharmamanyaniṣṭhatayā bhāsayatisaupādhiḥ—what apparently transfers its own attributes to another. Gūḍhārthadīpikā, BG. P. 52,

jīva is no more than this complex of ideas and tendencies is the tenet of the *Vijñānavādi* Buddhists ¹. That they constitute the qualities of the substantival *ātman*s is the doctrine of the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* thinkers ². That these are the manifestations of the three-fold *prakṛti* is the deliverance of the *Sāṃkhya* philosopher ³. Even the followers of the *upaniṣads* do not agree on the character of the *upādhis*. The Advaitic view, in the light of the identity of *tat* and *tvam*, 'That and Thou', taught by the *upaniṣads*, is that the *upādhis* are only appearances so that a casting off or out-growing of them is feasible. All plurally observed in the life of the *jīvas* must be referred to the mind and its countless tendencies and impressions. Gauḍapāda asserts that the *upādhis* which variegate nondual reality are on a par with dream bodies, projected by the *māyā* of the self. That is to say they are imagined by the self through its own *avidyā*. No essential differences distinguish the *upādhis* among themselves ⁴.

It is possible to treat the concept of the *upādhis* in a less summary fashion, so as to do greater justice to the picture of life Śaṅkara's works unfold. True *upādhis* depend on that *avidyā* which, as Śaṅkara has declared, drives us to associate with God *nāma* and *rūpa*, the very essence of God *qua* God, which constitute his *māyā* ⁵. *Upādhis* are fashioned by *avidyā avidyākṛta* ⁶. Due to them the supreme Brahman becomes God, the world, and *jīvas*. More specifically, the *upādhis* of the *jīva* consist of the gross physical body; and of the subtle body or *sūkṣmaśarīra* ⁷, which includes the mind also. It is important to note that mind or *manah*

1. Vide PP. 130-133 supra.

2. Vide PP. 17-18 supra.

3. Vide P. 42 supra.

4. GPK. III, 10 & 'Śaṅkara's Com. on it.

5. BSS. P. 382.

6. DSV. PP. 303, 304.

7. In the *Vivekacūdāmaṇi*, 'Sls. 98, 99, 'Śaṅkara explains that the subtle body consists of 8 componets—*puryaṣṭakam*—viz. (i) the 5 sense organs of action; (ii) the 5 of perceptions; (iii) the 5 vital breaths; (iv) the 5 rudimentary elements; (v) *buddhi* or intellect; (vi) *avidyā* understood psychologically only; (vii) *kāma*. (viii) *Karma*.

according to Advaita, is material or *jaḍa*; i.e. it falls within the realm of objects and not that of the subject, which is pure consciousness¹. The significance of the contention that the *upādhis* are made of such stuff as *avidyā* cannot be exaggerated. It implies that with the dawn of the true knowledge of the Self, the *upādhis* will be abolished being no more than the creations of *avidyā*. But for all that, they have an empirical or pragmatic reality and are responsible for the distinctiveness of each *jīva*'s personality².

We began with the observation that the older Upaniṣads firmly maintain the identity of *jīva* and Brahman. But in the latter upaniṣads, there are certain passages which apparently posit a difference between the two; it is necessary to note how the Advaitin understands these passages. In the *Śvetāśvatara*, e.g., in numerous contexts *Īśvara* and *Jīva* are sharply contrasted³. The celebrated simile of the two beautifully plumaged inseparable birds on the same tree of life, one pecking at fruits, sweet and bitter, while the other majestically looks on, brings out the normal relation between *Īśvara* and *Jīva* in empirical life. Here *Viśiṣṭādvaita* insists that as the *jīva* alone is the subject of experience or *bhoktā*, his difference from *Īśvara* is real and lasting. That they are similar and inseparable also suits the *Viśiṣṭādvaitic* position; but while the Lord is sinless, *apahatapāpmā*, &c., the *jīva* is both sin-smitten and grief-stricken. The Dvaitin adds the note that the inseparable companion, *jīva*, referred to is of the upright type, *rju*; for he holds that crooked *jīvas* are fit only to suffer in shady hell⁴. Śankara takes this as a description, not of the ontological status either of the *jīva* or *Īśvara*, but of the fact of life in the body. Man and God, with the same conditioning medium of self-manifestation⁵, viz., *avidyā* or

1. CU. VI, 5, 4—*annamayam hi somyamanah*; also, BG. XIII, 5, 6
2. Whether the creative *avidyā* has also not a cosmic reference we shall consider in the next chapter.
3. 'SU. I, 9; IV, 6; MU. III, 1, 1.
4. The Dvaitins maintain that there are three classes of *jīvas*, (i) fit for liberation, *muktiyogyāḥ*; (ii) perpetual wanderers in transmigratory life, *nityasaṃsāriṇaḥ*; (iii) doomed to hell life—*tamoyogāḥ*. MSS. 79.
5. *saṁānābhivyaktikāraṇau*—'SB. on MuU. III, 1, 1.

māyā are present in the living body, *saṁānam vṛkṣam*. The *jīva* or the empirical self, whose *upādhis* are *avidyā kāma karma* (nescience, desire, and acts) is alone subject to experiences, pleasant and painful. God, eternally pure, aware, and free, is a mere looker-on, without sharing in those experiences. Still, by his mere presence he may be said to cause the *jīva* to act. This causation or *prerayitṛtvam* consists merely in his presence ¹.

The passage under notice introduces the important idea that the *jīva* as he is, in fact, is a *bhoktā* or subject of experiences. While his real basic nature is that of the Lord, *nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāva*, unlike the latter, he has suffered a degeneration, has become a *bhoktā*. The Upaniṣadic explanation is that it is due to the association of the pure Self with the psycho-physical organism ². But this can hardly be called an explanation; it is only a statement of the fact of the *jīva's* finitude and consequent liability to experiences. The nearest approach to an explanation is given in the form of a simile ³. As the one fire has entered the world and becomes corresponding in form to every form, so the inner Self (i.e. God or *antarātman*) of all things corresponds in form to every form and yet is outside. This simile is repeated with regard to the wind, and the Sun, and suggests how one God and Self appears to be many in different organisms, and yet does not forfeit its own nature ⁴. An apparent pluralism of *jīvas* finds its most patent expression in the *Muṇḍaka*. ⁵ As from well-blazing fire, sparks by thousands issue forth of like form, so from the Imperishable beings manifold are produced and thither also go. The non-advaitins will take these words more or less literally and find in them support for their doctrine of plurality of *jīvas*. This, of course, places them in irreconcilable antagonism to the doctrine of non-duality, the unique teaching of the Upaniṣads as a whole. Sankara points out ⁶ that the production here referred to is to be understood as in the case

1. *darśanāmātram hi tasya prerayitṛtvam*. Ibid. cf. *dvāsuparnet-yādeśca lokasiddhabhedānuvādakatvāt*, TP. P. 371.

2. KU. III, 4-ātmendriyamadoyuktam bhoktetyāhurmanīṣiṇaḥ.

3. Ibid. V, 9, 10, 12.

4. Cf. BG. IX, 4 & 5

5. II, 1, 1.

6. SB. on MuU. II, 1, 1.

of the production of 'pot ether', 'house-ether' &c. That is to say, just as the partless ether is apparently broken up into countless fragments due to association with objects like pot, house, &c; but in reality retains its indiscerptible unity, so the supreme Self, too, through association with 'names and forms' i.e, organic hodies, only appears to be pluralized ¹.

Apart from these two types of upaniṣadic passages emphasized by the Advaitins and Dvaitins respectively, we have a third where the supreme Self is described as dwelling in the *Jīvātman* as his immortal, inner, controller. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* ² the Lord is described as abiding in all things including the *jīva*. The entire passage known as *ghaṭakaśruti* in *Viśiṣṭādvaitic* literature is stressed in that school as according best with their characteristic doctrine, that God's body consists of *cit* and *acit* or *jīvas* and matter ³. For Śankara this is a statement of the status of God as *sākṣi* or the witness Self of the *jīva*, using the latter as an instrument of its creative purpose ⁴. As a matter of empirical fact, the *jīvas* are not aware of their divine inner controller, their real Self; but that does not mean, explains Śankara, that there are two kinds of spiritual beings, viz. *Jīvas* and *Iśvara* "Other than he" points out the Upaniṣad, "there is no seer, hearer, thinker, understander. He is your Soul, the Inner Controller, the

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1. pārameśvarevahi śārīrasya ° pāramāthikam svarūpam; upādhikṛtaṃ tu śārīratvam SB. P. 785-786 on BS. III, 4, 8, Cf. Consciouness is never experienced in the plural, but only in the singular. Even in cases of split personalities, plurality is not manifested simultaneously. The idea of plurality arises through experience of the intimate connection of consciousness with a plurality of bodies. Plurality is produced by a deception, māyā. Adapted from 'What is Life?' PP. 89, 90; E. Schrödinger, Cambridge, 1944; Also, Cf. That experience should take place in finite centres and should wear the form of the finite 'thisness' is in the end inexplicable AR. P. 226.
 2. III, 7, 3-23.
 3. RB. P. 268 on BS. I, 4, 22.
 4. parārthakartavyatāsvabhāvāt parasya yat kāryam karaṇamca tadevāsyā naśvataḥ SB. on BU. III, 7, 3. Cf. BG. III, 22; XI, 33.

Immortal" ¹. Whereas he is devoid of all traits of the *jīvas*, he apports activities and their fruits to the *jīvās*.

Thus in the Upaniṣads three grades or positions of consciousness or *caitanyam* may be distinguished – the pure unqualified Brahman; Brahman with qualities or *Īśvara*; and *Jīva* involved in actions and subject to their consequences.

How are they related, if at all, and how are they to be distinguished and to what extent? Śaṅkara has clearly set forth the Advaitic positions on these important questions ². In his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* III, 8, 12, he refers to the views of a predecessor Bhartṛprapañca, an old Vedantin ³, whose metaphysical position has been described as *bhedābheda*, identity-cum-difference. Bhartṛprapañca pictured Brahman, the imperishable as an ocean, stirless, unmodified. God or *antaryāmin*, then, would be a mode or *avasthā* of Brahman, corresponding to a slightly agitated state of the same ocean. The *jīva* or *kṣetrajña* may be represented by a still more disturbed state of that ocean. Other thinkers invest Brahman with countless powers ⁴ and regard God and *jīvas* as being among these powers; or, explain these as *vikāras* or transformations of Brahman. Śaṅkara rejects the first two of these hypotheses on the ground that the Upaniṣadic Brahman transcends all empirical traits like hunger and thirst. To subject Brahman to real transformations, as the third proposes, is to make it perishable. His own explanation is that the distinctions among Brahman, *Īśvara*, and *Jīva* rest purely on *upādhis*. Apart from these, neither distinctions nor their negations may properly be predicated of the Absolute, which is a mass of undifferentiated consciousness, *prajñāghanaikaśvābhāvīyāt*. The description *netineti* ⁵ of the unconditioned Self underlines its ineffability, its wholly transcendental character. But when it is associated with adjuncts like body and sense organs the absolute reality is designated the *jīva* or the empirical Self. The same Absolute, in conjunction

1. BU. III, 7, 23.

2. SB. on BU. III, 8, 12, & AU. Introdn. to second Adhyāya.

3. Vide Hirianna's article in IA. April, 1924.

4. Cf. S'U. VI, 8.

5. BU. IV, 2, 4;

with the power of eternal, unsurpassed, knowledge, is termed *Īśvara*. All distinctions and difference, therefore, must be traced to *upādhis* in as much as the final doctrine of the Upaniṣads points to the *ekamevādviṭīyam* ¹.

Greater clarification is afforded in the introduction to Śaṅkara's commentary on the second *adhyāya* of the *Aitreya Upaniṣad*. The *jīva* has been described as the agent of activities like hearing, seeing, thinking, &c ². Other Upaniṣadic passages refer to him as the unthought thinker unknown knower, &c. ³. Again the unknowability of the *jīva*, has been laid down thus: *namatermantāram manvīthā, navijñātervijñātāram vijānīyāt* &c ⁴. These statements, as they stand, are not easy to reconcile. Do these suggest that, while the *jīva* is directly imperceptible, his reality may be inferred from his activities like hearing? Now, he who infers must, obviously, be the *jīva* concerned. But while hearing, surely, he cannot infer, as he is wholly absorbed in hearing. One's mind can attend only to one thing at a time. Thus, it follows that the thinker of thoughts ever remains a thinker, an eternal subject who can never become an object of thought such as inference involves. Other than this sole thinker of all thoughts, there is no second thinker to make the first an object of *his* thinking activity. A self-division of the unique Self into subject and object needs only to be mentioned to be rejected as inconceivable. The analogy of two lights illustrates this point. Neither may be regarded as revealing the other, each being self-revealing in its own right. Nor can the eternal thinker pause a while to turn his thoughts back upon himself ⁵. If neither perception nor inference directly leads to the knowledge of the Self, how is it to be known? What assertion may justifiably be made of it? To hold with the *Vaiśeṣikas* that hearing and so forth are contingent activities of the Self is no solution. An eternal spiritual substance has nothing contingent about it; it ought to remain immutable,

1. CU. IV, 2, 1.

2. BU II, 4, 14.

3. BU. III, 8, 1.

4. BU. III, 4, 2.

5. *nacamanturmantavyamananavyārārasūnyaḥ kālasyātmamanānāya*. Śaṅkara's Introdn. to AU. II.

as contrasted with changeable matter. There can be neither conjunction nor disjunction of spirit or consciousness. Thus we are forced to conclude that the philosophy of the Upaniṣads recognizes two kinds of perceptions, one ephemeral and contingent due to sense-organs and mind, and the other, eternal and immutable, the very essence of the Self¹. This position squares with expressions like *dyṣterdraṣṭā*. *s'ruteḥśrotā*, &c.². Experience also bears out this conclusion. The perceptive power of the eye, e.g., is conditioned by light, &c. Still, a blind man perceives objects in dreams. This latter perception must be ascribed to the eternally seeing Self. The eternal sight perceives the contingent seeing of the eye, &c. But due to lack of discrimination, to this eternal sight is often imputed the contingency of what it perceives, viz; the ephemeral seeing of the sense organs and mind.

Thus the basis of distinctions among *jīvas*, *Īśvara*, and Brahman, is an unstable appearance. With its abolition, these distinctions vanish and the sole reality of the Self remains³.

1. US. I, 107, *sācāvagatiḥkūṭasthasvayamsiddhātmaajyotiḥsvarūpāca* |.

2. BU. III, 4, 2,

3. In his commentary on the Īśa upaniṣad, Aurobindo develops a theory in which *jīva* is treated as a real projection or self-production of the Lord or the Saccidānanda, into form. Consciousness of the Lord dwells in energy upon its self-being to produce idea of itself, *viśṇūna* and form and action corresponding to the idea. Brahman (= Lord) is his own subject and object—the subject of his self-awareness. This *jīva* is however obscured by ignorance, but in its completeness it is the Lord. The multiplicity of the *jīvas* is explained as the play or varied self-expansion of the one by force of which the one occupies many centres of consciousness. Multiplicity is implicit or explicit in Unity. While the Lord is *Īśa*, man is *antīś*, powerless, being subject to *avidyā*. Aurobindo adds that this subjection is unreal, in essential fact or *paramārtha*, a play of ignorance: it is real only in *vyavahāra*, or practical fact. The *jīva*, soul, only plays at being bound. (P. 44. *Isopaniṣad* published by B. K. Ghose, Calcutta). Now this conception of the *jīvas* seems to be metaphysically weak. Is the self-distribution of the Lord in many centres real? If real, how does he retain his unity? When *jīva* is said to be bound only through *avidyā*, that he plays at being bound, the self-distribution of the Lord in many centres also becomes a mere product of *avidyā*. It ceases to be real. In fact, the words of Aurobindo in this context unwittingly render his position indistinguishable from that of Śaṅkara whom he is ostensibly criticising.

ii. Jīva and Sākṣin.

Above it was pointed out that there are two kinds of perception associated with the *jīva*, one of which is steady and unfailing, and the other fluctuating and contingent. In Advaitic literature the former is usually referred to as *sākṣin* or Witness-Self. A determination of its exact nature is important for grasping both the psychology of the *jīva*, and the character of his final liberation. ¹

The term *sākṣin* occurs rather late in Upaniṣadic literature, ² but the idea, like that of *māyā*, is in evidence in the earliest Upaniṣads ³. Commenting on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* III, 4, 2, ⁴ Śaṅkara points out that there are two kinds of perception *dr̥ṣṭi*, one empirical *laukikī* and the other eternal or timelessly real, *pāramārthikī*. The first is only the modification of *antaḥkaraṇa* when it operates, e.g., in contact with the eye & object. Being a product, an event in time, it is perishable. But the native sight of Ātman the Self of the *jīva* is immutable, being its very nature, just as the fire never loses its light and heat. Still, being associated with the contingent *vṛtti* or the mind's mode, the Ātman which is sight or *dr̥ṣṭi* is described as the *draṣṭā* or seer. The distinction thus made between the seer and the sight is conventional and contingent. ⁵ Śaṅkara's point is that the status of the imperishable Self of the *jīva* as *sākṣin* is not quite natural to it, but is contingent ⁶. Thus Śaṅkara urges that in each *jīva*, besides the evanescent modifications of its *antaḥkaraṇa* which make up its cognitive and emotive experiences, there is a witness-consciousness, the spectator, who is identified in the *Śvetāśvatara* ⁷ with the one God present in all ⁸. But

1. Cf. PD. Com. on VIII, 1 by Rāmakṛṣṇa.
2. ŚU. VI, 11—*karmādhyaḥśah sarvabhūtādhiṣaḥ sākṣi cetāḥ-kevalo nirguṇaśca*
3. BU. III, 4, 2, IV, 3, 23-30.
4. *nadr̥ṣṭer draṣṭāraṃ paśyernaśruteḥ śrotāraṃ śṛṇuyāḥ, &c.*
5. *sākṣin* literally means direct percipient; vide Pāṇini V, 2, 91. *sākṣāddraṣṭari samjñāyām.*
6. cf. Śaṅkara com. on Kena II, 4.
7. VI, 11.
8. Cf. *karmādhyaḥśat sarvabhūtādhiṣaḥ sākṣiṇaḥ* BSS. P. 552.

later Advaitic thinkers have sought to delimit further the concept of *sākṣin vis-a-vis* that of the *jīva* and *Īśvara*.

Citsukha, e.g., offers an inference in support of the reality of the *sākṣi* consciousness in *Jīvas*. "Emotions such as the desire of Caitra are cognized by a direct perception of his which is different from his ephemeral perceptions, because they are directly perceived by him; just as in the case of a pot directly perceived¹". He explains that emotions cannot be held to be directly perceived by the mind itself, because they are states of this very mind which cannot, at once, be both subject and object. Why not hold that mind as mind is the percipient, and as qualified by the perception, it is the object of its own perception? One may as well say that Devadatta as such is the agent of walking and as adorned with ear-rings, &c., is the goal of walking. In ephemeral perceptions of empirical life, mind functions as an agent, but in the direct perception of the *sākṣin* it may play the role of an object or an instrument.

This *sākṣin* is not qualified by *avidyā*; were he so, his perception would have been tainted. But the *Ātman* who is pure consciousness is called *sākṣin* when objects of perception are present. The *Vedānta paribhāṣa*² explains that the distinction between *jīva* and *sākṣin* is that the former is consciousness qualified by the *antaḥkāraṇa*, while *sākṣin* is consciousness having *antaḥkāraṇa* as an adjunct or *upādhi* only. *Antaḥkāraṇa* enters into the constitution of the *jīva* as an adjective, while it only serves to distinguish the *sākṣin* without qualifying him. Citsukha mentions that an important reason for positing *sākṣi* - consciousness is that, otherwise, the fact of memory will remain unaccountable. Without a persistent consciousness in the *jīva*, how can the

1. TP. P. 373.

2. VP. P. 96 ff. Cf. *viśeṣaṇamkāryānvayi vartamānam vyāvarttakam*; *upādhiḥ kāryānvayi vyāvarttakavarttamānaśca*. Cf. TP. P. 374.

flux of his psychological states be unified and consciously owned as belonging to a single personality ? ¹.

Madhusūdanasarasvatī defines *sākṣin* as consciousness reflected either in *avidyā* or its product ². This definition is intended to explain how, while *caitanya* is pure sight, *dr̥grūpam*, it has nevertheless to function as seer, *draṣṭā* in its status as *sākṣin*. The point of making *avidyā* the medium of reflection of *caitanya* is to render *sākṣin*'s function possible in dreamless sleep where only *avidyā* exists ³, while in dream and waking states, *sākṣin* functions as reflection of consciousness in the *vṛttis* of the inner organ which are products of *avidyā*. Only through this association with *avidyā* and its products does pure consciousness or *dr̥k* operate as the seer. There is no fear of a circularity of argument involved in this view, such as would be there if the being of *avidyā* depended upon consciousness. Neither in regard to origination nor cognition does consciousness depend on *avidyā*. Both are *anādi* or without origin in time, time itself being a form of *avidyā* ⁴, and cognition being the own nature of *sākṣin*. *Sākṣin* is different from both pure consciousness and *jīva* ⁵. Madhusūdana holds that *sākṣin* is one and common to all *jīvas*. Still

1. naca nityabodhamantareṇa pūrvāparabuddhinām anusaṃdhānasiddhiḥ TP. P. 374. Cf. If there is such a thing as a connected experience of related objects, there must be operative in consciousness a unifying principle which not only presents the related objects to itself but at once renders them objects and unites them in relation to each by this act of presentation and which is single throughout the experience. The unity of this principle must be correlative to the unity of experience. Prolegomena to Ethics, P. 34, Green.
2. avidyātakāryānyatarapratiphalitacaitanyaśaiva sākṣitvāt. AS. P. 754.
3. Cf. US. I, 93; Cf. VPS. P. 73, Section XCVI (b).
4. Siddhāntabindu with Nārāyaṇī, &c. P. 241 KSS. No. 65. 1928.
5. Some hold that *Īśvara* cannot be identified with *sākṣin*, for while *Īśvara* is qualified by *māyā*, *sākṣin* is *nirguṇa*, *kevala*. So they maintain, Brahman without attributes and identified with *jīva* is *sākṣin*. This for them is the sense of ŚU. VI, 11, vide TP. P. 374.

there is no possibility of any one *jīva*'s becoming aware of the experiences of all. For, *sākṣin* manifests itself as identical with the consciousness of each *jīva* individually ¹.

From among a variety of views on the relation between *jīva* and *sākṣin*, the more important may be noted. In the *Pañcadaśī* ² the *sākṣin* is designated *Kūṭastha* in view of his immutability. His function is to illumine both what is revealed by the *jīva*, the reflection of pure consciousness in the *antahkaraṇa* and what is not so revealed ³. *Sākṣin* may be defined as pure consciousness which is the substratum of the phenomena of gross and subtle bodies, and which observes them both without any change ⁴. It is pointed out that the reason why none doubts his own ego 'I-ness' is that it is perpetually in the light of the *sākṣin* ⁵. Since *jīva* is both an egoist and partisan, the *sākṣin*, the agent of impartial vision, has to be posited ⁶. In the *Nāṭakadīpa*, the witness-Self is said to illumine the psychological principles of egoity, *ahamkāra*, intellect, *buddhi*, and objects, *viśayaḥ*, and to continue to shine even after all these cease to be. ⁷

Rāmādvaya, the author of the *Kaumudī*, in consonance with the *Śvetāśvatara* identifies the *sākṣin* with an aspect of *Īśvara* which sanctions the activities of the *jīva* ⁸. The *Siddhāntaleśa* also refers to a group of thinkers who identify the *jīva* with the *sākṣin*, for he alone directly perceives. They would, however, explain the patent agency of the *jīva* as resulting from his more or less normal identification with his *antahkaraṇa* ⁹.

1. SLS. P. 32, SSS. Edn.

2. Ch. VIII.

3. PD. VIII, 1, 2, 3. Cf. *tasmāt sarvaṃvastujñātatayājñātata-yāvā sākṣicaitanyasya viśaya eva*, VPS. P. 20.

4. *dehadvayādhiṣṭhānabhūtaṃkūṭasthacaitanyam svāvacchedakasyadehadvayasya sākṣādīkṣaṇaṃ nirvikāratvācca sākṣītyūcyate*. SLS. P. 32.

5. Cf. *antahkaraṇatadvṛttisākṣicaitanyavigrahaḥ | ānandarūpaḥ satyaḥ sankim nātmānam prapadyase*, || Qd. in com. on PD. VIII, 25.

6. Cf. MuU. III, 1, 1 - *anaśnannanyah*

7. PD. X, 12.

8. SLS. P. 33.

9. Ibid.

(iii) The empirical self of the Jīva.

Having indicated the metaphysically real or *pāramārthika* Self of the *jīva* according to Advaita and studied its representative form in the individual, viz.; the witness-Self, we may turn to the question of the empirical Self of the *jīva* as it reveals itself in the stage of transmigratory life. In succinct and realistic fashion, Śaṅkara observes: there is the *jīvātman*, the superintendent of the cage of the body and sense-organs, who is the agent of actions and the reaper of their fruits ¹. The readiness to treat the empirical self of the *jīva* as a fact to be reckoned with, and not as a mere illusion to be repudiated out of hand, pervades the elaborate treatment Śaṅkara gives to this question in the *Bakmasūtrabhāṣya*.

In the first place, the *jīva*, understood as the empirical self or *jīvātman*, has no origination ² such as ether, &c., have. That *jīva* has neither origination nor destruction has been recognized in scriptures as well ³. In other words, the *jīvā* has continuity of existence from all eternity through cycles of births and deaths – a continuity snapped only by *mukti*. What are known as births and deaths, of course, refer only to the moment of association with and that of dissociation from the *upādhis*, viz., the psycho-physical organisms ⁴. But, nevertheless, this intimate association makes it appear that the *jīva* is merged in and blended with the organism. Hence, empirically, he may be described as “made of knowledge, of mind, of breath, of seeing, of hearing, of earth, of water, &c” ⁵. The interfusion of what in essence is pure consciousness with basically non-spiritual principles can be explained only as due to the non-manifestation of its distinctive nature. No doubt certain expression in the *śruti* seem to assert the origin and dissolution of the *jīvā* ⁶, but they are to be

1. *astyātmā jīvākhyāḥ śarīrendriyapañjarādhyakṣaḥ karma-phalasambandhī*—BSS. II, 3, 17, P. 525.

2. ‘SB on BS. II, 3, 17.

3. CU. VI, 11, 3. KU. I, 2, 18; BG. II, 20, &c.

4. BG. II, 13, 18. 22-24.

5. BU. IV, 4, 5.

6. *prajñānaghana evaitebhyobhūtebhyāḥ samutthāyānnyevānu-vināśyati; napretya samjñāsti*. BU. IV, 5, 13. MuU. II, 1, 1.

understood as referring to the origination and dissolution of the adjuncts of the ātman ¹

The empirical self is an agent of actions like knowing, *jñāh* ². His cognitive nature is of his very essence ³, and not, as in the *Nyāya-Viśeṣika* system, a contingent quality of his due to special contacts with the mind, &c. That agency, *kartṛtva*, is a mark of the empirical self also follows from the fact that the *śruti* enjoins activities on him, such as 'thou shalt sacrifice, shalt make gifts', &c. Were agency foreign to the nature of the *jīva*, these *śāstraic* injunctions would be in vain. Besides, both in worldly usage and in the *śāstras*, he is depicted as indulging in manifold activities ⁴. But it may be asked why, if *jīva* be a free agent, he does not always act to further his own well being; why, in fact, he should so often act tragically. Is the empirical agent, the *jīva*, really free? A preliminary answer is that freedom to act does not imply immunity from the unpleasant consequences of the act. For instance, in the matter of cognitive action, the *jīva* is free; i.e., once the cognitive situation presents itself, cognition follows freely. None the less what he knows may be pleasant or unpleasant. It is realistically granted that the *jīva* acts under conditions of time, space, and causality, and to that extent, his freedom is curtailed. Still, that the agent depends on appropriate accessories does not take away his agency from him.

But it is important to determine the nature of the *jīva*'s agency. We saw it is not unconditional. What precisely are its conditions and characteristics? The answer may be gathered from Sankara's comment on the important *sūtra*, *yathācatakṣobhayathā* ⁵. His conclusion is that the agency of the *jīva* is not inherent in his nature; were it so, all hope of

1. *avināśivā arēyamātmānucchittidharmā mātrāsamsargastvasya bhavati*. BU. IV, 5, 14.
2. 'SB. on II, 3, 18 & 33.
3. *yadvaitannapaśyati paśyanvaitannapaśyati na hidraṣṭur dṛṣṭer viparilopovidyate*. BU. IV. 3, 23. Cf. *avidyākarmapūrva-prajñopādihiko vijñānātmā*, is one the definitions of *jīva* Sankara gives BSS. P. 858 on IV, 2, 4.
4. BS. II, 3, 34-36. TU. II, 5, 1.
5. BS. II, 3, 40.

the ultimate liberation of the *Jīva* from his agency will have to be ruled out—*anirmokṣaprasaṅgāt*,¹ even as fire cannot be freed from its nature of heat. But why not remain an agent for ever? By its very nature, agency is painful². It is not sound to argue that the presence in the *jīva* of agency as a potency or *śakti* would not militate against his final liberation. It is argued that in liberation, though the potency remains, the *jīva* would not act, no occasion to act being there, just as the fire would not burn if no fuel be supplied. But potency to act refers both to its abode, the *jīva* and its objects; for, by its very nature potency or *śakti* is bipolar. So long as it is real, its objects also are unavoidable³. Therefore, Śankara concludes, the agency of the *jīva* is an appearance due to superimposition, *adhyāsa*, of the characteristics of the *upādhis* on the *jīvātman*; in other words, it is a product of *avidyā*. Thus the *śruti* teaches: "He, the *jīvātman*, appears to move."⁴ In this context it is useful to reiterate that for those who discriminate there is no *jīva*, either agent or enjoyer, other than the *paramātman*, the supreme Self⁵. Still the *Ātman* in association with the products of *avidyā*, viz; the psycho-physical complex, becomes an agent in the states of dream and wakefulness, even as a carpenter, armed with chisels, hammer, &c., works at his labourious jobs in his workshop, but, at home, casting them aside refrains from such work⁷. The agency of the empirical *jīva*, thus, is conditional, and altogether ceases when he returns to God who is our home. Divested of instruments like mind, sense organs, &c., the *Ātman* is not an agent,. Hence *śāstraic* injunctions also remain valid and binding only on the *avidyā*-bound, empirical *jīvas*, and do not imply their innate agency⁸. The conclusion is that the fact of *jīva's* agency must be traced to the *upādhis* like intellect, mind, &c.

1. BSS. P. 546.

2. Cf. the Buddhist notion of *duḥkha*. PP. 81-82, supra part i.

3. See Bhāmātī on 'SB. on BS. II, 3, 40 P. 546.

4. *adhyāsa avidyā*; vide, P. 309, supra.

5. BU. IV, 3, 7.

6. BSS. P. 547.

7. BSS. P. 548.

8. *tasmātavidyākṛtaṃ kartṛtvam upādāya vidhiśāstraṃ pravarttiṣyate*, BSS. P. 549, also cf. BSS. P. 20. *tametamavidyākh-yamadhyāsaṃpurāśritya sarve pramāṇaprameyavyavahārā laukikā vaidikā ścapravṛttāḥ*; vide BS. II, 3, 41.

Moreover, this agency is dependent on *Īśvara's* sanction or *anujñā*. This of course, implies that the *jīva's* transmigratory life is consequent on the Lord's sanction, even as liberation therefrom, too, is dependent on his grace. ¹ Still these facts do not make *Īśvara* guilty either of cruelty or partiality with respect to the obvious inequalities in evidence among the *jīvas*. For the sanction of *Īśvara* is determined and guided by the moral deserts, *dharma* and *adharma*, of the *jīvas* concerned ². The Lord's role is like that of rain which is indispensable for the germination and growth of seeds into plants and trees, the differences among the latter being determined, of course, by the innate nature of the seeds themselves. The Lord's sanction is necessary so that the *jīvas* may act, but the actual empirical agents in these acts are the *jīvas* alone ³. Their ethical urges drive them to actions, which, however, materialise only because of the Lord's general sanction ⁴, manifest in the laws of the world, physical, moral, and spiritual. These may be described as the ordinances of the Lord, constituting his very nature ⁵. Without the divine sanction thus understood, the *jīva's* initiative and effort must prove futile. ⁶

In the result, the empirical *jīva* in Advaita is an agent in the widest sense – he knows, wills, enjoys, or suffers, but all these he does under the general sanction and guidance of *Īśvara* ⁷.

What exactly is the relation of *jīva* to the Lord? That the Lord's status in the sphere of the empirical life of the *jīva* is that of a source of sanction clearly suggests that there is an indisputable distinction between them. The obvious otherness

1. *Īśvarāt tadanujñāyākartṛtvabhokṛtvalaṣaṇasya samsārasya-siddhistadanugrahahetukenaiva caviññānena mokṣasiddhirbhavitumarhati*. BSS. P. 552, also cf. KauU. III, 8.
2. BS. II, 1, 34 & II, 3, 42.
3. *parāyatte'pihikartṛtve karotyeva jīvah*, BSS. P. 553.
4. Cf. BG. XVIII, 14, with Śrīdhara's note; also BG. XV, 15.
5. "The law and the lawgiver are one" Gandhi.
6. *Īśvarasya cātyantamanapekṣatve laukikasyāpi puruṣakārasya vaiyarthya*, BSS. P. 554.
7. BG. XIII, 22.

and pre-eminence of the Lord is laid down in unmistakable terms: *adhikamtu bheda'nirdeśāt* ¹.

In this status of pre-eminence the Lord functions as the creator, &c., of the world ². Being eternally free, pure, and omniscient, the Lord has neither likes nor dislikes ³. Thus also is he the goal of the *jīvas*' seeking ⁴ so long as the *jīvas*' empirical distinctions and differences from the Lord persist.

It is natural to suppose that the relation between the *jīva* and *Īśvara* is one of servant and master. But it is affirmed that their relation is one of *aṁśa* and *aṁśī* part and whole, as of sparks and fire. Of course, this is only figurative, for the Lord is spirit and as such is not a whole of parts as material objects are. So *aṁśa* must be taken as *aṁśaiva*, part, as it were ⁵. Non-Advaitic teachers, however, understand the word literally. Rāmānuja, e.g., argues that since in the *śruti* both declarations of complete identity and total difference between *Īśvara* and *jīva* are met with ⁶, a sort of *via media* suggested by the term *aṁśa* must be deemed to denote the real relation between the two ⁷. But he does not raise the crucial question how pure spirit or consciousness which is *Īśvara* can have 'parts', literally. Madhva of course insists on the total differences between *Īśvara* and *jīva* relying on passages like the *Svetāśvatara* I, 9. ⁸, and even adds that the *jīvas* have ultimate differences among themselves ⁹. But Bhāskara takes *aṁśa* to denote distinction between *Īśvara* and *jīva* due to real adjuncts ¹⁰. His answer for the difficulty that

1. BS. II, 1, 22. BS. I, 2, 20 *śāriraścobhayēpi hi bhedenaina-madhiyate*.
2. BSS. P. 394.
3. Cf. BG. IX, 29.
4. BU. II, 4, 5; CU. VIII, 7, 1 &c.
5. *aṁśaivāṁśo nahi niravayavasya mukhyo mśah sambhavati* S'B. on BS. II, 3, 43, P. 555.
6. S'U. I, 9; CU. VI, 7-16, &c.
7. RB. P. 389.
8. *Jñānau dvājavīśanīśau*, &c.
9. vide MSS. 79 which classifies *jīvas* into three groups (i) *mukti-yogayāh*; (ii) *nityasaṁsāriṇah*; (iii) *tamoyogyāh*.
10. *upādhyavacchinnyānanyabhūtasya vācakoyamamśasābdah* - Bhāskara Bhaṣya, P. 140.

spirit cannot have literal parts is that since *āgama*, scripture, affirms this relation due to real *upādhis*, we must acquiesce ¹.

The difference thus posited between *Īśvara* and *jīva* must be traced to the exalted nature of the *upādhi* of the former, and the inferior grade of the *upādhi* of the latter ². This also suffices to ensure that the impurities and sufferings of the *jīva* do not taint the Lord. On the other hand, despite the low grade *upādhis* of the *jīvas*, they retain their essential spiritual nature intact; they never cease to be "the children of immortality" – *amṛtasyaputrāḥ* ³.

The problem of the relation between *Īśvara* and *jīva* has been sought to be solved by means of a number of hypotheses some of which may be adverted to here. These may be distinguished as *Ābhāsavāda*, *Pratibimbavāda*, and *Avacchedavāda*. These are, in essence, analogies and serve only to suggest certain aspects of the relation under consideration. The effort to understand these *vādas*, literally, is responsible for a somewhat fruitless exercise of ingenuity evident in the consideration of this problem ⁴.

The authors of the *Prakṛtīrthavivaraṇa* ⁵ and *Samkṣepaśārīraka* ⁶ picture both *īśvara* and *jīva* as reflections, *prati-*

1. Ibid. P. 141.

2. *niratisayopādhisampannaśceśvaronihnopādhisampannān jīvān praśasti*. BSS. P. 356; cf. "kāryopādhirayam jivahkāraṇopādhirīśvarah".

3. SU. II, 5.

4. The *Ābhāsavāda* makes *jīva* a reflection which, as such is false, being regarded as different from the thing reflected. Cf. *Ābhāsavāda* BS. II, 3, 50. *Pratibimbavāda* also makes *jīva* a reflection but it is here held that both reflection and the proto-type are equally true; the reflection is taken as the proto-type in another setting. Cf. BS. III, 2, 18-ataev *acopamā sūryakādivat*. cf. VPS. I, CXI. The *Avaccheda vāda* makes the *jīva* a mode of absolute consciousness, but, still an unreal mode the agent of modification being *avidyā*. Cf. *svarūpatomithyābhūtam pratibimbamitīvādahābhāsavādah*; *svarūpatahsatyam pratibimbavarūpeṇa mithyābhūtam bimba meva pratibimbamiti vādasya pratibimbavādatvamiti*. Ratnāvali of Brahmānanda P. 114.

5. Madras University Edition PP. 3 & 4.

6. III, 148, 277, 278.

bimba, of pure consciousness. The reflection in *māyā* of pure consciousness is *Īśvara*, *jīva* being the reflection of the same in *avidyā*, which, here, is distinguished from *māyā* as forming the latter's infinite parts. These have the powers to obscure consciousness and project appearances or phenomena. This is the view of the *Prakaṣārtakāra*. The view of the author of the *Samkṣepasātraka* differs only in holding that *Īśvara* is the reflection in *avidyā*, and *jīva* the same in *antaḥkaraṇa*, a product of *avidyā*. This variation is guided by the scriptural statement *kāryopādhirayam jīvaḥ kāranopādhirīśvarāḥ*.¹

In the *Pañcadaśī* a number of views on this question have been expounded. In book one, *Tattvaviveka*, it is said that *Īśvara* is the reflection of consciousness in *māyā*, which is an aspect of *mūlaprakṛti*² in which the quality of *sattva* predominates; *jīva* is the reflection in *avidyā*, that aspect of *mūlaprakṛti* in which *rajas* and *tamas* dominate³. In book six a more elaborate picture is attempted. Four states or grades of consciousness, instead of the usual three, are envisaged on the analogy of space delimited by a pot, space reflected in the water in the pot, space unlimited, and space reflected in the water particles in the clouds. Analogously, there is the immutable *sākṣin* or *kūṣastha*, viz; consciousness as the substrate of and delimited by the gross and subtle bodies of the *jīva*. Then comes the empirical self or *jīva* proper, viz; consciousness reflected in the *antaḥkaraṇa*. Pure consciousness, of course, is Brahman; and *Īśvara* is its reflection in the mental impressions of all *jīvas*, *dhīvāsanāḥ*, which abide in *māyā* whose locus is Brahman⁴. In book eleven, *jīva* in his wakeful state is said to have as his adjunct *antaḥkaraṇa*, but in his deep sleep, where the *antaḥkaraṇa* is dissolved, as it were, the same *jīva* is styled *ānandamaya*

1. Maṇḍana also upholds the reflection theory as regards the status of the *jīva*. His position regarding *Īśvara* is not clear. Cf. *avyatirekepi brahmaṇo jivānām bimbapratibimbavat vidyāvidyāvyavastha*. BrS. P. 12

2. Primeval Nature of the Sāmkhyas, the *mūlaprakṛti* has been subordinated to the Lord and appears as his power in a school of Advaita. For an account of the Sāmkhyan concept vide Pt. I, PP. 36 ff.

3. PD. I, 16, 17.

4. VI, 18-23.

or the blissful. *Īsvara* has two parallel aspects, microcosmic and macrocosmic, there being three forms for each aspect, Macrocosmically pure consciousness with *māyā* as its adjunct is *Īsvarā*; with the collective subtle bodies as its adjuncts, it is *Hiraṇyagarbha*; and with collective gross bodies as its adjunct, it is *virāt*. *Jīvas* are only appearances of pure consciousness, resembling the painted garments on a canvas. The three microcosmic forms of the *jīva* are termed *Viśva*, *Taijasa*, and *Prājña*, corresponding to the *Virāt*, *Hiraṇyagarbha*, and *Īsvara* ¹.

Feeling that the concept of God as a mere reflection, on a par with *jīva*, is altogether inadequate to account for the facts of religious experience in which God, free and sovereign, appears as the goal of all spiritual striving, the thinkers of the *Vivaraṇa* school maintain that *Īsvara* is the prototype or *bimba* and *jīva* a reflection of *Īsvara* ². They also argue that both cannot be reflections in the absence of two different media, for *māyā* or *ajñāna* is one only ³. *Jīva* is the reflection of *Īsvara* in *ajñāna* but is only manifested in *antahkaraṇa*, a product of *ajñāna*, just as the sun's reflection manifests itself best in a mirror. They also hold that consciousness delimited by the *antahkaraṇa* is *Īsvara* himself in his capacity as the *antaryāmin*, the Inner Ruler ⁴.

Opposed to the entire theory of reflection of consciousness is the stand of Vācaspati-miśra and his school of thought ⁵. They point out the obvious fact that consciousness which has neither shape nor colour cannot be reflected, and especially so in *ajñāna* which also has neither shape nor colour. The example of the so-called reflection of the sky is not helpful, for what is reflected is not the sky but the light in the sky. The right view, therefore, is that *jīva* is a delimitation of consciousness by the *antahkaraṇa* while *Īsvara* is no such delimita-

1. Ibid. XI, 61-68 & SLS. PP. 15, 16.

2. Cf. PA. P. 210.

3. Cf. vibhedajanake'jñāne nāsamātyantikamgate |
ātmano Brahmano bhedam asantamkaḥ kariṣyati- ||
Viṣṇupurāṇa VI, 7, 94.

4. SLS. P. 18.

5. Cf. AS. P. 585.

tion. Scriptural passages and the *Brahmasūtra*¹ which employ the idea of reflection to illustrate the relation between *jīva* and *Īśvara* are not to be taken literally. They are only concerned to stress the dependence, similarity, contingent limitation, &c., of the *jīva* on the one hand, and the freedom of *Īśvara* from all imperfections, on the other². It may be added that *avacchedavāda* has been often employed by both Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara for keeping *Īśvara* apart from the taints of the *jīva*³; also we had occasion to note Śaṅkara's opposition to the theory of reflection⁴.

Before leaving this question, we may note that according to some *Advaitins*, *jīva* is neither a reflection nor a delimitation of *caitanya* or consciousness. *Jīva* is only Brahman's appearance through *avidvā*, just as the son of Kuntī appeared as the son of Rādhā⁵. The matter may also be illustrated with reference to the prince long lost and living among hunters as one of them through his ignorance of his proper identity⁶. According to this view, of course, along with all the world, *Īśvara* also is nothing but an idea or figment of the *jīva*'s imagination.

iv. The Size of the Jīva.

A discussion of the size of the *jīva* is not out of place in view of the doctrinal differences on this question among the schools of Vedānta. Of course, in Advaita the question has relevance only to the empirical *jīva*; for, of him it is true that, during his transmigratory life, he is born or he dies or wanders from life to life. And movement implies limited size⁷.

1. yathāhyayaṃ jyotīrātmā vivasvānapobhinnā bahudhaiko'nugacchan |

upādhinā kriyate deharūpo devaḥ kṣetre'svevamañjō yamātmā ||
ata eva copamā sūryakādivat. BS. III, 2, 18.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, however, attempts a defence of the reflection theory but has to rely entirely on the fact that the 'sruti employs the idea; the latter fact is not questioned; but the idea itself has not been made more intelligible. Cf. AS. P. 579.

2. BS. III, 2, 19 & 20;

3. GPK. III, 3-8 and Śaṅkara's com. on them.

4. Supra P. 330 FN. 9.

5. The reference is to the story of the childhood of Karna, a hero, of the Mahābhārata war;

6. 'SB. on BU. II, 1, & the BV. PP. 970-972 VV. 506-516.

7. KauU. I, 2; III, 3; BU. IV, 4, 6.

There are but three alternatives :- that the *jīva* may be infinite, or of medium size, suited to his embodiment, or atomic. The first two are ruled out ¹. Denials of his atomic size in the *śruti* are not meant to apply to the *jīva* at all, and it is laid down specifically that the size of the *jīva* is atomic ². An atomic *jīva* may very well apprehend sensations all over the body from his permanent seat in the heart by means of the organ of touch, i.e., the skin spread all over the body ³. Thus the view that *jīva* is atomic seems plausible enough, and is in fact the view held by the theistic writers on the Vedānta Philosophy ⁴. But Śaṅkara interprets the *sūtra*, *tadgunasāra-tvāttu tadvyapadeśah prājñāvat* ⁵ in support of his contention that *jīva* is infinite and not atomic. His argument is that the question of size can refer only to the real *jīva* and not to his appearance and, in reality, as was seen above, *jīva* is Brahman ⁷; hence *jīvā* is infinite ⁸. Therefore references to *jīva* as atomic in the *śruti* must be taken to point to the superimposition of the atomic quality of the *buddhi* on the *jīva* itself, *buddhi* or intellect being the adjunct closest to the *jīva*. The association of the two, *jīva* and *buddhi* marks the *samsāric* or transmigratory life of the *jīva*. The very scriptures quoted above in support of the *jīva*'s atomicity also points to his real infinitude - *sacānantyāya kalpate*, ⁹ a statement that makes sense without strain only if infinitude is understood as inherent in the *jīva*. The term *anu* may also point to the extreme subtlety of the nature of the *jīva* ¹⁰.

v. Is Jīva one or Many ?

Śaṅkara assumes through out his writings that, though pure consciousness or *paramātmā* is one, the empirical *jīvas*

1. *nahivibhoṣalanamupapadyate*; and Cf. S'B. on II, 2, 34;
2. BS. II, 3, 21; 3. S'U. V, 8 & 9;
4. BU. IV 3, 7, ; CU. VIII, 3, 3; PU III, 6; BS. II, 3 24;
5. Cf. CSV., P. 126,
6. BS. II, 3, 29.
7. *parāmeva Brāhma jivaityuktam*, BSS. P. 536.
8. *savācya mahān jātmā yōyam vijñānamayah prāṇa*, BU. IV, 4, 22.
9. S'U. V, 9 - And yet it partakes of infinity.
10. BSS. PP. 538-539. Bhāskara holds that in empirical life, *jīva* is atomic due to association with *buddhi*. He differs from the advaitic view in maintaining that the empirical state of the *jīva* is also real. Cf. BB. II, 3, 29, Cf. *Iyasiddhi*, P. 248.

are many in so far as these are all appearances of the *paramātman* due to association with *upādhis* ¹. And we found that these *upādhis* are not one. His insistence that the creator of the world is *Īśvara* ², and not *jīva* is conclusive on this point ³. One obvious result of contending that *jīva* is one is that the world or the objective manifold sinks to the position of that *jīva*'s ideas or figments. Then, indeed, all of us will be such stuff as dreams are made on. We shall have outright solipsism which will rob life of all its seriousness and value. For, in this view, there is and ever has been but one real *jīva*, whoever that happens to be. Still this sort of *reductio ad absurdum* has not prevented some Advaitic writers from advocating such a view. For instance Prakāśānanda, the author, of the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, is an outstanding champion of the theory that there is only one *jīva*. He argues that *ajñāna* being one, the *jīva* whose adjunct it is can also be no more than one ⁴. His solution of the problem of the bound and the liberated *jīvas*, not to speak of the empirical distinctions between them, is to reduce all life to a dream in which such problems have no reality. This solipsistic type of thought may stem from the view above noted according to which *jīva* is Brahman with *avidyā* while *Īśvara*, world, &c., are his ideas ⁵. Appaya Dikṣita styles this stand as the theory of one *jīva* animating one body.

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1. Cf. "In all forms that surround me I behold the reflection of my being broken up into countless diversified shapes, as the morning sun broken up in a thousand dewdrops sparkles towards itself". Fichte, Qd. in Phily. of the Upds. P. 45. Gough, Cf. GPK. III, 6.
 2. BS. I, 1, 2; II, 1, 22, 28, 33, &c.,
 3. IP ii P. 610. Cf. "There would be no gain in wiping out distinctions between one self and another in finite life; our limitations no doubt have a value. Still, in principle, our limitations are merely defects". Individuality & Value. P. XXXI. Qd. in Idea of God. P. 264.
 4. Siddhāntamuktāvalī, com. on V. 8.
 5. Cf. bandhamokṣavyavasthā syāj jīvābhedekatham tava | yathā dṛṣṭam tathāivāstu dṛṣṭatvāt svapnadṛṣṭavat || Ibid. V. 9.
 6. SLS. 20.

A less rigorous variety of the same view is that *Hiraṇyagarbha*, a reflex of Brahman, is the principal *jīva*, while all other *jīvas* are only semblances of his, resembling the painted dresses of painted human beings. These latter appearances alone transmigrate. Such is the theory of one *jīva* with many distinctive bodies¹. A third group argues that a single *jīva* animates all bodies alike; if, still, pleasures and pains are not felt alike by all it is due to the difference of bodies. For difference of bodies destroys the ability to feel and think alike.

These are fancies rather than theories and may be treated as such². Gauḍapāda maintains that Ātman or pure consciousness through its own māyā sets up a diversity of objects and apprehends them, such is the Vedāntic conclusion³. This looks like the *ekajīvavāda* considered above, but Gauḍapāda is not an *ekajīvavādin*. He is an *ekātmavādin*, i.e., on who maintains that the Self or Ātman is one, as all advaitins do. That he held the theory of *avaccheda* or delimitation in regard to the *jīvas* may be seen from many of his *kārikas*. The vital question of bondage and liberation cannot be convincingly discussed on the basis of *ekajīvavāda*. So most Advaitins including Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara maintain that *jīvas* are many, each inhabiting a body of its own. That the Upaniṣads contemplate a plurality of *jīvas* follows from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* passage which refers to individuals attaining liberation⁴. Among these moderate Advaitins, it is held that *jīvas* are as many as there are *antahkaraṇas*, for those *upādhis* constitute the differential of the empirical self of the *jīva*.⁵ This means that though *ajñāna* is one, it has parts, each *jīva* being distinguished by a specific share of his own. In other words, each *jīva* has a personality of his own. The total destruction of his nescience means his liberation. Other *jīvas* with their characteristic

1. In his gloss on 'SB. on MuU. III, 1, 1, A. Giri refers to the *ekajīvavāda* and after pointing out its implications, rejects it as being unsupported by 'sruti. Cf. As. P. 539.

2. GPK. II, 12;

3. Ibid. III, 3-9; IV, 10.

4. BU. I, 4, 10; ŚU. IV, 5; BG. IV, 10.

5. Cf. Jīvarūpatā manaākhyā; manaākhyo pādhirjivah. ŚB. on CU. VI, 8, 1;

complements of nescience or personalities continue as empirical selves, of course. What determines the presence of *ajñāna* in a *jīva* is that of the mind or *antahkarana* in its unregenerate form, and most Advaitins agree that minds are plural, one for each *jīva*. Thus the representative Advaitins may be said to uphold the plurality of *jīvas* and, as we shall see, an objective world common to them all.

(iv) Kos'as and Avasthās.

The Advaitic view of the *jīva* will not have been adequately presented without an elucidation of his sheaths or vestures and of his states. The theory of the five vestures or *kośas* of man, the *jīvā* most concerned with the problem of bondage and liberation as expounded in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, discloses penetrating insight into his nature and destiny. As stated in the Upaniṣads it has a two-fold application: (i) to the individual man and (ii) to his cosmic counterpart¹. Man in the gross, i.e., his physical organism is obviously a product of food. The most patent aspect of man is bound up with the activities of his food-sustained body. Hence the outer most vesture which wraps him up and which, to the superficial observer, exhausts his reality is styled *annamayakośa*, the sheath of food. The significance of this physical aspect of man is underlined by the preliminary identification that food is Brahman². This is but the starting point of the evolution of our knowledge of reality from the subjective side. The world of inorganic matter seems to give rise to all living beings³. Once born, they are sustained by the same matter consumed as food. Upon death they return to the bosom of matter and are resolved back into it, i.e., in so far as they are identified with their vesture of matter⁴. And, corresponding to the view that man is his body, there is the macrocosmic idea that food (=matter) is Brahman, known as *virāt*.

1. Vide P. 348 Supra.

2. TU III, 2 – annam brahmeti vyajānāt.

3. Cf. "If we assume that life is not inherent in nature and that there was a time before it existed, it is an unwarranted assumption. It would make its appearance unintelligible." J. S. Haldance, Qd. in Religion & Science, B. Russel, 1935.

4. TU. III, 2;

In the search for the real Self of man, one cannot, of course, stop, as Virocana did ¹, with the gross material body. The fact of life which distinguishes the animate from inanimate bodies leads to the deeper view that man is made of vital breaths, or *prāṇas*. This sequence suggests that all life springs from matter. The self made of vital breath is styled the sheath of *prāṇa*. Especially is it the self, *ātman*, of the material body and fills it as air fills a bag, adds Śankara ². Taking after the body, the sheath of breaths is invested with a head, the in-breath or *prāṇa*, a right wing, the diffused breath or *vyāna*, a left wing, the out-breath *apāna*, a body, space or *ākāśa* (i.e. *samāna* according to Śankara) and a lower part, the earth, *puccha*. On the self of breath, the senses depend for their proper functioning *prāṇam devānuprāṇanti* ³. All animate beings breathe and live through this second sheath. On a cosmical scale, the self of breath corresponds to the *sūtrātman* or *Hiraṇyagarbha*. The concept of *sūtrātman* seems to derive from notion of the integrated unity of the individual selves of all living beings. It emphasizes the truth that life is not a sporadic phenomenon appearing in a variety of isolated embodiments, but has a cosmic unity in which the individuals merely share.

Even so, the view that the reality of man is his life or *prāṇa* cannot be final. The next deeper view is suggested in the concept of the *manomaya*, the self of mentation or consciousness. This concept is more adequate to the complex nature of man; for, consciousness denotes a higher stage of evolution than that of mere life. Just as life manifests itself in matter, so consciousness manifests itself in life. As life may be viewed as the self of matter, so consciousness may be regarded as the self of life. Matter fulfils itself in life and life in consciousness. Consciousness or mind that can contemplate and comprehend the world of matter and of life suits better the description of the Self of man than either the *annamaya* or the *prāṇamaya* sheaths. The sheath of mind is pictured as made of the Vedas - the *yajus* being the head, the *Rg.* the right wing,

1. CU. VIII, 8, 4;

2. ŚB. on TU. II, 2;

3. TU. II, 3.

the *sāman* the left wing, the *Brāhmaṇas* the body, and the hymns of the *Atharvan* and *Āṅgīras* the foundation ¹. The propriety of this description seems to consist of the fact that the most laudable forms of consciousness are the *vedic mantras*, which Śaṅkara defines thus: *Mantras* are consciousness of the Self cast in the modes of the mind ². Only in this sense are the Vedas eternal. The higher degree of truth associated with this conception of the Self of man is indicated by the *mantra* prescribed for meditation on the *manomaya* ³. At this stage of the inquiry man's real Self is identified with *manah* or mind by a process of superimposition, as before it was with the gross body and the vital breath. ⁴

The cosmic counterpart of the *manomaya* remains the *Sutrātman*.

More determinate than consciousness in general is Self-consciousness born of understanding or *Vijñāna*. The *manomaya* was represented as made up of the Vedas; its *Ātman* or Self is naturally the understanding of the Vedas ⁵. *Manah* or mind normally functions on the level of *samkalpa* or *vikalpa*, imagination and doubt. In these activities, consciousness is vague and indeterminate. With a wider and surer grasp of the nature of things due to the disciplined functioning of the mind, a clear distinction between Self and non-Self, subject and object, emerges. The evolution of self-consciousness due to the discriminative operation of the powers of *buddhi* is represented by the *vijñānamayaakośa*. It is made up of the elements of sure knowledge and leads to activities like the *vedic* sacrifice demanding precision of a high order ⁶.

Both *manomaya* and *vijñānamaya* sheaths pertain to the *antahkarana*, the inner organ; yet they are distinguished by the indeterminateness and determinateness respectively of conscious-

1. TU. II, 3 & SB. on it;

2. "manovṛttiyupādhiparicchinna-mātmavijñānam mantraḥ" - Ibid.

3. TU. II, 4, yatovāco nivarttante' prāpya manasā saha.

4. Cf. Vivekacūdāmaṇi VV. 170-182;

5. SB. TU. II, 4.

6. TU. II, 5;

ness, in these two modes ¹. In his *Vivekacūdāmaṇi* Saṅkara adds that the sense of egoity or Iness, the idea of agency, is bound up with the *viññānamayaako'sa*, the seat of self-consciousness ². Corresponding to the individual phase of the *viññānamaya*, there is the cosmic phase, the integrated whole of individual *viññāna* sheaths. But according to Ānandagiri, this cosmic phase includes the collective *prāṇamaya*, *manomaya*, and *viññānamaya* sheaths, which together constitute the *sūtrātman* or *Hiraṇyagarbha* ³.

Deeper and more comprehensive than sheath of self-consciousness is the sheath of joy, *ānandamaya* the core of human personality. The need to penetrate so deep into the essence of man arises from the sense of separation that self-consciousness imposes on the individual *jīva*, and from his impulse to integrate with all that is true, beautiful, and good in the world around. Did the world consist of a number of distinct isolated units, windowless monads, the joy of understanding harmony and love would be incapable of achievement. Actually man struggles towards peace, love and unity. A finite self, strictly, cannot achieve this goal of selfless *ānanda* or bliss. The two, self and not-self, must be embraced in a higher union through spiritual insight in order to achieve the goal of man's evolution ⁴.

The *Taittirīyopaniṣad* declares that body, life, consciousness and self-consciousness are sustained by the sheath of joy hidden in man. It is his inmost self. By itself it is blind as it is preoccupied with the claims of the separatist ego. The sheath of joy has pleasure, *priya*, for its head; delight, *moda*, for its right side, great delight, *promoda*, for its left side; bliss, *ānanda* for its body; and Brahman for its foundation or *puccha*. This *ānandamaya* is the subtlest of effects or *vikāras*, being closest to Brahman, or the absolute reality defined as 'rasa' or essence of

1. Vanamālā on P. 144 suggests alternatively that the *manomaya* may be identified with the *antahkaraṇa* pure and simple; the same blended with consciousness or *cit*, as a heated iron-ball with fire, is the *viññānamaya*;
2. VV. 186-191;
3. *atraprāṇomano viññānam ceti prakṛtyarthabhūtam kośatrayam sūtrātmarūpam* - Qd. V. P. 144.
4. Cf. *Reign of Religion in contemporary Philosophy* - PP. 423 ff.

joy. It manifests itself as the fruit of right effort on the part of the ego. ¹. Joy is the Self or as it were, the fruit, of right effort ². The sheath of joy, coming last in the series of sheaths, encases, so to speak, the Absolute, and is the closest approximation to it: its cosmic counterpart is God or *saguṇa Brahman*, the cause of the world.

An equally significant study of man, having much in common with the five-fold analysis given above, is presented in the *Māṇḍukyopaniṣad*, and *Gaudapāda's kīrikas* on it. It seeks to demonstrate that all reality is present in the individual and his states, an exposition of the text, *ayamātmā Brahma* ³. But man appears as a complex entity in this text, having four states or 'fourths', *catuṣpāt*. The explanation of this expression virtually exhausts the entire sphere of reality.

Empirically, reality is experienced on three different planes - of waking, dream, and sleep, and no study of reality can be complete which ignores any one of these planes ⁴. Of them all, the experiences of waking life are of course the most vivid and, for most men, they constitute the standard of all reality. But without conceding this majority view, the *Māṇḍukyopaniṣad* nonetheless, notes that they make up the first of the four states of reality and names it *Vaiśvānara* ⁵. Here the *Ātman* is outwardly cognitive, experiences gross objects of the senses and has seven limbs or constituent parts ⁶. Besides, *Vaiśvānara* has nineteen mouths identified by Śaṅkara as the ten sense-organs, cognitive and conative; the five vital breaths; and the

1. vijñānamyajñam'ante - TU. II, 5;
2. We have already noticed on P. 236 supra the important distinction Śaṅkara makes between *ānandamaya* and *ananda* = Brahman;
3. MU. II.
4. Cf. European and American Philosophy is based on the data of the waking state; in other words, of a fraction of experience; while Vedānta takes all the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep, or the whole of experience, into consideration - V. Subramanya Iyer. CHI. vol. III, P. 216.
5. The-common-to-all-men, MU. 3;
6. Śaṅkara identified them with reference to CU. V, 18. 12. Thus brightness is the head; the sun is the eye; wind is the breath, space is the body; water is the bladder; the earth is the feet and fire is the mouth - ŚB on MU. 3.

four divisions of the inner organ, viz., *citta*, *manah*, *ahamkāra*, and *buddhi* ¹.

Ātman in the dream-state is his second state and styled *aijasa*, the Brilliant. Here he is inwardly cognitive, experiences refined objects, and has the same limbs and mouths as *Vaiṣvānara*. In the wakeful state, *buddhi* or intellect operates through the sense-organs to apprehend the gross objects outside; but, in truth, the wakeful experience also is a matter of mental vibrations ². Still, impressions of the experiences of apparently external objects are stored up in the mind, which, thus, comes to resemble a painted canvas. Then, irrespective of external stimuli, and prompted solely by nescience, desires and prior acts, *avidyā-kārmabhiḥ*, the mind functions as in wakefulness:— such is the dream state. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* the dream state is likened to a junction between the familiar world of wakeful life and that awaiting man after his death ³. It is recognized that, as a rule, dreams are the confused memories of anterior experiences ⁴. With the subtle essences of wakeful experiences, the dream world is fashioned. On this plane of dream experience, the *jīva* is self-luminous, *svayam-jyotiḥ*; hence he is *aijasa*, the Brilliant. Here as well as in the wakeful state the real agency of the Self consists of illuminating the objects of perception *avabhāsatvātirekeṇa naka-*

1. In the theory that the first quarter of every man is the *Vaiṣvānara*, may be detected the germ of the *ekajīvavāda*, viz., that *jīva* is one only. Śaṅkara, commenting on this, remarks that the Self in the body is one with Virāt, having heaven as head &c. This may have been taken to mean his support of *ekajīvavāda*. In later theory *Vaiṣvānara* came to denote Virāt. But in the GPK. the term *Viśva* is employed to denote man in the wakeful state. Cf. GPK. v.1: Anandagiri declares that the entire cosmos as cognized in the waking state of man is his first quarter. This clearly is *ekajīvavāda*.
2. *jāgratprajñā anekasādhanaḥ bāhirviṣaye vavabhāsamānā manas-pandamatrasati*. ŚB. MU. 4;
3. BU. IV. 3, 9.
4. *Pūrvadṛṣṭasmṛtirhi svapnaḥ prāyeṇa* ŚB. on BU. P. 554.

trtvam ¹. Hence the expression *dhṛyāyativa lēlāyativa* ². The freedom of the self's movement in the dream state is emphasized:- it is the freedom of unfettered thought and imagination.

The third state of the Self, the *Prājña* or Cognitional has deep sleep as his state, where no desires are cherished or dreams dreamt. There he is a unified mass of cognition only, blissful in nature. The bliss of sleep, according to the *Chāndogya*, is a result of the temporary dissociation of the *Ātman* from the distractions of the mind, which is figuratively represented as a return of the *jīva* to his real Self or *Sat* ³. The flight of the *jīva* to the creative absolute or *Sat* is likened to the going back to rest of a bird fastened by a cord to a pole after vainly exhausting itself in efforts to break loose ⁴. Here in its status as *Sat* (= *Prājña* = *Īśvara*) *jīva* has left behind all distractions of the two anterior stages; he is bathed in peace and joy ⁵. The glory of the Self is undiminished though it is not empirically manifest ⁶. Though no forms are distinguishable, they are not abolished altogether; they are only blended together, *avivekāpannam*, like a day engulfed in darkness. The plurality characterizing the two earlier states is latent in this third to emerge later as a sprout from the seed. Hence it is described as the causal or seed-state which generates the dream and waking states ⁷. In other words, nescience and *karma* specific to each *jīva*, remain in deep sleep inactively, in seed state. *Prājña*, the third state of the *jīva* in sleep is characterized as the Lord of all, the origin and end of beings ⁸. Evidently in this passage the *jīva*'s empirical state is ignored and

1. ŚB. on BU. IV, 3, 10;

2. BU. IV, 3, 7;

3. *svamhyapīto bhavati* CU. VI, 8, 1;

4. Ibid VI. 8, 2.

5. *ananvāgatam puṇyena, ananvāgatam pāpena, tīrṇohitadā sarvāṇ chokān hrdayasya bhavati* - BU. IV, 3, 22;

6. Ibid. IV, 3, 23-30:

7. Cf. ŚB. on Mu. 5. *yadihi nirbījarūpaṃ vivakṣitaṃ brahmā-bhaviṣyat neti netiti ... avakṣyat. nirbijatayaiva cet sati pralīnāṇāṃ sampnnānāṇāṃ susuptipralayayoḥ punaruthānānupapattiḥ syāt.* ŚB on GPK. 2 Vide BSS. III, 2, 9. P. 637.

8. MU. p. 6.

only his identity with *Īśvara* in sleep-state is taken account of. This also suggests the parallelism we noticed more than once between the microcosm and the macrocosm. *Viśva* corresponds to *Virāt*; *Taijasa* to *Hiranyagarbha*, or *Sūtrātman*; and *Prājña* to *Īśvara* or *saguṇa Brahman* ¹.

In the three states under consideration, the objects of experience, the gross, the subtle, the joyful, are but three phases of one and the same stuff. Also the subjects in these three states referred to as 'I' in every case is one ². Both these objective and subjective aspects are only appearances of the real which admits of no bifurcation into subject and object. It is the presence of these that stamps the three states with the seal of unreality. That the fourth state of the *jīva*, representing the real without differences, is styled the fourth, *Turīya*, only conventionally will be clear from the following. "The *Turīya* or the fourth is not externally cognitive, internally cognitive, or both; it is not a mass of cognition, nor knower nor non-knower; it is unseen, unempiric, ungrasped, undefined, unthinkable, unnameable; its essence is the cognition of the unitary Self *ekātmapratyayasāram*: the worlds are extinguished in it; calm, good, non-dual, the seers name it the Fourth. It is the Self, it is to be known ³.

This, of course, is the description of the partless Absolute which we discussed in the beginning of Part II of this thesis, under the title of *Nirguṇa Brahman*. It is the one of which the first three quarters are only appearances. It is the real nature of the *jīva* as we saw above. Before we indicate the steps 'to know' the Absolute, we have to explain the need for 'knowing' the Absolute. In short, we must describe the nature of bondage before we explain the process of liberation.

1. A. Giri's *tika* on S/B on GPK. P. 24.

2. GPK. 5 & Śaṅkara's comm. on it.

3. MU.7.

CHAPTER IV

THE WORLD IN ADVAITA.

(i) Īs'vara and the world.

According to the definition *per accidens* of Brahman, he is the cause, both material and efficient, of the world ¹. The world is a complex of animate and inanimate existents. Of these, the problem of animate existents or *jīvas* we have already discussed, and, in that connection, it was pointed out that though the real nature of the *jīva* is identical with that of Brahman, empirically Advaita admits a plurality of *jīvas*. The world considered inanimate is the stage on which the *jīvas* play their various roles in life; there they suffer bondage, strive to improve their lots, and achieve their varied goals, the highest of which is liberation. How a cause which is essentially *saccīdānanda* in conjunction with *māyā*, gives rise to the world as we know it; what its status is; and how it is related to the *jīvas* living in it are the problems we shall examine in this chapter; for, without a solution of these questions the nature of *jīva's* liberation will remain obscure.

The different upaniṣadic approaches to the problem of the world may be reduced, according to Śaṅkara, to two chief patterns: (i) the *parināma-vāda* or the hypothesis of real change, and (ii) the *vivarta-vāda*, that of apparent change ². That is to say, *Īsvara* or the creative Absolute may be supposed to have undergone a real change and become the objective manifold, or, he may have suffered

1. Vide P. 246, Supra. BS I, 4, 24.

2. SS', II, 65 & 66. *kāraṇasya tāttvikakāryātmavṇam parināmaḥ ; sāvaṇasya sataḥ kāryātmavṇavā*. Where a cause which has parts really changes into effects, there is *parināma*: *hāraṇasya pūrvarūpāparityāgenābhinnam rūpāntaram*, atāttvikarūpāntarabhedovā *vivartaḥ*: where without loss of prior form, a new form is produced not different from the first, or an unreal change takes place, there is *vivarta*, Vide Sāra-saṃgraha of Madhusūdana on the above.

only an apparent change, and therefore the world is only his appearance. Both these hypotheses have been adopted in advaita but, as we shall see, not as equally valid.

Commenting on the *Brahmasūtra tadhinatvādarthavat* ¹, Śaṅkara writes that the causal state of the world, where the names and forms constituting its essence remain undifferentiated, is termed *avyakta*, but that, unlike the *sāṃkhyas*, the Vedāntins consider it as subordinate to *Īśvara* ². *Īśvara* cannot create the world except through the cooperation and instrumentality of *avyakta*, known also as *māyā*, *prakṛti*, *avidyā*, and so forth. It is essentially a causal power, *bījaśakti*, with which *Īśvara* is armed, and without which he cannot act ³. It may also be pictured as a great sleep, *mahāsusuptih* ⁴, in which the empirical *jīvas*, oblivious of their genuine nature, remain submerged. In the Upaniṣads this seed-power of the world has been styled sometimes as *ākāśa* ⁵, sometimes as *akṣara* ⁶, and sometimes as *māyā* ⁷.

The world cause in the upaniṣads, then, is *Īśvara* equipped with the creative power of *māyā*. It may be imagined, on the analogy of the potter and the pot, as the *Naiyāyikas* are never tired of repeating, that *Īśvara* is only the efficient cause of the world. Intelligence, planning, and execution are the characteristics of efficient causes like the potter in the example. The Upaniṣads urge: He thought, he created life⁸. It bethought itself; 'would that I were many.' ⁹ Besides, on the same analogy, *Īśvara* also must be deemed to stand in need of numerous acces-

1. I, 4, 3;

2. Prakṛti or avyakta is the independent source of the world in the Sāṃkhya Philosophy. vide P. 42. Part I;

3. śaktirahitasya tasya pravṛtīyanupapatteḥ BSS. P. 297. Cf. sivaḥ śaktyāyukto yadibhavati śaktaḥ prabhavitum nacedevaṃ devo nakhalu kuśalah spanditumapi. ĀL. V. 1;

4. Cf. anādimāyayā supto yadājivah prabuddhyate, &c. GPK.I, 16;

5. BU. III, 8, 11;

6. MuU. II, 1, 2;

7. SU. IV, 10;

8. PU. VI, 3 & 4;

9. CU. VI. 2, 3.

series of action when he sets about creating the world. Again the impure composite nature of the world argues a cause having these characteristics, since experience teaches that causes and effects share in the same nature. On the other hand, essentially *Īśvara* is partless, actionless, quiescent, and taintless¹. How, then, can the world be said to be a product of *Īśvara*'s real transformation or *pariṇāma*?

The *vedāntin* explains that the world-cause has to satisfy an important condition which will make *Īśvara* not only the efficient, but also the material, cause of the world. In the *Chāndogya*, where this point is elaborated, the world cause is laid down to be such that its comprehension includes that of everything, viz; all its products². Only the knowledge of the material cause can include that of the effects. The examples offered in that context, products of clay like pots and pitchers, &c., also point to the fact that the Upaniṣad is in quest of the material cause of the world³. Above all, that *Īśvara* in the Vedānta is the material cause also of the world is borne out by the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*⁴, where the world is said to originate and subsist in him; it also goes back to him in dissolution.

Having decided that *Īśvara* is both the material and efficient cause of the world, it is next affirmed that he transforms himself really into the world-*ātmakṛteh pariṇāmāt*⁵. As a preliminary statement of causality, Śaṅkara accepts that a real transformation *Īśvara* into the world is involved⁶. But the *Ratnaprabhā*, the *Bhāmatī*, and the *Nyāyañirnaya* alike point out that the transformation here is meant to be taken generally, so as not to affirm that the spiritual essence of *Īśvara* changes, an impossible assumption.

1. SU. VI, 19;

2. CU. VI, 1, 2;

3. CU. VI, 1, 4-6; MuU. I, 1, 2 & 7; BU. IV, 5, 6 & 8;

4. III, 2-6;

5. BS. I, 4, 26; TU. II, 7 - tadātmānam svayamakuruta;

6. pūrvasiddho'pihisannātmā viśeṣeṇa vikārātmanā pariṇamayā-māsātmanam. BSS. P. 341. On this passage Kokile'svara Śastry bases his thesis that Śaṅkara's final position regarding Brahman's causality is *pariṇāmavāda*; but he ignores Śaṅkara's immediately following words; *punāscetadsarvam vistareṇa-prativakṣyāmah* - I, 4, 27. BSS. See Note 235 on P. 259 Supra.

But objections to the view that *Īśvara* is both the material and efficient cause of the world are easy to raise. There is a vast disparity between the nature of this cause and that of the effect, viz., the world. It is the difference between purity, integrality, consciousness, &c., on the one hand, and their exact opposites, on the other. True, as regards the inertness of the world as contrasted with the consciousness of *Īśvara*, it may be suggested that in the inanimate parts of creation there is consciousness present; only it is dormant; just as a conscious being appears inert in sleep or swoon. This plea is however, futile, for the *śruti* itself recognizes the gulf between the conscious and the unconscious parts of creation¹. As for the disparity in regard to purity and impurity of cause and effect, it refuses to be explained away. The answer of the transformationist, *parināma-vādi*, is that as a matter of experience, conscious causes are seen to engender inert effects, e. g. the hair, nail, &c., arise from living bodies. True, bodies are by themselves inert. Still that they accommodate both consciousness and inertness is significant². Besides, to demand total similarity between cause and effect is to discard the distinction between them. As between *Īśvara* and the world, existence or *sattā* is a common trait. Even absence of consciousness in the world cannot be demonstrated. The Advaitin maintains, as indicated above, that consciousness is omnipresent, more or less patently.³

Another objection to the theory of *Īśvara's* real transformation into the world is that at the time of world dissolution or *pralaya*, he, the world-cause, will be infected by the grossness of the world. Again after such dissolution, how can the objective manifold, having lost all its distinctions in its cause, come forth again at the time of a fresh world-manifestation or *śr̥ṣṭi*? And, if it comes forth at all, even the liberated soul stand in danger of returning to this world of effects. But these objections also lose their force in the light of common experiences. Effects like pots and bracelets, when

1. TU. II, 6-tadnupraviśya saecatyaccābhavad...vijñānamcā vijñānamca;

2. BSS- P. 359.

3. Ibid. PP. 361-62.

smashed and reduced to the state of clay and gold respectively do not infect the causal stuff with their peculiarities. In fact, dissolution of effects involves their loss of peculiarities; else the effects will persist as such, and no real dissolution will have been achieved. Moreover, at all times, according to the theory of transformation, the cause and the effect are non-different and the contingency suggested above always threatens the cause. The danger of non-return of effects also is unreal; for, what determines the return is the presence in dissolution of the nescience of the *jīvas*. So long as this persists, they come back the same as they were before ¹. The liberated souls, of course, being free from nescience are not liable to return to the world of effects.

A subtler objection may still be urged against this preliminary *pariṇāmapāda* of the *Advaitin*. At the time of dissolution, will not the conscious subjects of experience, the *jīvas*, get blended and interfused with the inert objects thereof and *vice versa*, *bhoktrāpattiḥ* ²? The answer may be suggested by an analogy. The waves, ripples, foam, bubbles, one and all, partake of the nature of water. That, however, does not make them identical with one another; they maintain their distinctions among themselves all right. Similarly, both subjects and objects of experience remain non-different from the causal Brahman and yet are distinct among the themselves. ³

So far, the *Advaitin* has been arguing for arguments' sake, as it were - *abhyupagāmapāda*. It is not as though his final position on causality is based on the theory of real transformation of *Īśvara*. As *Sarvajñātman*, the author of the *Samkṣepaśārīraka*, says the theory of real transformation in *Advaita* is only a propaedeutic to that of apparent transformation. ⁴ The essence of the *pariṇāmapāda* is the recognition of the equal validity of the concepts of cause and effect. Both

1. CU. VI, 9. 2 & 3;

2. BS II, 1, 13;

3. BSS. P. 372,

4. II, 61:- vivartavādasyahi pūrvabhūmirvedāntavāde pariṇāmapādah vyavasthite' sminparināmapāde svayam samāyāti vivartavādah ||

are held to be equally real ¹. But in reality, argues Śaṅkara, there is no basis for a clearcut distinction between cause and effect. They are not two independent terms connected by the relation of inherence or *samavāya* as the *Nyāyavaiśeṣika* theory maintains or by any relation whatsoever ². The effect, namely the world is in reality not different from the cause, *Īśvara*, *Ananyatā* or non-difference between cause and effect is the truth about them ³. This important term signifies the negation of the effect considered independently of the cause-*vyatirekeṇābhāvaḥ kāryasya* ⁴. Vācaspati points out that what is asserted is not absolute identity between the cause and the effect, but only the negation of difference between them ⁵. It follows, therefore, that effects considered by themselves are unreal, a matter of terminology *vācārambhaṇam*, good enough for empirical purposes, but lacking in metaphysical reality. In short, effects apart from causes, are *mithyā* or false. This is the sense of the upaniṣadic teaching, "the firehood has gone from fire; the modification is merely a verbal distinction a name" and so on for all the effect constituting the world ⁶. Thus, according to the *vivartavāda*, which is a closer approximation to truth than *parināma-vāda*,

1. Cf. tatra (parināma-vāde) īśadabhede pi kāryakāraṇayoh prthaktvasyāpi sātītvād. Madhusūdana on S'S II, 56;
2. BSS. II, 1, 18;
3. BS. II, 1, 14 - tadānanyatvamārambhana's abhātibhyah;
4. BSS P. 373. It may be noted that Rāmānuja understands by *ananyatvam* non-difference between the manifested world of *cit* and *acit*, i.e. *Jivas* and matter and the same in the unmanifested state. In both states *cit* and *acit* constitute the body of Brahman; only, in the unmanifest state this body does not deserve to be treated as different from Brahman. This is the causal state of Brahman. When manifested, though still his body, the world of *cit* and *acit* may be treated as a distinct complex of effect. Then we have the effect state of Brahman. Of course, the two are non-different RB. PP. 312-13. The Dvaitins take the phrase as merely denying the independent status of the accessories which God, i.e., Hari, employed in the creation of the world. BSSM. P. 127.
5. nākalavananyatvamityabhedaṁ brūmah, kimtu bhedaṁ vyasthāmah. BSS. P. 373.
6. CU. VI, 4, 1-4.

apart from Brahman the cause, there is no real world at all. Explaining why, apart from the cause, the effects must be deemed false, Vācaspati writes ¹ that the nature of the real is immutability as in the case of pure consciousness or *cidātmā*: it knows no shadow of turning in any circumstances. But objects of the world are evanescent, *draṣṭa-naṣṭa-svabhāva* like the rope snake' since they have only a contingent existence. Were they also real, why do they not persist forever? But they are not entirely unreal, either, like the hare's horn; for, then, they would not have been experienced at all. To be experienced means to be real in some measure. The world of effects cannot be partly real and partly unreal, these, being contradictory traits, *sadastorekatravirodhāt*. Nor may reality and unreality be contingent attributes of effects, so that their presence and absence would make effects cognisable or not. For, in that case, the effects themselves would be permanent entities apart from reality and unreality, and so would cease to be effects of aught else. Unreality cannot, of course, exist apart in its own right; it has perforce to attach itself to something to make any sense at all. Possibly, unreality may be conceived differently. It is not an attribute attached to any entity, say, E. In the fact that E exists unreality. But the question may still be raised: is this mode of E's existence the same as unreality? or, is unreality of the nature of existence, *bhāva*? In the first alternative, all effects like E will be reduced to a sheer void, and thus there would be no world. In the second alternative, there would be no unreality at all, since its nature is that of existence. The conclusion, therefore, is that the world of effects considered apart from the cause is not real *navastu sat* ², - it is indeterminable, *anirvacanīyam* or false, *anṛtam*.

But why not, in accord with the theory of nondifference cum-difference, *bhedābheda*, consider world and *Īśvara* as partly identical and partly different? The relation between them may be likened to that between a tree and its branches. Thus both-unity and plurality may find a place, in the picture of reality ³ As cause, reality is unitary, while as effects it is plural. The world cause of Brahman is held to have manifold powers by

1. BSS. P. 374;

2. Ibid;

3. *pāramārthika evāyam bhedaḥ* BB. P. 94.

means of which he transforms himself in to the world of effects ¹. This position, however, is unsatisfactory. For, as between the cause and effect there is bound to be some relation, either non-difference, difference or both. Of course, it cannot be absolute non-difference, for, then there is no point in speaking of causes like clay and effects like pot. The two will be synonymous. Difference between the two will make empirical usage such as cause and effect quite intelligible. But there will be no sense, then, in saying that reality as cause is one, and as effect is many. One and the same thing cannot partake of the nature of two entities which are entirely different from each other. E cannot share in the nature of both M and N, if M and N have nothing in common. The difficulty of treating cause and effect as both different and non-different is equally great. Unity and plurality, in this case, are said to distinguish cause and effect, respectively. But to hold that between cause and effect there is non-difference-cum-difference is to mix up the attributes of the two, viz., unity and plurality. In other words, when substantives get mixed up through non-difference, their attributes also inevitably do the same. The plurality of the effects will communicate itself to the cause and the unity of the cause to the effects. Thus, total disintegration of the distinct natures of cause and effects will result. Therefore, the Advaita alternative of the indeterminability of the effects must commend itself to the candid thinker. To be sure, there is an experience of empirical plurality; but it is entirely a product of nescience ². True, the Upaniṣadic example of clay and pots may suggest that the world-cause transforms itself really into the world of effects. But such a suggestion has to be rejected for the reasons given above as well as in the light of what the upaniṣad itself teaches, later, viz; the cause alone is real, the effects being a matter of words ³. Besides, Brahman, being partless consciousness, a pure spiritual entity, cannot undergo real changes; it can only apparently do so. But, even this apparent transformation of Brahman demands

1. sahisvecchayā svātmānaṃ pariṇamayān svaśaktyānusāreṇa pariṇamayati BB. P. 97. 'SU VI, 8; CU. III, 14, 4.
2. mithyājñānavijṛmbhitāṃ cañānātvam BSS. P. 376;
3. vācāraṃbhāṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyevasatyam. CU. VI, 1, 4.

an explanation; a rigorously immutable entity should be beyond all conceivable changes. On the other hand, to insist on such immutability is to sacrifice the position that *Īśvara* or *saguṇa Brahman* is the sole cause, *abhinnanimittopādāna*, of the world; for, in strict non-dualism, how can he create? or be *Īśvara*? But, asserts Śaṅkara, the very status of *Īśvara*, his creatorship, his omniscience, and so forth, is a relative concept. *Īśvara* is an empirical category, and so too are the world, and the individual *jīvas*. *Īśvara*'s omniscience, e.g., is relative to the world whose essence is 'names and forms', which are *avidyākālpitā*¹. In other words, *Īśvara*'s status, as such, is not metaphysically ultimate, *tātvika*; it is conditioned by the nescience of the *jīva*². 'Names and forms', which are indeterminate as real or unreal, are superimposed on *Īśvara* through the nescience of the *jīva*. Whatever reality they have or appear to have are entirely derived from *Īśvara*³. The world and the activities therein are, thus, relative to the nescience of the *jīva* on the one hand, and the *māyā* of *Īśvara* on the other, making these distinctions in the same entity *ajñāna* with regard to its two poles, *Īśvara* and *jīva*⁴.

(ii) How is Brahman both the material and efficient cause of the World?

Brahman in itself is an impartite spiritual entity; how, then, can it be at once the sole cause of the world? This question may be discussed a little more thoroughly. True, Brahman has no parts, but through nescience, parts have been falsely ascribed to it by the *jīva*, *buddhīparikalpitāḥ*, and, through them, Brahman may be held to transform itself into the world. This idea has been echoed by Sureśvara: by virtue of nescience, the material cause of the world, Brahman is said

1. BSS. P. 381.

2. *natāttvikam aśvaryaṃ sarvajñatvaṃ ca brahmaṇah, kimtva vidyopādhikam Bhamati*. BSS. P. 381; *tadevaṃ upādhīparicchedāpekṣameveśvarasyeśvarattvaṃ na paramārthataḥ*. BSS P. 382.

3. *nāmarūpayorīśvarattvaṃ vaktumaśakyam jadatvāt; nāpīśvara ādanyattvaṃ kalpitasya pṛthaksattāśphūrtyorabhāvit*. RP. BSSr P. 382.

4. Vide P. 313. Supra.

5. CUB. P. 304.

to be the material cause of the world.¹ The position may be explained thus:— Brahman does not really transform itself into the inconscient world; but, in as much as it is the locus of nescience or *vivartitādhiṣṭhāna*, it is held to be the world's material cause². In this context by material cause must be understood what in itself gives rise to an effect³. Brahman and *ajñāna* together must be treated as the material and efficient cause. Nevertheless, real transformation takes place only in nescience⁴, which has already been pointed out to be a positive, beginningless, entity with its locus in pure consciousness⁵. Brahman with which *ajñāna* is associated remains immutable⁶, though, from the point of view of the *jīva*, it may be said to undergo apparent change⁷. The ontological status of the world is equal to that of nescience and less than that of Brahman; for effects share the reality only of the cause which transforms itself really into them, as, e.g., the pots of their cause, clay. The world considered as a complex of effects requires a cause which really changes itself into it, and that cause is *ajñāna*, which, however, being inert, cannot function without the superintending intelligence of *Īśvara*. But, then, what is the point of insisting that *Īśvara* is at once the material and efficient cause of the world? As conditioned by *ajñāna*, Brahman is said to be the material cause, and as the locus of desire, action, &c., which are only transformations of *ajñāna* he is also said to be the efficient cause⁸.

1. *asyadvaitendrajālasya yadupādānakāraṇam! ajñānamtadupaśrītya Brahma-kāraṇamucyate! BV. II, 371.*
2. AS. P. 757.
3. Ibid. *ātmanikāryajanihetutvam.*
4. Vide P. 328 Supra.
5. vide PP. 312, 313, Supra; also A. Giri on Vārttika II, 371—*naḥikūṭaḥthāsaṅgālvayam brahmajagadākāreṇājñānamanā-dāya pariṇāmibhavatī.*
6. AS. P. 758.
7. *naḥyavidyāsāhityepi brahma pariṇāmate kīmtu vivarttate.* Ibid. Cf. BSS. P. 401.
8. AS. P. 759. With regard to the cause of the world and its operation, there is divergence of views among Advaitins. Pure Brahman, and its conditional forms, *Īśvara* and *jīva* have all been held to be the sole cause of the world. The followers of the Samkṣepaśāstrīka regard pure consciousness to be the sole cause. nescience serving only the purpose of a medium through which that causality operates. (Vide SS. V. I,

The picture that emerges from the foregoing is of *Īśvara* at the beginning of a cycle of creation deciding to fashion this wonderful world in the manner of a mighty wizard. His agency, strictly, consists in casting a spell¹ as it were on the *jīvas* ready to share in empirical life, while he himself remains, of course, the master of the spell. This status of *Īśvara* is fully in accord with his omniscience and other attributes all of which are only due to the *sattva*-dominated *māyā* functioning as his adjunct².

The author of the *Iṣṭasiddhi* however gives a slightly different picture of the world in his opening stanza³. In this aesthetic concept, the world appears as a miraculous painting on the wall of eternal consciousness which bodies itself forth as the Self of bliss. The status thus indicated seems to imply that the world as it appears is the harmonious patterns of divine thought. Its significance and unity derive from Brahman, its ground.

If Brahman is essentially immutable, it may be asked why

325 & com. on it). For the Vivaraṇa school, *Īśvara* is the world-cause, and in support point to BSS. I, 1, 20; I, 2, 1; CU. III, 14, 2. Another view is that the objective world of spacetime has *Īśvara* as its sole cause, while the inner world of mind, intellect, &c., has both *jīva* and *Īśvara* as its causes; for, it is a product of *jīva*'s nescience in conjunction with the *māyā* of *Īśvara* (Vide PU. VI, 5, & MuU. III, 2, 7). A distinction made in this last view is that *jīva* alone is the cause of the inner world. Another way of stating the difference between *Īśvara* and *jīva* as causes is to hold that the former is the cause of the empirical world, and the latter, that of the illusory appearances like the rope-snake and dreams. Vācaspati's view is that Brahman, object of *jīva*'s nescience, unreally transforms himself as the world; hence he is the sole cause, and *māyā* only serves as an auxiliary. Prakāśānanda holds that *māyā*'s power alone is the world cause, and not Brahman. (Cf. BU. II, 5, 19; SU. IV, 8) but since Brahman is the ground of this *māyā*, Brahman also is figuratively referred to as the world cause. Cf. SLS. PP. 10-13.

1. Cf. It is as if the Divine Mother said to the human mind in confidence, with a sign from Her eye "Go and enjoy the World"—The Gospel P. 65.
2. AS. P. 759. Section on Brahman's authorship of the world
3. *yānubhūtirajāmeyānantātmanānandavigrahaḥ |
mahadādi jagannmāyācitrabhittimnamānyaham ||*

his real transformation into the world has been inculcated in the Upaniṣads and the *Brahmasūtras* ? ¹ Śaṅkara's answer is unequivocal. The sole object of such teaching is to provide a means for realization of Brahman ². Nay more, the entire Upaniṣadic account of the world-creation serves no other purpose ³. Sarvajñātman adds that the tentative employment of *pariṇāma-vāda* by Bādarāyaṇa also serves a polemical and constructive purpose. Thus has been demonstrated the inadequacy of the *Sāṃkhya* hypothesis of an independent *Prakṛti* as the cause of the world ; without an intelligent designer and executor, this world could not have come into being ⁴. Also, the *pariṇāma-vāda* serves as the first step towards the realization of the final truth about the world. Strictly, there are three points of view that Advaita adopts towards the world, and not two, viz, the *pariṇāmadrṣṭi*, *vivartadrṣṭi*, and *apavāda-kadrṣṭi*. By the first the empirical reality of the world is posited ; by the second, its partial falsity is suggested ; and by the third its total unreality is affirmed. According to *pariṇāma*, the world of objects is affirmed as real by the least advanced of inquirers. For the intermediate position adopted by the middlings, the world is not real, nor yet a mere nonentity. But the first inquirers must pass on to the position that the world is unreal with the complete abolition of the objective manifold ⁵. This highest level of Advaitic truth has been styled *ajīti* or 'non-birth' by Gauḍapāda, meaning thereby that the Absolute does not change at all really or unreally, into the world of effects ⁶.

(iii) The empirical world in Advaita.

Having shown what exactly is the status and purpose of

1. MuU. I, 1, 7 ; BS. I, 4, 26.
2. Cf. Brahmano jagadākārapariṇā mi vādi yacchrūyate tadbrahmadarśanopāyaivenaivaviniyujyate. BSS. P. 381. Cf. AU. SB. II, 1, 1 ; TU. SB. III, 1, 1.
3. sarvavyavahārahīnabrahmātūmabhāvapratiṭṭhānārthā tveṣā (pariṇāma-rūtiḥ) ; naceyam paramārthaviṣāyā sṛṣṭasrūtiḥ avidyākalpitanāmarūpavyavahāragocarātīvāt, brahmātūmabhāvapratiṭṭhādanaparātīvācca. BSS. P. 401, P. 406 ; Cf. also BSS. P. 320 ; GPK. III, 15 ; BUB. on IV, 4, 25, &c.,
4. SS. II, 76.
5. Ibid. II, 82, 83 with Madhusūdana's com.
6. Cf. GPK. IV, 22 ; 23 ; etattaduttamam satyam yatrakimcinna-jāyate - IV, 71.

the world according to Advaita, we shall study the nature of the empirical world, which, after all, is a fact staring us in the face and, as such, demanding close attention. Earlier we referred to Śaṅkara's sense of profound mystery which all sensitive and thoughtful minds experience in contemplating the world ¹. To begin with, the empirical world, which is a system of movements, *jagatyīm jagat* ² and styled *samsāra*, has no absolute beginning in time ³. This follows from the fact that *avidyā*, *jīva*, and *Īśvara* are simultaneously posited and that time itself is a product of *avidyā* ⁴.

The doctrine of the beginninglessness of the world has an important purpose to serve in Advaita. The obvious inequalities among the *jīvas* are sought to be explained as consequences of their own prior actions in preceding states of life. To posit an absolute beginning of the world means that *Īśvara*, the cause of the world, arbitrarily imposes invidious distinctions on the *jīvas*. To safeguard the ethical purity of *Īśvara*, the doctrine of the world's beginninglessness has been invoked. Further, it may be argued that this doctrine confers upon the *jīvas* themselves an incomparable sense of responsibility. Their acts have made them what they are, and their acts may very well make them what they will be ⁵. The doctrine of beginninglessness is reflected in the Upaniṣadic statement: let me enter these three divinities with this living soul-*jīvenātmanā* ⁶.

The fact that thus a beginningless series of world cycles is empirically contemplated also implies that the world has an objective status of its own. It is not a figment of any single *jīva*'s imagination as *ekajīvavādins* are driven to maintain ⁷.

1. Cf. BSS. on II, 2, 1; II, 1, 11 &c.,

2. ĪU. I.

3. BS. II, 1, 35-nakrmā vibhāgāditi cennānāditvāt;

4. Cf. *jīvaśo viśuddhā cittathā jīveśayor bhidā |*
avidyā taccitoryogah śadasmākamanādayah ||

5. Cf. Among the results of the theory of transmigration is the fact that the twin ghosts of fatalism and predestination are laid. Rehn: of the Veda, P. 262. Bloomfield M. 1908.

6. CU, VI, 3, 2; also Cf. RgV. X, 190, 3; BG. 3. XV.

7. The AS. PP. 533-37 attempts a partial defence of the *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi*

This is best brought out by Śaṅkara's spirited attack on the doctrine of the *Vijñānavādins* for whom only a beginningless stream of cognitions without objective counterparts is real¹. External objects exist independently of perceptions; for they are perceived². Like G. E. Moore in his refutation of Idealism, Śaṅkara demonstrates that whatever is, is not necessarily experienced. In other words, *esse* is not *percipi*, if this means the *percipi* of any given *Jīva*. External objects are real precisely because they are cognized as such. To deny the external objects which one perceives is like denying the satisfaction one derives from eating even while it is being derived. Both are cases of mere lack of candour. Nobody perceives mere perception when looking at a pot out there. The pot appears as the object of perception. So much is this the fact that even the Buddhist idealist is obliged to refer to objects of perception as seemingly external, *bahirvat*. Were externality a pure myth, like a barren woman's son, no comparison with it would have occurred to the idealist.

To decide whether objects are external one must employ means of valid cognition like perception, &c., and not start with theoretical preconceptions. And these means, according to their capacities, establish the reality of external objects. Also, the close resemblance between perceptions and their objects proves, if anything, the reality of the latter. That perception and its object are always concomitant does not do away with the independent status of the latter. On the contrary. Note also that among pot-perception, cloth-perception, &c., only the adjectives differ, and not the substantive, viz., perception, which objectifies pot, cloth, &c. Thus, percep-

vāda or solipsism, reducing inevitably, all the problems of life and their solutions to the status of those in dream.

P. 535. But the whole case is given away with the declaration that this doctrine applies only to *śṛṣṭi* other than the beginningless - *anādyatiriktaśṛṣṭivivṛṣayaeva dṛṣṭisṛṣṭisvikaṛāt*
P. 534.

1. Vide P. 130 Supra.
2. BS. II, 2, 28.
3. Vide Mind N. S. 1903.

tion and its object are different from each other. Further, it may be observed that two cognitions, anterior and posterior, cannot be subject and object, one of the other. To relate them thus is to give up, among others, the doctrine of the mementariness of cognitions. The reason for recognizing the reality of cognition, viz., its being experienced, also must suffice for that of its object to be recognized; for the object also is experienced. Cognition cannot cognize itself, since this violates the rule that one and the same thing cannot be the subject and object of the same action. The right thing is to grant that, empirically, cognitions have objects other than themselves. Besides, cognitions also must have agents other than themselves; otherwise, they would resemble lights concealed in a chamber of impenetrable granite-walls, i.e. would remain entirely unknown.

The empirical world of objects, again, is not on a par with dream-objects. The latter are sublated by waking experiences. Not so the objects of waking experiences. Dream experiences are only forms of memory in which objects are only recollected while in waking experiences, they are apprehended¹.

These arguments suffice to show that, for Śaṅkara, there is an empirical objective world, common to all percipients who cognize objects, given independently of any of them. In other words, Śaṅkara's is an objective idealism. This impression is strengthened by the objective treatment he gives to the constituents of the empirical world. Realistically, he considers *Īśvara* equipped with manifold powers as the source of the world². Before any world cycle begins, the complex of effects is held to reside in *Īśvara* as the seed power of the world to be³. This power is non-different from *Īśvāra*, the cause; and the effect the world, is non-different from the power⁴. This power may be called the will of *Īśvara*, his *īkṣāṇa*⁵.

1. S'B. II, 2, 28 & 29.

2. Cf. sarvaśaktiyuktācaparā devatā ityabhyupagantavyam BSS. P. 403; CU. III, 14, 4.

3. CU. VI, 2, 1; AĀ II, 4, 1. ātmavedameka evāgra āsit; BS. II, 1, 16.

4. tasmā-kāraṇasyā-mabhūtā śaktiḥ śaktescātmabhūtam kāryam. BSS. P. 387. saevaparmeśvarastēnātmanāvatīṣṭhamāno vikāram sṛjati. Ibid. P. 520.

5. CU. VI, 2, 3. tadaikṣata. Cf. Studies P. 15. V. J. Kirtikar.

From this unique cause, at once material and efficient, elements such as ether, wind, fire, water and earth evolve¹. In Advaita, ether or *ākāśa* is as much an effect as any other, Brahman alone being eternal². By the process of quintuplication³, the simple elements get interfused, and the world as we know it is held to arise - a complex of intermingled effects. Everything in the world save the sentient *jīva* is a product of the combination of the quintuplicated elements. Thus, e.g., the mind of man or *antahkaraṇa* is of the essence of the food eaten, vital breath or *prāṇa*, of water and *vāg* or speech, of fire⁴. The immanence of *Īśvara* in all the elements and their products is assumed⁵, but he is not exhausted in the world pantheistically; he also transcends the world.⁶ The order of creation is reversed in the process of the dissolution of the world⁷.

The whole of inorganic nature serves a purpose beyond it; it is *parārtha*⁸. In it may be recognized a clear order and hierarchy of forms depending on the increasing degree of manifestation of the cause in which, as components of the world, they are all rooted or which they may be said to envelope⁹. The various particulars and universals making up the world find their ultimate basis and receptacle in the most comprehensive of all universals¹⁰.

In the realm of the *jīvas* or organic nature, again, there is a hierarchy of ascending forms of life, manifesting more and more the world-cause immanent in them all. "As in the series

1. TU. II, 1; BŚ. II, 2, 8, 10, 11, 12.
2. BS. II, 3, 7. 3. Vide VeS.
4. CU. VI, 5, 4 annamayam; manah āpomayah prāṇah; tejo-mayī vāg.
5. BU. III, 7, 3-23.
6. pālośya viśvābhūtāni. tripādasyāmṛtamdivi. RgV. X, 90; BG. X, 42 viṣṭabhyāhmidamkṛtsnamekāmsēnasthito jagat.
7. BSS. II, 3, 14.
8. Cf. The Sāṅkhya idea that *prakṛti* functions for the sake of the *puruṣa* vide SK. vv. 56, 57, 58.
9. Cf. amṛtam satyena cchannam; BU. I, 6, 3.
10. sthāvarattvādārābhyā uttarottaram āvistaratvamātmanah BSS. AĀ. II, 3. aneke hi vilakṣaṇā ścetanācetanarūpāḥ sāmānyaviśeṣāḥ, tesāṃ pāramparyaगत्या ekamsin mahā-sāmānye'ntarbhāvah prajñānaghane. BUS. II, 4, 9.

of beings which descends from man to blades of grass, a successive diminution of knowledge, power, and so on is observed, though they are all alike animate, so in the ascending series from man upto *Hiranyagarbha*, a gradually increasing manifestation of knowledge, power, &c., takes place" ¹. Including both the organic and the inorganic realms in one, the *Aitarayopaniṣad* declares: All this is guided by intelligence, is based on intelligence. The world is guided by intelligence ². Still the empirical difference between the two realms is maintained in effect. While a stone, e.g., does not, obviously, live, a plant does ³. Animals, in addition, also move about and have a fuller life in the senses. But human beings, though resembling other animals in respect of their instinctive reactions ⁴, have a much more evolved mind, are *vyutpannacittās*, who reflect, discriminate, and act with remoter goals in view. Being the microcosm, man sums up in himself all that goes before his appearance on the world-scene and represents a fresh growth of the world in the direction of the perfection of God. Being most endowed with intelligence, he expresses and conceives what he has known, foresees the futuro, and seeks immortality through mortal means ⁵.

The empirical world is regarded not as a mere scene of sufferings and retribution, but also as a realm of opportunities for higher development, for the realization of the four ends of human life, viz., *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma*, *moksa*. It need not necessarily be a vale of tears, but may be made a vale of soul-making, i.e., the scene of the progressive realization of the divine which abides in it as its sole cause. In other words,

1. BSS. I, 3, 30. P. 262.
2. AU. V.3. Cf. the organic philosophy of Whitehead recognises no break (between matter, life, mind, and consciousness). All things are living, even an electron is low grade organism. The deadness of inorganic existence is but a deep hypnotic sleep of their consciousness. Time & Eternity. P. 81.
3. Cf. *tamasābahurūpeṇaveṣṭitāḥ karmahetunā | antahsattvā bhavantye sukha-duḥkhasamanvitāḥ ||*
4. *paśvādibhiḥcāviśeṣāt*. BSS. P. 21.
5. *puruṣetvevāvistarāmātmā. sahiprajñānena sampannatamo vijñātamvadati vijñātampaśyati vedaśvastanam vedalōkālōkau marṭyenāmṛtamipsatyevam sampannah—AĀ. II, 4.*

the world in Advaita has a variable status and value, and it depends on every *jīva* to evaluate it at its highest, i.e., as *Īvara* himself ¹, or see it as a fortuitous concourse of atoms, amidst which life struggles in vain for self-maintenance ². The Advaitin's world, which arose in bliss, is supported by bliss and is destined to return to bliss ³, is a standing challenge to us to realize this astounding truth in our life. "Not on the firm foundation of unyielding despair", but on the eternal truth of the world's non-difference from, nay, essential identity with, God is man exhorted to raise his soul's habitation. The world is the eternal *āśvattha* whose roots are above and whose branches are below ⁴. The world becomes a sore testing ground, even a hell, only if we get lost amidst the dark, gnarled, branches and ignore the roots above. The aim of the Advaita Philosophy is to point the way upwards. Thus, this world which seems to divide us from God will appear as bridge which connects and gives a passage unto Him. Forming the *taṭasthalakṣaṇa* of Brahman, the world in Advaita fulfils its sole purpose by awakening us to the truth that all is Brahman ⁵.

(iv) In what sense is the world Mithyā?

The world in Advaita is often described as false ⁶, *mithyā*. This word has a technical sense and nothing can be farther from truth than to imagine that the world is either a fiction or even a mere illusion like the rope-snake. In this section we shall attempt to determine precisely what is meant by the expression, the world is *mithyā*.

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1. Cf. *sarvam khalvidam Brahma*. CU. III, "14, 1.
 2. Contrast the world which, according to Russel, Science unveils: The world which science presents for our belief is even more purposeless. That man and his aims and ideals are the chance results of fortuitous collocations of atoms, that no life survives death.....is so very nearly certain that no philosophy which rejects these facts can hope to stand, vide, *The Freeman's* worship.
 3. TU. III, 6.
 4. KU. Vi I, BG. XV, 1.
 5. KauU. I, 6; CU VI, 9, 4, &c.
 6. Cf. *Brahma satyām jaganmīthya*.

In the *Pañcapādikā* two meanings of the term *mithyā* have been noticed, viz., negation and idefinability ¹. Of these the second, viz., being indefinable as either *sat* or *asat*, *sadasadvilakṣaṇatvam*, is the sense Advaitins have in mind when they describe the world *mithyā*. Objections to this view have been raised by Vyāsātīrtha in his *Nyāyāmṛta*. He asks what is meant by *sat* and *asat* in the definition of *mithyātva* or falsity. Does it denote (i) negation of existence qualified by non-existence? or (ii) two characteristics, viz., total negations of both existence and non-existence?, or (iii) total negation of non-existence qualified by total negation of existence? ² The author of the *Advaitasiddhi* points out that the last two alternatives are entirely tenable definitions of falsity. The main point to note is that by existence and non-existence, *satta* and *asattva*, the Advaitin does not understand contradictory or incompatible states - *parasparavirahatvarūpam*. Both the judgements 'the pot is existent' and 'the rope-snake is existent' are intelligible. Yet obviously, existence in the first case is not the same as existence in the second. Existence in the first case denotes unsublatability or *abādhyatvam* in empirical experience, while existence in the second is liable to sublation, as shown by the later judgement, 'this is not snake'. Thus *sattva* or existence in Advaita means non-sublatability at any time, *trikālābādhyatvam* ³, whereas *asattvam* means unfitness to appear as existent in any locus, i.e., the utterly non-existent ⁴. Therefore, by falsity of the world is meant that it has not eternal existence, incapable of sublation while, at the same time, it does appear its locus, i.e., Brahman ⁵. Thus understood, the negations of *sattvam* and *asattvam* may very well co-exist in the world, just as the negations of the universals of the cow and the horse co-exist in the camel. Or, by falsity of the world, one may mean that

1. *aphnavavacano' nirvacaniyatāvacanāśea*. CSS. No. I, P. 68; *mithyeti anirvacaniyatocyate*. Ibid. P. 88.
2. *taddhikim asattvaviśiṣṭasattvābhāvah ? sattvātyantābhāvāsattvātyantābhāvarūpam viśiṣṭam ? sattvātyantābhāvavattvesati asattvātyantābhāvarūpam ?* AS. PP. 48-9.
3. Ibid. P. 50.
4. *kvacidapyupādhan sattvena pratiyamānatvānadhikarapatvam*. Ibid. PP. 50-51.
5. *trikālābādhyavilakṣaṇatve satikvacidapyupādhan sattvena pratiyamānatvam ;* Ibid. P. 51.

the world is totally nonexistent at all times in Brahman, its locus¹. The fact of this negation, of the world in regard to its locus would not, itself, constitute a rival to the non-dual reality of Brahman. For, the Advaitic view is that negation is not different from its locus. The negation of a pot on the floor, e.g., is the same as mere floor. Nor, again, will the truth of the world's negation make its correlate, the world, equally true. For, in the analogous situation, the empirically true negation of the rope-snake does not entail the empirical truth of the rope-snake itself. Thus, from the point of view of pure Brahman, at no time is the world real². Nevertheless, the idea of falsity does not imply that the world is like the hare's horn. merely *tuccha*; for, both the world and its analogue, the rope-snake, appear to exist before their sublation³, in their respective loci, Brahman and rope. This also is the main difference between the Advaitic position and Buddhist nihilism; for, while in the latter the world-appearance has no basis at all, in the former, it is grounded in the immutable Brahman⁴. A third way of expressing the falsity in question is that the world is sublated by *jñāna*, i.e., the knowledge of its substrate, Brahman⁵. Whatever is thus liable to sublation is false as borne out by the rope-snake, for instance. This concept of falsity is stated by Prākṣātman, the author of the *Vivaraṇa* thus: *bādhā* or sublation consists in the cessation due to knowledge, *nivṛtti*, of nescience together with its effects, either in their solid or dissolved state⁶. Again, falsity may be understood as difference from reality⁷ where reality means what is established by valid means of cognition⁸. Validity, of course, means non-liability to subse-

1. pratipannopādhau traikālikaniṣedhapratiyogitvam mithyātvam. Ibid. P. 94.
2. Cf. nahanānāstikimcana. KU. IV, 11;
3. AS. PP. 139, 140.
4. Ibid. PP. 140. 150. vide also outlines of Indian Philosophy. PP. 372-73. Hiriyanna.
5. jñānanivartyatvam mithyātvam. AS. P. 160.
6. ajñānasya svakāryeṇa pravilenena varttamānena vāsaka jñānanivṛttir bādhah, Qd. AS. PP. 164-68.
Also Cf. tattvamasyā divākṛtyottha samyagdhījanmamātratah | avidyā sahakāryeṇa nāsidastibhaviṣyati ||
Qd. Ibid. P. 168.
7. sadviviktatvam. mithyātvam Ibid. P. 195.
8. Valid means (= Prāmāṇa) is defined as the flawless instrument of cognition doṣāśahakṛtajñānakaraṇam Ibid. P. 159.

quent cancellation. This last idea of falsity may be amplified by providing that what is different from the real must also appear to exist; otherwise, the attributless Brahman and the non-existent here's horn may fall within its scope, since neither of these is cognized as determined by *sattva* or existence¹.

The essence of these various definitions of falsity may be compared with what Sāṅkara expressed as *vyatirekeṇābhīva*², or independent non-existence. The implication of this phrase is that whatever truth the world has is properly Brahman's, that, independently of Brahman, its ground, the world is naught. In and through the definitions of falsity appears the important Advaitic truth that, of the three orders or degrees of existence³, viz., the metaphysical, empirical, and illusory, the world as a whole has only the second type of *sattā* or existence. The relation of the empirical to the metaphysical or real existence of Brahman is analogous to that of the illusory rope-snake to the empirical rope. Thus the world is a sort of mean proportional between the illusory rope-snake and the Absolute. The world is of course not eternally real, i.e., unsublatable; nor is it merely illusory. It has a pragmatic reality which continues to hold good until the ground on which it is superimposed, viz., Brahman, is fully realized. In other words, the world's empirically valid status will persist until one's identity with Brahman is experienced in the fullest measure⁴. Till then the activities

1. Vide AS. P. 202 tayoh sattvakrākārapratitivisayattvābhāvāt
2. SB. P. 373.
3. The question whether this threefold order of existence or *sattā* is true is discussed in the AS. If true, will it not be a rival reality negating the nonduality of Brahman? The answer is that this threefold division also is only empirically valid, and so the said contingency does not arise. P. 657.
4. The differentia of empirical reality is this, viz., it is sublated only by the indeterminate knowledge of pure Brahman or consciousness. On the other hand, what sublates illusory reality such as the rope-snake is the determinate knowledge of its substrate. Cf. saprakrākaṇiṣprakārajñānabādhyatvā bhyām vyāvahārikaprātibhāsikayorbhedah. AS. P. 658.

of the world, both sacred and secular, remain valid¹. The falsity of the world, in effect, is a task to be accomplished, rather than an empirically given fact. As Vidyāranya remarks, the worldlings would accept the world as real, *vāstava*; the thinker who ratiocinates will account it indefinable; and the saint, the accomplished philosopher, will treat it as naught. These three broad divisions include, of course, infinite degrees of varying attitudes to the world. The Advaitin stresses the fact that there is no stopping or rest for the fearless and ardent seeker after reality before he passes from the naive world-view of the worldling to the stable realization of the saint. Himself ever changing, he will find an answering change in the world also, till, having become Brahman, he finds no world apart from Brahman to account for.

Discussing the important question whether the world is an illusion according to Advaita, Dr. Rādhākṛishnan brings together a number of considerations in support of his view that it is phenomenal only and not illusory³. There are several passages in 'Śaṅkara's writings⁴ and in later Advaitic works like the *Advaitasiddhi* which maintain, taken by themselves, that the world is an illusion. Such a view, he urges, makes "a tragic joke of life", and renders meaningless many statements of Śaṅkara on the world of experience. The inconscient *avidyā* by itself cannot be the cause of the world; it is not a mere subjective force, but has also an objective reality. The pluralistic universe is an error of judgement, and correction of this error can mean only a change of opinion. The world of experience, ultimately, becomes transfigured in the intuition of Brahman. It is not negated so much as reinterpreted. Virtue has significance for Śaṅkara; for, it prepares man for Brahman realization. "Unreal the world is, illusory it is not". The world is based on the real, not the real itself. So it can only be called the appearance or phenomenon of the real". It is true that for Śaṅkara as we showed in the previous section, the world is not a dream, but has empirical reality. But the

1. *Prācīnmaikatvavagateravyāhataḥ sarvaḥ satyānṛtavyavahāro laukikovaidikaścetyavocāma*, BSS. II, 1, 14. P. 380.

2. PD. VI, 130.

3. IP ii PP. 578 ff;

4. BSS. I, 3, 1; I, 4, 6; II, 1, 14; II, 1, 27 & 28; II, 3, 46, &c.

important point to stress, we think, is not that, or even that it is not illusory as some extremists in Advaita actually maintain. The vital point is that the world in Advaita is a variable and that it has a value and significance which change with the culture and spiritual insight of the individual who evaluates it¹. It is allowed that in the intuition of Brahman the world is transfigured. But how? Śaṅkara insists that complete realization of Brahman, the ground of the empirical world, would not leave us with two entities, viz., Brahman and a transfigured world. Neither the knower nor the world remains; only Brahman remains, the *bhūmā* "where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else"². Commenting on the *Brahādāraṇyaka* IV, 3, 20³, Śaṅkara states that when all *avidyā* vanishes and the knower attains *sarvātmabhāva* i.e., experiences everything as Self, even in dreams his experience is "I am all this" *sarvoṣmīti manyate*. The perception of the slightest difference from the Self, to the extent even of a hair's tip, *bālāgramātramapi*, is nescience⁴. The empirical world, *samvyavahāraviṣayalokaḥ*, which is experienced before the final realization is a sign of and due to *avidyā*. The conclusion seems inevitable that the question, is the world an illusion? is not precise and is misleading. It raises the further question to whom? No answer can be legitimate without specifying the nature and capacities of the inquirer. To the perfected saint, as we said above, there is no world at all, but only God⁵, to the Advaitic dialectician, even to the saint who comes back to the awareness of the empiric manifold, the world may be accountable as an illusion; to the naive worldling it is the sole

1. Cf. The concept of cause, in 'Śaṅkara is axiological; it is the concept of essence, The Vedānta of Śaṅkara P. 293. R. P. Singh.
2. CU. VII, 24, 1; Cf. We have an experience in which there is no distinction between my awareness and that of which it is aware. Essays on Truth & Reality. P. 150;
3. *ahamevedam sarvoṣmīti manyate so 'syaparmo lokaḥ*;
4. *prapañcaparityāgena sadātmanā sampattnisprapañcasadātmavam-BSS. P. 361.* Cf. There cannot be time where there are no divisions or relations of before and after. Time & Eternity. P. 76;
5. Cf. But looked at from within, the divine eternal moment is all inclusive. Nothing falls outside it to which it may bear comparison. The mystic therein is identical with all other mystics and God. Ibid P. 84.

reality. The case may be likened to that of a hundred-rupee note. To the playful child it is only a piece of paper as he is not aware of its worth and value; but, to the adult who knows, it is not paper at all, but so much purchasing power. The Advaitin is justified in taking the world as a problem which is solved only when the answer of God is wrung out of it. Once that answer is secured, the problem entirely vanishes. That 'Saṅkara consistently speaks of the entire creation as a means to realize the sole reality of Brahman lends support to the view of the world we have adapted above¹. To the extent this view is valid, Deussen seems to be right in asserting that "to treat the world as real is to deny reality to God".² The world, we said above, is a bridge leading to God. It may be added that it progressively vanishes, as such, as it is progressively crossed, till, finally, Brahman alone remains³. Thus we conclude that the question of the world's being real or illusory is one of evaluation or axiology and that its answer is altogether relative to the spiritual insight of the individual concerned. Therefore, the world-views presented in *Dvaita*, *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, *Bhedābheda*, &c., may be looked upon as varying evaluations of the world in the course of an inquirer's progress to the summit of Brahmic realization⁴.

1. Vide P. 373, *Supra*;

2. *Phily*: of the *Upds.* P. 160;

3. Cf. "It was suddenly revealed to me that everything is pure spirit. The utensils of worship, the altar, the door-frame, - all pure spirit. Man, animals, and other living beings - all pure Spirit". *Sri Ramakrishna's Gospel*. P. 345.

4. 'The world is unreal' is a value judgement, and means that it is unblest or worthless. - *Stace*. P. 128.

CHAPTER V

BONDAGE ACCORDING TO ADVAITA

The indispensable condition and presumption of liberation or *mukti* is the prior state of bondage or *bandha* ¹. The nature of this prior state, therefore, determines that of liberation. In vital respects, the Advaitic concept of bondage differs from what it is in all other schools of Indian thought. We shall in this chapter set forth the implications of bondage or *samsāra* in Advaita stressing its distinctive features.

The main point in regard to bondage is to determine how Brahman, the sole reality in Advaita, lapses from its absolute perfection, *pūrṇatā*, into a state of errors, cravings and pains. In other words, how does Brahman become the *jīva*, or the infinite, finite? Earlier, it was generally stated that the association of Brahman and *māyā* is responsible for the simultaneous postulation of *Īśvara*, *jīva* and the world. This association, it may be repeated, is a hypothesis advanced by the philosophising *jīva* to reconcile the empirical experience of the objective manifold and the metaphysical experience of the non-dual reality. From the statements of Yājñavalkya, ² it is clear that the apparent lapse of Brahman from its non-dual state is not real. Were it real, one would have to conceive of reality forsaking its inherent nature, an impossibility as Gauṣapāda has so eloquently argued ³. Hence the Advaitin offers the hypothesis of nescience or *avidyā* on the part of the individual *jīva* to account for his apparent limitations, his actual predicament of bondage. For instance, commenting on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* I, 4, 17 ⁴, Śaṅkara says that the world is the tree of *samsāra* which, sprouting from the seed of acts, *karma*, grows in the field of *avidyā*; i.e., it is an

1. bahddasya hi mokṣaḥ kartavyaḥ—BUB. P. 385.
2. yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati taditara itaram paśyati—yatra-tvaśya sarvamātmaivābhūt tatkenakaṃ paśyet, &c. BU. IV, 5, 15; also, cf. BU. IV, 2, 23-31.
3. prakṛtiḥ setivijñeyaḥ svabhāvaṃnjahātiyā. GPK. IV, 9, prakṛteranyathābhāvo nakathamcid bhaviṣyati; Ibid. III, 21.
4. taddhedaṃ tarhyavyākṛtamāsīt, &c.

appearance resting on ignorance alone¹, ignorance of the *jīva*'s metaphysical nature as Brahman. Explaining this statement Ānandagiri adds² that the seed-state of the world or the cause of the world is at bottom the ignorance in which the Self is reflected - *sābhāsapratyāgavasthā*. The relation between the Self and nescience is limited to the fact of reflection of the former in the latter. Later³, clarifying his meaning further, he writes that cosmic phenomena arise from Brahman as unknown, while clear knowledge of Brahman must inevitably sublate the world. In other words, the causality of the world ascribed to Brahman⁴, is mark of the *jīva*'s nescience, and does not in reality belong to it. In fact, the status of *jīva* as *jīva*, i.e., his bondage, manifests itself in the imputation of causality to Brahman, in the innate tendency to perceive an objective manifold as effects and then to search for their cause.

The bondage of the *jīva* may also be described in the words of the *Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad*. "There is indeed another, different soul, called the elemental soul (*bhūtātman*) - he who, being overcome by the bright or dark fruits of action, enters a good or an evil womb, so that his course is upward or downward, and he wanders around overcome by the pairs of opposites". Explaining that the *ātman* in the body, the *bhūtātman*, is overcome by the *guṇas* of *prakṛti*, the *upaniṣad* adds that "because of being overcome, he goes on to confusedness, *sammūḍhatvam*; because of confusedness, he sees not the blessed Lord who stands within oneself; *ātmasthaprabhūṃbhagavantam*. Borne along and defiled by the stream of qualities, unsteady, wavering, bewildered, full of desire, distracted, this one goes on to the state of self-conceit, *abhimānatva*. In thinking, 'this is I' and 'that is mine' he binds himself with his self as does a bird with a snare - *jālenevakhacarah*." ⁵

This important passage makes it clear that the cause of bondage of the *jīva* is the thought "this is I", "that is mine". In other words what is called personality, the finite ego,

1. karmabījo'vidyākṣetro hyasau samsāravṛkṣaḥ—BUB. P. 108.
2. Ibid. P. 108.
3. Ibid. P. 110.
4. vide, BS. I, 1, 2; I, 4, 23, &c.
5. MU. III, 2. Translation by Hume.

constitutes the bondage of the *jīva* ¹. But, as Śaṅkara says ², "even in the state of bondage or nescience, every living being, *arvojantu*, is in reality Brahman ³; only through nescience, *avidyā*, the *jīva* deems himself, as it were, by an act of superimposition ⁴, or *adhyāropa*, even as silver is superimposed on nacre. This idea of superimposition, known also as *adhyāsa*, is of paramount importance for the elucidation of the concept of bondage. We have already pointed out that *avidyā*, the cause of the objective manifold, has been identified with *adhyāsa* by Śaṅkara'. Now we shall proceed to show in some detail the implications of the act of *adhyāsa*; for it is responsible for the *jīva*'s being what he is, cognitively, conatively, and emotionally.

The scope of superimposition is as wide as the world. It covers the total field of experience, subjective and objective. Its basic feature is a transference of the subject and his qualities to the object and *vice versa*. In view of the diametrically opposed natures of the subject and the object, - consciousness, and inertness-such mutual transference should be impossible. The Advaitin is the foremost to point out the fundamentally irrational nature of the *adhyāsa* under consideration. Writes Śaṅkara: Object and subject, 'having as their province the presentation of 'the thou' and 'the I' are mutually opposed as darkness and light. The transfer, with its qualities, of the object which has as its province 'the thou' (or the not-self) to the pure spiritual subject which has for its province the idea of 'the I' (or the self) and conversely the transfer of the subject and its qualities to the object, should be false ⁵. Nevertheless, it is a fact of empirical life which consists precisely in this very transfer and the consequences following therefrom. "Yet" continues Śaṅkara, "in mankind, this procedure resting on false knowledge of pairing together the true and the untrue

1. cf. the Buddhist notion of *anattā*, PP. 83-84 supra.
2. 'SB on BU. I, 4, 11.
3. BUB. P. 143.
4. *kalpayatyātmanātmānamātmā devahsvamāyayā. GPK. II, 12*
sa evabuddhyate bhedān.
5. Supra P. 311.
6. The opening of sentence of Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*.

(i.e. the subject and the object) is natural, so that they transfer the being and qualities of the one to the other" ¹. In other words, however irrational, *adhyāsa* is a fact, *sarvaloka. pratyakṣa* ², as borne out by expressions such as "I am this", "Main is this", &c. In such expressions, what stands out prominently is the association of consciousness, or the subject, and its opposite, the inert object ³. Being an effect or *kārya*, *adhyāsa* also requires a material cause ⁴, which is *mithyājñāna*, the indeterminable and inert energy of nescience ⁵. But what is the point of maintaining that *mithyājñāna* is the material cause of superimposition? Prakāśātman in his *Vivaraṇa* answers that it is so described because its presence is the necessary condition for the occurrence of superimposition; at the same time, without *mithyājñāna*, there can be no superimposition at all ⁶. As the efficient cause of *adhyāsa*, however, the peculiarities and defects of its locus and of the sense-organs and so forth may be counted ⁷. *Adhyāsa* denotes both the false object superimposed and the cognition thereof.

It may be asked how the empirical usage or procedure ⁸, which is conditioned by *mithyājñāna* has none the less been described as natural. Padmapāda in the *Pañcapādikā* urges the following considerations. The fact that both in the objective and subjective states the power of nescience is ever-

1. Ibid.

2. BSS. P. 25.

3. satyam = anidam caitanyam; anṛtam yuṣmadarthah—because it is wholly fictitious being a by-product of super-imposition. PP. pp. 85, 86. CSS. No. I.

4. sarvam cakāryam sopādānam bhāvakāryatvād ghaṭādivat. Ibid. PP. 90-91.

5. mithyetyanirvacanīyatocyate. ajñānamiti ca jaḍātmikāvidyā-śaktih.....tannimittastadupādāna ityarthah—Ibid. 188. cf. The expression 'material cause' means a cause that is common and necessary to all forms of illusion and is itself not an effect - Introduction to the *Iṣṭasiddhi* P. XXV, fn. 4.

6. tasminsatyadhyāsasyodayāt asati cānudayāditi brūmaḥ p. 89 CSS. No. I;

7. Ibid. P. 90.

8. Vide P. 388, Supra.

present has to be conceded. Otherwise, the appearance of false entities would be inexplicable. This power does not impede the appearance in cognition of inert objects, which remain uncognized only through the inadequacy of the means of right cognition. In other words, the non-self is not the object of nescience¹. In regard to objects, it operates by throwing up illusory appearances such as the rope-snake, while in regard to the subject or self, in which nescience is naturally located, the power of nescience cloaks the full revelation of the *Brāhmic* essence. Also, it throws up in the Self the illusory appearances of *ahamkāra* (egoity) and so forth². During deep sleep and swoon the creative potential of nescience remains in the self to precipitate later, in the waking and dream states, its natural products, viz., the *upādhis* like intellect, egoity, mind, &c. Thus the empirical procedure of coupling the true Self and the false *upādhis* is both natural and conditional³.

In the definition of *adhyāsa* as *śmṛtirūpaḥ paratrapūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsa*⁴, what is emphasized is the object of superimposition. It has, as it were, the form of memory⁵. It is, of course, not the object of an actual recollection; for, it is in front of the victim of illusion and in contact with his organ of perception. The superimposed object may have an empirical status like the world or only an illusory status like the rope-snake. In any case, that which is perceived may not be said to be remembered. The necessary condition of the illusory perception is that a like object should have been experienced before, *pūrvadṛṣṭa*; it is by no means necessary that it should have been real also⁶. One who has never seen a snake will not see an illusory snake either. The cognition

1. *nājñānaviśayo'nātmā*. Ibid. P. 106.
2. Cf. *sōpi tujīvasya jñānaisvaryatirobhavo dehayogād dehendriyamanobuddhiviśayavedanādiyogād bhavati*, BSS. on III, 2, 6.
3. PP. 96-131 - *Pañcapadika* in CSS. No. I.
4. BSS. PP. 10, 13.
5. *smāryamāṇarūpamiva rūpamasya, napunaḥ smāryata eva*. PP., p. 158.
6. *tasya ca dṛṣṭamātratvamupayujyate na vastusattā*. Bhā, BSS. P. 11.

of the illusory snake also is of the nature of memory, meaning thereby that all cases of cognition, where the sense-object contact is absent, resemble memory. ¹

Before we ask what the exact status of the superimposed object is in Advaita, certain relevant questions have to be faced. Firstly, who is the agent of superimposition? It is obvious that only the locus of nescience, the ignorant *jīva*, can be the agent of erroneous superimposition. But even in the stage of ignorance, as has been pointed out above, the *jīva* is in reality Brahman. Nevertheless, no *jīva*, as such, is aware of his identity with Brahman; else, where is the necessity to teach him that supreme Advaitic truth? In other words, undeniably, the object of *avidyā* is Brahman. Are we, then, to conclude that Brahman is the agent of superimposition on itself of the objective manifold? Śaṅkara unequivocally declares that Brahman is not the agent of superimposition, or in other words, the victim of *avidyā*. Brahman does not err, *bhavadrevaṃ nāvidyākārṭr bhrāntam - ca brahma* ². But, all the same, he denies that there is any intelligence, *celana*, other than Brahman who is such an agent and who errs. Ānandagiri explains that due to the beginninglessness of the cosmic phenomena, i.e., the process of superimposition, nescience does not depend on an agent, *kartā*, for its operation ³. But this is not a satisfactory conclusion, and it is reminiscent of the Buddhist teaching that there is no one who suffers, but only suffering ⁴. But Śaṅkara himself, elsewhere, suggests a more tenable solution. Commenting on the *Brahma Sūtra IV*, 1, 3, ⁵ he affirms that the identity consciousness abolishes all duality. But an objector asks: Who is wanting in this identity-consciousness? In other words, who is ignorant? Who is responsible for the erroneous appearance of quality? Śaṅkara's answer is: *yastvampṛcchasi tasya ta iti vadāmaḥ*. You who raise the query are the victim of nescience. This means that the agent of

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1. na hyasamprayuktābhaśināḥ pūrvapravṛttatadviśayapramānadvārasamutthatvamantareṇa samudbhavaḥ sambhavati. PP. p. 163.
 2. BUB. P. 144.
 3. Ibid. P. 144.
 4. vide, PP. 81-90 supra.
 5. ātmeti rūpagacchanti grāhayantīca.

superimposition is the *jīva* who has, as yet, not shaken off the illusion that he is finite, though, as a matter of metaphysical reality, he is never other than Brahman.¹

The next question is how there can be any superimposition on Brahman or *Ātman* who is impartite consciousness. Without being cognized as object, nothing can become the substratum of superimposition, as is evident in the case of illusory perceptions like the rope-snake. And obviously, pure consciousness or Brahman can never become an object of perception as, in all acts of perception, it remains the subject². As the *Bhāmali* elucidates, one object can appear as another only when some of its general features are cognized leaving out the specific features due to some defects or other³. To be the substratum of superimposition, therefore, an entity has to have parts or be composite, as, e.g., the rope is. Brahman is not only not a composite object, but also is a self-revealing entity, so that no mistakes can possibly be made with regard to it. Thus both under conditions of complete cognition and complete non-cognition of the substrate, superimposition must be ruled out.⁴

Śaṅkara's answer is that pure consciousness is not entirely unknown; it is the object of the presentation of 'the I', *asmātpratyaya*. In reality, no doubt, pure consciousness is without limits, differences and agency, and, also, it is unrelated to the fruits of all actions and is the object of no cognition; still due to association with intellect, mind, body, it appears as limited as the agent of actions, &c., i.e., it appears as the *jīva*. The possibility of superimposition on pure cons-

1. cf. 'SB on GPK. II 16 and Ānanda Giri's gloss on it; also US. I. 65 and Rāmātūrtha's introduction to it.
2. *yuṣmatpratyayāpetasya capratyagātmano' viśayatvaṃ braviṣi*—BSS. P. 17.
3. P. 290. CSS. No. I.
4. *tasmādatyantagrahetyantāgrahe canādhyāsa iti siddham*; Bhā, P. 291. Ibid.

consciousness arises from the fact that in its delimited phase as *jīva*, the distinction between it and its *upādhis* such as intellect and mind remains uncognised. This lack of discrimination leads to the superimposition of the *upādhis* on it and the *jīva*hood results. The *jīva*, then, is a composite product of superimposition. His constituent factors are the subjective consciousness and the objective *upādhis*. The *jīva* is *anīdamīdamītmā*, and, as such, may be said to be the object of the presentation of 'the I'. This may also be explained in another way. Pure consciousness is altogether passive; being free from both the powers of action and experience, *kriyāśakti* and *bhoga śakti*. On the other hand, the *upādhis*, *buddhi*, &c., possess both these powers, but are devoid of consciousness. When the two get interfused through superimposition, the resulting *jīva* comes in possession of the powers of action and experience, and also becomes an object of the notion of egoity, *ahaṁkāra*. In this predicament, the *jīva* is also styled *jantu* and *kṣetrajña* ¹.

Still, it may be objected, this is a case of circular argument. For, without presupposing superimposition, consciousness cannot be an object of cognition as a component of the *jīva*, and without such objectification, there can be no superimposition. Vācaspati points out that, just as in the case of the seed and the sprout, no vicious circle is involved in the case in hand. The series of superimpositions and objectifications of consciousness is without beginning in time. So, any single instance of superimposition may be explained with reference to the consciousness objectified in the immediately preceding act of superimposition ².

1. cf. *ahaṁkārasyakartṛtvaṁcityadhyasya, tathācītaḥ | sphūrṭiṁ cāhaṁkṛtau granthiṁ kuryānmāyātayordṛgham || Citradīpa.*
2. P. 299 CS§ No. I. † The PP. also gives a similar explanation. Egoity or *ahaṁkāra* is the direct object of the 'I-notion', but it is a composite entity made up of the objective and subjective elements — *anīdamīdamrūpavastugurubha*. PP. 302-303. Ibid. In the same text another explanation of Brahman being the substratum of superimposition has been put forward on P. 67. "ānando viśayānubhavo nityatvam itisanti dharmāḥ, apṛthakte'pi caitanyāt pṛthagivābāhāsanta iti nadoṣaḥ", — Though non-different from consciousness strictly, when viewed from the human end, the *sattā* or being alone of

So far we have been dealing with the possibility of superimposition on pure consciousness as *pratyagātmā*, the inner Self of the *jīva*. In the cosmic context also, the superimposition of the objective manifold on pure consciousness may be similarly conceived. In the *ekajīvavāda*¹, the world as a whole is held to be superimposed on Brahman by the only real *jīva*. In the theory of the plurality of *jīvas* also, each *jīva* may be held to live in a world of his own, having no doubt, similarities and common points of reference with those of other *jīvas* based on similarities of *samskāras*. Each *jīva* may then be considered to superimpose his world on Brahman. In this view, *Īśvara* the world-cause must be deemed to be the *jīva*'s way of interpreting pure Brahman. Like the world, *Īśvara* also is superimposed on Brahman as the cause of the world². Taking the two spheres of the microcosm and the macrocosm one gets a comprehensive view of the extent of the *jīva*'s bondage or alienation from the right vision of reality. Three basic forms of this bondage may be distinguished corresponding to the three basic tendencies of the human mind: (i) the bondage of the cognitive function; (ii) the bondage of the conative function; and (iii) the bondage of the emotive function. We shall consider them in this order.

(i)

Bondage of the *jīva* on the cognitive side may be conceived as primarily flowing from the superimposition on the Self of cognizership or *pramāṭṛtva*m. Cognizership is a mark of bondage, for, thereby, the *jīva* comes to perceive an objective manifold in lieu of pure undifferentenced consciousness. The process of superimposing cognizership on the pure Self is described by Śaṅkara as follows:—"Without the conceit of 'I and mine' in the adjuncts of the *jīva* consciousness, viz., the body, sense-organs, &c., cognizership cannot arise, and, then, of

Brahman shines forth, and not also its bliss and eternity. Hence as in the case of the rope, partial perception of Brahman in effect makes it a fit *adhiṣṭhāna* or substrate of superimposition. Cf. The Doctrine of *māyā*, P. 132, A. K. Chaudhury, Calcutta, 1950.

1. Vide PP. 354. ff. Supra.
2. Cf. *avidyātmakanāmarūpabijavyākaraṇāpekṣatvāt sarvajñatvasya... tadevamavidyātmakopādhiparicchedāpekṣamevāsvarasyesvaratvam*. BSS. PP. 382-82;

course, the operation of the means of cognition, *pramāṇa-pravṛtti* will also be out of question. The means of cognition like perception may operate only through sense-organs, which, in their turn, without an intelligent substratum, cannot function. Similarly, the body, too, without selfhood being superimposed on it, is inert. And, in the absence of this whole series of superimpositions, the unattached Self or pure consciousness cannot function as cognizer. Just as animals act without discrimination on their level, man, too, functions as cognizer, &c., without discriminating the Self from the *upādhis* and *vice versa*".¹

Cognizership of the pure Self, thus, being a product of superimposition, it follows that the result of such cognition must also be basically false or *mithyā*². In other words, the *jīva* in bondage as *pramātā* commits a series of intellectual errors. His cognitions deviate more or less from the full truth. The Advaitic evaluation of both the object of superimposition and its cognition may be briefly explained since the possibility of the complete sublation of the world by the knowledge of the Self or Brahman depends upon its status as an object superimposed on Brahman³. The Advaitic theory of superimposition is as follows. The causes of the illusion of say, silver in the nacre are sense contact with the nacre, impressions of prior cognitions of silver in the mind, the defects of the sense-organs, &c. When the defective sense-organ comes in contact with the nacre, the inner organ is modalized merely in the form of 'this'. This mode of the *antahkaraṇa* coincides with 'the this' aspect of the nacre and there results the coincidence of the intelligence

1. BSS. PP. 20-23;

2. Vide PP. 381 ff. *supra*, for the definition and discussion of *mithyātvam* in Advaita.

3. Though in his commentary on the Brahmasūtras, Śaṅkara refers only to three theories of superimposition or illusory knowledge, or *bhrama*, later writers on Advaita consider a few more so as to throw their own theory of indeterminability, *anirvācanīyatā*, into bolder relief. The theory of error current in the Viśiṣṭādvaitic school is based on the dictum *sarvam sarvāt-makam*: i.e.; all objects are in their nature entirely mixed up. Water is actually present in the mirage or silver in the nacre.

limited by the subjective mode and that limited by the objective 'this'. As a result the same intelligence is revealed in both the forms. Next, the nescience abiding in the intelligence limited by and revealed in the subjective and the objective

How is this known? From their interpretation of the Upaniṣadic theory of triplication of elements, according to which the three original elements, fire, water and earth were each halved and to each half of each of the elements was added a quarter each of the remaining elements thus; $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} \times 2 = 1$: This theory would obliterate all distinctions between truth and error. But, for Rāmānuja, the test of truth is pragmatic, *vyavahārānugunya*. The nacre-silver, e.g., is called illusory, not because of the absence of silver in the nacre, but only because it is not found in a sufficient measure to prove useful in practice. (RB. P. 66-67). This theory cannot be taken seriously since as the *Parimala* says, the absence of silver in the nacre may be demonstrated by putting it in fire.

In the Prābhākara school of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, the theory of error is called the *asatkhyāti*. The essence of this theory is that error does not represent an act of integral cognition but consists in the lack of discrimination between two distinct valid cognitions, one of which is a perception and the other is a memory-image. In the rope-snake illusion, the cognition of 'the this' is a direct perception while that of the snake is a memory-image, awakened by the similarity of the rope to the snake. Due to defects of the eye, &c., the reference of the second cognition to past experience is left out of account. Thus, arising consecutively, the perception of 'the this' aspect of the rope without its ropeness, and the memory of the snake without reference to its past context, are mixed together due to lack of discrimination between the two. Error, then, is due to the failure to observe that the objects of the two cognition, are not in actual relation. (Vide the *Iṣṭasiddhi* P. 43). Here again as in the *satkhyāti* theory of Rāmānujites, the test of error so-called is purely pragmatic. The cognition which does not lead to fruitful action is erroneous, while all cognitions, as such, are valid. (Vide *Intrdn*: to the *Iṣṭasiddhi* P. XVI) But this theory suffers from its complete divorce from the facts of experience. The victim of illusion who flees from the rope-snake is not aware of two cognitions. Activity can proceed only from the cognition of a single whole. Again, since knowledge or *samvit* is self-revealing according to the

'this-form' is agitated by *doṣa* or defect., Thus there results a double transformation of nescience which assumes the form of silver and that of the mode cognitive of silver, *avidyā-kārā vṛttiḥ*. In the first transformation as silver, the auxiliary cause is the awakened impressions of silver, and in the second, it is the awakened impression on the cognition of silver.

Prābhākaras, the two alleged cognitions should reveal their character fully making non-discrimination between them impossible. The Prābhākara assumption that all cognitions must necessarily issue forth in action is also clearly too narrow.

The theory of *anyathākhyātī* is professed both by the Naiyāyikas and the Bhāṭṭas among others. It stands for the notion that *Jñāna* sometimes reveals an object as different from what it actually is. Due to some defect of the sense-organs, &c., a piece of nacre, say, is perceived only as something very lustrous. Its sheen similar to that of silver revives the memory image of silver. Next silverness appears as an attribute of the object in front, and the cognition 'this is silver' results. The explanation proffered is that while 'the thisness' of the nacre is directly perceived through normal contact of the eye and object, silver itself is extraordinarily contacted by means of the cognitive relation, *jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti*. The relation between 'silver and this' is of course unreal, but appears in cognition being attached to the two reals, 'this and silver'. Thus the remote silver in the market, &c., appears in the cognition of 'this'.

The plain defect of this theory is, again, that it does not square with experience. The illusory silver is not felt as remote but as presented to the eye of the experient. Hence by the facts of the case, one is driven to conclude that the silver is present in the locus where it appears. What is denied in the later correction is, not the relation between the silver and the nacre, but silver itself. Were only the relation denied, the relata should have been separately available here as real. The perception of silver in the illusory experience can arise only from actual contact of the eye with a presented piece of silver.

According to the *ātmakhyātī* of the Buddhists, the object superimposed is really mental, and its perception as extra-mental and external constitutes the error. The stimulus to erroneous experience comes wholly from within, and not in

Both these transformations are alike illumined by the witness consciousness and this explains the experience of the illusory silver. Strictly, there are two cognitions involved here, represented respectively by the mode of the inner organ and that of nescience. Still, their object being illusorily one, viz., the composite product of the true 'this' and the false 'silver' the resulting cognition also may be considered one only ¹.

In a previous section ², we showed that the object of superimposition is neither real nor unreal (*sat* nor *asat*) defining *sat* as what is never cancelled and *asat* as what does not appear as real in any substrate whatever. This unique status of the superimposed object is technically styled *anirvacanīya* ³, the indeterminable. The *anirvacanīya* is not only distinct from the real and from the unreal, but also from the real and the unreal ⁴. This description would apply alike to the illusory object and to its analogue, the objective manifold, which is superimposed on pure consciousness as silver is on nacre ⁵.

the least from without. (vide Introduction to the *Iṣṭasiddhi* P. XXI). The difference between normal and abnormal perception is that among various kinds of predispositions or *vāsanās* the weaker *vāsanās* lead to illusory experience. But the actual experience proves that the object experienced is external. The cancelling cognition also only distinguishes the nacre from the silver and does not show the latter's internality, too. (vide *Bhāmati* P. 230 CSS, No. I).

Asatkhyāti is maintained by the *Mādhyamikas* for whom the illusory object is altogether non-existent – a fact which in their view is proven by the later cancellation. The appearance of the illusory object is credited to the power of erroneous cognition itself, acting in league with the impressions or *vāsanās*. The object manifested in illusion is non-existent. Error points to absolute nothing and not to the subject, predicate, or their relation. As for its refutation, the words of S'aṅkara may be recalled: *śūnyavāḍipakṣastu sarvaprāmāṇya vipratīṣiddha iti tannirākaraṇāyanādarah kriyate*. BSS. PP. 478-479.

1. VPS. Sect. LVIII;
2. Vide P. 380 Supra;
3. Cf. *Bhāmati* BSS. P. 13;
4. *sattvānadhikarāṇatve sati asattvānadhikarāṇatve sati sadasattvānadhikarāṇattvam anirvācyatvam* - *Citsukhua* on the *Nyāyamakaranda*, P. 115.
5. Apropos the mutual transference of subject and object and their qualities, the *Ratnaprabhā* (SB. PP. 24-25) points out

An important consequence of the bondage of the cognitive side of the *jīva* is that he experiences Brahman, not as pure knowledge or consciousness, *cinmātra*, but as having an objective reference. On the one hand, the pure intuition of the sage vouches for the reality of the objectless consciousness¹; on the other, empirical reason never knows without there being an object which is known. We have already noticed how S'aṅkara's repudiation of Buddhist idealism² proves that epistemological realism has a provisional status in Advaita. Knowledge born of sense-contacts is of course bound up with the empirical reality of objects. All forms of empiric-cognition consist of subject-object relations. But reflection on such cognitions reveals their unreal nature. Reality, we saw, is inconsistent with fluctuations, corrections, developments. But sense-knowledge of the objective manifold consists just of these, and nothing else. From this general condemnation, even the so-called valid cognitions are not exempt. It is a common experience that often one perception is cancelled by another, or has to be set aside by an inference³. The lack of total certitude in inference is wellknown. The fact is that even in empirical knowledge the percept is illusory; only its illusory character is not grasped as long as the locus of the percept, viz., Brahman, is not perceived. But to understand the unsatisfactory character of the categories cognized empirically, one need not wait for the

that the *adhyāśas* involved are both *dharmādhyāśa* and *dharmyādhyāśa*. When qualities alone such as stoutness & leanness are superimposed we have the former; e.g. 'I am fat', 'I am lean' &c. When the whole entity or substance is superimposed, we have the latter; e.g. I think, I feel, &c., where *antahkaraṇa* is superimposed on pure consciousness. In the awareness of 'I' what is superimposed is the relation of consciousness to the *antahkaraṇa*. This is an instance of *samsargādhyāśa*.

1. Cf. BU. IV, 5, 15; IV, 3, 23-31.
2. Vide P. 374 Supra.
3. Cf. *aparīkṣitapratyakṣamhi parīkṣitānumānāpekṣayā durbalam, nīlam nabha itī pratyakṣamiva nabhonirūpatvā numānāpekṣayā* AS. PP. 369-70; also; *pratyakṣāderhi parīkṣayā vyāvahārika prāmāṇyamātram siddhyati, tacca nādvaitāgamena bādhyate, bādhyate tu tattvikam prāmāṇyam.* Ibid. PP. 373-74.

realization of Brahman ; reasoning may very well expose it. As an example, consider the nature of parts and whole, *avayavas* and *avayavins*; assuming that the atoms are the parts of any given objective whole, it may be asked whether the whole is or is not different from its parts. If different, the two must occupy different positions in space, even as a pot and a cloth do. But, clearly, such is not the case with any given whole and its parts. If the two are not different at all, there is no reason to draw a distinction between the two. Again, it may be asked whether the whole remains in each of the parts or in all of them taken together. In the first alternative there will be as many wholes as there are parts, while in the second, the whole will require fresh parts whereby it may be present in all its original parts at once. There is the further difficulty that in the second case, the perception of the whole is impossible without all parts coming in contact with the eye - an impossibility. Reasoning thus exposes the pretensions of the empirical perception of parts and whole, substance and attributes, universal and particulars, &c¹

The objective reference of knowledge is a result of the cognitive bondage, according to Advaita. But the object-free nature of knowledge appears under the name *nirvikalpa* or indeterminate cognition in several Indian systems of thought, such as the *Nyāya*, the *Bauddha*, the *Sāṃkhya*, the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, and the *Advaita*. That even determinate forms of cognition, e.g., that of a pot, are preceded by indeterminate stages is a psychologically verifiable fact². That they are logically implicit in the determinate forms of cognition is the view of the *Naiyāyikas*³. Theists like *Rāmānuja*, on the other hand, identify knowledge with judgements. For S'ankara indeterminateness is the mark of pure *samvit*. Empirical judgements like 'this is a pot,' have no metaphysical status. For, judgement is a relational consciousness. This relation is two-fold: (i) The relation between subject and object, (ii) that between subject and predicate. The *Advaitic* view is that

1. Vide infra.

2. Cf. SV. 112; SD. P. 41;

3. *Muktāvali Kārikā* 58.

these relations cannot be established rationally. How can there be a relation between terms so diametrically opposed as subject and object? The relation between them has a meaning only to the subject. Actually, subject and object are distinctions made in a given whole of knowledge, nothing outside which can reasonably be posited. The appearance in pure knowledge of terms like subject and object is one of the implications of the *māyī* doctrine. Finally, it can only be accounted for as the result of superimposition. The point is illustrated by the illusory cognition of which first there appears an illusory object, and then it is negated. Advaita suggests that the instability of the object marks all cognitions, however much it may appear to persist. Except for the time factor involved, all cognitions which point to objects related to them are alike sublatable by the final cognition of the substrate of all objects, viz., Brahman. And, with the abolition of the object, of course, its correlate, subject, also vanishes, and pure knowledge or consciousness alone endures for ever¹.

Again, the subject-predicate relation apparent in judgments is only empirically valid, so that the tendency to formulate knowledge on this pattern is a sign of cognitive degeneracy. Rāmānuja, e.g., considers the predicate in a judgment as the concrete expression of the subject, and hence, the judgement itself as perfectly valid. Indeed, he knows no other valid formulation of knowledge². The Advaitin differs profoundly on this point. His view is that no pattern of thought involving relations can be satisfactory³. No relations between the subject and the predicate can be established. The basic fallacy involved is that a relational consciousness presupposes a differential consciousness; for, relations exist only between different relata. The attempt to relate the different terms by means of a third, viz., relation, obviously leads to an

1. Vide. *Ajāna*. P. 207, Malkani, &c. US. II, 6, 4.

2. *saviśeṣavastuviśayatvāt sarvapramāṇānām*. RB. P. 20.

3. Cf. The conclusion to which I am brought is that a relational way of thought - any one that moves by the machinery of terms and relations - must give appearance and not truth. AR. P. 33, London, 1908.

infinite regress. Nor can the relation between the subject and the object be one of identity. For, identity abolishes differences and excludes relations. Similarly, the concept of a unity in differences also is logically unsound. Besides, the concepts of subject and predicate are unintelligible without mutual reference and so are fallacious¹.

Thus the attempt to conceive knowledge as a relation either between subject and object or subject and predicate is logically unsatisfactory. And yet, empirically, we are driven to it. This is the sure proof of the cognitive bondage under which we labour. The result is we are actually moving in a region of errors in our intellectual life², but these errors are not equally removed from truth and reality. Gradations of more or less of error are recognized and are of the greatest practical importance. "The cognition which apprehends a single, undivided, reality in all things is the best, the *sāttvic*; the one which knows things in their differences and divisions is *rājasic*: while the cognition which ignores all else to dote on one thing, unmindful of its reality and in narrow measure, is *tāmasic*"³. These verses of the *Gītā* but broadly indicate the range of the human mind caught in the trammels of bondage, so narrow and even blind at one end, and so broad and free at the other. In between come the infinite variations of the intellectual perceptions of reality. Apprehensions condemned to treat appearances as realities are the fruits of the cognitive bondage. Its essence is the perception of objects where in reality they do not exist, viz., Brahman - *atas'mimstadbuddhih*.

ii

It was pointed out that the basic act of *adhyāsa* results in a wrong cognition of the form, 'I am this'. It leads at once to

1. TP. P. 168, *yugapadgrahaṇāyogādanavasthāprasaṅgataḥ | parasparāśrayatvācca dharmabhede'pi nākṣadhīh ||*
2. Cf. All judgements are false in the sense that no predicates which we can attribute to the subject is adequate to it. We have either to say Reality is Reality or say that Reality is X, Y or Z. The former is useless for thought but the latter is what thought actually does. It equates the real with the non-real.....This is *adhyāsa*. IP ii P. 505.
3. BG XVIII, 20-22;

an erroneous affirmation of the will - 'this is mine', *mamedam*¹. Thus, wrong cognitions lead to wrong conations, and, as a matter of empiric fact, desires or willings constitute the most marked feature of man's life in bondage. "A person is made of desires only. As is his desire such is his resolve, such the action he performs. What action he performs that he secures for himself. Where one's mind is attached, the inner Self goes there to with action, being attached to it alone"². Wrong cognitions offer wrong objects of desire, and wrong desires lead to wrong actions, which in their turn, yield a crop of fruits, pleasant and unpleasant. Experience of these accentuates attachments and aversions, and, once more, the wheel of wrong ideas, actions, and fruits is set in motion. The unremitting revolutions of this wheel is *samsāra* or life in bondage. The decisive force of desires in the fashioning of bondage may be illustrated in another way. The world of appearances, according to the *Bṛahadāraṇyaka* is made up of three elements viz., name, form, and action³. Both in its manifest and unmanifest phases the empirical world may be analysed into accessories, actions, and their fruits *kriyākāra-kaphalātmā*. Pure consciousness, as such, does not enter into the texture of the *samsāric* stage at all. The name or *nāmā*, the universal of all names, is the source of all names. All forms are similarly derived from the Eye, the universal of form, *rūpasāmānya*. And, all actions proceed from the universal of action, associated with the body. These three components of the world are interdependent, and bring about the manifestation of one another⁴, as well as their subsidence. They constitute the triune world which thus resembles a rope of three strands. The prime importance of *kāma* or desire lies in the fact that it maintains this three-fold world in endless existence, endowing it with a sort of 'permanence of the stream' *pravāhanīyatā*⁵. All incentive to actions, obviously, proceeds from desire, and the world as we know it will collapse without actions. Life in the

1. Vide P. 388 Supra;

2. BU. IV, 4, 5 & 6.

3. *tryaṃ vā idaṃ nāma rūpaṃ karma*. I, 6, 1;

4. BUB P. 236;

5. Cf. *yāvaddhetuphalāveśastāvaddhetuphalodayaḥ* |

kṣiṇe hetuphalāveśe nāstihetuphalodbhavaḥ ||

GP. IV, 55 and Śaṅkara's comm. on this as well as the next.

world is a tissue of actions dictated and guided by desires. The *Brhadāraṇyaka* classifies them as the desire for sons, the desire for wealth, and the desire for worlds¹. Behind all these desires is the basic will to live, the chief drive to action. Sons, wealth, worlds are sought after as affirmative expressions of the will to live. The desire for wife, writes Śaṅkara, may be traced to the need for qualifying oneself to perform vedic rites; that for sons to the need for success in this world². Desire for wealth is also directed to the right performance of vedic rites. The point is that howsoever interpreted, this world and the worlds to come are the goals of all desire-prompted actions. The root of all righteous actions is thus desire or *kāma*. That of unrighteous actions, also, of course is *kāma*. Arjuna, e.g., raises the question how, despite strong reluctance, man is driven to sin³, and the answer given is that behind all sinful actions, as their main driving force, is *kāma*⁴. It is the enemy of man, and from it spring all evils, *sarvānarthaprāpti*. Opposed and baffled by obstacles, the same *kāma* takes the form of anger, *krodha*. The source of *kāma* in terms of the *sāṃkhyan* psychology is *rajas* but also in its turn, *kāma* can accentuate the activity of *rajas*⁵. The difference between the desire prompting righteous actions, and that leading to sinful ones is more a matter of direction than of essence. The same energy of action, directed to ends leading to the final goal of life, manifests itself as righteous desire, while, directed to ends incompatible with it is sinful desire. The well-known distinction between the divine and the demoniac natures elaborated in the *Gītā* illustrates this point⁶. But both forms of *kāma* are expressions of *adhyāsa* in its conative aspect and are, so far, marks of bondage. Falling into its meshes, the victim of *kāma*, like a silk-worm in its cocoon, hurries along the paths of activity. He becomes an extrovert never suspecting in himself the presence of Ātman, at once self-sufficient and absolute. He is, indeed, like the man who, all ignorantly, treads the ground under which lies buried

1. BU. III, 5, 1.

2. BU. I, 5, 16.

3. BG. III, 36.

4. Ibid. III, 37.

5. Vide Śaṅkara's comment on BG. III, 37.

6. Vide BG. XVI.

a rich treasure¹. He deludes himself into thinking that the ends which actions can secure alone are real, and worth striving for. In fact, of the four ends of human life, a creature of desires is alive only to the first three, viz., the moral good, *dharma*, the economic good, *artha*, and psychological good, *kāma*. These three are realized only through some programme of action or other. Thus the vedic programme of action, embodied in the cult of the sacrifice, came to wield great influence on the minds of a majority. This universal dominion of *kāma* over the life of activities has been well expressed thus: Whatever is done by the *jīva* is an expression of desire².

Desire and its many transformations like anger fall within the sphere of the objects, of course; they are of the very stuff of the mind or *manas*³. In fact, on this principle depend all hopes of final emancipation. Had they belonged to the Self or *Ātman*, forming part and parcel of it, liberation from their clutches would have been out of question, on the principle⁴ quoted above, viz., *prakṛter anyathābhāvo nakathāñcid bhaviṣyati*. Desire leads to bondage through the sense of agency or which it fosters and strengthens in the individual. *Kartrtva* together with *pramāṭṛtva* and *bhokṛtva* forms the core of the individual's bondage; for it is a product of superimposition of *prakṛti* on the Self or *puruṣa*⁵. *Antaḥkaraṇa* a product of *prakṛti* or *māyā* has the natural characteristic of activity. Its specific nature is determined by one or the other of the three *guṇas* which happens to dominate the inner organ⁶. Through

1. CU. VIII, 3, 2:—*yathāpi hiranyanidhiṃ nihitamakṣetrajñā uparyupari samcaranto na vindeyuh*.
2. Cf. *yadyaddhikurute jantustattad kāmasya ceṣṭitam*.
3. Desire, imagination, doubt, faith, lack of faith, steadfastness, lack of steadfastness, shame, meditation, fear - all this is truly mind. BU. I, 5, 3; & Cf. IV. 4, 7 & BV. III, vv. 380-388.
4. GPK. III, 21.
5. Vide P. 341 Supra where Rāmānuja's view of the *jīva*'s inherently active nature is contrasted with the advaitic view that *jīva*'s activity is imputed only.
6. BG. XVIII, 26-28 distinguish the *sāttvic*, *rājasic*, and *tāmasic* types of agency, though all alike are falsely ascribed to the Self. The first is free from attachment, egoism, and emotional imbalance, both in success and failure. The *sāttvic* agent is both steady and energetic. The *rājasic* agent is violent, clings to fruits of action, is greedy, & unbalanced, the *tāmasic* agent is obstinate, indolent, low, and stolid; he is pessimistic and crooked.

reciprocal superimposition, the active nature of the inner organ illusorily appears as an attribute of pure consciousness, even as the intelligence of the latter appears as an attribute of the inner organ¹. This has found explicit expression in the *Gītā*: In all manner of ways, actions are executed by the constituent qualities of *Prakṛti*; but, blinded by the ego-sense, *ahamkāra*², the individual imagines that he is the agent of actions. Two aspects of the bondage implied by agency may be distinguished - the physical necessity imposed on the embodied individual to work to sustain life in the body³, and the moral forces which drive him to act righteously or otherwise. Both these aspects are covered by the term *kāma*, but in the cultural life of the individual, his activities of a moral complexion are obviously important. Hence the stress on the need to act in conformity with the injunctions of the *sāstras*, or the tested knowledge of mankind⁴. The consequences of actions, righteous and unrighteous, persist in the life of the individual through out his career in *samsāra*. He carries the resultant forces of his actions from life to life. "His knowledge, and his works, and his former intelligence (i.e. instinct) lay hold of him"⁵. Knowledge refers to all forms of cognitions, right and wrong, i.e., the intellectual equipment of the individual, the fruit of his cognitive bondage, as explained above. Works, too, denote the forces resulting from all forms of individual actions and stored up in the mind as *samskāras*. *Pūrvaprajñā* or former intelligence refers to the dispositions of the mind as determined by prior experiences⁶. In the purposeful life of the individual, then, both knowledge and works equally matter. In order to attenuate the forces binding the

1. Cf. Rāmānirtha's Com. on US. I, 81.
2. *ahamkāra* = the sense of 'I-ness' in the body and the sense-organs. Vide Śaṅkara's comm. on *Gītā* III, 27. Vide *Gītā* III, 27; XIII, 29; XVIII, 19, &c.
3. Embodiedness is the state of identification with the body due to lack of discrimination. Cf. *tathāvivekāvivekamātreṇaivātmano'śarīratvaṃ saśarīratvaṃca*. BSS. P. 235-36; *ta ra karmaprayuktasya grahātigrahasaṃjñākasyendriyāviyayatmakasya bandhanasya*. B'SS. P. 360.
4. BU. IV, 4, 5;
5. BU. IV, 4, 2;
6. S'B on BU. IV, 4, 2;

jivā to the wheel of *saṃsāra*, he should treasure up only right cognitions and right actions¹. In the light of these remarks, it is clear that the dictum *karmanā badhyate jantuḥ*² holds true only of certain types - *rājasīc* and *tāmasīc* - of *karmas*.

(iii)

The bondage of the emotive side of the *antaḥkaraṇa* is intimately bound up with the former two in so far as knowing willing and feeling are inseparable activities of the mind. They mutually affect and determine one another. Thus, at bottom, the conceit of agency, *kartṛtvam* and that of enjoyership, *bhokṛtvam*, stem from the fact of superimposition³. Pain and pleasure are the invariable concomitants of the fruits of actions and make up the core of *bhokṛtvam*. Hence it is clear that avoidance of pain and the attainment of pleasure, for which all actions are undertaken, are bound up with *adhyāsa*. In the section on values⁴ we remarked that happiness or sustained pleasure is regarded in Advaita as the final goal of life. All activities are aimed at it, or at means to secure it. But more pains result than pleasure, because almost always confusion of means and ends prevails. For instance, S'aṅkara remarks: "When sons, wife, &c., are either ill or well, one thinks that one is ill or well"⁵, and adds that it is due to superimposing one's self-hood on them. In other words, one identifies oneself with what is held to promote one's pleasure or shrinks from what is held to cause pain due to the radical error of *adhyāsa*.

This theme has been eloquently expounded by Yājñavalkya in his discourse addressed to Maitreyī⁶. Husband, wife, sons, social institutions, worldly status, duties, living beings - in fact everything that can be thought of - become dear, not for their

1. *yasmādvidyākarmaṇi pūrvaprajñāca dehāntarapratipattyupabhogasādhanaṃ tasmādaavidyākarmādi śubhameva samācareṭ* S'B. on BU. IV, 4, 2;

2. Quoted by S'aṅkara in BUB. P. 433.

3. *ataścāvidyākṛto'yaṃ tapyatāpakabhāvo naparamārthika ityabh्यupagantavyam*. BSS. P. 428;

4. Vide P. 260 ff Supra;

5. BSS P. 24;

6. BU. II, 4, 5 & IV, 5 6;

own sakes, but for the sake of the Self, dearest of all, being conscious and perfect bliss itself ¹. Attractions and aversions, pleasures and pains, hopes and fears - indeed all dualities of feeling - result from confusion of ends and means generally, and wrong ends and wrong means especially. All love, e.g., is an expression either of happiness or the lively expectation of it, just as all fear is an expression of either felt pain or lively apprehension of it. Since, as shown above ², the source of all joy is Self or pure consciousness, without the reciprocal superimposition of it and other objects like the relations, friend, country, world, &c., no enthusiasm, not to speak of love, for them is conceivable. Fear, on the otherhand, springs from the feeling that certain objects would come between one-self and one's cherished goal, either mediate or immediate happiness. In other words, fear springs from the double error of thinking that happiness is bound up with the attainment of objects identified with the Self, and that impediments can come between one's Self and such attainments ³. This process of loving and fearing wrong objects may be justly described as the bondage of the emotional side of man or, briefly, the bondage of the heart. In this case also, distinctions may be usefully made in the degree and intensity of the bondage involved. Not all pleasures, e.g., are equally removed from the fountain-head of them all. The more difficult types of pleasures, demanding strenuous training of the heart, and carrying within them an assurance that no deleterious reactions will supervene are *sāttvic*; they promote the growth at the higher aspirations of the *jīva*. But the keener and more violent excitements of the vital self due to the sense-object contacts, seductive to begin with, but fatal in the end, are *rājasic*. The lowest of all are the pleasures which stupefy the finer susceptibilities of the self and are born of sleep, indolence, and infringements of *dharma* ⁴.

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1. Cf. BU. I, 4, 8 - tadetat preyaḥ putrāt preyovittāt preyo'n-yasmāt sarvasmāt.
 2. Vide PP. 234 ff. Supra.
 3. Vide; yadāhyevaiṣa etasminnuḍaramantaram kurute, athata-sya bhayam bhavati. TU. II, 7 & S'āṅkara's comm. on this.
 4. BG. XVII, 36-39.

The noblest ardours and attachments of the heart, to the extent that they fall short of the supreme Self of man and the world, are marks of bondage according to the Advaita system, though they may be conceivably described as noble infirmities of human nature. The Advaita doctrine that the supreme goal of life is the realization of Brahman underlines the truth that even golden chains bind; that nothing short of the highest can be accepted with contentment. The relevant point is that the bondage of the heart points to *adhyāsa* no less than man's cognitive errors.

Perception of an objective manifold in the place of Brahman is the cognitive error, the essence of the bondage of the thinking and knowing part of man ¹. Desiring ends other than Brahman is the core of the bondage of his conative side. The bondage of his emotional nature consists in attaching himself to objects other than Brahman, and fearing that anything can impede his free possession of it. The good and the pleasant are different. Both are at hand, and almost seek man out. Man's emotional bondage is most marked in his choice of the pleasant and rejection of the good ². No doubt in all cases of bondage there are gradations, but all are to be judged by considerations of the basic questions: how far do one's cognitions approximate to the intuition of integral Brahman? how far do one's acts carry one closer to such intuition? how do one's loves and hates promote the same goal?

While the Advaitic view of the *jīva's* bondage is as set forth above, some clarification is called for certain statements in the upaniṣads and the Gītā which suggest a different approach. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* III, 7, 22, *Kausītaki* III, 8, and the *Kaṭha* IV, ³⁻⁵

1. abrahmapratyayah sarvo'vidyāmātro rajjvāmiva sarpapratyayah 'SB. on MuU. II, 2, 11.
2. KU. II, 2.
3. yovijñānetiṣṭhan...vijñānamantaro yamayati, &c.
4. eṣahyevainam sādhu karma kārayati tanyamebhyo lokebhyā unninīṣata eṣa u evainamasādhukarma] kārayatitam yamadhonīṣate.
5. parāṅcikhāni vyatṛṇatsvayambhūstasmātparāṅpaśyatinānta-rātman.

and the *Gītā* XVIII, 61¹ seem to picture *jīva* as a more or less helpless victim of *Īśvara*'s arbitrary whims. He, i.e., *Īśvara*, dwells in the understanding or Self and controls the *jīva* so that the latter is helpless if his cognitions all go wrong. "This one, i.e., *Īśvara* indeed causes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds to perform good actions. This one also, indeed, causes him whom he wishes to lead downward to perform bad action". "God or the Self-existent pierced the openings (of the senses) outward; therefore one looks outward, not within himself". These passages, *prima facie*, make bondage a sort of burden imposed on *jīva* by *Īśvara* - a view apparently reiterated in the *Brahmasūtras* thus: *parāttulacchruteḥ*². But, commenting on this, Śaṅkara writes: In the state of nescience, to the *jīvā* who identifies himself with the finite organism, *samsāra* consisting of agency of acts and experience of their fruits comes from God³. *Īśvara* is the *hetukarttā* or the sanctioning power behind all the actions of the *jīva*. But even the *Īśvara* is not arbitrary. Were he so, all sense of *jīva*'s ethical responsibilities will be altogether futile⁴. *Īśvara* in Advaita is conceived as *kṛtāprayatnāpekṣaḥ*⁵. With due regard for the moral record of the *jīva* concerned, i.e. in accordance with his *dharma* and *adharma*, *Īśvara* sanctions the *jīva*'s activities, good or evil. Or, as has already been mentioned, *Īśvara* is but the general though indispensable condition of all the activities of the *jīvas*⁶, so that, in the final analysis, on the *jīva* rests the chief responsibility for his bondage and liberation. God's over all responsibility only signifies that *jīva* lives and acts not in hostile environments, but that the slightest impulse to *dharma* and *satya* on his part will be infallibly responded to and strengthened. God assists the *jīva*

1. *īśvarah sarvabhūtānām hṛddeśe'rjuna tiṣṭhati |*
bhṛāmayan sarvabhūtāni yan.rārūdhāni māyayā ||

2. BS. II, 3, 41.

3. *avidyāvasthāyām kāryakāraṇasamghātāvivekadarśino jivasya*
...īśvarāttadanujāyā kartṛtvabhoktṛvalakṣaṇasya samsārasya
siddhiḥ. BSS. P. 552.

4. Contrast Spinoza's view that the individual sense of freedom is entirely illusory. "Men think themselves free because they are conscious of their volitions and desires, but are ignorant of the causes by which they are led to wish and desire". Qd. P. 178. The story of Philosophy. W. Durant.

5. BS. II, 3, 42.

6. Vide P. 250, Supra.

who acts on his own, *kurvantam hitam Īśvara kīrayati* ¹. As an empirical fact, however, *avidyāvasthāyām*, *jīva* is bound to feel that his bondage and liberation, as all other effects, proceed from the world cause, viz., *Īśvara* or *saguṇabrahman*. But metaphysically, there being no real causation at all, both bondage and liberation are solely bound up with *adhyāsa*, whose agent, we saw is *jīva* alone.

We have tried to show that according to Advaita, man's bondage is rooted in *adhyāsa* which has both a microcosmic and macrocosmic reference. There is the superimposition of the cosmos on Brahman, and that of the living organism on the Ātman. But as Ātman and Brahman are synonymous in Advaita, both these orders of superimpositions have the same substratum, viz., pure consciousness. This superimposition is the same as *avidyā* ². It must be noted that the notion of *avidyā* has been employed under different names by most schools of Indian thought to denote the cause of bondage. In the *Pātanjalayoga*, *avidyā* denotes not *adhyāsa* but a real treatment of things ephemeral, impure, &c., as permanent, pure and so forth. ³ In the *Sāṃkhya* it denotes a lack of discrimination between the evolutes of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* ⁴. In the Nyāya school, the idea is denoted by the term *mithyājñāna* in relation to the *prameyas* or knowables ⁵. More particularly, it may be said to consist in mistaking the not-self for the Self, the mistaking of the body, sense organs, mind, feelings, ideations for the Ātman ⁶. In early Buddhism, *avidyā* is the first link of the chain of dependent origination; in other words, it is the root of empirical life ⁷. It veils the capacity for intuiting truth, negatively, and perverts its vision, positively, *viparyāsaḥetu*. There, it also denotes the general ignorance of the four noble truths ⁸. In the latter *Vijñānavāda*, the conception

1. BSS. P. 553.

2. *tamevamlakṣaṇamadhyāsam paṇḍitā avidyeti manyante*. BSS. P. 19.

3. Vide P. 56 Supra & YS. II, 23 & 24.

4. Ibid.

5. PP. 22-23, Supra.

6. NB. IV, 2, 1. *kimpunastanmithyā jñānam? anātmanyātma-grahah ahamasmṛti mohohankāra iti*.

7. PP. 94 ff. Supra.

8. P. 96. Supra.

of *avidyā* shows striking similarities with the Advaitic position¹. It causes the world-show where, in fact, there is nothing but pure consciousness². Differences there are, of course, in details, as for instance, in the fact that the Advaita epistemology is realistic. This tends to make the Advaitin's *avidyā* more of an objective and cosmic force, with its poles in the *jīva* and *Īśvara*. In *Jainism*, the equivalent of *avidyā* is *mithyātva* or *mithyādarśana*³, perverted attitude, and that is responsible for the worldly existence of the *jīva*. It causes perverted cognition and perverted conduct. Thus, Advaita is unique in holding that *avidyā*, identified with superimposition, is the root of 'the tree of *samsāra*'! It is not a mere perversion of reason or the cognitive part of man; it affects his will and feelings no less. In fact *avidyā* denotes the perversions of life as whole. Hence it has been identified with the unregenerate mind of man. "*Samsāra* is just one's own thought, *cittam*. Mind is the cause of both the bondage and liberation of mankind. Bound to objects, it binds, free from objects, it liberates"⁴.

The unique feature of the Advaitic concept of bondage is that it makes bondage purely empirical. It is not real; were it so, it would have persisted for ever⁵. Nor does it involve any modification or degeneration of reality; for, as S'aṅkara remarks, the taints or virtues of what is superimposed do not in the least affect the substratum of superimposition⁶. Therefore, pure consciousness on which the whole range of phenomena, objective and subjective, is superimposed remains intact. With this Advaitic position may be contrasted the views of some other schools of Vedānta. The plurality and nitude of

1. PP. 132-33 Supra.

2. Cf. *cittamātram na dṛśyo'sti dvidhā cittam hi dṛśyate | grāhyagrāhakabhāvenaśāśvatocchedavarjitam ||*
LA. III, 65.

3. PP. 170 ff. Supra.

4. MaiU. VI 34 *cittamevahiṣamsāram; manāevamanuṣyāṇām kāraṇaṃ bandhamoksayoḥ | bandhāya viṣayāsaṅgi mokṣe nirviṣayam smṛtam ||*

5. US. I, 45;

6. *tatraivam satiyatrayadadhyāśastadkṛtena doṣeṇa guṇenavā-
ṇumātrenāpi sanasambadhyate. BSS. P. 19 ;*

the *jīvas* appear in the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* as brute facts which Philosophy cannot explain, but has merely to accept ¹; but reason cannot tolerate them either. Finitude, the sum and substance of bondage, is the intolerable burden that the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* imposes on the individual. It is real, being his very nature and therefore, irremovable. From it no *mukti* is possible. The empiric fact of plurality is commended as a metaphysical truth as well, and the proof it proffers is a mere appeal to the same empirical fact. Mystics, it is stated ², report that only separate consciousness is swallowed up in the state of communion and not separate being. But, it may be asked, how, without separate consciousness, awareness of separate being is possible at all. '*Tattvamasi*', '*ayamātmā-brahma*', &c., are mystic affirmations, par excellence. In the course of interpretations, the original character of mystic experience is sicklied over with the pale cast of dualistic thought. All limitations imposed on the powers and potentialities of man are repugnant to his reason with its irresistible urge for infinitude and perfection. The atomic *jīva* is said to forget his divineness and wander in *samsāra* ³ due to the influence of *avidyākarma*, whose origin cannot be explained ⁴. So long as *jīvas* are held to be distinct from Brahman in reality, there always will remain the possibility of such forgetfulness, so that, even the liberated *jīvas* may fall victims to it. On closer scrutiny, the position reveals further inconsistencies. The *Jīva* is atomic, but, all the same, has an attributive *jñāna* which may expand into infinitude. Essentially the *jīva* is the same as *jñāna* or intelligence; still, it is arbitrarily maintained that the *ātman* or substantial intelligence remains immutable, while his adjectival intelligence, the *dharmabhūtajñāna*, contracts or expands due to *avidyākarma* ⁵. In fact, what undergoes bondage is this adjectival intelligence alone. As Sureśvara remarks in another context ⁶, the *Viśiṣṭādvaitic* position on the *jīva*'s

1. PV. P. 301;

2. Ibid.

3. CU. VI, 8, 7 &c., MU. 2;

4. PV. P. 305;

5. Ibid. P. 306;

6. Ibid. P. 286;

7. BV. I, 182. *tvatpakṣebahukalpyamsyāt sarvaṃ mānavirodhi ca.*

bondage is a tissue of imaginative constructions without any obvious logical necessity.

In the *Mādhva* system, the position hardly admits of any argument. The large majority of *jīvas* grouped dogmatically as *taṁoyogyas* and *nityasamsārins*¹ are eternally condemned to bondage. Very little solace can be derived from the knowledge that the enveloping of the finite creation in ignorance and the lifting up of the veil of that ignorance are under the control of Viṣṇu². Viṣṇu cannot but appear ruthless when his liberating activity leaves untouched the classes referred to above. In the *aupādhikabhedābheda-vāda* of Bhāskara, Brahman, by means of his *bhoktr-śakti* and *bhogyasakti*, actually changes himself into living *jīvas* and inert matter. This amounts to saying that Brahman actually falls into bondage or becomes imperfect³. The how and why of it are, of course, unknown. "The finitising process is a long story and its origin and working are utterly unaccountable"⁴. Bondage in Bhāskara's philosophy is a deliberate association of Brahman with real *upādhis*, an illogical position for Bhāskara to hold; for, he fully subscribes to the *Chāndogya* affirmation that Brahman is one without a second.

In conclusion, we may add that rational hopes of liberation can be based only on the view that bondage, however *factual*, is not *real*, and therefore, may be overcome. Such is the position maintained by Advaita⁵. The life of bondage that has no beginning in time is a wandering in the wilderness of nescience, where, blindfolded, the *jīva* searches for light and gropes his way back to his genuine status as Brahman⁶.

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1. The Reign of Realism PP. 172 ff.
 2. Ibid. PP. 177-78.
 3. Vide, The Phil. of Bhedābheda-vāda P. 157;
 4. Ibid. P. 72;
 5. US. I, 50;
 6. Vide CU. VI, 14. With the Advaitic picture of *jīva's* bondage as a groping towards reality, light, and immortality may be compared Plato's parable of the cave in the Republic, Book VII, "Behold! human beings living in a sort of underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and

He may hope to do so; for, he is only suffering from the delusion that he has fallen from his natural perfection, and that the world has fallen from its real value as Brahman. There has been a fall, but not a real one. What has happened is a sleep and a forgetting¹. The trumpet call of truth may yet awaken man to the immutable truth of his oneness with Brahman.

reaching all across the den; they have been here from their childhood and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move and can only see before them..... Prisoners see only the shadows of the objects moving outside or the shadows of one another.....They hear the voices of passing shadows.....What they see in the cave is an illusion". Transln. By W.L. Bryan & C.L. Bryan, N. York. 1898.

1. Cf. AU. III, 12. He has three dwelling places, three conditions of sleep.

CHAPTER VI

THE WAY TO MUKTI

Having pointed out that though bondage in Advaita is a *fact* affecting the thoughts, acts and feelings of the *Jīva* it is not metaphysically real and, as such, may be abolished and outgrown, we shall consider the disciplines designed to secure this result. How is the *Jīva* who is essentially Brahman ¹ to realize this truth? What is the way out of *samsāra* which is not real, *asat*, is a state of nescience, *tamas*, and of living death, *mṛtyu* ²? That is evidently the most vital problem affecting man who is galled by the errors of his understanding, the infirmities of his will, and the crudities of his emotions. The comprehensiveness of the means it prescribes to raise him to the fulness of integral self-realization constitutes a rare distinction of the philosophy of Advaita. In fact, Advaita as a theory is proposed to be empirically tested by the *sādhana* or the disciplines it prescribes; for, by its fruits shall it be known ³.

(i) Adhikāra

The metaphysical truth that the *Jīva* is not other than Brahman apparently implies that all *Jīvas* as such may shed their *Jīvahood* or bondage and realize their identity with the Absolute. But, as a matter of fact, the capacity to recognize the truth of bondage and passionately desire its abolition does not appear except on the human level ⁴. Even among human beings few indeed are those that appreciate the supreme value of freedom and are willing and competent to strive for it. The fact is, as Vivekānanda points out ⁵, that the desire for total freedom springs up late in the human breast; for, it implies not only eternal vigilance, but the readiness to renounce

1. Vide P. 330 ff. Supra;

2. Cf. BU. I, 3, 28;

3. Cf. New Testament, Mathew, VII, 16.

4. BS. I, 3, 25. *hr̥dyapekṣayātu manuṣyādhikāratvāt*;

5. Complete works, Vol. V, PP. 350-51;

all that is not the true Self or God¹. This can come only after considerable experience of the world and evolution of character. Hence Śaṅkara in the *Vivekacūḍāmāṇi* writes that only the grace of God can bring about three rare conditions which govern the possibility of achieving *mukti*, viz., birth as a human being, desire for liberation, and contact with a self-realized sage²

There is nothing dogmatic about the insistence that no *Jīvas* below man may win *mukti*; for, he represents the point at which the multiplicity of the universe becomes consciously capable of turning to unity³. Man's special eligibility for spiritual life and eventual liberation is brought out by Śaṅkara in his comment on the *Taittirīya*⁴. "Why is man alone singled out, though all *Jīvas* equally arise from Brahman? Because of his pre-eminence. In what does this consist? In his eligibility for the performance of actions and for the acquisition of knowledge. Due to his ability, need, and fitness, the man competent to discriminate alone is entitled to pursue activities and knowledge. The Self or *ātman*, is manifest most in man; he is indeed best equipped with intelligence. He utters what he knows, conceives it, knows what is to be, knows this world and the next, and seeks to attain immortality through his mortal nature. Other living beings are aware only of hunger and thirst."⁵ To lift men above the animal level by canalising their energies and furnishing them with higher goals than the satisfaction of impulses is the purpose of the Vedas, divided into the sections of *Karma* and *Jñāna*. Thus, Śaṅkara writes⁶, "that the law of life or *dharma*, laid down by the Vedas, has two aspects; one is characterized by action or *pravṛtti*, and the other by abstention or *nivṛtti*. Both these aspects contribute to the fulfilment of life; but the realization of full spiritual freedom in *mokṣa* is more directly

1. Cf. The Practice of the presence of God, PP. 42-43, Brother Lawrence, London Edition.
2. VC. V. 3; Cf. *Īśvarānugrahādevapuṃsāmadaaitavāsanā mahābhayakṛtatṛṇā dvitṛṇāmupajāyate* I, 25. Khaṇḍana;
3. *Īśa Upaniṣad*, P. 36; Sri Aurobindo, Arya Publishing House, Calcutta.
4. TU. II, i; 5. AA. II, 1, 4.
6. Introduction to the *Gītā Bhāṣya*,

associated with *niṣṛṭṭi* than *pravṛṭṭi*. Not only are these aspects meant to suit the qualitative differences of the aspirants to perfection, i.e., the *sādhakas*; also, between the two there is a causal relation whose exact nature will be clarified in the course of this chapter. The principle of *adhikāra* or eligibility refers to the fact that human beings differ in their taste; and capacities, needs and aspirations and, therefore, no single rule of life can help all alike.¹ Hence, also, S'aṅkara's remark that the *śāstras* do not compel action, but only give guidance to those who can profit by it.²

Left to himself, instincts drive man to act in the world of objects in order to secure what he desires and avoid what he dreads³; but, in due course, he discovers that no permanent satisfaction, no lasting goal, is attained by the way of action. Thus, arises the chance of such a man listening to the counsel of the *S'āstra* to look inward⁴. Of the two main sections of the Vedas, that of *Karma* is addressed to those who live under the sway of desires - *samsāraparavaṣṇanarapaśu*. The section on *Jñāna* or upaniṣadic wisdom is meant for those who would turn away from a life of desire-prompted activities.

The prerequisites which constitute eligibility for quest after perfection have been classified under four headings and are known as the *sādhanacatuṣṭaya*. The expression *atha* in the first aphorism of the *Brahmasūtra*⁵ is held by S'aṅkara directly to refer to these indispensable conditions of serious spiritual quest. When he rejects the claim of the *Karmakāṇḍa* to precede invariably the inquiry into Brahman, he has in mind the *pravṛṭṭi* aspect of the vedic law of life. It is not vedic actions but certain achievements and virtues of man's mind that constitute his fitness to approach and apprehend Brahman.

1. Cf. BG. IV, 11; GPK. III, 16;

2. BUB, P. 290;

3. *parāṅcikhānivyatṛṇat svayaṃbhūstasmāt parāṅpaśyati nāntarātman*. KU. IV, 1.

4. *yohi bahirmukhaḥ pravartate puruṣaḥ iṣṭaṃ mebhūyādaniṣṭaṃ mābhūditi, naca tatrātyantikaṃ puruṣārthaṃ labhate tamātyantikapurūṣārthavāñchinam.....pratyagātmasrotastayā pravartayanti*; BSS. P. 84.

5. *athātobrahmajijñāsā*.

The four-fold equipment S'aṅkara has in view is the authentic mark of the practical philosopher, bent upon rising to the full height of his spiritual nature. These *sādhana*s or means are as follows: (i) *nityānityavastuviveka* or discrimination between the permanent and the ephemeral. As Vācaspati points out ¹ in the *Bhāmātī*, if by *nitya* is understood Brahman or Self, the permanent par-excellence, and by *anitya* the objective flux, the first condition itself will amount to the realization of Brahman and nothing more need be aimed at. Nor does the term *viveka* refer to doubtful knowledge as it is incompetent to generate the spirit of renunciation, without which Brahman-inquiry is out of question. Therefore, the expression *nityānityavastuviveka* must be taken to denote the substrates which are permanent as well as the attributes which abide in them ². The first pre-requisite of the candidate thus amounts to a general sense of discrimination between things permanent and their attributes on the one hand and things impermanent and their attributes, on the other. Permanence here denotes truth or *satyatva*. What is true comes to be sought after, *āsthāgocara*, the opposite of which is untrue which, as such, is shunned. In the sphere of our experience, subjective and objective, what is true and delightful is sought after and the contrary is rejected. This much of discrimination accrues to those who, through *sāstraic* action either in the past or the present, have purified themselves, and live an intelligent life ³. The systematic practice of discrimination and the unfailing choice of the more permanent leads to the evaluation of the whole world of empirical experience as incompetent to satisfy the *sādhaka's* hunger for the eternal. Thus Maitreyī asks Yājñavalkya ⁴: 'If now, Sir, this whole earth filled with wealth were mine, would I be immortal thereby?' and is answered, "No..... of immortality there is no hope through

1. BSS. PP. 36 ff.

2. Ibid. *nityānityayorvasattitinyānityavastu taddharmaḥ nityānityayordharmiḥ* oṣṭadadharmānām cavivekah;

3. MuU. I, 2, 12 - *parīkṣya lokāṅkarmacitān brāhmaṇo nirvedamāyānnāstyakṛtaḥ kṛtena*; VC. VV. 20, 21; Cf. St. Paul: for the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal. II. Cor. IV, 18.

4. BU. II, 4, 2.

wealth." In the same spirit of divine discontent and moved by the same lofty aspiration does Naciketas resist the tempting god of death: not with wealth is a man to be satisfied ¹. This shrinking from all the prizes of this world and the world to come, *ihāmutrārthaphalabhogavirāga*, is the second trait of the candidate fit for inquiry into Brahman ².

The third pre-requisite of the Advaitic *sādhaka* consists in the cultivation of the six virtues, viz., *śama*, *dama*, *uparati*, *titikṣā*, *śamādhi* and *śraddhā*. Vācaspati identifies *śama* or tranquillity with the victory over mind won through *vairāgya* and identifies it with the *vaśikārasamjñā* ³. Normally by *dama* is meant control of the sense organs, *bāhyakaraṇānāmu-
paśamah* ⁴. But Vācaspati understands by the term the fitness of the tranquillized mind to pursue truth ⁵. *Uparati* is the formal renunciation of the acts enjoined by the vedās including the obligatory and the occasional ones. This renunciation is inspired by the desire for winning Self-knowledge ⁶. *Titikṣā* is the stoic endurance of dualities like heat and cold, its limit being, of course, the preservation of life ⁷. Intellectual alertness due to the avoidance of sleepiness, indolence and carelessness is *śamādhi* ⁸. *Śraddhā* is receptiveness in regard to knowledge from the *śāstras* and the teacher ⁹. Deussen seems to have somehow missed the spirit of some of these

1. KU. I, 26, Cf. It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God. N.T. Mathew XIX, 24.
2. Cf. The Yoga definition of *vaśikārasamjñā*: *drṣṭānusravikaviṣayavitrṣṇasyavaśikārasamjñā vairāgyam*. YS. This refers to the highest state of mind's detachment. Madhasūdana in the *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* (BGC. P. 328) points out that it is the immediate means of *samprajñātasamādhi*. The still higher type of *vairāgya* which he styles 'para' or supreme is defined as: *tatparam puruṣakhyātergunavaitrṣṇyam*—YS. —supreme indifference to gunas due to realization of the *Puruṣa*, and this leads to *Kaivalya*.
3. See the previous note.
4. RP. BSS. P. 37. & VC. V. 24.
5. *vijitampāmanastattvaviṣayavinīyogayogyatāmniyate seyamasya yogyatā damah* Bhā. on ŚB. P. 37.
6. *Jñānārtham vihitanityādikarmasannyāsa uparatiḥ*—RP. on ŚB. P. 37.
7. VC. V. 2.
8. *nidrālasya pramādatyagena manahsthitih samādhānam*. Ibid.
9. VC. V. 26.

requirements, for, he comments ¹ that the philosophic genius should be profoundly excitable. The Advaitic *sādhaka*, however, with his spirit of stern detachment (the second pre-requisite) is no more excitable. He holds, as Max Müller has rightly emphasized ², 'that the sea must no longer be swept by storms if it is to reflect the light of the sun in all its divine calmness and purity'. As against Deussen's view that quietness is unfit for a philosopher, ³ M. Müller observes that the Advaita teaches that we have only ourselves to conquer, that we have the whole truth in ourselves. We have only to turn away from the illusions of the sense-world. Again, Deussen quotes with approval Descartes for whom *de omnibus dubitare* is the beginning of wisdom; thus *śraddhā* seems to Duessen to be an unphilosophical trait of the mind. But, for the Advaitin, as for Kant, many things are beyond the grasp of man's understanding, and so an attitude of unprejudiced receptivity - *śraddā* - seems to be in order. At the same time the first two pre-requisites are there to save the *sādhaka* from the pitfalls of credulity. These six virtues are the fruits of an intense moral training, and they are based on the upaniṣadic dictum: "therefore, having become calm, subdued, quiet, patiently enduring and collected one sees the Self just in the Self".⁴

The fourth pre-requisite is *mumukṣutva* or the desire for liberation. Obviously this presupposes the three preceding equipments without all of which life in the world as it is may be felt as all right. "To seek to realize one's essential nature means one is dissatisfied with one's life as it is being led now. Is it true? Most people feel well enough as they are. But great ones doubt and question this complacency of the herd-mind."⁵ "Without a painful sense of being cribbed and cabined in the prison house of this body, one cannot passionately strive for freedom and expansion of consciousness beyond its present ego-centric predicament⁶. The search for freedom implied

1. DSV. P. 81.

2. Three Lectures, P. 36.

3. DSV. P. 35.

4. BU. IV, 4, 23; Cf. KU. II, 24; nahisadācārahinah kaś'cida-dhikṛtaḥsyād. BSS. P. 609-610; BS. III, 4, 27.

5. Vedānta for the Western World, P. 3; Isherwoof, N. York, 1946.

6. Cf. samsārādāvapāvakasamtaptah sakalasāadhanopetaḥ. SN. V. 3.

in *mumukṣutva* is a 'tiresome wholetime job' and small wonder that very few care to take it up without reservations. Besides the intolerable sense of present limitations, *mumukṣutva* also presupposes an insight, however faint, into the real nature of the Self; else, there would be no rational basis for the hope of liberation. What matters most in *adhikāra* is the candidate's eagerness for Self-knowledge. 'Nārada, e.g., notwithstanding all his immense secular knowledge is still disconsolate ¹, for he is not yet a knower of the Self. Only the self-knower can cross over sorrow *taratiśokamātmanī* ². With eagerness must be combined ability. Hence the qualifications of the candidate denoted by such terms as *pañḍito medhāvī* ³. Just as only a clean and even mirror can faithfully reflect objects, a pure and disciplined mind alone can apprehend the Absolute. "*āhāra sūddhau sattvasūddhiḥ sattvasūddhau dhruvā smṛtiḥ smṛtilambhe sarvagranthīnāṃ vipramokṣaḥ*" ⁴. The pure nourishment referred to here is not mere food for the body. Śaṅkara wisely observes that it means all objective cognitions, *śabdādīviśaya vijñānam* ⁵. Their purity consists in their freedom from taints like attachments, aversions and delusions, *rāga dveṣa mohāḥ*. Untainted cognitions guarantee the purity of mind or *sattva*. In the pure mind will be firmly rooted the memory of the Self which, then, completely liberates the spirit of man ⁶. Such purity of mind and unbroken preoccupation with the supreme Self are embodied in the upaniṣadic prayer: Lead me from the unreal to the real; lead me from darkness to light; lead me from death to immortality.⁷

Apart from these moral and intellectual qualifications, there remains in connection with *adhikāra* the question of castes. As Deussen says, Advaita should have logically admitted all who are desirous and able, irrespective of caste considerations, to the study of the Vedānta. It is granted that the *sūtras*,

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1. CU. VII.
 2. CU. VII, 1, 3.
 3. Ibid; VI, 14, 2.
 4. CU. VII, 26, 2.
 5. Rāmānujā takes the phrase literally and insists on the ceremonial purity of the food eaten. RB. on BS. III, 4. 29.
 6. Cf. Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God. Mathew, V, 8;
 7. BU. I, 3, 28.

the non-Āryans, have both the need and the capacity for the wisdom of the Vedas ¹. But Bādarāyaṇa advances arguments to refute this suggestion and exclude the *śūdras* from the right of approaching Brahman through the study of the Vedas ². An impartial study of the upaniṣadic texts, ³ on which he bases his arguments, reveals that far greater liberality in this matter prevailed in ancient days ⁴. The example of Satyakāma is decisive on this point. The boy truthfully reports to his teacher that he does not know his father's name, for his mother conceived him while she was a serving-maid *bahavam carantī-paricārinī* ⁵. The teacher appreciates the boy's truthfulness and remarks that none but a brāhman would have dared to be so frank. In other words, character and not the accident of birth, determined the eligibility for *Brahmavidyā*. Sāṅkara also recognized that all human beings are entitled to work for and secure liberation subject only to their capacities which may be cultivated by proper means. Hence orthodox prejudice against the *śūdras* implies only that they do not have the eligibility resulting from the knowledge of the Vedas. Other means such as right conduct and the knowledge of Self gathered from the Purāṇās, etc., are open to them; they suffice to make them free ⁷.

1. arthitvasāmarthyayoḥ sambhavāt. BSS. P. 275.
2. BS. I, 3, 34-38.
3. CU. IV, 1-5.
4. Jānaśruti is addressed as *śūdra* by Raikva in CU. IV, 2, 3., but upon his offering his daughter in marriage to the sage, he is instructed in the *samvargavidyā*. Bādarāyaṇa argues that natural capacity and need would not suffice; one must also have the technical proficiency in Vedic learning from which the *śūdra* is debarred.
5. CU. IV, 4, 2;
6. Cf. *tesāmapī cavidhurādīnā maviruddhaiḥ puruṣamātrasam-bandhibhirjapopavāsadevatārādhanādibhirdharmaviśeṣaira - nugraho vidyāyāḥ sambhavati*. BSS. 810;
7. *vedapūrvakastu nāstyadhikāraḥ śūdrāṇāmitisthitam*. BSS. P. 281. At the other end of the scale, Jīvas above man like the gods are eligible for the saving knowledge, vide; *taduparyapi Bādarāyaṇaḥ sambhavāt*. BS. I, 3, 26, Cf. CU. VIII, 11, 3; TU. III, 1;

(ii) Āśramas and their bearing on the pursuit of Self-knowledge.

A question of great importance in this connection relates to the place of *āśramas* or stations in life in the Advaitic scheme of *mukti*. The point at issue is which among the four stations of life - *brahmacarya* or the station of the celibate student, *gārhasthya* or the station of the householder, *vānaprastha* or the station of the recluse, and *sannyāsa* or the station of the mendicant - is fit to secure the saving knowledge of the Self. "There are three branches of duty. Sacrifice, study of the vedas, alms-giving-that is the first. Austerity is the second. A student of sacred knowledge, *brahmacārīn*, dwelling in the house of a teacher permanently is the third. All these come to possess meritorious worlds. He who stands firm in Brahman attains immortality ¹". The clear distinction drawn here between those who win immortality, viz., *brahmasamsthas* and the rest who pursue *dharma* and achieve worlds of merit is noteworthy. Those who fall in the last category are the occupants of the first three *āśramas*. The goal they achieve is of course only an aspect of *samsāra*; for, as S'āṅkara remarks ², the immortality of gods and so forth is at best only relatively more enduring than the human condition on earth - *āpekṣikam devādyamṛtatvam*. But the absolute *amṛtatva* or total freedom is the *brahmāsamskṛti*'s alone. A *prima facie* view held by the *vṛttikāra* ³ is noticed by S'āṅkara ⁴. Occupants of all *āśramas* alike achieve only meritorious worlds, *puṇyalokas*. The *Brahmasamskṛti* i.e., the *sannyāsin* according to the Advaitin, is no exception. Knowledge, restraints, and observances, which the *sannyāsin* must acquire constitute his *tapas* or austerity. The expression *tapaevadvi-tīya* applies both to the recluse and the mendicant. The phrase *brahmasamskṛti*, according to the *vṛttikāra* refers the adorer of the mystic syllable AUM. Whoever in the four *āśramas* adores AUM becomes immortal. The conclusion of the *vṛttikāra* is that occupants of all the four *āśramas*, are alike eligible for

1. CU. III, 23, 1;

2. CUB. P. 103;

3. Ibid; P. 105, *tīkā*;

4. Ibid; PP. 104 ff.

immortality. It may also be observed that immortality would not result automatically from taking *sannyāsa*, *pārvirājyāśramadharmamātreṇa*; for, then, *Jñāna*, held to be indispensable for *mokṣa*, would become superfluous. Knowledge and actions associated with the *āśramas* yield *mokṣa*; there is nothing in the *veda* to prove that the *sannyāsin* who is a *brahmasaṁstha* alone will be liberated. *Jñānāt mokṣaḥ* is the *upaniṣadic* teaching, not *jñānādevamokṣaḥ*.¹

This *prima facie* view of *samuccaya* or combination of knowledge and action is emphatically and repeatedly repudiated by Śaṅkara in numerous contexts². His main reason for doing so is that the perceptions leading to actions, on the one hand and the realization of Brahman, on the other, are irreconcilable - *karmanimittavidyāpratyaḡayorvirodhāt*.³ All activity is based on a sense of plurality, while the supreme knowledge of Brahman abolishes all sense of plurality as its content is the non-dual reality. *Brahmasaṁstha* in our context is one who has already achieved the saving knowledge; so he is, 'willy-nilly, a *sannyāsin*, i.e., one who has renounced all egoistic activities⁴. Such a *sannyāsin*, of course, runs no risk of incurring *pratyavāya*, the sin of omission of enjoined acts; for, his attributes are *śama*, *dama*, etc., which he faithfully maintains. *Karmakāṇḍa* has ceased to have any sense for him.⁵

May we not say that, irrespective of *āśramas*, any one on whom the idea of unity has dawned is a *sannyāsin*, or *brahmasaṁstha*? No; for, in the other three *āśramas*, there is bound to persist the sense of possessions and of difference, *svasvāmītvabhedabuddhi*. Besides, *āśramas* other than *sannyāsa* are meant to qualify their occupants for actions of one kind or other. *Sannyāsin* alone is for ever free from the sense of

1. Maṇḍana also favours a kind of *samuccaya* of *Jñāna* and *Karma*, holding that acts 'promote self-realization by purifying the mind of the agent; Cf. BrS. P. 36 - *yajñenadāneneti śravanāt karmānyapekṣyante vidyāyāmabhyāsalabhyāyāmapi*. Ibid, P. 37;

2. S/B. on TU. I, 11, etc. 3. CUB. P. 106;

4. *brahmasaṁstha itihi brahmaṇīparisaṁaptīrananyavyāpārātā-rūpam tanniṣṭhatvamabhidhiyate. tacca trayāṇāmāśramīṇā-mnasambhavati*, BSS. P. 795 ;

5. Cf. MNU. VII, 8; MuU. III, 26, etc.

6. CUB. P. 109.

possession. Nor will this cultivated sense of non-difference affect his moral integrity. For *yamas* and *niyamas*¹ will spontaneously operate in the life of the *sannyāsin*, as he has reached the present status through the cultivation of these moral virtues; they have become his second nature. "Because one stumbles into a pit or steps on a thorn in the dark, it does not follow that after sun-rise, too, one is apt to do the same."² The conclusion is that of all the *āśramins*, only the *sannyāsin* who abjures all egoistic activities may rise to the status of a *brahmasamstha*. What the Advaitin discards is the sense of the reality of the separatist ego. This wholesome result must follow from the study of the valid vedāntic texts. If a householder acquires this sense of unity of the self and the falsity of the world of objects as such, his *sannyāsa* is really implied therein, *arthasiddha*. The *gṛhastha* in these circumstances may, without blame, renounce all and follow the light of his unitary knowledge.

(iii) The Way of Karma

The immediate qualification of the inquirer into the nature of the self or Brahman, we saw, is four-fold; but, by the very nature of the case, few and far between are the candidates who are thus qualified³. Before securing these qualifications and, indeed, as a preparation for them, all alike have to undergo the discipline of *karma* or action. The fact that it is impossible for the unregenerate man to remain without actions and that, willy-nilly, his very nature will drive him to engage in them has been clearly recognized⁴. Therefore the problem for the man who wishes to tread the long and narrow path to perfec-

1. Vide YS. II. 30 and 32.

2. CUB. P. 210;

3. Ibid; P. 112;

4. The Upaniṣadic passages often couple *saṁnyāsa* with *brāhmanas*; e.g. MuU. I. 2, 12; *brāhmaṇonirvedamāyād*; BU. IV. 4, 22 – *brāhmaṇāvryuthāya bhikṣācaryam caranti*; also Cf. BU. III, 5; BV. III, 88. Still JU. 4 – *yadvetarathā brahmācaryādeva pravrajat*, etc. specify no castes and so the first three castes are held to be competent to renounce. Cf. SLS. P. 91. But the orthodox view is that the right of the three castes to renounce relates only to *vidvatsannyāsa*. See further below;

5. BG. VII, 3;

6. Vide BG. III, 5, 33; XVIII, 11, 59, 60.

tion is to perform actions in a manner consistent with his ultimate goal. In discussing Brahman as value we pointed out ¹ that the moral good or *dharma* is the action which promotes purity of mind, without which there can be neither *ihāmutrār-thaphalabhogavirāga* nor *mokṣa*. What makes *karma* an indispensable, though mediate, condition of *mokṣa* is its purifying virtue ². In this section we shall attempt to indicate the manner in which *karma* may be performed so as to fit the agent to achieve *mokṣa*, the supreme good of life.

The urge to act at the dictates of *kāma*, we pointed out ³ is the expression of the bondage of man's will. Karma Yoga prescribes the steps to cure will of this inherent propensity and make of it an instrument for the integration of personality. Advaita's insistence on *karmayoga* as a preliminary discipline also implies the importance it attaches to the moral training of the *sādhaka*. A sympathetic and well-informed critic like Deussen states ⁴ that the consciousness of human solidarity, of common needs and interests, was but slightly developed according to the Vedāntic scheme of life. But the theory of *karma yoga* bears testimony to the vedāntic thinker's awareness of the intimate connection between the progress of the individual and that of society ⁵. Now, the object of the ethical training is the overcoming of evil. Moral evil, according to Vedānta, has its roots in selfish desires. 'Hunger is death' says the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* ⁶. Selfish desires share with hunger the trait of seeking immediate satisfaction; they make the individual altogether ego-centric. They blind the mind to its own higher potentialities, by blacking out the future and confining it to the brief and narrow present. In order to deal with the death-dealing hunger of selfish desires, the *karmakāṇḍa*

1. Vide P. 286. supra.

2. BU. IV, 1, 22 -, tametaṃ vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇa vividiṣ-
ṣanti yajñena dānena, etc. Cf. Bhā. on BS. III, 4, 26: tathāhi-
ṣṣ/ramavihitanityakarmānuṣṭhānāddharmasamutpādistataḥ
pāpmā vilīyate; also tāvadvadkarmāṇīkurvīta na nirvidyeta yāva-
tā - Bhāgavata, XI, 20, 7;

3. PP. 402 ff. Supra.;

4. DSV. PP. 364-65 ;

5. Vide, The Quest after Perfection. P. 6;

6. I, 2, 1 - aśanāyāhimṛtyuḥ; Cf. AU. II, 1, KU. I, 12;

prescribes, as a first step, the performance of the *kāmyakarmas* and the *nityakarmas*, optional acts and obligatory acts ¹. The performance of optional acts also serves to check the first onset of impulses and tame and harness them by forcing them to flow along socially recognized channels ². This implies an adjustment between the claims of the actual self or ego of the individual and those of his ideal ego. Nor is there any necessary conflict between the legitimate interests of the individual and those of society; for, the individual is an organic member of society, a fact brought out by the pristine concept of *varṇāśramadharmā*. Still, the training of the will entailed by the performance of optional acts has only a preparatory value in the scheme of *karma yoga*; but it has that value because without such initial steadying of purpose, higher purposes cannot be conceived or worked out. ³

But in the next stage, where stress falls on the performance of obligatory acts - the observance of the laws of the castes and the stations of life - the need for the integration of the individual will with that of society becomes more pronounced ⁴. And, from this point, really, starts the ethical discussion of the *Bhagavadgītā* to whose salient points we shall confine our attention in what follows.

The ethical object of the discussion in the *Gita* is to prescribe a way of action which, instead of fettering man's will, results in its emancipation. Action in the world is a dense forest, *gaḥana*, through which a safe path has to be cut, so that the agent may emerge into the open air of freedom ⁵. The first point to note is that not all actions bind; only such as are performed with desire for their fruits do so ⁶. But why do desire-prompted acts bind at all? Such acts, in essence, are what we

1. Vide P. 207. fn Supra;

2. Cf. *lokevyavāyāmiṣamadyasevā nityāstijantornahitatraco-danā* | *vyavasthitistasyavivāhaya jñāsurāgrahairāsunivṛttiriṣṭā* || *Bhāgavata* 11, 5, 11.

3. CU. III, 14, 1 - *athakhalukratumayaḥ puruṣo yathākratuḥ..... sakratumkurvīta*. BU. IV, 4, 5;

4. Vide, *The Quest*, P. 4.

5. BG. IV, 16, 17;

6. Ibid; III. 9; XVII, 24, 25;

described above as *kāmyakarmas*. They entangle agents in their fruits or outcome which have to be reaped; these fruits of actions cannot be shirked. They follow the agents as surely as the wheels of the cart follow the bullocks which draw it. Thus, desire-prompted acts entail repeated births and deaths.¹ Therefore, the agent of acts is exhorted to perform them without any mental clinging to their outcome². But, divorced from their fruits, how can acts be undertaken at all? Here an appeal is made for a more liberal view of the purpose served by actions. The fruits of action are not merely what please the desire-ridden ego. The agent may widen his interests to include those of the society to which he belongs; then his ends will coincide with those of society, i.e., his own widened self. This result follows from his enlightened self-interest. In our section on values³ we described the good as the tendency towards unification and evil as the proneness to division. In the *Gītā*'s exhortation to act without regard for narrow self interests, we can recognize how, practically, such good may be realized and evil avoided. For, to sacrifice the fruits of one's actions does not, of course, mean to ignore them or belittle them; but only not to claim them acquisitively as one's own. Further, it implies that the agent should recognize them as a contribution to the welfare of society. This point is placed beyond all doubts when the Teacher in the *Gītā* asks Arjuna to act for the well-being of the world⁴, offering as examples Janaka and himself.⁵

That action 'without selfish regard for fruits is the realization of the good also follows from a consideration of the nature of such action. The individual is bidden to carry out his *svadharma*, i.e., *svabhāvajaṁkarma*⁶. The members of

1. phalārthinākriyamāṇaṁ karma nīkṣṭam, janmamaraṇādi-hetuvāt. BGC. PP. 108-109; Cf. MuU. III, 2, 2;

2. BG. II, 47; 3. P. 288. supra.

4. BG. III, 20. 5. Ibid, III, 22-24.

6. Śāṅkara explains it in three ways; (i) *svabhāva* is the power of God or *māyā* consisting of the three qualities. The activities of the castes - vide BG. VIII, 42-44 - proceed from the divine *māyā*. (ii) It is the nature innate in the four castes: a brahman, e.g., is *sāttvic*, *kṣatriya* *rājasic* with *sattva* subservient; *Vaiśya* is *rājasic* with *tamas* subservient; and *śūdra* is *tāmasic* with *rajas* in subservience; (iii) It is the disposi-

the four social orders, in acting without regard for fruits of such action, are only doing their duty for duty's sake. If nothing is good but the good will which is the free will, this doing of duty as dictated by one's station in life is preeminently good ¹. No matter how lowly that duty may seem, it has to be carried out and may be carried out with assurance that all agents alike may achieve thus the highest fruit of *karma* ². The demand to act without thought of fruit has a rationale of its own which Advaita can elucidate most satisfactorily. The metaphysical nature of the agent, we saw ³, is one of perfection. As such, in truth, he stands in need of no fruits -*āptakāmasyakāspṛhā*? ⁴ Hence this basic demand of *karmayoga* is in fact a practical application, in the field of ethics, of the highest metaphysical principle. And, this principle has got to be applied if it is real and true. For, thus alone can the metaphysical gulf between the empirical and the real be successfully bridged and existence as it appears, viz., devoid of value, be converted into the real which is one with value. ⁵ In carrying out the ideal of the detached action, the *sādhaka* gives expression to the highest truth of his nature. Nothing else can take him to the goal of his *sādhana*, viz., the realization of his identity with Brahman ⁶. Also, in renouncing the fruits of his actions in favour of society, the *sādhaka* is giving concrete expression to his spiritual identity with all. What gives joy to others makes him also happy; for, all together constitute but one spiritual whole. ⁷

tion with which all jīvas are born and which results from the impressions of actions in previous lives vide. ŚB. on BG. XVIII, 41.

1. Cf. Ethical studies, P. 144, Bradley, Second Edition.
2. BG. XVIII, 45-48.

3. P. 335 Supra. 4. GPK. I, 9.

5. "According to Śaṅkara creation is the bringing about of an apparent distance between the ideal and actual, so as to reaffirm the identity of the two essentially". The Vedānta of Śaṅkara, P. 300. Karmayoga as explained above is one means of reaffirming the identity.

6. Mere verbal affirmation of 'tattvamasi' or 'soham' is futile without corresponding action. Karmayoga demands such action; hence its correspondence with Buddha's noble eight-fold path.

7. Cf. In the realized idea is the end, self-realization, duty and happiness in one. We find ourselves when we have found our station and its duties, our functions as an organ in the social organism. Ethical studies, P. 163.

Another notable consequence of this procedure is the healthy shift of concern from one's rights to one's duties. To act in the light of the austere motto *karmayogēdhikāraṣṭe*¹ is "to act so that you use humanity in your own person as well as in any other always as an end and never as a means only"². In fact, all scrupulous discharge of duties is based on the recognition of the supreme worth of what is served. Only, in Advaita, that worth is absolute as the *Gītā* recognizes³. The advice to act, having surrendered the fruits of action to God⁴, just bears on the *modus operandi* of the agent who wishes to act regardless of actions' fruits. If he is of a devout temperament, he will find this method most natural and effective; but if he is a stoic philosopher, he may treat success and failure alike, and find his anchorage in the *samatva* or equanimity of mind which the *Gītā* identifies with Yoga⁵.

But so far we have been discussing only the first major stage of *karmayoga*. Here, where the sense of duty is keen, is still present an awareness of duality, and therefore the possibility of conflict⁶. The object of the next stage in *karma yoga* is to pass beyond all possibilities of conflict and yet act effectively. The *sādhaka* takes a higher step when he realizes that even the sense of agency in action ought not to be entertained; for the real Self does not act at all. Action is the characteristic of *Prakṛti*. The individual whose mind is deluded by egoism deems himself an agent⁷. In other words, the sense of agency is due to the *adhyāsa* of the body and mind on the pure Self. To grasp this with a purified mind is to be further strengthened in the attitude of detachment. Now it is not the sense of duty, but the spirit of worship which inspires action. It will be work done for its own sake or as worship of God.⁸ Even at this stage, the *sādhaka's* perception of his real Self's freedom from action is imperfect, he is not yet an *ātmaratī*⁹;

1. BG. II, 47. 2. P. 287, Supra,

3. XIII, 27, 28.

4. BG. IX, 27; III, 30 etc.

5. BG. II, 49.

6. Cf. IU. II, 7.

7. BG. III, 27.

8. Ibid XVIII, 46 *yataḥ pravṛttirdbhūtānāṃ yena sarvamidam tatam |*

svakarmaṇātaṃ abhyarcya siddhiṃ vindatimānavah ||

9. BG. III, 17.

so his actions continue though in a lofty spirit of detachment and dedication. His is only, as yet, *parokṣajñāna*. To convert it into *aparokṣajñāna*, he continues to act without egoistic motivation. He may now choose to regard himself as an instrument in the hands of God, and let himself be used by Him rather than initiate, through private desire, actions on his own account¹. Thus he achieves as closely as possible a merger of his will in that of God or the will of the universe. Thus, the *Karma Yogin*, according to the *Gītā*, attains *saṃsiddhi*². For Śaṅkara this means that the *karmayogin* becomes fit for the steady cultivation of *jñāna-jñānaniṣṭhāyogyatālakṣaṇāṃsaṃsiddhim*³. But some modern teachers and scholars hold that *karmayoga* by itself is competent to yield the highest goal of life, which, according to orthodox Advaita, only the *brahmā-kāraṇvṛtti*⁴ can do. Thus Swami Vivekānanda writes⁵ that the readiness to sacrifice mind and body for another in the spirit of uttermost renunciation is the climax of *karmayoga*. It takes one to the same goal as *Bhaktiyoga* or *Jñānayoga* do their votaries. According to Tilak, again, *Karma Yoga* is an independent line of *sādhana* in the *Gītā*⁶, capable of yielding the highest perfection; for he holds that the *Gītā* is a protest against the neglect of *Karma* evident in the upaniṣads. But Śaṅkara is logically irrefutable when he maintains that *Karma*, no matter how performed, cannot liberate man, wholly. At best, it purifies the mind and makes of it a fit instrument for the intuition of the identity of *Ātman* and Brahman. Commenting on the *Brahmasūtra* III, 4, 26⁷, Śaṅkara discusses the important question of the relation between action and knowledge. Without performance of the actions of the four stations in life, the saving knowledge of identity cannot dawn at all; for thus alone the mind becomes fit for such knowledge.

1. Cf. BG. XI, 33.

2. Ibid, XVIII, 45, 46.

3. ŚB. on BG, XVIII, 45, 46.

4. Vide infra.

5. Complete Works Vol. I, PP. 84-85.

6. Vide *Gītā Rahasya* Vol. I, PP. 421 ff. E. T. by Shukthankar Poona. Tilak quotes BG. III, 3 in support of his view.

7. *sarvāpekṣā ca yajñādis'ruterasvavad*.

8. *apekṣate ca vidyā sarvāṇyāśramakarmāni.....utpattimpratitvapekṣate*. BSS. P. 802.

Vācasapti explains this position thus: 'Knowledge follows the desire to know, while this desire in its turn, is the product of the doing of the acts of the *āśramas*. *Sama*, *dama*, etc. ¹, are the immediate, and acts the mediate, means to saving knowledge ². Performance of *karma* in the spirit taught by the *Gītā* dissolves the *vāsanās* or complexes of the mind ³, and makes it a clean mirror for reflecting the highest truths.

That *karma* cannot liberate the spirit also follows from the nature of the bondage discussed in the previous chapter. Its essence is an ignorance or *avidyā* regarding the Self. And, obviously, *avidyā* is removed, not by any sort of action, but by knowledge. This point will be further elucidated when the nature of *mukti* as an ever-accomplished reality is discussed. Dr. Brahma observes ⁴ that according to the *jñānayogin* knowledge alone eradicates desires while the *karma yogin* claims that *karma* alone can do it. The Advaitin contends that even the actions of the best *karma yogin*, by themselves, do not uproot desires; they only facilitate, through their purifying virtue, the dawn of the knowledge which, once for all, emancipates the mind from the sway of desires. Till the dawn of the saving knowledge, the possibility of lapse and bondage remains. S. S. S. Śāstri in a paper on *jñānādevatukaivālyam* ⁵, argues that the Advaitin's emphasis on *Jñāna* as the sole saviour is due to:— (i) an intellectual bias due to the fact that metaphysics was the special pursuit of *sannyāsins*; (ii) a defective psychology, compartmentalising cognition, conation, and emotion; (iii) possibly an escapist mentality. But it must be pointed out that he does not face the basic question how, if *mukti* were brought about by action, it can be otherwise than a product which, as such, must be perishable *nāstyakṛtaḥkṛtena* ⁶. Also his analysis ignores the central Advaitic position that bondage

1. Vide PP. 419 ff. supra.

2. *pratyāsannāni vidyāsādhauāni śamādīni.....bāhyatarāṇiyajñā-dīnītivivektavyam*. BSS. P. 804.

3. Cf. *kaṣāyapaktiḥkarmāni jñānamtuparamāgatih | kaṣāyekarmabhiḥpakvetatojnānampravartate ||*
Qd. BSS. P. 802; BG. XVIII, 5.

4. Vide Philo. of Hindu Sadhana, P. 125;

5. Vide The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XVII, 41-42;

6. Vide 3'B. on BG. on BG. XVIII, 66; BS. III, 11. 1 - *puru-ṣārtho'taḥ s'abdādīti Bādarāyaṇaḥ*.

is not metaphysically real, but only an empirical fact and, as such, unreal. On this position hinges the very possibility of liberation¹. We showed above that the Advaitin's insistence on knowledge as the sole means of liberation stems from the very root of the Philosophy of Advaita which makes nescience the cause and pith of bondage².

(iv) The way of Bhakti

Īśvara in Advaita is Brahman as it appears to the individual; He incarnates Himself for the promotion of *dharma* and the protection of the righteous³. Accepting these facts, Advaita makes ample room for the operation of *bhakti* or love in the spiritual life of the *sādhaka*.

Love is the response of the human heart towards beauty and, in its essence, is disinterested joy⁴. In the discussion on beauty as a value in Advaita we pointed out that 'as a matter of fact the fair visage of beauty revealed in phenomena tends to arrest spiritual evolution by inducing premature self-satisfaction'⁵. In considering the bondage of emotions, we remarked that all love directed towards objects other than the Self or God, in truth, implies their *adhyāsa* on the Self; for, *ātmanastukāmāya sarvaṃpriyaṃ bhavati*⁶. *Bhakti*'s way seeks to convert the pursuit of the fugitive beauty in this garden of God⁷ into that of the Master of the garden himself. Like *Jñāna*, *bhakti* also presupposes a 'home-sickness' for God. Attachment to *Īśvara* on the part of the devotee is the positive side of his detachment from the world of sense-objects⁸. This exclusive love for *Īśvara* is, of course

1. Ibid. *tasmādbhrāntipratyayanimitta evāyam saṃsārabhramanātuparamārthaiti samyagdars'anādatyantaevoparamaiti siddham* BGC. P. 765;
2. Cf. *ātmajñānasyatukevalasyanihśreyasa hetutvaṃ bhedapratyayanivartakatvenakaivalyapahalāvasāyitvāt.* 'SB. on XVIII, 66.
3. Vide PP. 260 '61 Supra;
4. Vide P. 280, supra;
5. P. 283 supra;
6. BU, II, 4, 5;
7. Vide PP. 282 - 283 supra;
8. Cf. When one has such love and attachment for God, one does not feel the attraction of *māyā* to wife, children, relatives and friends. To such a man the world appears as strange land, a place where he has merely to perform his duties. The Gospel, P. 105.

of slow growth. In the admiration he feels for the beautiful in nature and in the attachment he cherishes for his kith and kin, may be discovered the germ in man of that emotion which, developed, becomes love of God¹. Just as the purification of will and its eventual merger in the will of God entails the expansion of consciousness in the direction of the impersonal, the purging of emotions and their orientation towards God demands that objects of beauty be treated as mirrors of the divine. Otherwise, instead of integrating and exalting emotions, they may cause their deterioration and dissipation². The *Gītā* doctrine of *vibhūti*³ makes it easy to treat *Prakṛti*'s glories as revelations of God's inexhaustible richness. Hence the wide-spread tendency to deify the grandeur in Nature and offer it worship. But no worship is really thrown away; all forms of it have ultimate reference to and reach God⁴. Still the lack of understanding is serious and the worship of anything lower than the highest entails the loss of that very highest⁵. But with the knowledge that the object of all genuine worship is God, the devotee is free to choose any form of the Lord he likes; the Lord responds to him in the same form⁶. There is no doubt that it is far better for the devotee to love the Lord himself, directly, instead of approaching him through his *vibhūti*.

In this connection may be noticed the place of the two kinds of worship in Advaita, the worship of Brahman with qualities and that of Brahman without them, *saṅḡopāsanā* and *nirḡṇopāsanā*. The former refers to *bhaktiyoga* proper which, normally, implies love for a personal God, *saṅḡabrahman*. The object of *saṅḡopāsanā* is the realization of God or his *vibhūti* and worship conducted with devotion yields that fruit. But Śaṅkara is emphatic that mere worship of God will not result

1. Vide The Philo. of Hindu sādhanā. P. 251;
2. Cf. The Elimination of *Kāma* and *Karma*, while *avidyā* continues in a latent form marks the aesthetic attitude. the dismissal of *avidyā* even in this latent form marks the saintly attitude. Hiriyanṇa. Qd. IP. ii P. 624;
3. Vide P. 267 supra, *ekamapihi brahma vibhūtibhedairanekadhā upāsyate iti hi sthitiḥ*. S'B P. 708-709;
4. BG. IX, 23;
5. Ibid; IX, 25;
6. Ibid; IV, 11;

in liberation but only in progress¹ along the path of gods to the sphere of Brahman where, eventually, *mukti* may be attained². The *Gītā* deals with the first type of worship, but also makes a significant reference to the worship of the impersonal and the Absolute. The idea of worshipping the impersonal Absolute, *akṣara*, is admittedly extraordinary; but in the attempt of the spirit of man to seek its highest level, the impersonal Absolute also is sometimes chosen by him as an object of adoration³. According to S'aṅkara, the worship of the Impersonal is the chief theme of the nine chapters of the *Gītā* beginning with the second⁴. The devotees of the impersonal Brahman are the *sannyāsins*, who have renounced all desires - *tyaktasarvaiṣaṇāḥ sannyastakaramāṇaḥ*⁵. In fact they are the same as the followers of the way of *Jñāna* and may be considered in that context.

The worshippers of the personal God or *saguṇopāsakas* normally represent him with a form which the mind may grasp and the heart adore. Hence the practical value of the *Avatāras* who may be loved and followed. Four kinds of devotees of God may be distinguished:— (i) those who, being hard-pressed, turn to God for succour and relief - the *ārtas*; (ii) those who, seeking intellectual satisfaction, love him to know about him - *Jijñāsu*; (iii) those who love God for rewards, *arthārthi*. All of them, in due course, secure release and are alike since they all expect a reward from God⁶. But the highest and best type of devotee is the *Jñāni*, one who has realized the truth of the Lord, and so is a confirmed lover of God⁷. The *jñānin* has no desires for whose fulfilment he loves the Lord.

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1. sarvāsāmevābhyudayaaprāptiphalānām saguṇānām vidyānām aviśeṣenaiṣā devayānākhyagatirbhavitumarhati. S'B. P. 730;
 2. This is styled *kramamukti* - see *infra*;
 3. BG. XII, 3; the devotees of the Impersonal are held to be of the very nature of God - *bhagavatsvarūpāḥ* vide, BGC. On XII, 4;
 4. Vide Introduction to BG. XII;
 5. S'B. on XII, 1;
 6. *ete trayopi bhagavadbhajnena māyām taranti.....jñānotpattyā Gūḍhārthadīpikā* BGC. P. 362.
 7. Cf. *ātmarāmāśca munayo nirgranthā apyurukrame | kurvantyahaitukīm bhaktimīttamaṁbhūtaguṇohariḥ || Bhāgavata.*

All ideas of barter have been left far behind. He only seeks to love the Lord for love's own sake¹. Examples of such motiveless love in Indian devotional literature are S'anaka, Nārada, and Prahlāda. It is they who realize that *bhakti* is *paramapremarūpā*². The goal of those who choose the path of devotion is to reach this summit of divine love.

As in *Karma Yoga*, the first step is to conquer the desires which distract the mind and direct it to the worship of the partial forms of the divine. There is the danger of its getting stuck up in these partial devotions and missing the whole³. But the transience of the rewards the devotee secures will disillusion him at long last⁴, and then he may turn in earnest to the Lord himself. Three stages of genuine *bhakti* have been distinguished:— (i) where the devotee feels that he belongs to the Lord exclusively; (ii) where he deems that the Lord belongs to him alone; (iii) where he experiences his identity with the Lord⁵. To realize the first stage, the devotee surrenders himself wholly to the Lord, convinced that there is no other way to overcome the divine *māyā*⁶. What does this surrender imply in practice?⁷ The answer is given in the expression,

1. Cf. Intellectual knowledge brings us most joy with the idea of God as its cause. From this knowledge necessarily springs the intellectual love of God. He who loves God cannot seek that God should love him in return. T. M. Forsyth in 'God and Causality' accg. to Spinoza. Vide Philosophy, October, 1948;
2. Nārada's Bhaktisūtras I, 2;
3. BG. VII, 20, 21;
4. Ibid.; 23.
5. Cf. tasyaivāhaṃ mamivāsau sa evāhamiti tridhā | bhagavaccharaṇatvaṃ syād sādhanābhyāsapākataḥ || Gūḍhārthadīpikā, BGC; P. 754;
6. BG. VII, 14; Cf. taṃhadevamātmabuddhiprakāśaṃ mumukṣurvai śaraṇamaham prapadye. S'U. VI, 18;
7. It may be noted that for the Viśiṣṭādvaitin surrender or *papatti* is the infallible means of gaining mokṣa, through the grace of God alone. The devotee makes a gift of himself to the Lord, and the Lord's *dayā* or grace starts its redemptive function. Preceding the ātmārpaṇam of self-surrender are certain important steps he must take:— ānukūlyasaṃkalpa; prātikūlyavarjana; mahāviśvāsa; kārpeya; and goptṛtvavarāṇa. First is the decision of the devotee to serve all living beings; the second marks his determination to avoid injury to all, the third is complete faith in the saving grace of God; the

anangatā or single-mindedness in one's relations with the Lord . What the *karmayogin* attains by the renunciation of fruits of actions, the *Bhakta* achieves through the performance of all action as offerings to the Lord . Thus, both alike attain freedom in action . The *karmayogin* also has been advised to act in a spirit of dedication; but, for him, this entails considerable effort. For the *bhakta*, however, offering of all work at the feet of his Lord is a sheer joy. For the *karmayogin* God is a means to achieve freedom in action; for the *Bhakta* God is all in all - "the sole way, support, witness, abode, refuge, friend, source, goal"³.

One major difference between the path of love and other paths is: the total dependence on the Lord that the former encourages. In the initial stages, the devotee also must make purposeful efforts to tune his heart to the call of the divine⁴. But with advance in the discipline, his *ananyatā* increases and the Lord begins to treat the devotee as non-different from himself⁵ and takes upon himself all the burdens of the devotee⁶. If the latter be an *ārta* etc., i.e., loves God for some reward, he gets it. But the more advanced *bhakta*, the *jijñāsu*, wants only the truth about God, and no material rewards. But, without the grace of God, no finite being can hope to know the infinite reality of God. The path of devotion has a special advantage in that the *sādhaka* here may count upon God's grace to

fourth is the devotee's sense of incompetence to follow the three normal paths of *Karma*, *Jñāna* and *bhakti*; and the fifth is the deliberate choice of God's grace, as the devotee's sole hope for mokṣa. Vide. PV. PP. 390-91. Dvaitins also agree that liberation cannot be achieved without *bhakti*, through knowledge alone, Cf. *bhaktyaivainam jānāti: paśyati; bandhāt pramucyate* - NV. III, 3, 30;

1. Vide BG. VIII, 14; IX, 22; XII, 6; *ananyatā*; *apṛthakbhūtātā*, the sense of non-difference. S'B. on BG. IX, 22;
2. BG. IX, 27;
3. Ibid; IX, 17, 18;
4. Cf. Sri Ramakrishna's parable of the child holding the father's hand and the father holding the child by the hand. In the second case, there is no fear of the child slipping.
5. BG. IX, 22. S'B. on it says: *tasmād te mamātmabhūtāhpriyā-śca*;
6. *teṣāṃ nityābhiyuktānāṃ yogakṣemamvahāmyaham* - BG IX. 22;

reveal to him the divine reality. The devotee on his part makes a gift to God of his mind and acts ¹ and the Lord grants him *buddhiyoga* ², union with divine knowledge. The attitude of no expectations from God, of motiveless love, moves His *anukampā* or grace. Dwelling in the heart of the devotee and moved by grace, God lights ³ the lamp of wisdom, *jñānadīpa*, which dispels the darkness of nescience, *ajñānājāṃ-tamaḥ*. This lamp is fed by the devotee's love of God; its ardours brighten the light ⁴; the lamp's wick is intelligence, *prajñā*, purged and steadied through celibacy; and it continues to shine in the heart of detachment, safe from the intrusions of the gales of worldly desires ⁵.

Thus the *bhakta* reaches his highest goal; he becomes the *jñānibhakta* ⁶. All *bhaktas* are noble, but the *jñāni* leads them all, being the very Self of the Lord - *atmaivamevamatmaṃ*. The content of this highest realization is: I am myself the Lord; I am not different from Him ⁷. This Advaitic interpretation of *bhakti* is borne out by passages like: I am such that, through devotion which knows no other, one may know Me, see Me, and enter into My very essence ⁸. It is true that the general run of devotees would not choose to 'lose themselves' in God, they prefer 'to eat sugar rather than to become sugar' ⁹. But this analogy hardly does justice to the Advaitic goal of *bhakti*. Unlike sugar, God with whom the Advaitic devotee seeks identity is all intelligence and bliss. Hence through all the stages of *bhakti* he grows into, or, rather, abandons the illusion that he is other than, his own proper Self, viz., God.

1. BG. IX, 34; XVIII, 65;

2. BG. X, 10;

3. *buddhiḥ samyagdarsanaṃ mattattvaviśayaṃ tenayogaḥ* S'B. on BG. X, 10;

4. BG. X, 11;

5. S'B. on BG. X, 11;

6. BG. VII, 17;

7. S'B. on BG. VII, 18; Cf. P. 437, F.N. 5;

8. *bhaktyā tvaṇanyayāsākyā abamevamvidhorjuna | jñātaṃ draṣṭuṃ ca tattvena praveṣṭuṃ caparantapa ||*
BG. XI. 54;

9. Cf. 'And 'I do not want to become sugar, I want to eat it'. Gospel. P. 104.

(v)* The Way of Jñāna.

Jñāna Yoga or the way of knowledge is par excellence the Advaitic approach to the highest goal of life. This path takes the eligible *sādhaka* completely out of the state of bondage, by restoring his integrality of vision. The bondage of will and emotions may largely be set aside by following the disciplines of action and devotion. When the desires are controlled by a God-directed will and the emotions harmonized in God-centered love, the *sādhaka* is in a position to realize God as his very self. The Advaitin contends that this realization can only be a knowing, which is, at the same time, a being and not an act of willing or feeling. Bondage being an expression of *avidyā* it can be set aside only by knowledge¹. The saving knowledge is not a matter of mere contemplation of something inferior as being superior² as when it is asserted, "verily, endless is the mind. Endless are the all-gods"³. Nor is it a matter of deliberate superimposition as in the assertion: Reverence the mind as Brahman⁴. Again the saving knowledge is not a species of purificatory action. Briefly, the knowledge of Brahman does not depend on any act of will at all,⁵ but is entirely determined by its object, viz., the absolute reality. This is true of all valid knowledge, for instance, the nature of valid perception is determined by its object and not by the will of the percipient. Nor may pious devotion or contemplation yield saving knowledge. "That is Brahman, not this which one meditates on"⁶. But is not knowledge itself a kind of mental activity? A vital point must be noted in this connection. With regard to action, the agent feels free to perform it, or not, or even to perform it otherwise than as prescribed; for, action depends on the will of the agent. But knowledge, though, of course, it presupposes cognitive activity, is a product of the operation of the valid means, *pramāṇajanyam*.

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1. mithyājñānāpāyaśca brahmaikatvavijñānātभवति. BSS P. 76
 2. alpāmbanātiraskāreṇa utkṛṣṭavastvabhedadhyānam. RP. S'B. P. 76;
 3. BU. III, 1, 9;
 4. CU. III, 18, 1;
 5. atonapuruṣavyāparatantrā brahmavidyā, kimtarahi pratyakṣa dipramāṇavisayavastu jñānavad vastutantra. S'B. P. 78;
 6. KeU. I, 4;

Validity here means the faithfulness with which knowledge represents its object. Therefore, unlike action, knowledge is not at the mercy of man's will¹. In view of this, the Advaitin has always treated the way of *jñāna* as the most direct and effective in getting rid of that basic *adhyāsa* which is the root of bondage. *Jñānayoga*, in other words, directly yields the knowledge which liberates.

It is recognized that this path of knowledge is not easy to tread. "A sharpened edge of a razor, hard to traverse, a difficult path is this, the wise declare"². Hence the traditional insistence that the *sādhaka* should take the help of a teacher who is an adept himself, i.e., one who has realized the identity of his Self and Brahman³. For instance in the *kaṭha*, there is the call⁴ to awake and arise and search out the *varas*, notable teachers who know the truth, *tattvavidāḥ*⁵. Advaita holds that the Brahman-knowledge actually saves only when imparted by a competent teacher, - one who is both a *śrotriya*, master of the theory and *brahmaniṣṭha*, the master of the practice, of Brahman-knowledge. Being well-established in Brahman, the adept can guide the worthy disciple to the supreme goal. The *guru* is, in fact, not other than Brahman, for *yo brahmaveda-Brahmaiva bhavati*⁶. In short, in the *jñānayoga*, the *guru* practically replaces God and the reverence paid to him is of the same quality as the *bhakti* which the devotee feels for God⁷.

1. S'B. P. 83;
2. KU. III, 14; *jñeyasyātisūkṣmatvāt tadviṣayasya jñānamārgasaya duḥsāmpādyatvaṃ vadanti*. S'B. on the above; Cf. BU. IV, 4, 8.
3. Vide : *evamevehācāryavānpuruṣo veda*. CU. VI, 14, 2;
4. KU. III, 14;
5. S'B on KU. III, 14;
6. MuU. III, 2, 9. Cf. *saccidānanda* alone is the Guru. If a man in the form of a guru awakens spiritual consciousness in you, then know for certain that it is God the Absolute who has assumed that human form for your sake. The guru is like a companion who leads you by the hand - Gopāl P. 152. The guru is credited with the ability to transfer his spiritual powers to the worthy disciple - the transference being known as *śaktipāta*. Vide JMV. P. 48, *darśanāt sparśan-acchabdāt kṛpayās'iṣyadehake Janayedyaḥ samāvesam gāmbhavaḥ sa hi deśikah* |
7. *yasyādeve parā bhaktiryathādeve tathāgurau*. S'U. VI, 23.

In adopting the path of *jñāna*, the *sādhaka* is choosing the *nivṛttimārga*¹, the way of abstention from activities - represented in the *kāṭha* as a turning inward of the eye due to desire for immortality². The spontaneity with which he does it shows that he has had already a thorough training in *karma Yoga*, either in this life or in prior lives. As a rule, he begins his serious search for the saving knowledge with the formal act of renunciation³ enjoined by the *śruti etameva pravrājino loka icchāntaḥ pravrajanti*⁴. The *loka* referred to here is the experience of the *Ātman*⁵. Being prompted by the desire to know the self, the initial renunciation is styled *vividiṣāsannyāsa*⁶. But the step is by no means universally obligatory; for those who had their renunciation and vedāntic studies in prior lives but failed to win success may, in the present life, achieve it in any station of life; indeed, a fresh act of renunciation would be superfluous for them⁷. Such exceptions apart, the injunction to renounce actions associated with *varnas* and *āśramas* is deemed compulsory; renunciation is an indispensable auxiliary in the pursuit of self-knowledge, *ātma-jñānāṅgam*. What is renounced is the desire for ends other than the supreme goal of *mokṣa*. Hence the vital distinction drawn between *aparavidyā* and *paravidyā* in the *Muṇḍaka*⁸. The former consisting of all conceivable branches of secular knowledge cannot obviously produce spiritual insight. But *paravidyā*, by which the

1. Vide P. 415. supra.

2. *kaściddhirapratyagātmānamaikṣadāvṛttacaksuramṛtatvamicchan. KU. IV, 1.*

3. The objection that this will violate the injunction, *brahmacar yeṇa ṛṣibhyo yajñenadevebhyah prajāyā pitṛbhyā eṣa vā anṛṇa*, is discarded because this refers only to those who are not sufficiently detached. Cf. *na ca kevalakarmabhyo-muktiryuktyopapadyate | tathāca vakṣyate spaṣṭamatomuktirnakarmataḥ || BV. 437*

4. BU. IV, 4, 22.

5. *lokyate nubhuyate itilokah JMV. P. 16.*

6. JMV. P. 16. SS. III, 357 and Madhusūdana's comment on it.

7. BG. IV, 40, 44 and SS. III 360.

Janmāntareṣu yadi sadhana-jātamasītsannyāssapūrvakamidam śravaṇādirūpam | vidyāmavāpsyati janah sakalopi yatatratrāṣrameṣunivasanna nivārayāmah ||

8. I, 4 and 5;

Absolute is realized is alone competent to yield the *summa bonum*. So that one may fruitfully turn to the higher *vidyā* one has gladly to bid farewell to all other pursuits; for, as A. Huxley remarks¹, "the seeking of the kingdom of God is a tiresome whole-time job." The giving up of all lower ends in favour of the highest, viz., *mokṣa*, is the essence of the renunciation on which the upaniṣads and Śaṅkara insist. Thus in his commentary on the *Muṇḍaka*², Śaṅkara remarks that people of all stations of life may hope to get an intellectual apprehension of Brahman through the study of the upaniṣads; but only the Brahman-knowledge, consolidated and perfected, by *sannyāsa* will yield *mokṣa*. Ānandagiri asserts³ that this renunciation means the surrender of all possessions and secular activities—*sarvasvatyāgakarmasannyāsa-niṣṭhā*. This stern condition is reminiscent of Christ's words: "Sell whatever thou hast and follow me." "If any man come to me and hate not his father and mother and wife and children and brethren and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple." "Whosoever be he of you that forswearth not all that he hath, he cannot be my disciple."⁴

The object of *vividiṣāsannyāsa* is held to be liberation in the state of disembodiment or *vidhanmukti*. He who performs it strives to carry out the injunction, *ātmānamevalokamupāsita*⁵, both in letter and spirit. But even if this act of renunciation is not carried out externally, it has to be mentally performed by inquirers in all stations of life⁶. Some of the special qualities of head and heart which all seekers after Self-knowledge should cultivate have been detailed in the *Gītā*. "Humility, sincerity non-violence, forbearance, simplicity, devotion to the teacher, cleanliness, perseverance, self-conquest, aversion to sense-objects, freedom from egotism, meditation on the evils of birth, death, old age, sufferings and pain detachment from kith and

1. VWW. P. 35; Cf. *ananyacittatā brahmaniṣṭhāsaukarmaṭhe katham ?* |
karmatyāgītao brahmaniṣṭhāmarhati netarah ||
Qd. JMV. Com. P. 8.
2. MuU. Bhāṣya, ĀAE. P. 3.
3. Ibid.
4. Mark X. 21; Luke XIV. 26; 33. Cf. MuU. III, 2, 6. JU. 4, 5; BV. II, P. 1049.
5. BU. I, 4, 45. 6. JMV. P. 21.

kin as well as possessions, equanimity in happiness and misery; devotion to God, love of solitude; pursuit of Self-knowledge and the vigilant awareness of the final end¹." It is easy to see that this list is only a significant amplification of the four prerequisites considered above². The vital point is that the candidate for *Jñāna* should guard himself against deviation from the path hard to traverse; for, *pramāda* or negligence in this respect is fatal³.

With these initial preparations the *sādhaka* calls upon the teacher; for the latter alone can unveil the secret of life and self⁴. The supreme word which guides the *sādhaka's* steps now is the upaniṣadic injunction, *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*⁵; for, with the seeing of, with the hearkening to, with the thinking of, and with the understanding of the Ātman this world-all is known⁶." This is the programme for the *sādhaka's* activity. The expression *draṣṭavya* denotes the goal, viz., the realization of the Self; the three remaining expressions indicate the steps to be taken before the goal is reached. The traditional view is that, of the three steps, *śravaṇa* or hearkening to the Self is the *aṅgi* or the main; for no means of cognition other than *śabda* is competent to yield the saving knowledge⁷. From the Upaniṣads alone is the real nature of the Self known - the Self being the *aupaniṣadah puruṣaḥ*. Hence hearkening to the upaniṣads has been accorded pride of place among the steps leading to self-realization⁸. The next two steps, thinking and pondering aid the hearkening and so are its auxiliaries⁹.

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1. BG. XIII, 7-11; US. I, 5.
 2. Vide PP. 416 ff supra.
 3. Sanasujatīyabhāṣya I, 4—*pramādaṃ vai mṛtyumahaṃ bravimi-sadāpramādamamṛtatvam bravimi*. MuU. III, 1, 5.
 4. KU. II, 9; II, 23;
 5. BU. II, 4, 5; IV, 5. 6.
 6. Cf. CU. IV, 1, 3, *yenāśrutaṃ śrutaṃ bhavatyamatam matam avijñātam vijñātam*.
 7. Cf. BU. III, 9, 26 *taṃtvaupaniṣadam puruṣam prcchāmi*.
 8. Vide VPS. I, 162; Nyāyaratnāvali, P. 427, SB.
 9. *śravanamangi, prāmāṇyasya prameyāvagamam pratyavyavahānāt; manananididhyāsanetu cittasyapratyagātmapravaṇa-samskāra pariniṣpannatadekāgravṛttikaryadvārena brahmanubhava hetu tampratipadyete Vivarana, Qd. As. P. 859;*

Śravaṇa is essentially investigation or, *vicāra* which consists in the determination of the purport of words constituting *śruti*, especially the major texts or the *mahāvākyas*. Only after its purport is determined can the word function as a means of valid cognition. Understood as the means of valid cognition, *śravaṇa* may be seem to be the *aṅgi* or the chief¹. *Śravaṇa* means the determination of the purport of words in the relevant precepts of *śruti* by means of the well-known six aids². But can any word have the power to denote the vedāntic Absolute from which the words with the mind recoil?³ True, the Absolute without limitations of any kind is beyond the range of words; but in *śruti* there are words which denote the qualified Absolute; the knowledge of such words aids that of the pure Absolute⁴. *Śravaṇa*, strictly, is not a form of knowledge, *jñāna*, for knowledge is not a proper object of injunction; rather, *śravaṇa* is an activity and such as may be enjoined. In fact, the other two steps *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* also are only mental activities. *Śravaṇa* is a thinking consideration such as: if the major texts like *tattvamsi* do not convey the sense of identity of Brahman and Ātman, they would not yield it even when tested with the help of the six aids of sense-determination. Generally, it serves the purpose of dispelling the fear that the Advaitic teaching of identity is baseless *pramāṇagatāsambhāvanā*⁶. This fear may take the form that the upaniṣadic texts do not teach the non-dual Brahman but only subserve ritualistic activity⁷. According to the *Nyāyaratnāvalī*, ratiocination in support of the identity of Brahman and Ātman also is included in *śravaṇa*s.

1. Cf. *tātparyaviśiṣṭaśabdajñānam kāraṇam, atastātparyāvadhār. anarūpavicārasyāṅgitvam. Qd. AS. P. 859.*
2. *upakramopasamhāravabhyāsapzrvatāphalm | arthavadopapatticalingam tātparyanirṇaye || Qd. Com. on SŚ. III, 333.*
3. Vide PP. 237 ff supra.
4. AS. P. 866.
5. *śraṇanādikriyātāvadkartavyechaprayatnatah. Suresvara. Qd. AS. P. 866.*
6. Nārāyaṇi on SB. P. 428.
7. PMS. I, 2, 1 etc.
8. SB, P. 428.

How does the major text *tattvamasi*¹ convey the supreme Advaitic teaching of identity? The determination of its sense is the chief object of *śravaṇa*. Now, *tattvamasi* is known as the *upadeśavākya*, the proposition that sets forth the content of the saving knowledge. The appositional use of the two words 'tat' and 'tvam', 'that' and 'thou' arouses the idea that they both refer to the same reality.² *Sāmānādhikaraṇya* or the appositional use of noun-words may refer to four different kinds of apposition³: (i) apposition by sublation; (ii) that by superimposition; (iii) that by means of the relation of the adjective and the substantive; and (iv) that through identity. An example of the first is furnished by the proposition 'the thief is the post' uttered on discovering that what was mistaken for the thief is in fact a post. The subject here, viz., 'thief' restates the content of the original error; but, of that is predicated the being the post, which, thus, sublates the initial error. This type of apposition is inapplicable to the text '*tattvamasi*'⁴ for it will imply that 'thou', the individual, is absolutely annulled in liberation, and, therefore, any effort on his part to secure it is unintelligible. The second type of apposition, based on superimposition, also is irrelevant in the present context; for propositions based on it are injunctive; e.g., 'meditate on mind as Brahman' - *manabrahmetyupāsita*. Obviously, in '*tattvamasi*' there is no exhortation to meditate. This point becomes clearer still in the light of the fact that were meditation enjoined here as the direct means of liberation, the latter, as the product of meditation, will be transient⁵. In examples like 'the blue lotus', there is the third type of apposition between the adjective 'blue' and the substantive, 'lotus', which also must be rejected in the case of 'that' and 'thou'; for these terms refer, by their denotative power, to mutually opposed entities, viz., 'God and man. The apposition between these is empirical; but, empirically, it

1. CU. VI, 8, 7, etc.

2. Vide Madhusūdana's Com. on SS. I, 197.

3. SS. II, 39.

4. Com. on II, 39; SS.

5. It is clear that if *bādha* or sublation is applied to 'that' effort at liberation will cease to have any goal; for it means abolition of Brahman.

6. Com. on SS. P. 214.

cannot be ignored. God being mediate and full consciousness, and man immediate but partial consciousness¹, there can be no apposition between the two, as such. Thus, the only alternative is to treat the apposition in question as referring to identity, *aikyapakṣa*, of the reality connoted by *tat* and *tvam*². But, as mentioned above, the identity cannot hold between the senses expressed by '*tat*' and '*tvam*'. Nor may one of these terms be taken in an indicative or secondary sense without discarding its expressed sense, as an instance of *ajahatsvārthā*. Take, e.g., that *tat* connotes the world-cause. This indicated sense must be similar to the world or to the *Jīva*. The former will rule out all relation to *Jīva*, there being no mutual expectancy between the two. If it is deemed similar to the *Jīva*, the sense of the sentence will be 'I, the *Jīva*, am the world-cause'. This knowledge yields no *puruārṣṭha* or human end; for it leaves the *Jīva* in his state of nescience. Similarly, the knowledge that God is one's master, derived from the same proposition by means of *lakṣaṇā* or otherwise, does not avail to liberate the *Jīva*³. For even after such knowledge the *Jīva* has to meditate on God to win his grace. Nor can the secondary implication by which the expressed sense is ignored, *jahatsvārthā*, be applied to this major text; for, it can function only if a sense related to the expressed senses be available⁴; nor can we decide to which of the two terms

1. Cf. Vedāntasāra, Notes, P. 37. Ed. by Hiriyanna, Poona, 1929;

2. SS. II, 39 and, P. 215.

3. '*tattvamsi*' has been variously interpreted by the different schools of Vedānta. Rāmānuja takes *tvam* as denoting the *Jīva* or *cit* and its apposition with '*tat*' meaning God signifies that the former is the body of the latter; or God is the self of the *Jīva*. The Dvaitin understands the text to teach *Jīva*'s dependence on and the difference from God; he splits *tattvam* as '*tasyatvam*' or is prepared even to say that the expression is *atattvamsi*. According to Bhāskara the text denotes an ultimate *ekibhāva* or merger of the *Jīva* in Brahman as of rivers in the sea. For Vallabha, *tattvam* means *tasmādvam* implying, mystically, the ecstasy of love. Vide PV. P. 595.

4. EG. 'in the hamlet in the Ganges', "in the Ganges" *Gangāyām*, indicates the bank, in contact with the Ganges; in doing so, the expressed sense of *Gangāyām* is entirely discarded. No such related sense is available for '*tat*' or '*tvam*'.

should this *lakṣaṇā* be applied. Therefore, the right procedure is to apply to both terms the *bhāgalakṣaṇā*, by which a part of the expressed sense is retained while the incompatible element is rejected¹. The incompatibility of the terms '*tat*' and '*tvam*' is confined to their expressed senses², for, these refer to God and his attributes on the one hand, and to man and his on the other. But they have a secondarily indicated sense, each. Thus, *tat* indicates the ground of the world, pure consciousness, which is existence and bliss also at the same time. Similarly, *tvam* indicates the eternal and immediate consciousness which witnesses the body, sense organs, and mind. Thus understood, these two indicated senses may be seen to be absolutely identical. This is analogous to the understanding of the proposition 'this is that Devadatta'. The attributes of Devadatta, viz., the being qualified by the past time and some other locality, and the being qualified by the present time and this locality, are of course, incompatible, and as such are discarded; the final sense thus conveyed by the proposition is the self-identity of Devadatta stripped of his incompatible characteristics. Even so, the major text '*tattvamasi*' yields the absolute identity of the indicated sense of *tat* and that of *tvam*, the identity whose content is pure consciousness, without any accidental attributes or relations³.

The determination of the Advaitic sense of *tattvamasi* as indicated above in the vast majority of the *sādhakas* does not at once yield liberation, though, in very rare instances, it may. So that it may result in liberation, it has to be aided, as mentioned above⁴, by *manana* and *nididhyāsana*. *Manana*

1. ucitādvayorapihibhāgalakṣaṇā. SS. II, 42 and SS. I, 160.

2. Vide SS. I, 158, 159.

3. This cognition is said to have the supra-relational sense or the *akhandārtha* as its content. It has been defined by Citsukha as follows:

'samsargāsaṅgisamyagdhīhetutāyāgirāmiyam |
uktākhaṇḍārthatā, yadvā tatprātipadikārthatā ||

TP. P. 109. i.e. in the engendering by non-synonymous words of a valid cognition which is non-relational consists their integrality of sense; or, it may be taken to be the non-relational sense of the stem-words.

4. Vide P. 444 supra.

is the mental activity which secures mediate certitude for the knowledge born of the major text.¹ According to the *Nārāyaṇī* it serves to remove the perverse thought that though the upanishads have a distinct teaching of their own, it is not the identity of self and Brahman.² This perversity is called *prameyagatāsambhāvanā*. *Nididhyāsana* is the reasoning activity for securing immediate certitude of the knowledge of identity.³ All these three steps *śravaṇa*, *manana*, *nididhyāsana* together consist of four types of reasoning processes :— (i) the determination of the otherness of the objective manifold in relation to the conscious - subject *dr̥gdr̥śyānvayavyatireka*. It is argued that the sphere of objects is posited by the self-revealing subject in judgements like : I perceive this pot ; I perceive this mountain, etc. Without such perceptions, the world of objects can in no way be deemed to exist. In other words, existence, to be intelligible, must be existence for a subject. To posit an object means to relate it to the consciousness which judges. We saw, in the previous chapter,⁴ that this relation can be neither contact nor inherence i.e., external or internal. Contact between things, so opposed as consciousness and inert objects, is unintelligible. As for *samavāya*, an independent relation between the two relata, it leads straight to the infinite regress. So the Advaitin concludes that the objective manifold is related to pure consciousness through *tādātmya* or identity. But identity cannot be conceived between consciousness and the inert objective manifold. Therefore, like the rope-snake, the world of objects is merely superimposed on consciousness ; it has no independent status.⁵ The next three types of reasoning follow the same pattern. In the second, *sākṣisākṣyānvayavyatireka*, it is argued that what is witnessed, viz., the inert states of the mind like pain and pleasure, cannot be identical with the witness intelligence ; hence they are independently false. In

1. *mananam tu vakyajanya jñānasya parokṣaṇiścayatvasampādakastarkah*. SB. P. 428.

2. Ibid.

3. SS. takes it to be the repeated practice of undisturbed *śravaṇa* and *manana* - vide NR. PP. 428-29.

4. PP. 400-401 supra.

5. *svaprakāśadr̥gastādātmyena siddham jadam yadi satyam syādtadā, jadadvadinā svaprakāśadatyamta vilakṣaṇam syād* NR. SB. P. 429.

the third, *āgamāpāyītadavadhyānvayavyatireka*, it is made out that the objects and their states which are in perpetual flux cannot be identical with the immutable self. Hence they are different and false. In the fourth, *duḥkhiparamapremāspadānvayavyatireka* the argument is that what causes evil and suffering, viz., the world of objects cannot be identical with pure consciousness which is also bliss; hence it is different and false.¹ The point of these reflections is to impress on the inquirer the Advaitic conclusion that Ātman alone is immutably real. Like the thread running through pearls holding them together is the Atman in regard to all phenomena.² What this *mithyātva* or falsity signifies we have already discussed.³ A significant part of the three steps *śravaṇa*, etc., consists in assimilating the nature of the world's falsity. Together with this proceeds the determination of the real nature of the Self, which has been referred to under *śravaṇa*.

In deciding the meaning of *tattvāmāsi* we spoke of the expressed and indicated senses of *tvam* and *tat*. The precise nature of *tat* has already been set forth in the chapter on Brahman.⁴ Before one succeeds in grasping the import of identity conveyed by the major text, obviously, one should fix the precise sense of *tvam* also. We shall briefly indicate how it is done. S'āṅkara has set forth the procedure to be adopted in several works of his. Bondage has been explained to consist in a series of superimpositions or *adhyāsa* (*adhyāropa*); in contrast, its abolition consists in the process known as *apāvada*⁵ or repudiations. On pure consciousness have been super-imposed both the objective world and the subjective phenomena of the organism and its activities.⁶ By means of discriminative reasoning, these subjective superimpositions must be set aside, and their substrate, the pure consciousness in its immediacy,

1. NR. on SB. P. 429-30.

2. Cf. BG. VII, 7.

3. Vide PP. 379-385 supra.

4. Vide PP. 210-238 supra.

5. Vide SS, PP. 125-254; This is the actual implication of 'neti' - rejection of the whole world of objects as not being Brahman. Cf. BS. III, 2, 22.

6. Vide PP. 355 ff. supra.

must be apprehended.¹ The positive and indubitable starting point of the inquiry 'who am I, ' *koham* ' is the felt certitude of the self's reality - the doubts are not in regard to whether the self is or is not but what its nature is. Self or *Ātman* stands revealed howsoever mixed up with extraneous elements in the perception of 'I'.² But may not this very reality of the self or 'I' be called in question? Clearly, this calling in question of the 'I', this process of doubting, being an action entails an agent, and the 'I' thus doubting, is the doubter.³ But this much of certitude regarding the Self would not suffice to liberate the *Jīva*; it has to be thoroughly distinguished from its sheaths "drawn out from the body like an arrow-shaft out from a reed".⁴

An account of the *Kośas* and their significance has been set forth above,⁵ where we showed that the metaphysical Self of the *Jīva* cannot be any of these five *kośas*: For instance the gross body or the sheath of food cannot be the self,⁶ for the obvious reason that in states like sleep, its inertness is conspicuous. In our account of the materialist rejection of *mukti* we exposed the inadequacies of their views of Self.⁷ The self which witnesses all changes remains immutable as consciousness. Body, mind, etc., are only its instruments, owned and used by it, but by no means indispensable for it. Beyond the gross body is the sheath of vital breaths, *prāṇamayakośa* subject to vicissitudes like hunger and thirst; its impermanence, objectivity and inertness make it unfit to be the self of man. On the level of the *prāṇamaya*, life begins to manifest itself; but it is unconscious as proved by the sleep state where breath functions without consciousness. The *manomaya* is conscious, no doubt; but it is not the self for it is subject to attachments

1. Cf. Self-inquiry is the one, infallible means, the only direct one, to realize the unconditioned, absolute Being that you really are - Mahrahis Gospel, P. 53. Tiruvannamalai, 1949;
2. Vide P. 410 supra.
3. SN. V. 4; Cf. *ātmanas/capratyākhyātumaś/akyatvāt, ya eva nirākartā tasyaivātmavāt*; S'B. PP. 86-87;
4. KU. VI, 17;
5. Vide P. 356 supra;
6. Vide BS. III, 3, 54;
7. Vide Part I. supra;
8. SN. V. 10;

and aversions, mistakes the body for the self and has conceit in possessions like houses, etc. Briefly, the plain limitations of the finite mind make it impossible for the inquirer to rest content in his mind as his self. The next higher sheath, *buddhi* or *viññānamaya* also is equally imperfect; it collapses in sleep and is subject to the sway of the sense-organs and mind. Being but an instrument of the self, it may not be identified with it. The last sheath of bliss is the closest approximation to the self; it is revealed in the happiness of deep sleep, and as limited by it, the self appears as egoity.¹ The real Self or *Ātman* is the prototype, not blissful, but bliss itself.² It is Self because, both before and after the integral experience, uncontradicted, it exists. Strictly speaking the Self cannot be an object of experience, but one speaks of experience in regard to it because its very essence is sentience or experience.³ Therefore, the Self whose essence is awareness can never be doubted.⁴ Briefly, the pure Self is that alone which cannot be thought away. Behind and supporting all thoughts of negations remains the pure consciousness and that is the *Ātman*.

That the Self alone is real may be reinforced by the demonstration of the *mithyātva* of the world of objects. The latter may be thought away, it was said. But how? By *manana* it is feasible to show that the world of objects fails to satisfy the demands of logical intelligibility and, as such, is false or untrue. As an example may be considered the nature of *bheda* or difference on which rests the concept and experience of the world of objects. To the dualists *bheda* is both ultimate and necessary. Empirical life, even for the Advaitin, admits of *bheda*. But is it, for all that, an intelligible concept? Difference may be deemed to be either the nature of things or their attribute, *svarūpa* or *dharma*. It cannot be either. For, if it were of

1. SN. V. 13 ānandamayako'sanāmaso'haṃkāraḥ kathaṃ bha-vedātmā;
2. Vide S'B on Ānandamayādhikarapa;
3. Cf. Reality is one individual experience · a higher unity above all ideality and relations, above thought, will, and aesthetic perception. Essays; P. 342. Bradley.
4. svayamevānubhavatvād yadyapyetasya nānubhāvyaṭvam | sakṛdapyabhāvaśaṅkānābhaved bodhasvarūpatvāt || SN. V. 16.

the very nature of a thing, say of A, then its difference from another object say B, could be perceived without any reference to B at all. But it is obvious that the concept of difference is unintelligible without reference to its counter-correlate or *pratiyogin*. The dualists may maintain that this dependence of difference on a counter-correlate holds good only of determinate perception; in indeterminate perception difference is cognized without references of any kind. For example a rod of fixed length requires reference to other rods, etc., only when it is to be described empirically as long or short. But this argument is weak. Reference to other rods is needed in the example because contrary attributes like length and shortness cannot at once be predicated of the same object. But if difference were the nature of things, its perception should require no reference to other objects. If 'difference from B' be included in the nature of A, then since B, which qualifies the difference, is also included in A, all difference between A and B would vanish. Thus, if difference were the nature of things, everything will be the attribute of everything else. Ultimately only a single substrate would remain with all things as its attributes. Again the nature of difference is to divide things and if difference were itself the things in question, only division would remain and no things divided.¹ If the integrality of things be denied, no thing would remain single and whole, but each would be split up into everything else.

Nor may difference be deemed a *dharma* or attribute of things. For, perception does not testify to such an attribute. What perception does is to yield the knowledge of an object in its unity; it cannot simultaneously perceive the two entities, the object and its attribute of difference. To arrive at difference, first the differents, viz., the substrate and the counter-correlate of difference must be perceived; next the cognition of difference may follow. The fact is, difference also is a sort of relation and so cannot do without the relata. Again, if difference were an attribute, it must be different from its substrate and then they have to be related by a term other than both the relata. This attempt, we saw,² involves infinite

1. vidāraṇātmakabhedasyabhāvasvabhāvatāyām nakiñcanaikam vastu syād. TP. P. 168;

2. Vide PP. 400-401, *supra*.

regress; for each subsequent cognition of difference depends upon that of the immediately preceding difference. Finally the concept of difference is vitiated by the defect of mutual dependence; when two objects are cognized as different their relation as substrate and the counter-correlate of that difference is cognized; but only after cognizing them as substrate and counter-correlate may their difference be cognized. To say that this is true of determinate cognition, and not of indeterminate cognition is futile; for it is a mere assertion without proof, and beyond experience.¹

The main object of *manana*, as said above, is to convince the inquirer of the sole reality of the Atman understood through *śravaṇa* as identical with Brahman. Ratiocination, the study of Vedāntic texts, and unwearying efforts to concentrate the mind on this sole theme,² *nididhyāsana*, are held to fit the *sīdhaka* for *videhamukti*, for as we observed above,³ the object of *vividiṣāsannyāsa* is liberation which guarantees that no more embodiment is in store for him. But the distinctive feature of Advaita is that it holds out the hope of liberation even in this life, or, as it is called *Jīvanmukti*. The achievement of this goal is conditioned by a fresh act of renunciation styled *vidvatsannyāsa*.⁴ It is accomplished by those who have acquired through *śravaṇa*, etc., the knowledge

1. *yugapadgrahaṇāyogād anavasthāprasṅgataḥ |
parasparāśrayatvācca dharmabhede'pinākṣadhīḥ ||*
TP. P. 168.
2. *tamevadhīro vijñāyaprajñāmkarvitabrahmaṇaḥ.* BU. IV, 4.
3. Vide PP. 443 supra.
4. The need for a fresh act of renunciation is explained by Vidyāraṇaya as follows: There are two classes of candidates eligible for the saving knowledge: (i) those who have realized some *saguna* aspect of Brahman in meditation, *kṛtopāstayaḥ* and then undertake inquiry into the nature of reality, (ii) those who have not, *akṛtopāstayaḥ*. Having secured the knowledge of Brahman through *vividiṣāsannyāsa*., the former need not freshly renounce; for their inherent dispositions and mind as a whole have already been purified. They can expect *vidvatsannyāsa* and *jīvanmukti* to follow automatically. Such indeed are the proper candidates for *vidyā*. Since *sannyāsa* has been enjoined with such candidates in view, the two forms of it seem mixed up in the *sāstras*. Vide JMV. P. 231.

of the supreme reality.¹ A classical example of *vidvatsannyāsa* is the renunciation of *Yājñavalkya*, who having instructed Janaka, Maitreyī, etc., retired from the world.² The basis and sanction for this second act of renunciation is the declaration that Brahmans who know such a Self overcome desire for sons, desire for wealth, desire for the worlds, and live the life of mendicants.³ *Vividiṣāsannyāsa* yields mediate knowledge of the self; the *Vidvatsannyāsa* serves to ripen and perfect it. Hence they may be regarded as cause and effect.⁴ This second act of renunciation is designed to achieve liberation in this very life. The direct means to *Jīvanmukti* or liberation in life are held to be three: (i) the knowledge of reality or *tattvajñāna*; (ii) tranquillization of mind are *manonāṣa*; (iii) attenuation of mental impressions, or *vāsanākṣaya*. These three means employed over a long period of time liberate the Self.⁵

In practice these three factors act and react on each other. Without the tranquillization of the mind, impressions must persist while without the attenuation of impressions, mind (unregenerate) must persist. But what does tranquillization of mind mean? By mind in this context are meant only the waves, the modifications, of the mind-stuff; to tranquillize them is to restrict these *vṛttis* of the mind. Indeed it is the same as what Patañjali defines as: *vyutthānanirodhasamskārayorabhibhavaprādurbhāvau nirodhakṣaṇacittānvayo nirodhapariṇāmaḥ*.⁶ The practice of tranquillizing the mind stuff is aimed at transcending the empirical dualism between the subject and the object in all acts of cognition and thus at making the mind

1. Clearly this knowledge cannot be other than mediate. Were it immediate, there would have been no need, no possibility, for any fresh act. Vide SS. III, 346.

2. Vide BU. IV, 5.

3. BU. III, 5; Also, *etameva viditvā munirbhavati*. BU. IV, 4, 22.

4. JMV. P. 35.

5. *tribhīretaiścīrābhyastairbhūdayagranthayo dṛḍhāḥ |
nihsaṅkamevatruṣyanti bisacchedāt guṇāiva ||*
Vāsiṣṭha, Qd. JMV. P. 203.

6. YS. III, 9; When there is a becoming invisible of the subliminal impressions of emergence and a becoming visible of the subliminal impression of restriction, the mutation of restriction is inseparably connected with mind stuff in its period of restriction.

a proper means of intuiting the identity of Ātman and Brahman.¹

Yoga or the process of perfecting the mind as an instrument of intuition has an honoured place in Advaita.² While the impure mind cannot intuit the self,³ the purified mind, or *agryābuddhi*, can.⁴ For the process of purification the upaniṣads have laid down certain types of *upāsanas* or meditations. The meditations which do not culminate in the knowledge of *tattvamsi* cannot liberate in this very life; they only lead to liberation by stages or *kramamukti*.⁵ But as said above, these *upāsanas*, when successfully performed,⁶ result in the purification of the mind, and thus they facilitate the final intuition of identity.

Upāsana signifies the uninterrupted flow of the same mental state in regard to an object prescribed by the *śāstras*.⁷ As examples may be noticed a few of the more outstanding of these meditations. The meditation on *saguṇa* Brahman or *Īśvara* enjoined in the *Chāndogya*⁸ has unusual significance. The qualification of the *upāsaka* here is that he be *śānta*, of calm mind. The theme of meditation is qualified Brahman, *manomayabhārūpa*, etc.⁹ The real self of the meditator is this very Brahman or *Īśvara-esama ātmā antarahṛdaya*.¹⁰ Hence the injunction to meditate on Him as the very Self of the

1. *drśyate tvagryayābuddhyā sūkṣmayā sūksmadarśibihih.* KU. III. 12.
2. Vide ŚU. II, 8, VI, 113. KU. II, 12; VI, 11; MuU. II, 2, 3; Cf. *samyagdarśanopāyohiyogo vede vihitah.* ŚB. P. 352; GPK. III, 40. In the PD. Bhāratīrtha holds that yoga is an independent means to release; but in the VPS. his position is the normal one, viz., that *Jñāna* alone liberates. Vide PA. P. 245.
3. KU. III, 12 - *eṣa sarveṣu bhūteṣu gūḍhotmā naprakāśate.*
4. *asamskṛtabuddheravijñeyatvāt naprakāśata ityuktam; drśyate tu samskṛtayā ekāgratayopetayā sūkṣmavastunirikṣanaparayā.* ŚB. on KU. III, 12.
5. *saguṇāsu vidyāsu gatirarthavati.* ŚB. P. 730.
6. *yāvadupāsyaviśayasākṣātkāreṇatathaphalam prāptam.* ŚB. P. 777.
7. CUB. P. 6.
8. III, 14.
9. CU. III, 14, 2.
10. Ibid, III, 14, 4.

sādhaka.¹ Since in these meditations the distinction between the subject and the object is maintained, their fruit is not full Self-realization - *neha svārāje' bhiṣiñcati*.² The words, 'after death I shall reach Brahman'³ testify to the persistent sense of difference. The final goal of this meditation, therefore, can only be *kramamukti*⁴ after attaining the realm of *saguna Brahman*. The *upāsaka* meditates on God as dwelling in the heart's ether, in the city of Brahman⁵; here he also realizes Him. As in an expanse of clear water or in a clear mirror objects are reflected faithfully, so in the cleansed mind⁶ of the yogin shines forth God, a mass of the light of consciousness - *viññānājyotiḥsvarūpābhāsam*.

Of all forms of *upāsanas* recommended in the upaniṣads, that on AUM is the most celebrated.⁷ Meditation on AUM is held in high esteem because AUM is the most adequate symbol of Brahman, and, as such, has been identified with it. The *Māṇḍūkya* makes AUM central to its theme by means of this identification. The entire realm of the real is symbolized by AUM; past, present and future as well as the waking, dream and sleep states of the individual are said to be symbolized by it. Saṅkara declares that to comprehend AUM aright is the way to Self-realization.⁸ Anandagiri explains⁹ that when the sacred syllable is uttered with a concentrated mind, *caitanya* or consciousness shines forth. The process of meditation consists in the merging of the first syllable 'a' of AUM in the second 'u'. Similarly the second is merged in the 'm', the last element of AUM. Finally, 'm' itself is dissolved in the nonsyllabic AUM which is equivalent to the *Turiya*,¹⁰ the impartite reality, which is neither cause nor effect. The

1. BS. IV, 1, 3, *tvam vā ahamasmi bhagavo devate ham vai ivam asi*. Qd. ŚB. P. 741.
2. CUB. P. 159.
3. CU. III, 14, 4, *itapretyābhisambhavitāsmi*.
4. See *infra*.
5. CU. VIII, 1.
6. MuU. III, 1, 8.
7. MuU. II, 2, 3 & 4.
8. Cf. GPK. I, 28.
9. Tikā on ŚB. on the MU. P. 9.
10. Vide P. 362 *supra*.

procedure sketched above is to be worked out in the manner which the adept teacher imparts to the *sādhaka*.¹

The practice of *upāsana*, when successful, makes the mind tranquil by arresting its extrovert tendencies ; the *sādhaka* in fact becomes an *āvirṭtacakṣus*.² But still there are the *vāsanās*, the subtle impressions of the mind for him to contend against and uproot ; without success in this respect, that conquest of the mind, on which absolute freedom from fear depends, ³ may not be attained. It is recognized that the eradication of these impressions is as difficult as the emptying of the sea, drop by drop with a blade of grass⁴ ; but this should spur the *sādhaka* to intense effort, rather than induce a sense of despondency and frustration. The effort called for is directed to the cultivation of mental states opposed to the distracting and degrading states of lust, anger, and greed.⁵ This is, in fact, a process of sublimation effected by the knowledge of the Advaitic truth of identity or non-dual reality.

Again the *tattvajñāna* consists in the reasoned conviction that the Self alone is real, the objective manifold being only an appearance, *mithyā* in the sense explained. As already mentioned above, this conviction serves to discipline the natural impulses. Attenuated impressions and knowledge of reality also aid each other.⁶ Further, when the mind is tranquillized, external objects cease to rouse the latent impressions of the mind and they get more and more attenuated. In their turn, the attenuated impressions tend to keep the mind tranquillized. And, the knowledge of reality

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1. The three syllabus 'a', 'u' & 'm' are symbolic of the three states of waking, dream and sleep, each being less gross than the previous and as such the cause of it. All the three are, as objects of knowledge, on the same level. Cf. CIP. P. 325. In the meditation the idea followed is to merge the grosser state in the subtler.
 2. KU. IV, 1.
 3. Cf. *manaso nighāyattambhayam sarvayoginām*. GPK. III, 40.
 4. GPK. III, 41.
 5. Vide BG. XVI, 21.
 6. Cf. *yāvanna vāsanānāśastāvattattvāgamah kutah | yāvanna tattvasamprāptirna:āvadvāsanākṣayah ||* Qd. JMV. P. 205.

guards the mind from straying away into the world of objects and getting distracted; also it leads the *sādhaka* to see the Self in foes, friends and one's own body - thus it nips anger, etc., in the bud.¹ We have already discussed how *sāma* conditions the dawn of knowledge of the real.²

In order to secure these three indispensable means to *Jīvanmuktī*, the *sādhaka* must exert himself. It is here that courage and initiative are called for. Even in the earlier stage of *vividiṣāsannyāsa*, these three means are needed: but there knowledge of reality was the chief goal. In the second stage, the tranquillization of mind and the attenuation of its impressions are the main objective. Hence all the three may be simultaneously practised with but a shift of emphasis. Practice of knowledge consists in pondering over it, expounding it, exhorting one another to follow it and oneself loyally following it.³ The matter may be expressed differently also. *Jīvanmuktī* may be attained through the displacement of the demoniac traits in human nature,⁴ like hypocrisy, vanity, pride, anger, etc., by the divine traits such as fearlessness, purity of mind and so forth. The latter may be acquired through striving to cultivate a detached mind. A detached mind is trained to be sufficient upto itself by snapping all its artificial ties with the world of objects:— for, *muktyai nirviṣay-aṁmanah*.⁵ Attenuation of impressions removes the milder form

1. Cf. ripaubandhaṁ svadeheca samaikāgryaṁ prapaśyataḥ | vivekinah kutaḥ kopah svadehāvayaveṣviva || Vārt. Qd. JMV. P. 207.
2. Vide PP. 455-6 *Supra*. The attempt to secure saintly perfection by means of the three factors mentioned in the text is no doubt thorough; but its effectiveness may be considerably enhanced by providing for action in the world outside, in society, to match the mental states. To conquer anger, etc., the cultivation of opposite states as yoga teaches or brahmavihāra as Buddha teaches is effective; but still more effective will be the service of love extended to fellow beings. It is here that the Neo-vedāntic school of Vivekananda has made a vital contribution to Advaitic ethics.
3. Vide FN. 2. Loyally following knowledge must mean carrying it out in one's relations with fellow-beings or acts dictated by the conviction of unity of Self. That, of course, means service of man in the knowledge that man is God disguised. Cf. Vivekānanda on this theme.
4. Vide BG. XVI, 4, and 1-3.
5. Mai. U. VI, 34.

of bondage due to the demoniac traits ; but the tranquillization of mind obliterates bondage in all its forms. Still the need for the attenuation of impressions will remain as a bulwark against the mind's agitations due to *prārabdha karma*, acts that have already started to bear fruits.¹

(vi) The Final Means to Liberation.

What is the final means that yields *mukti* or the intuition of identity between *Ātman* and *Brahman*? Is it mind or is it word? There is no unanimity on the answer to this interesting question in the schools of Advaita. There are upaniṣadic passages like '*manasaivedam āptavyam*',² which point to mind as the final means of realization. True, there are also passages like '*yanmanasā namanute*',³ '*aprāpyamanasāsaha*'⁴ which seem to deny it. But these negations may refer only to immature or untrained minds. On the other hand, there are also upaniṣadic passage which make out that *śabda* or the word of the upaniṣads is the immediate means of liberation.⁵ These latter cannot be explained away as just teaching that the word of the upaniṣads and of the enlightened teacher aid the mind in intuiting the Self. But if the word were competent to yield the integral knowledge of the Self, why are *manana* and *nidihyāsaṇa* enjoined after *śravaṇa*? As explained above, the two latter steps are meant to strengthen *śravaṇa* and prove effective when the dawn of knowledge is obstructed by *adharma* and *dharma*.⁶ Mind, on the other hand is not established as an independent means of direct perception. E.g., it does not function as such in regard to the *Ātman* which is self-luminous, or in regard to pleasure, etc., which are intuited by the witness-intelligence.⁷ Mind, of course, may fervently imagine; but it is well-known that imagination does not yield objectively valid knowledge.⁸ But on the other hand, upaniṣadic word

1. Vide P. 70 supra.

2. KU. IV, 11.

3. KeU. I, 5 ;

4. TU. III, 4.

5. Vide CU. VI, 16, 3 - *taddhāsyavijajñau* ; VII, - 262 *tamasah param darsayati Sanatkumārah*.

6. Vide BS. III, 4, 51.

7. AS. P. 876.

8. TP. P. 336 ; VKL. P. 70.

yields valid knowledge for its consequence, the sundering of the knots of the heart, 'the dispelling of all doubts' and 'the attaining of eternal enlightenment' ¹ is proof of its validity. Nor can this view of the validity of the word be refuted by an inference such as: Word is not the cause of immediate cognition because it is word. The reason adduced here is seen to be groundless in the light of the 'parable of the ten men'. ² 'Thou art the tenth' addressed to deluded man produces instantaneous enlightenment. In this example it is not the eye which engenders immediate cognition; for the same result follows in darkness also. ³

This view of the sole competence of the word to yield immediate cognition of the Self is traditionally associated with the *Vivaraṇa* school. ⁴ But *Vācaspati* holds that word can yield only mediate knowledge and mind alone, through *prasaṅkhyāna* or deep meditation, is the direct means of immediate intuition. ⁵ He says: the intuition or *sākṣātkāra* aimed at is that of '*tvam*' as identical with '*tat*'. Only thus can the empirical nature of *tvam*, as the subject of sufferings, of erroneous cognition and the agent of wrong actions be abolished. Now, the word together with investigation, *mīmāṃsāsahitā* cannot yield intuition; only perception is competent to do it. Hence, the mind or *antaḥkaraṇa*, matured by reflection on the sense of the major text *tattvamasi*, produces the intuition of identity. This experience is not the nature of the Self; for, then, it could not have been effected. It is only a specific modification of the inner organ, having Brahman for its object. To make Brahman the object of *vṛtti* does not mean that Brahman is not self-luminous. Even the word, according to the former view, is held to reveal the self.

1. MuU. II, 2, 8; CU. VII, 26, 2.

2. Vide NKS. III, 64-71. This refers to the parable of ten slow-witted men crossing a stream and checking up their number to make sure that all are safe. Each tries to count up, but finds only nine as he leaves himself out. Seeing them all weeping at the presumed loss of a companion, a kind wayfarer tells each: You are the tenth. Each gets the immediate conviction: 'I am the tenth'.

3. AS. P. 876.

4. Vide VPS. P. 128;

5. In this, too, *Vācaspati* was indebted to Maṇḍana, vide. Introduction to BS. PP. XXVIII-XXIX.

luminous Brahman.' The fact is that the final *vr̥tti*, of the mind objectifies, not Self or Brahman in its absoluteness, but as qualified by that very *vr̥tti* which, however, is competent to abolish all *upādhis* including itself.¹ The *Kalpataru* on this passage explains: the function of the final *vr̥tti* is to intuit Brahman as entirely unconditioned or *nirupādhi*. It will, therefore, abolish itself, for it also is an *upādhi*. In itself it carries the cause of its own abolition. Thus it follows that Brahman as conditioned by the final self-sublating *vr̥tti* is the object of the latter.²

The consensus of views among Advaitic thinkers, however, is in favour of the former position that 'śabda' or the upaniṣadic word is the immediate means of Brahman-realization.³ The power to yield immediate knowledge is confined to the word which declares identity with 'the thou' when that with which 'thou' is declared to be identical is fit for perception.⁴

The final *vr̥tti* induced by the Upaniṣadic word, viz., 'tattvamasi'⁵ may be regarded as either true or false,⁶ *satya* or *mithyā* for, what sublates *avidyā*, the material cause of the objective manifold, is *caitanya* or consciousness, manifested in the immediately cognitive mode of the mind. *Vr̥tti* itself is not regarded as the cause of the sublation just as in *Nyāya*, the being a rod, *daṇḍatva*, is not deemed a cause of the pot.⁷ Though the determinant of consciousness, the *vr̥tti* is not real; what is determined, viz., consciousness, is, and so, the sublation of nescience may very well be effected.⁸ Or, in as much as

1. tasyaivatadūpadhervinas' yadvasthasya svapararūpōpādhivirodhino vidyamānatvāt. Bhāmātī on S'B. P. 31;
2. evaṃca nānupahitasya viṣayatā na copādhernivartakāntarāpekṣā. Kalpataru on the above, P. 29.
3. Vide Introduction to NKS. P. XXVI;
4. yogyapadārthanirūpitatvampadārthābhedaparaśabdatvenāparokṣajñānanajanakatā. VKL. P. 78;
5. pūrvavadeva vedāntavākyena janitā akhaṇḍavākyaarthaviśayāvr̥ttiḥ. Ibid. P. 91;
6. Ibid. P. 50. natatrobhayatrāpi doṣaṃ pas'yāmah;
7. Ibid.
8. An example of a superimposed and, as such, 'false' entity leading to valid cognition is length or shortness, qualities of *dhvani*, being superimposed on vowels which are devoid of them and eternal; still as 'long' or 'short' vowels yield correct cognition. vide VKL. P. 51.

this *vr̥tti* has empirical reality (and that is the meaning of being *mīthyā* or false), it also may be held to abolish nescience.¹ Even as but empirically real, the final *vr̥tti*, considered as knowledge, is valid; for in Advaita validity of knowledge consists in its having an object which is not sublated,² and Brahman, the object of the final *vr̥tti* is unsublated, being the sole reality.³

The final *jñāna* which liberates is indeterminate or *niṣprakāra*.⁴ But as such, can it sublate nescience? Yes; for its content is the substrate, *adhiṣṭhāna*, of the entire superimposed world, viz., the pure consciousness. Since this substrate is in reality indeterminate, the right knowledge of it also, of course, is indeterminate. Also, the object of the error whose consequence is bondage is this indeterminate consciousness or Brahman; hence it is natural that its right knowledge or *pramā* should sublate the error and abolish the objective manifold, caused by the error. The Advaitic indeterminate cognition is vitally different from the *nirvikalpaka jñāna* of the *Naiyāyikas*; for, this latter is merely an object of inference, while the former is immediate⁵ awareness.

Can Brahman, devoid of all attributes, become an object of the final *vr̥tti*? Madhusūdana's reply is that while Brahman is not an object of final *jñāna*, this *jñāna* has as its object Brahman.⁶ This seems to be a distinction without a difference and one's understanding is not helped when it is added that the relation between Brahman and the final cognition

1. *ataeva.....pramāṇajanyāparokṣāntaḥkaraṇavṛttirevājñānanāśakatvāṅgikāre pinadoṣaḥ. Ibid;*
2. *abādhitārthajñānaviśayatvaṃ prāmāṇyaprayojakam. VKL. P. 52;*
3. The fact that an empirical *vr̥tti* yields valid cognition may be elucidated with reference to *samvādhībhrama* – i.e., a delusion which culminates in a fruitful result; e.g., the mistaking the light of a gem for the gem itself leads to attainment of the gem, vide PA. P. 245 and VKL. P. 52;
4. Vide PP. 400 ff. supra.
5. VKL. PP. 56-57.
6. *Brahmaṇo jñānaviśayatāyā asambhavepi jñānasyabrahma-viśayatāvartate. Ibid. P. 58;*

is indeterminable, . *anirvacanīyam*.¹ In his Advaitasiddhi,² Madhusūdāna has a more straight forward answer. He says there that the final mode is in itself false, being a transformation of *avidyā*; but, in the final cognition, the mode does not enter as an object; only pure consciousness is cognized. Brahmānanda's note on this clarifies the matter. He admits that the very idea of cognizing pure consciousness is illusory; but he denies that the final cognition is incompetent to abolish all illusions. Pertinently, he points out that ignorance relates only to Brahman as conditioned by that very ignorance, not to pure, unqualified, Brahman, beyond all conceivable relations. And, to remove this ignorance, cognition of the Brahman conditioned by *this* ignorance is of course competent.³ When the Advaitin talks of *brahmākārāvṛtti*, he means only the final mode of mind having as its object Brahman, of course, as said above, conditioned by this very mode.⁴ This conditioning or objectification of Brahman would not make it inert as a pot, etc, which are also objectified by the modes of the mind; because to make of something an inert object, it has got to have no more degree of reality than the mode itself.⁵ But, of course, while the mind's mode is empirical only, Brahman is metaphysically real. Or, it may be held that what constitutes inertness or materiality is the being an object of consciousness, as a pot, e.g., is.⁶ This position is sounder, according to Madhusūdāna, than the normal view that *phalavyāpyatā*⁷ is what constitutes inertness. Now, by '*phala*' or fruit is meant consciousness manifested in the mind's mode engendered by a means of valid cognition.⁸ Since mental states like

1. anyadevavā kiṃcid anirvacanīyam. Ibid;
2. [P. 886. upahitasyaviśayatve'pi upādheraviśayatvenābhramatvāt.
3. bhramatvamātramāpādyate, ajñānanivartakatāvirodhibhramatvamvā. tatraśvopahitaviśayakājñānaṃ pratisvopahitavi-jñānasyaiva nivartakatvenopahitaviśayakatvarūpabhramatvamīṣṭam. LC. P. 886.
4. viśayataivacākṛāḥ VKL. P. 58;
5. svasamānasattākaviśayatāyā eva karmatvāpādakatvāt. Ibid. P. 59;
6. athavācāitanyavisayataiva jādātvpāpadiḥ. Ibid.
7. Cf. phalavyāpyatvamevāsya śāstrakṛtibhīrnivāritam | Brahmanyajñāna nās'āyavṛttivyaptirapekṣitā || Qd. VKL. P. 59.
8. pramāṇajanyāntaḥkaraṇāvṛttyabhihiyaktacāitanyasyaiva'sāstre phalatvavyapades'āt. Ibid;

pleasure are directly intuited by the witness consciousness without being illumined by the *vṛtti*-manifested consciousness, these states too, like Brahman must be deemed non-material - a view which Advaitins reject. Hence, materiality must be taken to consist in being the object of consciousness, and its being a mere object of the final *vṛtti* would not make Brahman material.

In the first moment after the rise of *brahmākārāvṛtti*, as the result of the operation of the upaniṣadic word, *tattvamasi* well grasped, both *vṛtti* and the mind are illumined by the witness-consciousness; still, it retains its character as indeterminate having for its content indeterminate consciousness. This is the state of *pramāṇaphala* or the fruit of the operation of the word or the *pramāṇa*. In the next moment, the mode, made potent through its grasp of consciousness, abolishes the nescience regarding pure consciousness as such, just as the mental mode which objectifies the rope abolishes nescience in regard to it. Next follows the cancellation of the superimposition of distinctions such as egoity, *Jīva*, Brahman, etc., for, with the abolition of their material cause, viz., nescience, these distinctions must also be nullified. Next, or, at the same time as the former event, the final mode, whose content is consciousness, is cancelled, for, it also is a product of nescience. Thus is accomplished the final cessation of all kinds of superimpositions such as the body, etc., on pure consciousness. The final upshot of this entire process is the self-abidance of pure consciousness without distinctions of *Jīva* and *Īśvara* and world¹; for, nescience and its products have been dispelled without residue. And this is the state of *mukti* or liberation.

(vii) The Nature and Status of the Cessation or *Nivṛtti* of Nescience.

The cessation of *avidyā* also raises some problems. What is its nature and implication? The cessation of *avidyā*, i.e., of the entire objective manifold, has been variously interpreted by Advaitic thinkers. The negation of the world, according to Maṇḍana, is the great truth to be learned which only Vedānta

1. Vide PP. 254-255, supra.

texts can teach. He holds that the reality of this negation does not conflict with the sole reality of Brahman; for, he upholds what has been styled *bhāvādvaita* or *sādadvaita*, translated as *ensmonism*.¹ Therefore, a negative reality like the cessation of *avidyā* does not affect his *bhāvādvaita* in any way. It is secure so long as there does not exist by the side of Brahman a second positive reality. *Avidyānivr̥tti* is real in the sense that it is not annulled by the realization of absolute and pure consciousness.

The author the *Iṣṭasiddhi* seems to hold two views on this question: (i) He treats *avidyānivr̥tti* as a fifth indefinable category; for it is not real or *sat*; or non-real or *asat*; or both, being self-contradictory; or *anirvacanīya* i.e., neither real nor unreal. It cannot be the last because, then, as we saw above,² it would be sublated by the valid cognition of Brahman, and, as a result, the reality of the world would follow. (ii) *Vimuktātman* also reduces *avidyānivr̥tti* to the substrate of the objective manifold, viz., *Ātman* or Brahman.³

Ānandabodha, the author of the *Nyāyamakaranda* favours the view that *avidyānivr̥tti* belongs to the fifth category as explained. But according to Citsukha, his commentator, Ānandabodha's own view is that the status of *avidyānivr̥tti* is *anirvacanīya*.⁴

In his work the *Tarkaprādīpikā*, Citsukha criticises *Vimuktātman* and Ānandabodha and maintains that, strictly, Advaita must equate *avidyānivr̥tti* with pure consciousness.⁵

Madhusūdana and Brahmananda also reject the view which assigns to *avidyānivr̥tti* the status of a fifth category⁶ and lend support to the position of Citsukha.⁷

1. Vide Introdn. to Br.S. P. XLI.

2. Vide PP. 384. ff. supra.

3. Vide Introdn. Br.S. P. XLIII.

4. Nyāyamakaranda P. 357. Ch.SS. 1907.

5. *nivr̥ttirātmāmohasyajñātātvenopalakṣitaḥ*; TP. P. 382.

6. *vastutastvavidyānivr̥tteḥ pañcamaparakāratvam..... anabhy-upagamaparāhatam*. AS. P. 467.

7. *Caramavṛttyupalakṣitasyaātmanōjnānahānirūpatvāt*. Ibid; P.884.

That *avidyānivṛtti* implies the abolition of everything other than Self follows from the upaniṣadic teaching of 'neti' 'neti' ¹ and it may be identified either with the ever accomplished nature of the Self or with the final *vṛtti* whose object is the Self.²

What does the cessation of *avidyā* imply? The fact that it ceases is natural; for, as we insisted, *avidyā* or bondage is essentially other than real and so, in the light of the realization of the sole reality of pure consciousness, it vanishes like the rope-snake. The *Nyāyaratnāvali*, using technical language describes the cessation as: *drśyādhikarāṇakṣaṇe drśyādhikarāṇakṣaṇapūrvatvānādhikarāṇatvaṇ drśyocchedaḥ*.³ This means that as soon as the final mode of Self-intuition rises, there is an experience of a total stepping out of the stream of time; the time consciousness with its past, present and future and the relations of before and after completely vanishes. "There is a liberation from the alien that besets us here".⁴ Further it signifies that *avidyānivṛtti*, from the point of view of the Saint who experiences it, is not an effect produced by the operation of certain causes. It is realized as an eternal variety.⁵ For the Advaitin, operation of grace is just this experience of the uncaused or eternal variety of Self-realization.⁶ But from outside the experience, it seems to be something effected and so may be dated.⁷ Madhusūdana thus remarks that in as far as the final *vṛtti* is to be effected, *mukti* also may be said to be so. The world and the three-fold *sādhana* in it are real enough to bring about the final *vṛtti* which sets the seal of sainthood on the *sādhaka*; with this accomplished, the world,

1. Ibid. P. 885.

2. *ajñānahānirātma-varūpaṃ tadākāravṛttirivā*. Ibid.

3. SB. P. 12.

4. Ennead VI, XI, 10-11. Qd. Religion & the Modern World. W. T. Stace, London, 1953.

5. Within that single moment of time are enclosed all eternity, and infinity. Hence Blake :

To see the world in a grain of sand, And Heaven in a wild flower; Hold infinity on the palm of your hand, And eternity in an hour. Qd. Time and Eternity, PP. 76 ff.

6. SB. on KU. II, 23.

7. If the divine moment is looked at from outside, it will have natural causes of some kind. Time & Eternity, P. 88.

i.e., *avidyā* ceases for the saint ; for him, in full possession of his deepest reality as pure Consciousness,

“like the baseless fabric of the vision
The cloud-capped towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve;
And like this unsubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a rack behind ”.¹

The Saint has crossed the bridge of the world ; its full value as wholly *Ātman* is a matter of indubitable experience for him.² He has entered into the state of *turiya* consciousness. “ The fourth, say the wise, is not subjective experience, nor objective experience, nor experience intermediate between the two, nor is it a negative condition which is neither consciousness nor unconsciousness. It is not the knowledge of the sense, nor is it relative knowledge, nor yet inferential knowledge. Beyond the senses, beyond the understanding, beyond all expression is the fourth. It is the pure unitary consciousness wherein awareness of the world and of multiplicity is completely obliterated. It is ineffable peace. It is the supreme Good. It is one without a second. It is the Self ”.³ The path of ‘*Neti*’ ‘*Neti*’ or stripping away all that is unspiritual culminates in the paradoxical experience of *sarvam khalvidam Brahma* - all this is Brahman. This is the state of liberation or repose in one’s own greatness and freedom.⁴

1. Temp. Act. I, Scene 1;

2. Vide. PP. 387-388 Supra.

3. MU. 7. Translation by Svami Prabhavananda & F. Manches-ter, Qd. by Stace. Religion and the Modern World PP. 246-47 ;

4. *svenarūpenābhiniṣpadyate* ; CU. VIII, 12, 3.

CHAPTER VII

MUKTI OR DELIVERANCE

(i) Mukti as general concept in Advaita.

In the previous chapter we saw that as a result of the *brahmākārāvṛtti*, the final modification of the purged mind or *agryābuddhi*, the *sādhaka* realizes his identity with pure consciousness. This self-realization has been styled *turiya* or the Fourth relatively to the phenomenal states of wakefulness, dream, and sleep, though as pointed out earlier,¹ it is not a state among states, but the impartite and infinite consciousness or the Advaitic Absolute itself. The recognition of one's integrity as pure consciousness is deliverance or *Mukti* in Advaita, whose nature and implications we shall set forth in this chapter.

We shall begin with Śaṅkara's definition of deliverance. "That which is absolutely real, immutable, eternal, all penetrating like *ākāśa*, exempt from all change, ever-satisfied, impartite, self-luminous; in which neither good nor evil nor effect, nor past nor present nor future has any place - this incorporeal state is called deliverance."² From this it is clear that for Śaṅkara the state of deliverance is ontologically identical with Brahman or the Absolute;³ for, it is the *paramārtha* or what has *sattva*, defined as *trikālābādhyatva*⁴. The point of characterizing *mukti* as *kūṭasthanitya* or immutable is to stress its contrast from what, though changeable, remains recognizable as the same, viz., the *parināminitya*,⁵ such as

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1. Vide p. 354 supra.
 2. *idamtu pāramārthikam kūṭasthanityam vyomavatsarvavyāpi sarvavikriyārahitam nityatṛptam niravayavam svayamjyotiḥ-svabhāvam |*
yatra dharmādharmau sahakāryeṇa kālatrayam ca nopāvar-
tete; tadetadaśarīratvam mokṣākhyam ||
ŚB. PP. 73-74.
 3. *brahmaivahi muktyavasthā*. ŚB. p. 823.
 4. Vide p. 381, supra.
 5. *kūṭasthanityamiti nirvartyakarmatāmapākaroti*. Bhā. on ŚB. p. 73.

a river or the *guṇās* of the *Saṃkhyas*. Further, it underlines the truth that *mukti* is not an effect, produced from a collocation of causes, and, as such, ephemeral. The comparison of *mukti* with *ākāśa* is only by a concession to the prevailing view that the latter is eternal, whereas, in Advaita, *ākāśa* also is transient being a product.¹ Also, it serves to suggest the freedom from all obstacles that *mukti* denotes. That *mukti* is not a remote goal in space to be reached by actual physical movement, as the traditional heaven of dualistic creeds is, is denoted by the adjective all-pervading.² The absolute security and finality of the state of *mukti* is meant by describing it as *sarvavikriyārahitam*, exempt from all change. As all changes we know or conceive of fall within the sphere of phenomena, exemption from changes confers on *mukti* its noumenal and spiritual status, a truth further stressed by its characterization as *niravayavam* or impartite. Its eternally blissful nature, which lifts it above the realm of all activities and achievements, is expressed by the adjective, *nityatrptam*, ever satisfied.³ *Trpti* in fact implies independance or *anapckṣatvam*, and freedom from all grief, even bliss, *viśokam sukhām vā* ⁴. The autonomous bliss that is *mukti* alone possesses an intrinsic value of its own, because, at the same time, it is *svayam jyotiḥ svabhāvam*, viz., consciousness. It does not require to be illumined by a light other than its own.⁵ Nor does *mukti* fall within the sphere of ethics with its empirical distinctions of good and evil. It transcends both; for, these ethical distinctions obviously presuppose conflict of wills, purposes and plurality which find no place in the noumenal realm of the non-dual reality. As it is not located in space, so too, *mukti* does not fall within time.⁶ It is the eternity of which time is the moving image. In its essence, *mukti* is a state of freedom from embodiedness, *aśarīratā*. "Him who is the bodiless among bodies, stable among the unstable, the great, all-pervading

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1. TU. II, ātmanaākāśah saṃbhūtaḥ; also vide Bhā. S'B. p. 73.
 2. sarvavyāpīti prāpyakarmatāmapākaroti, Ibid.
 3. phalānapekṣatvānnaphalārthāpi kariyā. RP. on ŚB. p. 73.
 4. Ibid.
 5. sukhām cāpratīyamānam na puruṣārtha ityata āha svayam jyotirīti; Bhā. SB. p. 73.
 6. vide, kālātīte vilasati padesvātmakanṭhīravonah, SS.III, 40.

Ātman, - on recognizing Him, the wise man sorrows not”¹ or, as long as one is subject to embodiment, i.e., deems oneself a finite being confined to one’s body, one cannot but suffer from the flux of emotions and be exposed to the hazards incidental to embodiment.² The final liberating knowledge consists in abolishing, once for all, the illusory, but nonetheless, effective, sense of such embodiment. The realization of the saint is not only that *now* he is no more confined to the finite organism, and in future will not be, but also that at no time was he so confined. His is the realization of the timeless reality of absolute consciousness. *Mukti* is the state in which one’s hunger for the Infinite is quenched. “Due exclusively to the right knowledge born of the major text *tattvamasi*, one sees that nescience with its manifold effects (such as embodiments, &c.) was not, is not, and will be not”.³ This conclusion follows from the nature of *avidyā* as *anirvacanīya*.⁴ It was pointed out,⁵ that the concept of *māyā* essentially names and forms (*nāmarūpe*) has far-reaching significance in Advaita. That significance may be appreciated in the light of the conclusion that the knowledge of Brahman, the substratum of the objective manifold, abolishes without residue both *avidyā* and its effects. The significance of the *mithyātva* or falsity of the world, too, is no other. The various meanings of the term *mithyātva*, we stressed,⁶ add up to the truth that ‘the empirical validity of the world of plurality holds good till one’s identity with Brahman is experienced in the fullest measure’. Now that such realization has been won by the sage and mystic, the superimposed world of objects including his ego collapses, leaving nothing except the timeless reality of pure consciousness. The clouds of nescience lift and the eternal sun of reality shines forth without let or hindrance. This experience of the shining forth of the eternal truth is

1. KU. II, 22 ; MuU. II, 1, 2 ; IV. 3, 15.

2. na vai saṣṭarjasya sataḥ priyāpriyayorapahatirasti - CU. VIII, 12, 1.

3. tattvamasyādivākyotthasamyagadhījanmamātrataḥ |
avidyā saḥakāryena nāsidasti bhaviṣyati ||
BV. I. 183.

4. vide. p. 316. supra.

5. vide pp. 312-315 supra.

6. vide. pp. 383. ff. especially p. 386.

affirmed in the proposition "*ahambrahmāsmi*"¹, called the, *anubhavavākya*, the appropriate response to the *upadeśavākya*, *tattvamasi*. The climactic experience in the search for perfection may, with equal validity, be described as the gaining of one's Self or Ātman, the *ātmalābha*. True, one's Self is always there, and a real alienation therefrom is unimaginable. Still, due to the confusion born of *avidyā*, possession of Self is not effective; its vision is not unclouded. It is more like a treasure buried deep under the products of *avidyā*. *Sādhana*, discussed in the previous chapter, consisted in dispelling these clouds or digging up this treasure - *yasmin viśuddhe vibhavaty eṣa ātmā*.² This removal of the illusion of the loss of one's Self and its virtual recovery through right knowledge or *samyagdarśana* has been likened to that of an ornament worn on the body, but feared to have been lost, when some one draws one's attention to it.

The state of nescience which enshrouds the Ātman is the sphere of plurality.³ Due to *samyagdarśana*, the perception of plurality vanishes for good. The sphere of the many in which the Self is, as it were, asleep⁴ is abolished, when the Self wakes up and fills its place. No kind of empirical activity based on the subject-object dualism is any longer possible for the awakened Self, for, now, it has attained the consciousness of being the Self of all, *sarvātmabhāva* or *brahmabhāva*.⁵ It is a universalization of the consciousness of identity, a perception of all things as Brahman.⁶ This is the essence of the celebrated expression *prapañcaprivilaya* or *prapañcopaśama*. In experiencing the Self as the Self of all, indeed, as all, there is total

1. BU. I, 4, 10.

2. MuU. II, 1, 9 ; also cf. MuU. III, 1, 8.

3. *yatra hidvaitamivadhavati tad itara itaraṃ paśyati*, &c. BU. IV. 5, 15.

4. GPK. I, 16 - *anādimāyayā supto yadā jivāḥ prabuddhyate | ajamanidramasvapnam advaitaṃ buddhyate tadā ||*

5. cf. *tad etad paśyannṛṣir Vāmadevaḥ pratipede iti brahmadarśanasarvātmabhāvayorekakālatvanirdeśāt*. pp. P. 1095 CSS. No. 1.

6. cf. *evambrahmātmatayā triśukāleṣvavisiṣṭaṃ tadvyatirek-eṣāgrahanāt*. S'B on C.U. III, 14, 1. MuU. II. 2, 18. *sarvaṃ, brahmeti tu sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ prapañcaprivilāpanārtham. nānekarasatāpratipādanārtham*. S'B. p. 206 cf. also BU. IV. 5, 13.

negation of the manifold in the very substrate, where formerly it appeared - the *adhiṣṭhānariṣṭhāntaśhāso* ~~of~~ ^{OF MADRAS, MADRAS} *dvaitam*.¹ Such is the effect of converting what was, in the state of *sādhana*, only an intellectual view into an indubitable experience; in other words it is the implication of the growth of the philosopher into the saint and mystic. After the dawn of knowledge, says S'aṅkara,² in all states of life the conviction matures:— 'I am the world-all'. On the contrary the perception of the slightest difference from the absolute Self, even to the extent of a hair's end, *bālāgramāttramapi*, is nescience or *avidyā*.

That by *prapañcayavilaya* is meant this transfiguration of the world into the substance of the Self, its perception and evaluation by the *mukta* as pure consciousness or spirit, has been argued at length by S'aṅkara.³ The dissolution of the objective manifold is of course not a physical process - like the melting of butter in fire. It can only be the translation, by means *vidyā*, into Brahman of the world of names and forms, the product of nescience, just as the plurality of moons, a product of defective eye-sight, is changed into the right perception by means of proper cure. No man can literally demolish the empirical world, of course; were it possible through deliverance, the first *mukta* would have accomplished it.

Samyagdarśana or the saving knowledge of the Ātman does not and cannot imply making the Ātman an object of the act of knowing.⁴ On the contrary, Ātman is experienced as the seer of seeing, *drṣṭerdrasṭā*.⁵ This experience, in its turn, does not require to be further cognized. Once it is realized that the knowledge of the knower is eternal, no further knowledge in regard to the knower is desiderated. For, one can seek to know only what is other than one's Self. One's Self is always known, or rather, the very being of the Self is consciousness. The sun surely should not require a torch to see itself.⁶ The inevitability

1. cf. Definition of *mithyātvam* p. 382

2. *ahamevedam sarvo'smītimanyate* - BU. IV. 3, 20.

3. vide S'B. on BS. III, 2, 21, p. 649.

4. cf. *vijñātāramarekena vijānīyāt*? BU. II, 4, 14.

5. BU. IV, 3, 23.

6. *na cadraṣṭurnityaiva drṣṭirityevam vijñāte draṣṭṛviṣayam drṣṭimanyāmākāmṣeta ... na ca svarūpaviṣayākāmṣā svasyaiva*, S'B. on BU. 1, 4, 10.

of deliverance due to *samyagdarsana* is affirmed as follows: "Whoso knows the true ātman itself as assuredly as (in the undelivered state) he takes the body to be the Self and so as to sublimate this latter perception, will, despite himself, be delivered." ¹

Śaṅkara employs a parable to illustrate the truth about the Advaitic doctrine of *mukti*.² "A prince, soon after his birth, is abducted and brought up by a hunter in the forest. He leads the life of a hunter totally ignorant of his real identity. Later, upon attaining manhood, he feels a novel and noble spirit striving within himself, and there grows a sense of total estrangement from his immediate environments. Now it happens that a kind and trustworthy courtier from his father's court meets him and reveals to him his royal status. His artificial and unbecoming status as a hunter falls off, and he just recognizes his innate royalty". Such is the nature of the realization of Brahmanhood by the *jīva*. The knowledge of Brahman or *samyagdarsana* implies only the shedding of false imaginings by the *jīva*; so far only may it be regarded as a result of right cognition.³

Mukti, understood as a recognition of the Self's identity with Brahman, is no bare identity as some have apprehended⁴. In fact, as pointed out before, it is identical with Brahman and all its fullness, *pūrṇatā*, and richness of contents is there to make it the highest value and goal of life. In discussing Brahman as *Satyam*, *Jñānam*, and *Anantam*, both in its *nirguṇa* and *saguṇa* aspects we pointed out at some length that Brahman is not less, but immeasurably more, than the contents of these expressions. The incapacity of the empirical mind to grasp the contents of the Absolute is of course no excuse for it to condemn Brahman as 'bare'. The sole

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1. dehātma jñānavaj jñānam dehātma jñānabādhakam |
ātmanyeva bhavedyasya sanecchannapi mucyate ||
US. IV. 5
 2. S'B. on BU. II, 1, 20. also vide BV II. pp. 970-972.
 3. GPK. IV, 93 - ādiśāntābhyanutpannāḥ prakṛtyaiva sunirvṛ-
tāḥ |
sarve dharmāḥ samābhinnā..... S'ankara comments on this :
tasmācchāntirmokṣovānās tikartavyaitarthāḥ.
 4. Vide PV. P. 480

purpose of the texts on creation, we said, is just to emphasize the *pūrṇatā* of Brahman, the source of the world. What is achieved in *mukti* is the perception of this very world in its essential character as Brahman or the apprehension of its value as Brahman.

‘The original sin’ involved in bondage and imputable to the *Jīva* is the affirmation of ‘I will’ - an expression of the finitude of the *Jīva* seeking to expand against obstacles¹. Right knowledge, at one stroke, abolishes this finitude, together with the sense of opposition from alien entities. The significance of predicating Brahmanhood of *Ātman* may be stressed in this connection. Advaita teaches the deliverance of *jīva*; it is a perception by *ātman*, in *ātman*, and of *Ātman*, *ātmanā*, *ātmani*, *ātmānam*.² The obscuration of identity of *Ātman* and Brahman afflicts and torments the *jīva* only. So, the revelation of that identity is his most precious gain³. So much is this the fact that for all practical purposes ‘*Ātman* is Brahman’ may be treated as a synthetic judgement. In being Brahman, something of incalculable value has been added to the *Ātman*.⁴ This point may be better appreciated by comparing the Advaitic concept of *Brahmā-tmaikya* with the *kaivalya* of the *yoga* philosophy - a sort of self-deification.

(ii) Varieties of Deliverance.

The final knowledge or *brahmākārāvṛtti* no doubt liberates the body-bound Self into a boundless Self-vision and consciousness of freedom. But this does not always coincide with the disappearance of the body, the erstwhile prison house of the Self. From “the super-vision of *samādhi*, wherein one’s contact with the Infinite is sufficient to make the illusion of all differentiated egos - our own and other men’s - disappear immediately”,⁵ some return to the attenuated shell of the differentiated ego, to the world of relativity. These are said

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1. vide Vedāntic Epistemology, pp. 60-61.
 2. Vide Mysticism, East and West, p. 32.
 3. cf. *yaṁlabdhvā cāparam lābhammanyate nādhikaṁ tataḥ*, &c. BG. VI. 22
 4. vide Mysticism p. 83.
 5. Prophets of New India, p. 45, R. Rolland.

to enjoy the status of deliverance in life or *jīvanmuktī*, and this concept forms one of the most characteristic features of Advaita philosophy. Above we referred to two forms of renunciation, *vividiśāsannyāsa* and *vidvat sannyāsa* as having for their goals *videhamukti* and *jīvanamukti* respectively. Besides these two types, *krma mukti* or gradual deliverance and *sadyomukti* or immediate deliverance are also recognized in Advaita. Before we discuss the characteristics of the liberated Self in life, we shall distinguish these main types of *mukti*.¹

(a) *Sadyomukti* or immediate deliverance is brought about by the knowledge of the Ātman i.e., the realization of pure consciousness.² In his commentary on the *Gītā*, Śaṅkara says that immediate deliverance accrues to those renunciants who have established themselves in *samyagadarśana*.³ The reference here is to those whose happiness is within themselves, who delight within themselves, whose light is within those who are *yogins* and have become one with Brahman. Their sins have all dwindled away; their doubts have all been solved; they have perfect sway over themselves and are intent on promoting the welfare of all living beings. They are free from lust and anger; they have known the self, and are, therefore, delivered both in this life and hereafter.⁴ This conception of deliverance hardly differs from that of *jīvanmukti* as we shall presently see. Logically, *sadyomukti* must be identical with *videhamukti* or

1. The *Sūtasamhitā*, ĀĀ. series No. 25, in its section on deliverance makes a broad distinction between deliverance achieved through knowledge, *jñānaphalabhūta* and that produced by action, *karmaphalabhūta*. The latter is divided into four, *sālokya*, *sāmīpya*, *sārūpya*, and *sāyujya*. The first refers to the sharing by the devotee of the same sphere of which the god he worships is the Lord; the second is the proximity to the goal of liberation won by those who perform the duties of their respective stations in life; the third is the sameness of form with the deities won by the devotees who deem these deities as different from themselves; the last is the unity of the devotee with the deity worshipped. None of these is genuine deliverance; being products of activities, they are all transitory states at best. What the *Samhitā* calls, the *jñānaphalabhūta* alone deserves to be styled *mukti* and that is the central theme of Advaita.
2. *evaṃ sadyomuktikāraṇamapyātmajñānam*, S'B. p. 118.
3. *samyagdarśananiṣṭhānām sannyāsinām sadyomuktiruktā* BGC. p. 276.
4. BG. V. 24-26.

deliverance without embodiment. Both may be alike defined as *jñānaśamakālamukti* - deliverance, simultaneous with the knowledge that saves.¹ That no time may intervene between the dawn of the saving knowledge and deliverance is the sense of several declarations of the *s'ruti*, i.e., the experience of mystics and saints.² Besides, the function of the saving knowledge is to abolish all nescience and its manifold effects.³

(b) *Kramamukti* or gradual deliverance refers to the ultimate freedom from nescience which awaits the *sādhaka* who, due to failure to win the saving knowledge, is obliged to travel to the world of the *kārya* Brahman or *Hiraṇyagarbha*⁴ by the way of the gods or the *devayāna*.⁵ The need for this change

1. *vistāram yadāpaśyati brahmaiva bhayati tadā* BGC. p. 580; and A. Giri on it; *jñānaśamānakālaiva muktiriti sūcyate*. Ibid.
2. cf. *viśīrṇakāryakaraṇobhūtasūkṣmairanāvṛtaḥ | vimuktakarmanigalah sadya eva vimucate || Vākyaṇṭi śl. 51*. Memorial edn. of S'āṅkara's works No. 15, p. 31. also compare : *yathāvidyābrahmaprāptyoḥ samānakālatā śrūyate : Brahmaveda Brahmaivabhavati; ānandaṁ Brahmano vidvāna bibhēti; tadātmānameva vedāham Brahmāsmi*; Bhā, S'B. p. 80
3. NKS. IV. 58, 59;
4. BS. IV. 3. 10.
5. The *Devayāna* also known as *arcirādimārga* starts from the moment of departure from the body. Those who cultivate the *saguṇa vidyā* and certain forms of occult lore like *pañcāgnividya* (cf. CŪ. V, 3-10) are the travellers on this path. The departing *vidvān* or knower of the *saguṇavidyā* (vide S'B p. 868) blessed by the *saguṇa* Brahman dwelling in his heart, moves along the *susumnā* nerve. (RP. S'B. p. 868; also vide CŪ. VIII, 6,6). Irrespective of the time of departure, it is held that the *susumnā* is connected with the sun's rays by means of which the *vidvān* proceeds to his destination. vide BS. IV. 2, 19 & CŪ. VIII, 6, 2. This upward movement is conceived as very fast - "as fast as one can direct one's mind to it he comes to the sun" - CŪ. VIII, 6,5. The details of the path given in different *upanishads* may be synthesized. Vide BS. IV. 3, 1. &c. The following are the stations on the way, so to speak, while actually the references are to the masters of these stations :- the flame, the day, the half month of waxing moon, the six months of the sun's northward movement, the year, the world of gods, the air, the sun, the moon, the lightning, *Varuṇa*, *Indra* and *Prajapati*. vide CŪ. V. 10, 1 & 2. and BS. IV. 3, 2 & 3; these are all construed as living beings 'escorts' or *ativāhikas* who conduct the advancing *vidvān* to the world of Brahman, vide BS. IV, 3, 4;

of place does not, of course, exist for those who have won the knowledge that saves; for as observed above, they are *jñānasamātkīlamuktas* or those who have been delivered at the very moment of enlightenment.¹ But the *sādhakas* who have ardently worshipped *saguṇa* Brahman, i.e., are well-versed in *saguṇavidyās*,² move on to higher stations where they progressively gain competence for the saving knowledge. The movement here, of course, relates only to the *sūkṣmaśarīra* of the *sādhakas* and not to the *Ātman* which is all pervasive³. Besides the worshippers of *saguṇa* Brahman, specialists in occult lore like the *Pañcāgnīvidyā*⁴ are also held competent to travel along the path of Gods.

The followers of the *saguṇa vidyās* are exhorted to let their minds dwell on the objects of their worship till the last moment of their conscious life.⁵ The general principle behind this exhortation is the belief voiced in the *Gītā* that the state of mind in which a person departs from this world determines the nature of the environments amidst which he is reborn;⁶ for this is really a case of the *tatkratunyāya* viz., what one wills with all one's mind and heart, that one gets.⁷ They are helped along the path of the gods by the regents of the stations through which they pass; finally, a non-human guide, *amānavah puruṣah*, conducts them to Brahman.⁸ Of course this Brahman cannot be the non-dual reality or the Advaitic absolute which is accessible only through right knowledge.⁹ The Brahman referred to in *kramamukti* is the *kārya* Brahman, presiding over the

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1. vide *nahyātmaikatvadars'inām apekṣitavyamkimcidasti, tattrānarthikāgatiḥ*. S'B. p. 729.
 2. eg. the *S'āṇḍilyavidyā* CU. III, 14.
 3. vide p. 337, supra, and BS. IV. 2, 8-10
 4. Mention, in this connection, may be made of the *paryāṅka vidyā* (KauU. I, 3 & 4); the *Upakosalavidyā*, CU. 10-15; the *Pañcāgnīvidyā*; Ibid; V, 3-10; and the *daharavidyā*; Ibid, VIII, 1-6;
 5. BS. IV. 1, 12.
 6. BG. VIII, 6 & 10;
 7. CU. III, 14, 1 - *yathākraturasminloke bhavati tathā itah pretya bhavati*.
 8. CU. IV. 15, 5.
 9. *natuparasmin Brahmani gantrtvam gantavyatvam gativā-vaklyapate*, S'B. p. 880.

highest heaven.¹ Still it is called Brahman because the difference between the Absolute and the *kārya* Brahman is solely due to *upādhis* such as thought and light, *manomayatā bhārūpatā*.² In the sphere of *kārya* Brahman the devotees, *saguṇopāsakas*, enjoy a state of quasi-deliverance consisting in heightened powers of enjoyment. That this state is really only an aspect of *saiṃsāra* is fully recognized.³ But enjoyment presupposes a mind and each is held to retain his own mind⁴. On the other hand, they may or may not be embodied.⁵ Without the body and senses they enjoy as in a dream, and with the body, as in wakeful life. What they enjoy depends on their wish. Whatever they wish for, they are supposed to have the power of effectuating and enjoying.⁶ Further, these semi-liberated dwellers in Brahman's world are endowed with the power of multiplying their bodies and ensouling them all to maximize their enjoyments.⁷ Great as are their powers, they cannot exercise the cosmic functions of *kārya Brahman* or *Iśvara*⁸. Their powers and knowledge indeed depend on the Lord who alone is the creator, &c., of the world. Under the supreme sway of the Lord the devotees wield their powers. In respect of enjoyment, both the Lord and the sojourners in the world of Brahman are alike.⁹ Their ultimate destiny is non-return to the lower regions of *samsāra*; ¹⁰ in due course, they also attain immortality.¹¹ But in Advaita, there is only one type of genuine immortality, or *amṛtatva*.¹² Therefore, it is contended

1. BS. IV. 3, 10.
2. *paramēvahi brahma viśuddhopādhisambandham kvacid kaiścid vikāraḍharmair, manomayatvātibhirupāsanaṅyopadiśyamānamapāramitīṣṭhitiḥ* - S'B. p. 881.
3. *Jagadaṣvāryalakṣaṇam samsāragocaram evaphalam*; S'B. p. 889.
4. BS. IV. 4, 10.
5. Ibid; IV. 4, 12.
6. vide CU. VII, 25, 2 & VIII, 1, 6.
7. BS. IV, 4, 15 with S'ankara's comment.
8. BS. IV. 4, 17 *Jagadvyāpāpavarjam, &c.*
9. *bhogamātrasāmyalingācca* - BS. IV, 4, 21.
10. *etenapratipadyamānā imam mānavamāvartam nāvartante* CU. IV. 15, 6.
11. CU. VIII, 6, 6; KU. VI, 6.
12. cf. *tasmātsvarūpānandasya svaprākāśātmarūpiṇah | prāptirmuktirnatatrāsti tāratamyam kathamcana ||* AS. p. 899.

that during their sojourn in the world of Brahman, they develop their fitness for the final illumination. At the time of dissolution of the world of Brahman, together with its Lord, the devotees win final deliverance.¹

This doctrine of gradual deliverance is, strictly speaking, a presumption made by the Advaitic thinkers in order to make sense of the various statements of the upaniṣads regarding the departure of certain type of knowers along the path of the gods, and their non-return to a state of earth-life. Perhaps, here, we have to reckon with an article of ancient faith in a heaven beyond our present habitat, and in life there as the destiny of virtuous and wise souls.² This suggestion is supported by S'aṅkara when he says: "We have to recognize deliverance by stages because the *śruti* teaches movement and non-return"³. It is important to notice that Advaita does not compromise the fundamental principle of deliverance through knowledge alone, even when it subscribes to the faith in *kramamukti*. For Advaita there are two approaches to the Absolute:— (1) directly, through right knowledge; (ii) indirectly, through worship and knowledge of the same Absolute limited by *upādhis* like omniscience, &c., i.e., of *Is'vara*. The concept of *kramamukti* pertains to the second of these approaches; but, even here, unqualified deliverance ensure only from the right knowledge of the Absolute.⁴

(c) Jīvanmukti or Deliverance in Life.

The main result of *brahmākārāvṛtti* is deliverance of the type we distinguished above as *sadyomukti*. Ethically, it entails the destruction of all *karma*, good and bad; for, if either survives the blazing fire of right knowledge, bondage to its results also must continue.⁵ But how can acts already

1. vide S'B. on BS. IV, 3, 10—*Kāryātyayetadadhyakṣeṇa sahātaḥ paramabhidhānāt*.
2. Cf. *saguṇavidyāvīpākasthānam tvetat svargādivadavasthāntaram*—'SB. p. 902.
3. *itthaṁkramamuktiranāvṛtityādiśrutyabhidhānebhyo' bhyupagantavyā*—'SB. p. 881.
4. *tatraivetpannasamyagdarśanāḥ santastadadhyakṣeṇa saha paramapadam pratipadyante*. Ibid.
5. *akartrātmavabodhanimitasya ca karmakṣayasya sukṛtaduḥskṛtayostulyatvāt*—'SB. p. 849. cf. *ksīyante cāsyakarmāṇi*. MuU. II, 2, 8; CU. IV, 14, 3; V. 24, 3.

performed be prevented from producing, their results? The answer is that the capacity of acts to yield their fruits is obstructed by the power of Self-knowledge. The reason why this knowledge obstructs the native capacity of acts to bear their fruits must be sought for in the nature of knowledge itself. The saving knowledge of Self reveals it to be a non-agent, *akartā*. The contents of this knowledge may be thus expressed: I have ever been, and am, and will be Brahman which is neither agent nor experient. I have never been an agent, or experient nor am I such, now, nor ever will be¹. In the light of this immediate realization vanishes at once the illusion of all agency. So, it stands to reason that *karmas*, good and evil, previously superimposed on the self should perish, and that none should, in future, stick to the delivered Self.² Were the agency of the Self at all natural or real, neither it, nor the acts and their consequences could have disappeared on the dawn of knowledge; deliverance would have been unattainable.³ Indeed, Rāmānuja who holds agency of the Self to be real is obliged to impute to *vidyā*,⁴ the magical power of destroying sins through the grace of God.⁵ The Advaita position, on the contrary, entails no appeal to faith. It holds that bondage of the *jīva* consists in its false assumption of agency⁶ and, therefore, deliverance is freedom from such assumption.

An important distinction has, however, to be made. Not all acts and their fruits are burnt up in the fire of right knowledge, though certain scriptural passages may apparently bear such an interpretation.⁷ Only such acts, performed before

1. *pūrvasiddhakartṛtvabhokṛtvaviparītam hi triṣvapikālesvakartṛtvabhokṛtvasvarūpam brāhmāhamasmi, netaḥ pūrvamapikartābhoktā vāhamasāṃ nedanīm nāpi bhaviṣyatkāla iti brahma-vidavagacchati*—'SB. pp. 847-48.
2. *tadadhigama uttarapūrvāghayoraśleṣavināśau tadvyapadeśāt* BS. IV. 1, 13.
3. cf. *nābhuktaṃ kṛtyate karma kalpakotiśatairapi* — Qd. RB. p. 534.
4. For Ramanuja; *vidyā* = Worship of God - *Vedyabhūtaparama-puruṣārādhana-rūpā*. RB. p. 535.
5. Ibid.
6. vide p. 406 supra.
7. MuU. II, 2, 8; BG. IV. 37, BU. IV, 4, 22, &c.

the dawn of the saving knowledge, will be consumed as have not begun to bear their fruits - *anārabdhakārya eva tupūrve tadavadheh*.¹ Acts which have brought about the present life of the right knower, or *vidvān*, remain unaffected.² Why? By the inherent power of Brahman-knowledge, as explained above, all actions, being based on nescience only, must be abolished alike. In reply, Śaṅkara remarks that the dawn of right knowledge itself can be understood only in relation to the maturation of certain appropriate *karmas* of the knower. Once they begin to operate, the process must continue due to the original momentum, just as the wheel of the potter keeps revolving even after the completed pot is taken off.³ Nor is this an unintelligible contention. The knowledge that the Self is not an agent, doubtless, cancels the ignorant belief that it is; though thus cancelled, ignorance persists for a while due to its deep rooted impressions in the mind, just as the false vision of the double moon, despite the right knowledge that the moon is single. Finally, this is not a matter for theoretical speculation at all; it is the truth of direct experience. One *has* immediate realization of Brahman, and, at the same time, for a while the body remains - the body and its workings being the visible symbol of the *karmas* which have begun to bear fruit.⁴ None may dare question the fact of another's realization of Brahman attested by his own heart. The term *jīvanmukti* is used to describe this state of continued life in the body on the part of a knower of Brahman. 'But we defined *mukti* as a state of disembodiedness,⁵ and is not, therefore, *jīvanmukti* a contradiction in terms? No; for, embodiedness is not a physical state so much as a matter of false knowledge; it is the clinging, through nescience, to the body as though it were the Self or an integral part of the Self.⁶ The point of utmost importance in Advaita is that every seeker after deliverance may hopefully aim at the goal of *jīvanmukti*.

1. BS. IV. 1, 15.

2. *tasyatāvadeva ciram yāvanna vimokṣye' tha sampatsye* CU. VI. 4, 2.

3. cf. *Haṭṭāmalakabhāṣya*, p. 180, ME. Vol. No. 16.

4. *apīcanaivātra vivaditavyam brahmadevākamcitkālam śarīram dhariyate nava dhriyate iti*. SB. p. 851.

5. vide P. 468. supra.

6. *na saśarīratvasya mithyāj'ñānanimitatvāt*. SB. p. 95.

Vidyāraṇya defines *jīvanmukti* as the eradication of the mind's proneness to act and thereby to experience pleasure and pain¹; or it is one's awareness of the absence of all *adhyāsa* though the psycho-physical organism continues to exist as long as the *prārabdhakarma* lasts.² It is recognized that since the conations and the emotions are the very stuff of the mind, these cannot be absolutely eradicated; but by means of yoga, none the less, these may very well be overborne and restricted.³ It is not as though there is a conflict between the operation of *prārabdhakarma* and that of Brahman-knowledge; the operation of knowledge also, resulting in the joys of holiness, is one of the results of *prārabdhakarma*. Still, human effort is necessary to assist the operation of *prārabdha*: hence *sādhana* which invariably precedes the attainment of *jīvanmukti*.⁴

As the concept of *jīvanmukti* is based on the self-certifying experience of the saints and mystics, we find evidence for it in the ancient religious literature of India. In the *Kaṭha upaniṣad*⁵ it is clearly stated that the seeker experiences two stages of deliverance. "Even here he is liberated from the bonds of desires and desire-prompted acts springing from nescience".⁶ The next stage supervenes on death, when, for good, he drops the *upādhis* of body and mind. He is no more re-embodied.⁷ Again in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*,⁸ deliverance in life is clearly affirmed⁹ as identical with the shedding of all

1. *jīvataḥ puruṣasya kartṛtvabhokṛtvasukhaduhkhādilakṣaṇāś-cittadharmāḥ kleśarūpatvādbandho bhavati—*
tasya nivāraṇam jīvanmuktiḥ ||
JMV. p. 102.
2. *svasminsvadṛṣṭā satatādhyāsāpratibhāse sati yāvatprārabdham svacittādyavasthiti.* - Com. on JMV. pp. 103-4.
3. Cf. *Yogaścittavṛttinirodhah*, YS. I, 2.
4. Cf. *svapauruṣaikasādhyaena svepsitatyāgarūpiṇā |*
manahpraśamamātreṇa vinā nāsti s'ubhāgatih ||
YV. Qd. JMV. p. 123.
5. *vimuktaśca vimucyate* - KU. V. 1.
6. *ihaivāvidyākṛtakāmakarmabandhanairvimukto bhavati*; SB.
on KU. V, 1.
7. *vimuktaścavimucyate punah śarīram na'grahnāti* - Ibid.
8. IV. 4, 7 - *yadā sarvepramucyante kāmā ye' sya hrdisṛitāḥ |*
atha marṭyo'mṛto bhavatyatra brahma samas'nute ||
KU. VI, 15.

desires that hold the heart captive. "The mortal becomes immortal; he attains the status of Brahman even here, *atra*, once all his heart's desires are totally renounced". "These desires constitute man's mortality, and when they are wholly dropped, the knower becomes immortal. While living in the body, he attains the status of Brahman, viz., deliverance"¹. Sāṅkara adds that deliverance has nothing to do with any change of place, thus bearing out the statement in the previous section that the attainment of the world of Brahman is no *mukti* at all. He quotes another scriptural passage to the effect that deliverance in life is a state in which the sense organs, mind and the vital breaths function but apparently; in fact, they have been sublated - *bādhitānuvṛtti*, and are now like a cloth burnt to ashes, but retaining the original shape.²

That the *Bhagavad Gītā* and texts like the *yogasūśiṣṭha* contain numerous references to deliverance in life will become clear from our discussion of the conduct of the *mukta* or the delivered individual.

Still [it] may be noted that certain teachers of Advaita do not whole-heartedly uphold the doctrine of *jīvanmukti*. For instance, Sarvajñātmamuni, the author of the *Samkṣepasārīraka*, maintains that after the dawn of the saving knowledge neither nescience nor its products like the body can even appear to exist. *Sadyomukti* alone is in order. Therefore all references to *jīvanmukti* are only eulogistic in their import. They exalt the idea of deliverance and encourage the *sādhaka* to press on with his endeavours to secure it.³ Nevertheless, it is obvious, that this teacher also felt that weight of tradition too strongly

1. anātmaviṣayāḥ kāmāḥ avidyālakṣaṇāḥ mṛtyavah.....ato mṛtyu-viyoge vidvāṁ jīvannevāmṛto bhavati | asminneva śārīrevartamāno brahmabhāvam mokṣam pratipad-yata ityarthah ||

'SB. on BU. IV, 4, 7. Cf. Moral actions are the denial of the will to life. A salvation from moral and physical evil is possible only through a total transformation of our being consisting in a turning of the will. The Elements, p. 228.

2. sacakṣurackṣuriva sakarṇo karṇaiva saprāṇopprāṇaiva, and Ā. Giri's note on it. 'SB. p. 97.

3. jīvanmuktipratyam śāstrajātam jīvanmuktekalpate yojanīyam | S'S. IV. 39.

to discard the ideal of *jīvanmukti*. For in the subsequent verses,¹ he falls in line with orthodox Advaita thought and supports *jīvanmukti*. He makes it the consequence of the survival of either a part, or appearance, or impressions, of *avidyā*.² There is deliverance in life, he also affirms, because it is experienced.³

Maṇḍana who slightly precedes Śāṅkara⁴ also holds two conflicting views on the question of *jīvanmukti*. Pure logic forces him also to maintain that the realization of Brahman annihilates all forms of *karma* including the *prārābdha*. This means that the only deliverance he recognizes is the *sadyomukti* which entails the fall of the body of the *mukta*.⁵ But facts, viz., the saint's experiences, force him also to concede that, even after the realization of Brahman, the body of the saint persists for a while. This phenomenon he refers to the traces of nescience, *avidyāsamskārāḥ*, which persist in the form of *prārābdha*, and which will be annulled either through the force of right knowledge or automatically.⁶

(d) *Videhamukti* is the absolute deliverance of the Self from all forms of nescience - *avidyāstamayomokhsah*.⁷ It denotes the perfect manifestation of the nature of the Self - *kevalenaivātmanāvirbhavati*.⁸ In this state not even traces of nescience may be predicated of the Self.⁹ It has won back its absoluteness, and abides as pure consciousness without any limitations.¹⁰ No difference now is conceivable, as in *kramamukti*,

1. Ibid ; 40, 42, 43, 45.
2. Ibid. IV. 42. cf. AŚ. p. 892.
3. S'S.IV. 43. vide vidvadanubhavasiddhatvādvirodhah. Madhusūdana on the above.
4. vide Introduction to BrS. P. I viii.
5. atahkṣipraiva muktirnapratikṣāṇiyamasti |
dehapātapratikṣātunāntariyakivāt bhavatyeva ||
BS. p. 130.
6. alpakālasthāyitvātsamskārasya.....tattvadarsanādeva kram eṇa
tasyāpi nivṛtteḥ, svayameva vā sāceyamavasthā jīvanmukti-
ritigiyate. BS. p. 132.
7. Qd. LC. p. 2.
8. 'SB. p. 892.
9. sarvabandhavinirmuktah śuddhenaivātmanāvtiṣṭhate. 'SB.
p. 893.
10. aṇṇarūpeṇābhiniṣpadyate sa uttamaḥ puruṣaḥ CU. VIII, 12, 3.

between the fully delivered Self and *parabrahman*. For only now is realized the absolute significance of utterances like *tattvamasi*. In other words, in *videhamukti* there is unqualified identity between the delivered Self and Brahman.¹ "As pure water poured forth into pure becomes the very same, so becomes the *ātman* of the seer".² It is obvious from this that *videhamukti* is *jñānasamakālamukti*,³ i.e., deliverance simultaneously with the right knowledge of Brahman. In contrast to *kramamukti* and *jīvanmukti*, it entails the lapse of the body and mind at the very moment of deliverance".⁴

The view given above is the traditional one as borne out by the text. "He delays only so long as he is not freed (from the body); then he attains (oneness)".⁵ But Vidyāraṇya puts a different interpretation on the concept of *videhamukti*. He grants that normally the expression refers to deliverance without relation to any form of embodiment. But he uses it to denote merely the absence of future embodiment. The acquisition of right knowledge, he argues, is intended only to ward off future embodiment. The body in which the saving knowledge is won is the product of past acts; it was there before the dawn of that knowledge and so its origin could not have been prevented by that knowledge. It may be noted that the fall of the present body also is not brought about by the saving knowledge; for, even the body of the ignorant falls by the exhaustion of *prārabdha* alone. Nor can the saving knowledge destroy the *sūkṣmaśarīra*, the subtle body, of the *vidvān*, for we know that the *jīvanmukta* has a subtle body, too, despite his knowledge. Indeed, the function of knowledge is not to destroy

1. avibhāgena dṛṣṭatvāt, BS. IV. 4, 4.

2. KU. IV, 15.

3. vide JMV. p. 221.

4. cf. jñānādevatukaivalyaṃ prāpyate yenamucyate |
kevalasyātmānobbhāvah kaivalyaṃ dehādirahitatvam |
Yenajñānaprāptibaleṇa kṛtsnabandhādvimucyate. JMV.
p. 219.

5. CU. VI. 14, 2. translated according to Śaṅkara's comment.
also cf. Vākyavṛtti, vv. 52, 53 & YV. - Jīvanmuktapadam
tyaktvāsvadehekālasātkṛte |
viśatyadehamuktatvam pavanō spandatāmiva ||
Qd. JMV. p. 221.

any body; it only abolishes nescience.¹ Therefore, Vidyāraṇya concludes that *Videhamukti* must be taken to mean deliverance with the certainty that no future embodiment awaits the Self.² To this certainty Yajñavalkya refers when he assures Janaka, "You have indeed achieved fearlessness."³

Reasoning also shows that the knowledge of Brahman must immediately liberate from all future embodiments; for, if it did not, and only after death it liberated absolutely, an unseen potency or *apūrva* for knowledge will have to be assumed.⁴ But this will obliterate all distinction between *karma* and *jñāna*. Therefore *jñāna* must liberate at once, and may not wait for the moment of death to produce its natural effect of deliverance.

This view of Vidyāraṇya is not in conflict with the traditional view presented above. It is a matter of interpretation only. If by *Videhamukti* we understand deliverance from all embodiment, present and future, of course it can only supervene death. But Vidyāraṇya's view is quite logical when the expression, *videhamukti* is taken in the sense he gives to it.⁵

(iii) The *jīvanmukta* or the saint.

The various types of *mukti* discussed above have, on the whole, a speculative interest; but a distinction must be made in the case of the *Jīvanmukti*. For, this provides a test of the claims made on behalf of the supreme Advaitic ideal of deliverance. Immediate deliverance, gradual deliverance and deliverance in disembodiment - all these are beyond the scope

1. cf. yatojñānamajñānasyaiva nivartakam. pp. Qd. JMV. pp. 222-223.
2. tasmādbbhāvideharāhityalakṣaṇā videhamuktirjñānasamakālīnā JMV. p. 228.
3. BU. IV. 2, 4.
4. In the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* it is maintained that sacrifices which perish as soon as completed, nevertheless, secure heaven through the agency of *adrṣṭa*, the unseen potency of sacrifices. If the *Jñāna* of Brahman did not liberate at once, for it, too, an unseen potency will have to be assumed.
5. cf. tīrthe śvapacagṛhe vā naṣṭasmṛtirapī parityajan deham | jñānasamakālamuktah kaivalyaṃ yāti hataśokah || Śeṣa qd. JMV. p. 229.

of observation, and have to be taken on the strength of probability and scriptural authority. But *jīvanmukti* may be studied at close quarters as exemplified by the living sages and saints; for, the man liberated while living in the body is none other than a saint and mystic in one. "A saint is mystic, a human being looking upon the division between the earthly and super-earthly, the temporal and eternal, as transcended, and feeling himself, while still externally amid the earthly and temporal, to belong to the superearthly and eternal".¹ In setting forth the nature of the *Advaitic mukti* we pointed out that it is the realization of the timeless reality of Brahman.² The *jīvanmukta* fully shares in that realization, and yet, as long as the body and mind persist, in the intervals of his absorption in the beatific vision, he must be aware of the world in time also. Thus he fully answers to the description of the saint and mystic quoted above. We shall examine the traditional accounts of the *Jīvanmukta* with a view to judge how far they reveal a picture of perfection that should serve as an example and stimulus to those who accept the challenge to be perfect.

A general view of the *mukta* is furnished by the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka* when it enjoins: therefore let a Brahman become disgusted with learning and desire to live as a child. When he has become disgusted both with the state of childhood and with learning, then he becomes an ascetic, *muni*. When he has become disgusted both with the non-ascetic and with the ascetic state, then he becomes a Brāhman.³ From 'Sankara's commentary on the passage quoted it appears that the terms *pāṇḍitya*, *bālyā*, and *mauna* denote increasing degrees of the knowledge of the Brāhman.⁴ But in commenting on the *sūtra*, *anāviṣkurvannan-vayāt*,⁵ 'Sankara takes *bālyā* to mean the purity and simplicity of the heart of children.⁶ In any case, the climax in this text denotes the *jīvanmukta* who has fully realized the purpose of life

1. Schweitzer Qd. in Goethe after two centuries, p. 106. Louisiana State University Press, 1952.
2. vide P. 470, supra; also cf. CU. VIII, 4, 1; III, 11, 3;
3. BU. III, 5, 1.
4. vide also RP. SB. p. 316.
5. BS. III, 4, 50.
6. tasmādāntaro bhāvaviśeṣo bālaśyāstriyate. S'B. p. 820.

and won the crown of perfection while alive in the body.¹ In the words of the *Bhagavat Gītā* the *mukta* may be distinguished as a *viññāni*.² At the same time it is necessary to observe that *muktas* do not all conform to a single type. Having emptied themselves of their private egos, they have become perfect vessels filled with the spirit of God which expresses itself in unpredictable ways. The recognition of this fact is necessary lest we apply a single yard-stick to all the *muktas* and fail to appreciate the unfettered spontaneity of their self-expression. Thus it has been remarked that "some among them conform to established patterns of conduct and may not violate social conventions; others resemble simple rustics, children, or people possessed; yet others may display abnormal powers; also, among them are yogins intent on contemplation and averse to the normal activities in the world".³

How does the world of multiplicity appear to the integrated mind of the *viññāni* or the *mukta*? In the full tide of his Brāhmie realisation, it is small wonder that he sees no alien world at all.⁴ Above, below, before, behind, right and left,

1. athabrāhmaṇaḥkṛtakṛtyobhavati; brahmaiva sarvamiṭipratyaya upajāyate; nirupacaritam hi tadātasya brāhmaṇyam prāptam S'B. on BU. III, 5, 1. cf. yaḥkaścidātmānamaparoḥkṛtya kṛtāṣṭhatayā vartate saeva brāhmaṇaḥ - Vajrasūcikā.

2. BG. VI. 8 & Śaṅkara's comment on it: jñānamāstroktapadārthānām pariñānam; viññānamtu jñātānam tathaiva svānubhavakaraṇam.

3. ke'pi varṇāśrāmācāraniṣṭhāparā mugdhabālāpramattopamās'cāpare {
rāgiṇo bhogino yoginaścetare jñāninām lakṣyate; naikarūpā
sthitiḥ ||

SS. IV. 22. cf. The wind bloweth where it listeth so is everyone that is born of the spirit. St. John. III. 8. Also "These artists of the inner life are of different types. Some are full of poetry and music; others are vigorous men of action; still others are solitary souls" - Great Indians, P. 62. S. Radhakrishnan.

4. According to the intensity and fullness of the realization of Brahman, the *muktas* have been classified into four: (i) Brahnavit; (ii) Brahmaividvara; (iii) Brahnavivariyān; (iv) Brahmaividvariṣṭha. These 4 classes correspond to the last four levels of yoga - yogabhūmayah, as expounded in the Yogavāsistha. The first three levels viz., s'ubhecchā,

the *mukta* perceives only his Self.¹ In this highest state of realization, as often remarked before, the objective manifold does not exist for the *mukta*; its highest value as pure consciousness stands unveiled. The question, then, of the illusoriness or otherwise of the world would not crop up for him; because, the *mukta* in the *nirvikalpasamādhi* has no awareness of objects. Such a one is, strictly speaking, not a knower of Brahman but Brahman itself.² But even after the return of the *mukta* to the attenuated shell of the differentiated ego, to the world of relativity, the power of his integral experience remains potent. It is the firm and unshakable grasp of this deepest truth of the world that is denoted by the term '*sahitaprajña*' applied to the *jīvan mukta* in the *Gītā*.³ Amidst all his apparent activities in the world of plurality, the *mukta* has unbroken awareness of the integral experience.⁴ No matter what objects confront his enlightened vision, they reveal to him their essential nature

vicāraṇā, and tanumānasā, comprise the means to the realization of Brahman. The fourth, *Sattvāpatti*, is the level of the *nirvikalpasamādhi* born of the major text *tattvamasi*. One who has reached this is the Brahman, who realizes Brahman alone is true and that the world is *mithyā*. The next three levels, *asamsakti*, *padārthabhāvinī*, and *turiya* denote grades of the *jīvanmuktas*, the grades depending on the degrees of of the repose born of the indeterminate contemplation or *nirvikalpasamādhi*. On the fifth level, the *mukta* descends from the *samādhi* unaided - such a one is *Brahmavidvara*; on the sixth, his attendants have to induce him to come down from *samādhi*; he is the *Brahmavidvariyaṇ*. When the *mukta* reaches the seventh level, he no longer descends therefrom, and is styled *Brahmavidvariṣṭha*. Vide JMV. pp. 344-47. cf. *ātmakriḍa ātmaratīḥ kriyāvāneṣa brahmavidāṃvariṣṭhaḥ* MuU. III, 1, 4.

1. CU. VII, 25, 1 & 2. cf. "She (the Divine Mother) showed me that everything was full of consciousness. The image was consciousness, the altar was consciousness, the water-vessels were consciousness, the door-sill was consciousness, the marble-floor was consciousness - all was consciousness" - The Gospel p. 290.
2. *yasminnityasukhāmbudhaugalitadhirbrahmaivaṇabrahmavid Maṇiṣāpañcaka* v. 5.
3. Ch. II. vv. 55 ff.
4. cf. *evam tatvepare śuddhedhḥtroyīśrāntimāgataḥ | tadevāsvādayatyantarabhir vyavaharannapi ||* YV. Qd. JMV. p. 179.

as pure consciousness.¹ The *Gītā*, describes this blessed state of the *muktas* as 'the day' which is but 'a night' to the undelivered worldlings, meaning that the latter are shut out from the vision of the world as pure spirit or God. On the contrary, the awareness of plurality normal to 'common sense' is 'a night' to the *muktas*.²

In the sense that the *mukta* immediately apprehends the world as Brahman, which is its highest truth, obviously he possesses truth in its highest and most inclusive form. To apprehend the world as a mere congeries of objects, detached and inert, and opposed to oneself is, in the first place, a mark of cognitive bondage.³ Besides, it is evidence of a false valuation, a failure to recognize that the world is not merely an effect of Brahman, but is Brahman in essence. In fact, the concept of cause in Advaita is axiological, i.e., it has a reference to the essence of things. To find out the cause of a thing is to find out its essence. In the experience of the *mukta*, the gulf between the actual world and the essence it embodies is abolished; the world's truth as Brahman is apprehended.⁴ The *mukta* thus has an unbroken realization of the final truth of Advaita, viz., that the world is an expression of divine bliss.⁵ He realizes that worlds are but the waves of the boundless ocean that he is - their rise and fall do not affect him.⁶ This does not mean that, eg., the *mukta* fails to distinguish between a saint and a sinner. Only, he would not treat them as irreconcilable opposites, but appreciate the one

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1. sarvamātmānaṁ paśyati BU. IV. 4, 22. cf. dehābhimānegalite vijāate paramātmani | yatra yatra mṛno yāti tatra tatrasamādhayaḥ || Vākyasudhā Qd. JMV. p. 326; also BG. VIII, 19.
 2. Ch. II. v. 69 and Saṅkara's comment on it. cf. Dakṣiṇāmūrti stotra v. 1.
 3. vide P. 403 supra.
 4. vide The Vedānta of Sankara, pp. 293-94.
 5. cf. This very world is a mansion of mirth, Here I can eat, here drink and make merry. O physician! You only see the surface of things, holding to one as well as to the other. He drank his milk from a brimming cup-Rāmprasād, Qd. Gospel, p. 432.
 6. cf. mayyanantamahāmbhodhau jagadvicīh svabhāvataḥ | udetuvāstamāyātu na me vṛddhina vākṣayah || Aṣṭāvakra Gītā, V.74.

as the realization of the potentialities of the other. The saint is the transformed sinner; what is transformed is not the Brahmic essence of the sinner; but the changing circumstances of his life, the *u pādhis*, which for the saint has only an empirical reality.¹ Realizing himself to be the Self of all, the saint's judgement of the sinner will be different from that of the unregenerate mind. The saint very well sees that the evaluation of the world as Brahman makes no sense to the 'sinner' just as the hundred-rupee note has no immediate significance for the child.² Dr. Radhakrishnan points out that the *mukta* functions in the temporal world with consciousness of the timeless Infinite. "He has *trikāladṛṣṭi*, an intuition of time in which past, present, and future exist together in the Self-knowledge and Self-power of the Eternal. He is no more a victim of time".³

The action of the *mukta* is a highly controversial subject. In numerous contexts, Śaṅkara vehemently argues that action and perfect knowledge are utterly incompatible. For instance, in the introductory remarks to his comment on the first chapter of the Gītā he says: "One who knows the truth about his Self realizes 'I do nothing'⁴; therefore he cannot even dream of performing action which is hostile to right knowledge"⁵. Śaṅkara's main contention is that all actions fall within the sphere of *avidyā*,⁶ and so the *mukta*, who perceives

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1. sarvamevānujānāti sarvamevanīṣedhati |
bhedātmalābhōnujñā syānnisedho'tatsvabhāvatah ||
NKS. IV. 51.
 2. Vide P. 388, supra. cf. A mouse no less than an angel is dependent on God, yet a mouse is not a kind of angel. Spinoza, Qd. 'Idea of God' P. 222. 'The more perfection a thing has, the more does it participate in the deity, the more does it express God's perfection'. Ibid.
 3. Great Indians, pp. 88 ff. Bombay 1949.
 4. vide, BG. V. 8 & 9.
 5. nāhaṃkaromīti pratyayasya ātmayāthātmyavidāḥ kartavyat-
venopadeśāt, samyagdars'anaviruddhamithyājñānahetukah
karmyogah svapnepi na sambhavayitum sakyate. BGC.
p. 245, also cf. tasmāt Gītā'sāstraṣanmātreṇāpi 'srautena
smārtenav karmanātmajñānasya samuccayo nakenaciddar'sa-
yitum 'sakyate. BGC. p. 44.
 6. sarva evakriyākarakādivyavahāro' vidyabhūmāveva., Ibid.
p. 200.

no difference, not only need not, but cannot, act.¹ But Śaṅkara's views on the action of the *mukta* are not exhausted by the trends of thought of which the quotations given above are only a sample. In fact he takes *karma* in a technical sense, and understands by it only such actions as are performed with the sense of egoistic agency and claims on the fruits thereof. The actions of *muktas* and of those who, like Śrī Kṛṣṇa, are born with the fullest enlightenment are not egoistic, and so, for Śaṅkara, are not properly action at all.² The position requires an explanation. On the one hand, the *mukta* perceives non-differenced reality; on the other, he acts, though, of course, unegoistically. But the basic condition of all actions is awareness of difference. Is then the *mukta* also aware of difference? The answer has been partly anticipated above, where it was pointed out that while the *mukta* realizes the *brāhmic* value of things metaphysically, he is also aware of their empirical status. Not to be so aware will be a limitation of his full knowledge. Besides the *mukta*, in proportion to the fullness of his realization of Brahman, is moved by compassion. "He hates no living being, is friendly, and compassionate".³ Urged by compassion, he seeks to promote the welfare of the world by setting up the right norm of action.⁴ In fact, Śaṅkara has recognized that work for the welfare of the world is necessarily undertaken by the *mukta*.⁵ The *mukta* unceasingly works for the good of all beings - *sarvabhūtahiteratāh*.⁶ It must be remembered that these remarks hold good only of certain

1. nābheda darśinō kṣaropāśakasya karma yoga upapadyata iti darśayati. Ibid. p. 512, vide also p. 711. cf. also, jñānānāmṛtenatṛptasya kṛtākṛtyasya yoginah | naivāstikimcitkṛtavyamasti cennasatattvavid || Smṛti Qd. JMV. p. 365.
2. yasyatu jñānam utpannam paramārthaviśayam ekameve dam sarvam brahmākṛtā ceti tasya karmāṇi karma prayojane ca nirvṛtte'pi lokasamgrahārtham yathāpravṛttistatthaiva karmaṇi pravṛttasya yat pravṛttirūpam dīśyate na tat karma.....yathā bhagavato Vāsudevasya.....tatphalābhisa mdhyaham kārābhavasya tulyatvāt viduṣaḥ. BGC. p. 44.
3. BG. XII, 13.
4. Ibid, III, 21.
5. yadipunarahmivatvam kṛtārthabuddhirātma vidanyovātasyāpyātmanah kartavyābhāve'pi parānugraha evakartvyaḥ BGC. p. 162.
6. BG. V. 24; XII, 4.

types of *muktas*, for, as we observed earlier, the *muktas* are subject to no external compulsions and are a law unto themselves.¹ Strictly speaking, having fully abolished their private selves or egos, the *muktas* do not act now, but the spirit of God who uses them as his perfect instruments.

In his activity the *mukta* is fully aware that all actions properly belong to *prakṛti*, and that the Self beyond *prakṛti* is never bound by them.² But the Lord of *prakṛti*, viz., *Īśvarā* the denotation of 'tat', has been realized by the *mukta* as his very Self. Therefore the *mukta* acts in the liberating knowledge that he is only a *nimitta* or instrument of the Lord.³ The *mukta's* action, again, is marked by total freedom from desires. We have dwelt at length on the role of desires in enslaving the *jīva*.⁴ Since all these desires of the *mukta* have been eradicated, his acts are not vitiated by them⁵ - *kāma-saṃkalpavarjitāḥ*. He does not desire the success even of the work he initiates, for such desire is impossible without egoism. As the action proceeds, he realizes - *naivakimcidkaromīti* - I do nothing.⁶ Nonetheless, the work is done perfectly, for, *yogaḥkarmasu kauśalam*.⁷ What interferes with and even spoils the successful issue of actions is the preoccupation of the agent with his own hopes and fears. Rid of all these, the *mukta* is a perfect channel for the unhindered flow of divine energy, and the success of the enterprise takes care of itself. As far as the *mukta* is concerned, only his body functions and not his will as identified with his body's interests.⁸ In truth, the *mukta* may be deemed *kṛtsnakarmakṛt*,⁹ because he realizes the Self's freedom from all interested actions, and its

1. cf. *nīstraiguṇyepathivicaratām kovidhiḥ koniṣedhah Qd. JMV. p. 382.*
2. BG. III, 27; XIV. 18.
3. cf. "I am the machine, and she is the operator. I am the chariot and she is the charioteer, I move as she moves me, I speak as she speaks through me" - The Gospel, p. 583.
4. Vide pp. 403 ff supra.
5. BG. IV. 19.
6. Ibid; V. 8.
7. Ibid; II, 50.
8. *śūriramkevalam karma kurvannāpnoti kilbiṣam, BG., IV. 21.*
9. Ibid, IV. 18.

status as the stable support of *prakṛti*'s eternal play of energy. There is no question of the *mukta* committing sin, for sin does not consist in the outward act, but in the impure, egoistic motive of the private will. And, having no axe of his own to grind, the *mu ta* can cherish no motive for or against anyone. Since his will has been absolutely merged in the will of God, the *mukta* may be held to realize, alone among living beings, the meaning of the freedom of will; he sees that nothing finite is free.

The fact of freedom from egoism means that the *mukta* acts in a spirit of impersonality. "All great souls are conscious of an impersonal force, whether love, or will or knowledge, working through them; but until liberated, they are not free from egoistic reactions".¹ The *mukta*'s actions, on the contrary, are tainted by no sordidness. His impersonality lifts him above all *dvandvas* or dualities. Not that troubles and tribulations do not assail him; he has his full share of sufferings. But he never loses his equanimity; his *tīlikṣā* never deserts him.²

In spite of his unremitting action, there is a sense in which the *mukta* may be described as a *sannyāsīn*. He has not only given up the fruits of all activities, but also is free from emotional reactions like aversions and attractions.³ Thus, he works as a master, not as a slave for wages.⁴

What is the nature of the *mukta*'s works? As was pointed out, he has no preferences. Though, normally, deliverance comes in the wake of formal renunciation, it is not inconceivable that occupants of other stations of life also should be delivered.⁵ Thus Janaka and Vidura, *Dharmavyādha*, the butcher, Sulabhā, a woman, are examples of *muktas*. They all discharge the duties of their stations in a spirit of detachment and impersonality. According to Advaita, it is not the nature

1. Aurobindo. The Essays on the Gita - Part I.

2. BG. II. 15 & 16

3. Jñeyah sa nityasannyāsīyonadveṣṭina kāmṅkṣati; BG. V. 3.

4. vide Vivekananda, Complete works, Vol. I, pp. 54, 55.

5. vide SS'. III, 360.

of the acts, but the way they are discharged, that distinguishes the *mukta*.¹ Without any external compulsion, he continues the customary duties of his station in life lest the masses emulate him prematurely by renouncing their duties.² For, the guiding principle of the *mukta*'s actions is *lokaśaṃgrahēcchā* - desire for promoting world-welfare. But it is necessary to emphasize that deliverance or Self-realization is not to be evaluated in terms of the benefits it confers on the world.³ Deliverance is not a means to improve the world - it is the supreme good, *yam labdhvā cāparaṃ lābhaṃ manyate nādhikam-tataḥ*.⁴ The *mukta* has no illusions that he is helping the world. He knows that the world requires no help from him. The world is God's and God can look after it himself. The *mukta* is privileged to serve the world. The *mukta*'s work is service, and as such, it is worship of God. The *mukta* alone can fully live up to the upaniṣadic injunction *īśāvāsyamidam sarvam*; ⁵ for, every moment of his life, he perceives "*sarvāṇibhūtānyātmānyeva; sarvabhūteṣu cātmanā*" ⁶ and so does not 'shrink from them' ⁷; rather, he serves them with joy and gratitude, being *samadarśana*.⁸ This seeing of all beings in the Self and of the Self in all beings is the *brahmātmabhāva* referred to earlier. Only, now, his vision is that of *Brahman* as *Īśvara*.⁹ Therefore, in the knowledge that all beings are God Himself in strange garbs,¹⁰ the *mukta* serves them rather than pities them.¹¹ The good in Advaita, we said, is whatever eliminates division and makes for unity. The *mukta*'s service, conceived

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1. BG. XVIII. 46.
 2. Ibid. III. 25 & 26
 3. cf. If a man seeks from the good life anything beyond itself, it is not the good life he is seeking. Plotinus Qd. Eastern Religions and Western Thought, P. 323.
 4. BG. VI. 22.
 5. *Īśa*. I.
 6. Ibid. 6.
 7. BU. IV. 4, 1. KU. IV, 5; *Īśa*. 6.
 8. BG. VI. 29.
 9. Ibid; VI. 30;
 10. SU. IV, 3.
 11. cf. "Doing good to others out of compassion is good; but, service, *sevā*, of all beings in the spirit of the Lord is better" Thus spake Vivekananda. pp. 20-21.

and carried out in the spirit of impersonal dedication, is the highest expression of such goodness. Humanitarian work, not unoften, results in perpetuating in the beneficiaries a sense of impotence and abasement; but the *ukta's* service uplifts the beings served and opens their eyes to their own worth and dignity. Regarding the services rendered by the liberated saints Philo observes: "Households, cities, countries, and nations have enjoyed great happiness when a single individual has taken heed of the good and beautiful. Such men not only liberate themselves; they fill those they meet with a free mind".¹

The problem of the conduct of the *mukta* may be considered in greater detail. Deliverance implies deliverance also from the laws of *karma*; for *karma* binds the ego, and, in the case of the *mukta*, all the knots of the ego, *hṛdayagranthis* have snapped.² It has been declared of the *mukta*:— He does not become superior by good action nor inferior by bad action. Him these two do not overcome - neither the thought, "Hence I did wrong", nor the thought, "Hence I did right". Verily, he overcomes them both. What he has done and what he has not done do not affect him.³ This may be misunderstood as granting a license for reckless activity. R. E. Hume, the translator of the upaniṣads, compares⁴ the Socratic doctrine of the identity of knowledge and virtue with the upaniṣadic teaching that the knowledge of the Self lifts a man beyond good and evil, and remarks that, according to the latter, "the possession of metaphysical knowledge actually cancels out all past sins and even permits the knower unblushingly to continue in what seems to be much evil with perfect impunity". But this seems to be a hasty conclusion. The knowledge in question is no mere 'metaphysical knowledge,' a matter of intellectual jugglery and assent. The upaniṣads contemplate the total transformation of the Self-knower. This is clear from

1. Qd. Great Indians, p. 68.

2. MuU. II, 2, 8.

3. BU. IV, 4, 22. cf. This eternal greatness of a Brāhman is not increased by deeds nor diminished. One should be familiar with it. By knowing it, one is not stained by evil action. Ibid; IV. 4, 23. cf. also TU. II, 9.

4. Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, p. 60, prefixed to his translation of the Upaniṣads.

the words, "Therefore having this knowledge, having become calm, subdued, quiet, patiently enduring, and collected, one sees the Self in the self. One sees everything as the Self; evil does not overcome him; he overcomes evils &c. Free from evil, free from doubt; he becomes a Brāhman". It is clear that here we are dealing with a perfected saint, the Self liberated from the private ego.¹ In speaking of eligibility we showed how a thorough ethical discipline is a prerequisite for enquiry into Brahman. Discussing this question in his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, Sureśvara remarks,² that far from being licentious in his behaviour, the *mukta* will reveal virtues like benevolence as though they are his second nature - so spontaneous have they become.³ An immoral *mukta* is no better than a dog turning to his vomit.⁴ Immorality springs from *aviveka*, lack of discrimination, whereas the *mukta* is what he is solely due to his *viveka*. Hence lack of restraint from which his conduct even before his deliverance was free cannot disfigure it after deliverance.⁵

The feelings of *mukta* are governed by his experience of the transcendental bliss of Brahman; for, as we observed earlier, deliverance is the same as Brahman. Now, Brahman is *bhūmā* or the plenum.⁶ The *mukta*, thus, is aware of the plenum which is the same bliss, in which "one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else." The experience of this absolute bliss also implies fearlessness.⁷ Fear is rooted in the perception of duality or difference. The integral experience of Brahman reveals it as a sea of self-contained

1. Hume's remarks seem to be based on some select passages from the upaniṣads. He does not read them together with the passages we have quoted in the text; this gives a very one-sided view. In themselves, his passages would be treated as arthavāda or eulogistic texts by the traditional Advaitins. Vide Śaṅkara's comment on BU. V. 14, 8.

2. vide NKS. IV. 57-69.

3. utpannātmaprabodhasya tvadvestṛtvādayogunāh |
ayaṁnato bhavantyaśya na tu sādhanarūpiṇah ||
NKS. IV. 69.

4. Ibid. IV. 62.

5. vide Ā. Giri in BUB. p. 442.

6. vide CU. VII, 23-25.

7. ānandam brahmanovidvān nābibhēti kutaścanā TU. II, 9,

joy.¹ This vision keeps the *mukta* perpetual company throughout his activities in the empirical world. Hence the joy with which he faces all the trying situations of life. He is *antah-sukho'ntarīrmah*² - he finds both happiness and rest within. Or, he may be described as the *ātmarati*, delighting in the Self. This open access to the headquarters of bliss accounts for many of his unique traits. "People do not shrink from him, nor does he shrink from them. He is free from the passing moods of elation, resentment, fear and indignation. He is independent, *anapekṣa*, and free from the dualities of feeling like attachment and aversion. He renounces both good and evil. He is the same to friend and foe, unmoved by honour and dishonour, impervious to external conditions. Praise and blame do not affect him. He is content with whatever he gets. He has no fixed abode, but has a steadfast mind. Above all he is a lover - loving all with the love of God".³

In Advaita the highest value is happiness in consonance with the concept of Brahman as *ānanda* or *bhūmā*.⁴ The attainment of the Self, *ātmalābha*, is held to be the highest gain because Atman is Brahman, which is absolute bliss.⁵ We explained that attainment of Brahman means *sarvātmabhāva*, a realization of one's own Self as the Self of all. This is the highest fruit of spiritual life because, "He alone lives whose life is in the whole universe. The fear of death goes when it is realized that death cannot triumph so long as one life lives".⁶ The attainment of the highest value by the *mukta* is described eulogistically as "*so'snute sarvāṅkāmān saha brahmaṇā vipaścitā*".⁷ All the desires of the *mukta* are fulfilled: he becomes an *āptakīma*. Commenting on the above, Śaṅkara says that the expression does not mean that the

1. tadvijñānena paripaśyantidhīrā ānandarūpamamṛtam yadvibhāti MuU. II, 1, 7.

2. BG. V. 24.

3. vide BG. XII, 15-19; & XIV, 22-26.

4. vide p. 271 supra.

5. ātmalābhānnaparam; Āpastamba; Brahavidāpnoti param; TU. II, 1.

6. Vivekānanda's works, Vol. II. pp. 80, 81.

7. TU. II, 1.

mukta satisfies, one after another, all sorts of desires. Causal collocations govern attainment of results in the empirical world. But the *mukta* no more depends on any extraneous factors for his satisfaction. Having shed his nescience, he has attained unqualified autonomy. As Brahman, the delivered Consciousness is the integrated unity of values like truth, beauty and goodness.¹ Hence he is said to have achieved the *param*; *brahmavidūpnoti param*. Since Brahman is the unity of values, not to realize Brahman as the sole reality is to be condemned to the status of a non-entity - "*asanneva sabhavati*".² On the contrary to know Brahman is to be at once real and good: - *santamenam tato viduh*.³ Sāṅkara explains that to ignore Brahman is to be cut off from the goals of life like truth and bliss - an *apuruṣārtha-sambandhi*; ⁴ for, in denying Brahman, one denies the social order, which is designed to help realize Brahman, *brahmapratipatty-arthatvāttasya*. To accept the social order and work it loyally is to tread *sanmārga*, the right path, with the assurance that Brahman may be realized. A more cogent reason for treating Brahman alone as supreme value is implicit in Advaita metaphysics. Brahman as truth and goodness, *satya* and *s'iva*, is valuable, because, at the same time, Brahman is bliss. We emphasized above,⁵ that bliss is the only ultimate value in Advaita, other values being the last means to bliss, the supreme end. Unlike empirical forms of pleasure, Brāhmic bliss is at once true and conscious. Hence it is the final goal of all our seekings.

Besides, upon the winning of this bliss, *sānti*, or peace that passeth understanding, crowns the saint's life; for, all struggle, so far, was directed to the realization of imperishable bliss. That all endeavours are inspired by the yearning for peace or *s'ānti*, seems to be suggested by the invocations with which Upaniṣadic studies begin and end. In the case of the *mukta* this aspiration is finally fulfilled through the discovery of the Self's identity with Brahman that is bliss.

1. vide GPK. II. 33. PD. XIV. vv. 12, 36, 37 & 38.

2. TU. II, 6.

3. Ibid.

4. S'B. on the above.

5. vide pp. 223. ff. supra.

The life of the *mukta* that is steeped in the peace of Brahman is of course the very embodiment of holiness. The elements of holiness which we distinguished earlier¹ - the sense of the mysterious, of the wonderful, &c., shine forth in all his movements. His incorruptible purity and the unbroken awareness of the divine within himself make his holiness palpable to all who find themselves in his presence.

The enlightened vision of the *mukta* sees the world not only 'apparelled in celestial light', but as the living vesture of God. For him only the Vedāntic doctrine of the world and its affairs being a divine play or *līlā* makes real and full sense. That "on the sea-shore of endless worlds" we have all, like children, met with shouts and dances to play² the *mukta* with his disinterestedness, as a spectator of all time and history, fully realizes. No doubt 'death is abroad', but the *mukta* perceives that the evil, so-called, no less than the good, comes from the divine.³ He accustoms himself to the vision of the divine in the terrible and ruthless phenomena of the cosmos as readily as in the beautiful and the sublime. All aversion and loathing are born of the egoistic impulse to assert oneself; when the latter is dissolved, the whole universe becomes a mighty song which reveals its central reality.⁴ This is not a merely aesthetic attitude; it springs from the depths of the spiritual realization of Brahman as bliss, and the *mukta's* ability to pierce the most appalling masks nature and life wears and see into their blissful core.⁵ The secret of his inexhaustible spiritual vitality is that he no more seeks to gain aught for himself; he lives only to give.

Among other traits of the *mukta* may be noted his genuine humility which is perfectly compatible with great dignity and

1. vide pp. 281 ff. supra.

2. Gitañjali, No. 60.

3. BG. VII, 12.

4. cf. We have to see that Nature devouring her children, Time consuming all, Death universal and ineluctable, are also the supreme God-head in one of his cosmic figures - Essays on the Gita. II series. pp. 160-161. Aurobindo.

5. cf. I see that it is God himself who has become the block, the executioner, and the victim for the sacrifice - The Gospel, p. 932.

fearlessness. He has none of the cock-sureness of the theoretical philosopher who has an answer for every problem of the understanding. He does not claim to know the Absolute,¹ since Brahman is not an object to be known. *Anīviṣkurvannan-vayāt*² refers to the *mukta*'s attitude to social recognition and status. "He is the perfect man whom none knows as either good or bad, ignorant or learned, polite or impolite. Let the sage live a life of unobstentatious righteousness. Let him walk the earth as the blind, the ignorant, and the dumb do".³

Before we close this account of the *jīvanmukta*'s perceptions, conations, and emotions, we shall also underline the fact that, as depicted in Advaita, he embodies an exalted ideal of the superman. Between the *sarvātmabhāva* of the *mukta* and the ruthlessness of Nietzsche's superman "Who will do almost anything *except betraying a friend* for a purpose he cherishes"⁴, there is a wide gulf of difference, of course. Nietzsche's superman evolves through human selection by eugenic foresight and an ennobling education. "For him all that increases the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man is good"⁵. By the way of the 'transvaluation of all values' Nietzsche's superman has come to uphold and exemplify the ethics of power, the morality of masters as against the morality of the herd. Thus he repels the burden of sorrow and service without rising victorious over mortality and sufferings "with the triumph song of a liberated humanity attending his ascension".⁶ The *mukta*, on the contrary, shares life in the spirit of divine *līlā*, like a god, while Nietzsche's superman like the *asura* or Titan struggles violently to overthrow and crush all opposition. The *mukta*'s is "an impersonal personality with a heightening of sympathy into constant experience of world oneness".⁷ The *mukta*'s supermanhood is a divine and harmonious absolute of

1. KeU. II. 2 & 3.

2. BS. III, 4, 50.

3. verses Qd. by S'aṅkara, S'B. p. 820.

4. The story of philosophy, P. 427, Will Durant, New York, 1952.

5. Ibid; p. 426.

6. The Superman, Aurobindo.

7. Ibid;

all that is essential in man; for, he is the very embodiment of the divine. The finite-infinite being that is man has been transformed into a constant consciousness of infinitude in the *mukta*.¹ As against the exclusiveness of the western superman, the *mukta* proclaims that every human being, *amṛtasya pūtraḥ*, is a potential superman, and invites and assists all to self-transcendence. The *mukta* rules by the power of self-effacing love and service.

(iv) The status of the *mukta* after the fall of the body.

Upon the fall of the body due to the exhaustion of the *prārabdhakarma*, does the *mukta* remain as pure consciousness or as *saguṇa Brahman* or *Īśvara*? Views have been expressed in favour of both these alternatives. It is agreed that no movement is possible for the fully delivered Self after the body falls.² "As the slough of a snake lies on an ant hill, dead, cast off, even so lies this body".³ The Self of the *mukta* neither leaves the body nor travels, as happens in *kramamutī*; for the Self is realized as the omnipresent Brahman.⁴ The fall of his body synchronises with the attainment of *Videhamukti* as normally understood.

The *jīvanmukta* enters upon absolute deliverance just as the moving breeze suddenly ceases to stir. Of the fully delivered Self, it may not be said, that it either rises or sets or is quiescent, that it either exists or does not; that it is remote or near; that it is either 'I' or some other.⁵ Descriptions of any kind are inapplicable to the *videhamukta* for the same

1. cf. When a man ceases to be an individual, he raises himself again and penetrates the whole world. There, one with all, he creates the All. Plotinus, Qd. Mysticism, East & West, p. 117.
2. *athākāmyamāno yo'kāmoniṣkāma āptakāma ātmakāmo bhavati na tasya prāṇa uktirā nanti brahmaivasaṁbrahmāpyeti* BU. IV, 4, 6.
3. Ibid; IV. 4, 7.
4. *nā ca brahmavidaḥ gatiropapadyate, nimittābhāvāt-atra-brahma samaśnute*. S'B. p. 865.
5. *jīvanmuktapadaṁ tyaktvā svadehe kālasātkṛte | viśatyadehamuktatvaṁ pavano' spandatāmiva || videhamukto nodetī nāstameti naśāmyai | na sannāsanadūrastho nacāhaṁ naca netaṛaḥ ||* YV. Qd. JMV. p. 175.

reason that they are to Brahman. It has been often pointed out that the state of deliverance is Brahman. Every determination implies a negation, and of the Absolute, the least objectionable definition is 'neti neti'.¹ S'aṅkara quotes a verse to the effect that even the gods cannot trace the *mukta* whose body has dropped off; for he has become the Self of all beings, and so is neither in space nor in time.² From the point of view of delivered Self, his body and mind also, like everything else, are resolved back into Brahman.³ Of the *mukta* after the fall of the body, it may perhaps be said, 'satkimcidavas'iṣyate'.⁴ Bādarāyaṇa also maintains that the status of the fully delivered Self is one of non-duality⁵ *avibhāgo vacanāt, avibhago dṛṣṭatvāt*.

Though this status thus appears to be beyond all doubts, dissentient voices have been raised as regards its interpretation. From the point of view of the *ekajīvanāda*,⁶ of course,

1. cf. In our Self-seeing there is a communion with the Self restored to purity. No doubt we should not speak of seeing, but instead of seen and seer, speak boldly of a *simple unity*. For in this, we neither see nor distinguish, nor, are there two. The man is changed, no longer himself, not self-belonging. He is merged with the supreme, sunken into It, one with It; only in separation is there duality. Beholder was one with the beheld. This is the life of god-like and blessed men - liberation from the alien that besets us here, a life taking no pleasure in the things of earth, a flight of the alone to the Alone - Ennead VI, IX, 10-11, S. Mackenna, London.
2. sarvabhūtatmabhūtasya samyagbhūtāni paśyataḥ |
devāpimārgemuhyanthyapadasya padaiṣiṇaḥ ||
S'B. P. 865.
3. evamevāsyaparidraṣṭurimāḥ śodaśa kalā puruṣāyaṇāḥ puru-
ṣaṁ prāpyāstamgacchanti PU. VI, 5. also cf.
vidvatpratīpattyapekṣyā kṛtsnam kalājātam parabrahmavido
brahmaiva sampadyate; 'SB. p. 866.
4. tatahstimitagāmbhiraṁ na tejo natamastatam |
anākhyam anabhivyaktaṁ satkimcid avaśiṣyate ||
Qd. JMV. P. 176.
5. BS. IV. 2, 29; IV 4. 4; also cf. PU. VI 5; CU. VI, 8, 7; BU. I.
4, 10; CU. VII, 24, 1; BU. IV, 3, 23. natutaddvītyamasti;
KU. IV. 15, MuU. III, 28.
yathānadyah syandamānāḥ samudreṣṭam gacchanti nāmarū-
pevihāya |
tathā vidvānnāmarūpādvimuktah parātparam puruṣamupaiti
divyam ||
6. vide pp. 357 ff. supra,

full deliverance entails the abolition of the entire objective manifold, including distinctions like *jīva*, *Īśvara*, and *jaḍa*; for all these are constructions of one real *jīva*, and his awakening must sublate them without remainder. The one *jīva* himself will then remain as the absolute consciousness¹. A modern writer contends that solipsism is a great spiritual truth, and no fallacy, and that subjectivism terminates only with the world.²

But Śaṅkara's own view of Advaita is not solipsistic as we have already shown. He accepts an empirical plurality and distinctions between the delivered Self and the undelivered *jīvas*. From this point of view also more views than one are possible regarding the final status of the delivered Self. The nature of the relation between the *jīvas* and *Īśvara* which we discussed earlier³ has an important bearing on the question under consideration. Taking both *jīvas* and *Īśvara* to be reflections, *pratibimbās*, the delivered Self must revert to its natural status as the prototype, *bimba*, viz., pure consciousness. For, on the destruction of its *upādhis* a reflection cannot revert to another reflection, viz., *Īśvara*.⁴ But Śaṅkara and several other Advaitins hold that the facts of religious experience become intelligible only if *Īśvara* is regarded as the truth of the *jīva*. This point was emphasized in our discussion of relation between *Īśvara* and *jīva*. Empirically speaking, both bondage and freedom issue from *Īśvara*⁵. While *Īśvara*

1. GPK. I. 16.

2. vide Vedantic Epistemology, p. 30; GR. Malkani, Amalner 1953.

3. vide pp. 353. ff. supra.

4. The reasoning here rests solely on analogy. An Object reflected in numerous mirrors answers to the cosmic situation of pure consciousness and its reflections as *Īśvara* and *jīvas*. When one mirror is broken, the reflection may be held to abide as the prototype. Appayya holds that in the *avāccheda-vāda* this explanation would fail, and so that *vāda* has to be rejected. Else it will be open to the charge of exposing the *mukta* to the chances of further bondage. Of course, both theories only serve to illustrate certain truths regarding the relation between consciousness and its *upādhis*. Neither may be taken literally. vide p. 353. supra.

5. *Īśvarātadanujñāyā samsārasya siddhistadanugrahaḥ hetukenaiva caviññānena mokṣasiddhirajīvasya*. 'SB. on Parāttu taschruteh; BS. II, 3, 41.

is the truth of *jīva*, pure consciousness or Brahman is, of course, equally present in both. Therefore, *Īśvara* may be rightly conceived as the prototype of which the *jīvas* are the reflections in countless *upādhis*. Deliverance would mean, then, the reversion of the *jīva*'s reflected consciousness, not to the unconditioned and Absolute consciousness, but to the prototype, viz., *Īśvara*. What this position implies may be set forth thus: All characterizations, including the status, of *bimba*, are appropriate only when applied to *Īśvara*; for, the Absolute is beyond words and thoughts and no relations may be predicated of it. Therefore, from the stand point of *parabrahman* the truth is that there is neither bondage nor liberation¹. There can be no philosophizing there. On this side of the Absolute, *Īśvara* is the prototype of all *jīvas*, and so it stands to reason that the delivered Self must, empirically speaking, assume the status of *Īśvara*, and not *parabrahman*. In the terms of Advaita, of course, *parabrahman* will refuse and resist all characterization,² even the statement that the delivered Self reverts to its status.

Thus the delivered Self may only be conceived as having become absolutely one with *Īśvara*. In several notable passages Śaṅkara has supported this view. Commenting on "*parā-bhidhyānāttu*" &c³, he writes: Are there not the same attributes for *jīva* and *Īśvara*? To be sure, there are. But they are concealed by the curtain of nescience, &c. In rare cases, when the *jīva* strives, meditates on the Lord, and succeeds through His grace in dispelling the darkness of nescience, his hidden sameness with the Lord manifests itself, as the power of sight, suppressed by disease, does under the influence of a

1. GPK. II, 32; nanirodhonacotpattir nabaddhonacasādhakah |
namumukṣurnavai mukta ityeṣā paramārthatā ||
cf. also BU. IV, 3, 22;
2. cf. nacaikam tadnyaddvīṣyam kutaḥ syānavākevalatvam na cā
kevalatvam |
naśūnyam nacāśūnyamadvaitakatvātkatham sarvavedānta-
siddham bravāmi ||
Sl. 10, Daśaśloka.
3. BS. III, 2, 5.

potent remedy.¹ By identical attributes Śāṅkara means traits like truthful willing, *satyaśaṅkṣa*, &c.²

In relation to three *sūtras*,³ Śāṅkara says "Though in strict Advaitic truth, the delivered self is the metaphysical reality, viz., pure consciousness, empirically, Bādarāyaṇa recognizes that the glories and powers of Brahman are compatable with it".⁴ These words clearly affirm that the unity of the delivered Self and *Is'vara* holds good only from the point of view of the undelivered *jīvās - baddhapuruṣavyavahārādṛṣṭyā*.⁵

The mukta's identity with *Is'vara* implies that the goal of *sādhana* in Advaita is not only to 'be perfect as the Father in heaven is perfect', but to realize one's absolute identity with that Father. This becomes intelligible when it is remembered that the *mukta* is fully delivered from all forms of finitude. He has ceased to be an individual among individuals. He has become the Self of all. He realizes himself as the pure consciousness on which the whole cosmos has been superimposed.⁶ To say that the liberated Self is God is the same as saying that truth, goodness, beauty, and holiness are the forms in which the *mukta* appears to the *jīvas* still struggling to deliver themselves. As *Is'vara*, his work of assistance and benediction will continue as long as there is a single undelivered *jīva*.⁷

1. SB. P. 628. *kimpunarjīvasyeśvarasamānadharmatvam nāstye-va? na nāstye'ha, vidyamānamapi tattirohitamavidyādivyavadhānāt tat.....parameśvaram abhidhyāyato yatamānasya jantoh.....kasyacidēvāvīrbhavati.*
2. vide *Sivādvaitaśirṣaya* (SAN) p. 97. Appayya Dīksita, Madras University, 1930.
3. BS. IV. 4, 5, 6 & 7.
4. *evamapi pāramārthikacaitanyasvarūpatvābhyupagamepi vyavahārāpekṣayā pūrvasyāpratyākhyānādavirudham Bādarāyaṇa ācārya manyate, SB. p. 896. cf. tadvilāyanamatadviparītam apahatāpāpmatvādiguṇakam Pāramesvaram vidyayāpratīpad-yate. SB. P. 237.*
5. SAN. p. 78.
6. Audulomi's view BS. IV, 4, 6 is the Advaitic; not Jaimini's BS. IV, 4, 5.
7. Complete identity with *Is'vara* implies that, unlike the sojourners in the world of Brahman, the Advaitic *mukta* performs all cosmic functions like creation, sustentation and retraction of the world. His identity with *Is'vara* is 'nisandhibandham'. vide SLS. p. 112.

Besides the status of complete identity with *Īśvara*, Śaṅkara contemplates in special cases, the possibility of the *mukta*, re-appearing in the world of phenomena to continue some mission divinely entrusted to him. Knowers of Brahman like Apāntara-tmāh are held to have been reborn.¹ The acceptance of such a position does not invalidate the central tenet of Advaita, viz., that the direct knowledge of Brahman leads to instantaneous deliverance. The analogy of the *jīvanmukta* is invoked to clarify their position. The *muktas* who are appointed to carry on special missions are held to be under the sway of *prārabdha karma* which takes several life periods to exhaust itself.² By the force of this *prārabdha*, they freely move from body to body as one may from house to house retaining full memory of the past. At the end of their missions, they also, like other *jīvanmuktas*, attain absolute deliverance from embodiment.

This liberal interpretation is further evidence of the value the Advaitin attaches to the ideal of spiritually enlightened service, which the *muktas* alone can render to the world. Besides, this should finally dispose of the charge that for Śaṅkara this world is nothing but an illusion. *Muktas* do not postpone their complete deliverance for the sake of illusions. The conception of God calling upon the *muktas* to discharge missions of service to struggling humanity also reveals the lofty significance of the *līlā* of life. To the dialectical philosopher the world is *anirvacanīya*; to the unliberated man it has the reality of everyday life. But to the liberated saint it is divine. And, with a view to open the eye of the unregenerate man to the highest value of the world, the saint puts off his complete merger in *para-Brahman*.

1. vide ŚB. on yāvadadhikāramavasthiterādhikārikāṇām. BS III. 3, 32. p. 732.
2. Apantaratmaḥ prabhrtayo'pīśvarāḥ paramesvareṇa teṣu teṣvadhikāreṣu niyuktāḥ santaḥ satyapī samyagdarśanekaivalyahe-tāvakṣiṇa karmāṇo yāvadadhikāram avatiṣṭhante. ŚB. p. 733.

(v) Mukti in the Schools of Vedānta.

(a)

In order to throw into relief the Advaitic concept of *mukti*, we shall briefly consider the forms it has taken in some prominent schools of Vedānta. Among these the *Viśiṣṭādvaitic* elucidation of *mukti* is striking for the religious feelings which have inspired and informed it. We have already referred to its conception of reality as a complex whole of Brahman, *cit* and *acit*, and noted that its account of the *jīva*'s bondage as due to *avidyākarma* leaves it a hard and unintelligible fact.¹ "Finitude, the sum and substance of bondage, is the intolerable burden the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* imposes on the individual. Being the very nature of the *jīva*, finitude is irremovable" - we remarked. Still, that school has its own concept of *mukti* which largely corresponds to the *krāmamukti* as set forth above. The *Viśiṣṭādvaita* conceives *mukti* as reached by a flight of nine steps leading to *paramapada*, the supreme abode of Brahman.² These steps are *viveka*, *nirveda*, *virakti*, *bhīti*, *prasādana*, *utkramaṇa*, *arcirādi*, *divyadeśaprabhāva*, and *prāpti*. *Viveka* is the perception that Brahman is both *śarīrin* and *śeṣin*, the Self of the *ātman*, the whole, of which the *ātman* is part. *Nirveda* is the moral feeling of remorse due to the sense of one's sinfulness, and sufferings due to it. *Nirveda* leads to *virakti* or the renunciation of the joys of heaven and of the self-contentment of *keralin*³. *Bhīti* is the spiritual dread of the hideousness of *saṃsārā* which leads to the desire for release and the practice of *bhakti* and *prapatti*. The next step *prasādanā* points to the divine grace indispensable for *mukti*, grace which begins to operate when the *sādhaka*'s devotion and self-surrender develop into hunger for God. The next four steps refer to the departure of the eligible *jīva* via 'the way of the gods' for the world of Brahman.⁴

Paramapada or the world of Brahman corresponds to the noumenal form of Brahman, referred to in the *Puruṣa sūktā*

1. Vide pp. 416 ff. supra.

2. PV. p. 73.

3. Ibid, pp. 347-48.

4. vide p. 479.

as *tripadasyāmṛtaṇḍivi* ¹. *Mukti* is conceived as a withdrawal from *avidyā kāma-karma* – the complex of ignorance, desire and the sphere of space-time ². The ineffable ecstasy of attaining the *paramapada* is said to be alogical, amoral and supra-personal ³ and yet the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* contends that the liberated *ātman*s retain their distinctness among themselves ⁴. It is often asserted that the *mukta* is *brahmanized*, ⁵ and further, the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* speaks of the '*aprākṛta* forms, flavour, and fragrance' of the experience of Brahman. Inconsistently with the position that *paramapada* is the noumenal aspect of Brahman, the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* speaks of 'matter there without mutations' ⁶. Again it speaks of the *mukta* enjoying identity of abode, proximity and similarity of form, none of which being intelligible without employing the concept of space. But these inconsistencies seem to result from giving free reins to imagination in conceiving the *mukta*'s status. Of course, the *mukta* enjoys bliss in the *paramapada*; in this respect all *muktas* are alike and even equal to Brahman ⁷; but as in the *karamukti* of Advaita, the *muktas* in the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* are debarred from the exercise of the function of creation, &c.

Mukti according to Rāmānuja is the integral experience of Brahman ⁸. But the question how, in integral experience, there can persist the distinction between subject and object is not faced. Besides how can one self objectify another? To be an object of experience is to be inert. Pure consciousness – and both Brahman and Atman are that – can never be objectified ⁹⁻¹⁰,

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1. Rg. V. X, 90.
 2. PV. p. 443.
 3. *avidyā* and *karma* have been identified by Rāmānuja on the basis of the following:
avidyākārmāsamjñānyā tṛtīyā śaktirīṣyate |
yayākṣetrajñasaktih sā vestitā nṛpa sarvagā ||
Viṣṇu Purāṇa VI, 7, 61 Qd. RB. p. 55.
 4. PV. p. 472.
 5. *Ibid*, p. 115.
 6. *Ibid*, pp. 168, 463, 473 &c.
 7. *Ibid*; p. 473.
 8. *niratisāyanandam parambrahma.....anubahavati muktah.*
RB. p. 573.
 9. PV. 479
 10. cf. *svayamev nubhavatā tvādyapyetasya nānubhāvya tvam SN. V. 16.*

and, therefore, an objective experience of Brahman makes little sense. On the otherhand, an unlimited expansion of consciousness such that nothing remains opaque or foreign to it is intelligible. This latter is the *brahmātmabhāva* of Advaitin.

The *mukta* is said to see with 'the eye of Brahman'.¹ With out actually being Brahman, which is ruled out in the *Viṣiṣṭādvaita*, it remains a mystery how 'Brahman's eye' comes - to be borrowed by the *mukta*. In view of the persistent distinction between the *Ātman* and Brahman, no significance can be attached to the expression 'brahmanizing' the *ātman*. It is pertinent to recall the observations of Gauḍapāda on the impossibility of altering the nature of things³. As we have found throughout our study of the problem of *mukti*, the *jīva* can only recover its own nature. This seems to be Rāmāṇja's view also⁴. No doubt he says under *avibhāgena dṛṣṭvāt*⁵, that the *mukta's* experience takes the form '*aham brahmāsmi*'. But this only means that the *mukta* realizes himself to be an inseparable mode or *prakāra* of Brahman. In the light of these clear statements, the expression 'brahmanize' seems to be extremely misleading. In *mukti*, the contracted *dharma bhūtajñāna* or attributive knowledge of the atomic *ātman* expands infinitely. This should mean that all finite *muktas* will be omniscient like God himself. But it is arbitrary to juxtapose the infinitude of knowledge, the attribute, and the finitude of its owner.

Even in *mukti*, the liberated self is dependent as the body on its Self or *satirīn*.⁶ "The *ātman* is nothing, has nothing, and does nothing by itself,"⁶ then, to talk of its deliverance seems to have little meaning.

1. PV. p. 116.
2. cf. The Self in *mukti* develops no new character, IP. ii. p. 710.
3. *prkṛteranyathābhāvonakathamcid bhaviṣyati* GPK. III, 21. IV. 7, 9, 29.
4. *karmasambandhatatkṛtadehādivinirmuktah, svābhāvikenarūpenāsvasthito'tra svenarūpenābhiniṣpadyata ityucyate*. RB. p. 562.
5. BS. IV. 4, 4.
6. *Sāmyasādharmyavyapadeśobrahmaprakārabhūtasyaiva pratyāgātmanah svarūpam tatsamamīdēvāliprakṛtadharmaprah... .. āpōna brahmasamānasuddhim pratipādayati*. RB. p. 564.
7. PV. p. 459.

The *Viśiṣṭādvaita* extols the *dāsa* or the attitude of the servant adopted by the *mukta* ¹, as *kainkaryarasa*. But very little is said about the nature of the services rendered to God by the *mukta*. The *dāsa* is said to be superior to *kaivalya* or the *ātman*'s self-knowledge as distinct from *prakṛti*; for the *ātman* may still lapse into egotism. If this danger is genuine, surely this should mean that the *kevalin* is not yet delivered.

The *viśiṣṭādvaitic* picture of heaven and its Lord is common place. It is only a transposition of the good things of this life. As observed earlier, the most serious drawback of the *viśiṣṭādvaitic* doctrine of *mukti* is that it gladly accepts man's finitude as final. Thus it becomes altogether inadequate for the mystic temperament, more or less present in all *jīvas*, which hates to be imprisoned in a particular finite nature. The mystic longs to escape from himself into God or Brahman. The Upaniṣads give the fullest expression to this longing and its fruition. But due to its metaphysical commitments, the *viśiṣṭādvaita* is forced to ignore this most unique feature of the upaniṣadic record. So long as the finite self is deemed ultimate, and its boundaries sacrosanct, it must remain cut off from the sea of *saccidānanda* and idolize its own finitude.

His metaphysical instincts compel the *viśiṣṭādvaitic* philosopher to affirm that the *jīva* is essentially free ², and yet, quite inconsistently, he maintains that the *jīva*'s bondage is real, though, of course, he has to resort to a 'somehow' to support this self-contradictory position ³. Sin and punishment and liberation can only form an objective series which leaves the Self untouched.⁴ As such, they can only be appearances. The soul that is bound and liberated is the empirical ego. The failure to perceive this truth is responsible for the inconsistencies of the *Viśiṣṭādvaitic* position.

(b)

In the dualistic school of Madhva, as already noted ⁵, not all *jīvas* can achieve deliverance. Those who are fit for deli-

1. Ibid.

2. PV. pp. 105, 140.

3. Ibid; pp. 136, 461.

4. vide Vivekānanda's works, Vol. III, p. 239.

5. vide p. 340.

-verance - *muktiyogyas* - alone will be delivered. This is an extremely disquieting position, for, the fitness in question is not in the power of the *jīvas* to acquire. Ignoring this vital point for the moment and turning to the question of *mukti* itself, we note that the gulf between the *Jīvas* and God will always remain unbridged. For the *Jīva* is *alpa-guṇa*, of few virtues, while Brahman is *pūrṇa-guṇa*,¹ of infinite excellence. The denial that the *Jīva* can attain identity with God is based on what Madhva calls the contradiction of this concept by all *pramāṇas sūrvamānavirodhāt*.² True, in the upaniṣads there are affirmations of such identity, but according to Madhva they mean only similarity. The bondage of the *jīva* is accepted as a fact. In *Dvaita* it can only be due to the pleasure of God, i.e., Viṣṇu, that some are kept in perpetual bondage and only some are released. Madhva maintains that the knowledge of the *Jīvas*' dependence on God is a condition for winning liberation; for it will please God and induce him to grant liberation.³ This will apply, of course, only to those who are fit for *mukti*. Though, on the basis of the *śruti*, *nānyahpanthā vidyate'yanāya*,⁴ Madhva insists on the importance of knowledge, in his scheme of *mukti bhakti* or devotion to God is given a still more prominent place.⁵ In spite of such statements, Madhva's final position seems to be that God liberates whomsoever he is pleased to liberate.⁶ As in all other schools of Indian Philosophy, in *Dvaita* also meditation, *dhyāna*, is regarded as indispensable for the immediate apprehension of God as without equals and superiors.⁷ The author of the *Nyāyāmṛta* argues that he who has the vision of the truth but not the grace of God continues to live in flesh. This state corresponds to the *jīvanmukti* of the Advaitic School.

1. NyV. I.1. cf. apūrṇo'yaṃ jīvasamghoṣvatantraḥ pūrṇohariḥ saṁsavatantraḥ sadaiva | Qd. NyV. II. 1-11.

2. Ibid; II, 3 14.

3. From a dualist comment on the ŚU. I, 6, it would appear that what causes the *jīvas*' bondage is their notion that themselves and God are *not* different, vide The ŚU. with the comment by Nārāyaṇācārya of Satara.

4. Jñānīnām mokṣaṃ dadātyeveśvaraḥ; NyV. III, I, 18.

5. ŚU. III, 8.

6. bhaktyaivainaṃ jānāti paśyati bandhāt pramucyate; NyV. III, 3, 30.

7. kaṃcanamocayedvāsausvāntṛyaṃ tenatasyahi NyV. III.

8. dhyānaṃ vināparokṣajñānākhyaviśeṣakāryānupāpatteḥ NyV. IV. 1, 7.

The progress of those who are destined to be liberated along the path of the gods is a feature of the Dvaita school also; the only difference is that *Vāyu* is said to lead them to the world of Brahman - here interpreted as the 'creator Brahman'.¹ Corresponding to the *paramapada* in the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* there is the *Śvetadvīpa* in the Ocean of Milk in the mythology of Dvaita, where Viṣṇu, the Supreme Being is conceived to dwell.

Mukti itself has been defined as the abidance by each *jīva* in his own proper nature discarding all foreign elements²; or as the manifestation of the bliss forming one's own nature and in the measure of one's fitness.³ A modern writer on Dvaita describes it as the realization of perfection according to one's capacity.⁴ Since no two *jīvas* have the same capacity, it follows that the *muktas* are unequal among themselves, and are different entirely from God. Their respective powers of enjoyments are also under the firm control of God.⁵ In spite of the subjection of the *muktas* to God as to other superior beings,⁶ Madhva says they have no sense of incompleteness and are all happy.⁷ The problem of harmony among the wills of these unequal *muktas* is solved by the assertion that complete concord prevails among them as well as between them, on the one hand, and God, on the other. Further it is affirmed that the *muktas* have a sense of supreme achievement, *kṛtakṛtyatā* and are supremely happy, *paramasukhinah*.⁸ They are still devotees of God, and their very devotion is blissful.⁹ As in other schools, the *muktas* never have to return to a state of wordly life; for their desires are fulfilled and they do not desire to return.

1. MB. P. 1066.
2. muktirhitvānyathā rūpaṃ svarūpeṇa vyavasthitiḥ MB. P. 113.
3. svasvayogyasvasvarāpānandābhivyaktiḥ - Qd. IP. ii, p. 748.
4. DV. P. 211.
5. MB. P. 1083.
6. muktānāmpatayodevā devānāmca prajāpatiḥ |
tasya Viṣṇurncaivedam pāramparyaṃvinaśyati ||
NyV. IV. 4, 7.
7. apurnatādibhāvovā dukkhaṃ vā nāstikiṃcana |
muktasya pūratantrye, pitāratmyepyataḥ sukhiḥ ||
NyV. IV. 2, 8.
8. Ibid; VI. 4, 10.
9. Ibid.

In defence of the Dvaita doctrine of inequality in *mukti* we are told that in actual life - ie., life in bondage, there are inequalities.¹ But this implies that there is no difference between the states of bondage and deliverance. "Madhva" it is said, "has given a touch of *mukti* to the so-called bondage".² The opposite of this statement is the truth of the matter; the *mukti* in Dvaita reproduces all the intolerable features of *samsāra* like the distinctions of high and low. This unsatisfactory character of the Dvaita doctrine of release stems from its dogma of the *jīvas*' eternal dependence on God. If the difference between the two, *jīvas* and God, be absolute, there can be no dependence at all. Actually dependence implies a closer kinship between the nature of God and that of *Jīva* than Madhva envisages. To make this dependence a common feature of bondage and release is to make them indistinguishable.

Of course, *mukti* loses all sense and value when it is arbitrarily limited to a few *jīvas*. God who functions in this manner can scarcely command the allegiance of enlightened human conscience. Nor can any individual, uncertain of his position in the gradation of *jīvas*, seriously strive for *mukti*, he may have been preordained to damnation for aught he knows. On such premises, spiritual indolence and despair must logically follow. "Is not God playing a practical joke on us when he implants in us a desire for heaven while making us unfit for it?"³ Not even by human standards of fairness can we tolerate the condemnation of large numbers of human beings either as *nityasamsārins* or as *tamoyogyas*. God in Dvaita appears needlessly despotic and man abjectly helpless. Not only does the doctrine of inequality of the *muktas* violate our sense of justice, it also runs counter to the express teachings of the upaniṣads like *paramamsāmyamupaiti*,⁴ and the clear pronouncement of the *Brahmasūtras*.⁵ The full vision of reality cannot admit of degrees and differences, for right understanding is objectively

1. DV. P. 214.

2. Ibid;

3. IP. ii. 751.

4. MuU. III, 1, 3.

5. *evam muktiphalaṇīyamastadavasthāvadhr̥testadavasthāvadhr̥teḥ* - BS. III, 4, 52.

determined and not subjectively swayed one way or other.¹ The *Dvaita vedānta* runs counter to the deepest intuition of the spiritual equality of mankind.²

(iv) Mukti in Advaita and in other Schools of Indian thought.

Now we may turn to an estimate of *mukti* in Advaita in comparison with the elucidation of the same concept in the classical schools of Indian thought. In part one of this thesis we offered a detailed examination of their solutions of the problem of *mukti*. What is proposed now is to place their results side by side with the Advaita concept of *mukti* so as to stress the salient features of the latter. Among these schools we observed, the *Cārvākas* or materialists can hardly be taken seriously; their main object was only to caricature the orthodox views.³ They ridicule all suggestions of an end beyond the plane of instincts. As no thinking man can remain confined to the narrow and drab world of his senses, and ignore or suppress the urges of his rational and spiritual nature, the *Cārvāka* 'ideal' of the pursuit of pleasure may be left alone to tell its tale of subhuman grossness.

The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* effort is more serious. It recognizes that life in the world without looking beyond it is quite unedifying. True, the thinkers of this school deepen the shadows of life and fail to see any of its relieving features. Life is represented as a mass of pains.⁴ To avoid life, therefore,

1. SB. P. 824.

2. According to Bhāskara the upholder of the *bhedābhedavāda*, *mukti* consists in *ekibhava* or *avibhāga* - non-difference of the *jīva* and the Absolute, in which the sense of plurality is removed, and not plurality itself. vide PB. p. 116. This suggests a partial obscuration of knowledge. His view of Brahman as being endowed with real *upādhis*, due to which it undergoes transformation into *jīvas* and the world, makes his concept of *mukti* hard to follow. So long as the *upādhis* are real the danger of the *mukta* lapsing into a state of bondage is real. Besides, such a concept of Brahman infects Brahman with the evils and imperfections of life; and unity with it can hardly form a worthy goal for the *Jīva* seeking perfection.

3. vide P. 13 supra.

4. P. 23 supra.

seems logical enough. But what they offer in its place is nothing very fascinating - an *ātman* devoid of all sensations and life. There is no pain in the delivered self. There is no joy nor life in it either. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* concept of the *ātman* is an extremely impoverished one. With Śrī Harṣa we may ask: how can a disembodied self, no better than a piece of stone, be held up as the goal of human endeavour¹? Deliverance is nothing if not a state of holiness, consciousness, bliss and repose. None of these characteristics distinguishes the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika mukti*. Hence one can understand the feelings of abhorrence which it evoked from the earliest days and which have been expressed in the verse we quoted in our section on this school of thought.²

The *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* concept of *mukti* stresses its nature as free from pain. *Mukti* here is not positive bliss.³ The philosophers of this school are much concerned to keep the self or *Puruṣa* empty of bliss. While they hardly reason out this position, we may infer that they hold it because they identify all bliss with the empirical forms of it. In *mukti* the *puruṣa* does not enter into subject-object relations, and therefore, there can be no experience of bliss either. But it never occurs to them to ask what the source of the positive pleasure we all experience is. Some of them treat pleasure as the cessation of pain, flying in the face of experience. But apart from their defective conception of the self, we pointed out the metaphysical difficulties of the self's association with, and dissociation from, *Prakṛti*. The *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* thinkers start with antagonistic concepts of the two, and, no wonder, no useful purpose is served by them. For the self, thus conceived, there can be no bondage or deliverance. The weakness of this school of thought lies in their defective metaphysics. If somehow the *Puruṣa* is entangled in *Prakṛti*'s toils, nothing can prevent even a liberated *Puruṣa* from repeating the fatal error. Nor may an inert and eternal *Prakṛti* discriminate or pity. The strong point of the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* thinkers seems to be the perception of the totally opposed nature of the subject and

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1. P. 32 supra.
 2. P. 31 supra.
 3. vide pp. 68 ff.
 4. vide pp. 69. ff. supra.

object. The self is pure consciousness, they insisted rightly. They even saw that, as such, the self cannot be bound or released. But from this they proceeded to deduce wrongly that it is the inert *Prakṛti* that is both bound and released. Further, they failed to see that *Prakṛti* itself cannot, without prejudice to the infinitude of the self be ultimately real or infinite. Two real and opposed infinities make for an unsatisfactory solution of the problem of deliverance. They create difficulties for thought, for, they are born of confused thinking. Both are more abstractions in the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* metaphysics.¹

The *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* is very lukewarm in its treatment of the problem of *mukti*.² All the time insisting on the importance of ritualistic activities, it could not very well enthuse over the ideal of deliverance from all obligations to act. Nonetheless, in conformity with 'the spiritual fashion' of the Indian schools of thought, the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* also speaks of bondage and deliverance. Bondage is due to the self's relation to the body, organs, and the external world,³ and deliverance consists in the avoidance of *dharma* and *adharma*.⁴ Both *karma* and *jñāna* must cooperate to bring about *mukti*, which is merely absence of pain without any positive happiness. There is some dispute regarding the precise nature of *mukti* in the two schools of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*. The *Prābhakras* make it indistinguishable from the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* concept. Some *Kaumarilas* tend to make it a state of bliss.⁵ But, in essence, and on the whole, the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* view of *mukti* may be taken as the same as the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* one. The way they speak of exhausting past acts and their effects through the performance of *nitya* and the *naimittika* acts suggests a clean refusal to face the issues seriously. The whole scheme they propose is wildly conjectural and no effort is made to reason out the issues. To maintain that it is the very nature of the self to be an agent in actions and an

1. P. 73. supra.

2. p. 207. supra.

3. p. 208. supra.

4. P. 214. supra.

5. vide P. 218. supra.

experient of pains and pleasures is to condemn it to perpetual bondage; for, the nature of things cannot be altered.¹

Turning to the *Jaina* view of *mukti*, defined as the annihilation of all *kārmic* matter,² or the final dissociation from the body, one is struck by their abnormal view of the self and the karma which stricks to the Self. Real contact is possible only between things of like nature. Karma being material, self also must be such, presumably. This conclusion is reinforced by the *Jaina* theory of the self's expansions and contractions - notions which are illegitimately transferred from the sphere of matter to the realm of the spirit. Add to this the further notion that the delivered selves of varying dimensions shoot upwards and reach a certain point in supra-mandane space - *alokākāśa* and dwell there for ever. The expression 'upward movement', '*ūrdhvagaurava*'³, to suggest the notion of spiritual aspirations, is pretty, but to take it literally and identify it with deliverance leaves the latter a movement without rest. Still, the delivered self is supposed to enjoy infinite knowledge, power, and intuition. But how can these infinitudes be reconciled with the finitude of the *jīva*? What are the perfected selves supposed to do with their power, knowledge and intuition? If in all these respects, the delivered selves are identical, there is no point in maintaining that they are many. To say that their sizes vary is to provoke the question how a spirit can have any size at all which is a purely material attribute. But, in fact, the *jains* had a more satisfactory concept of deliverance of a thoroughly spiritual character.⁴ Still, their two views are incompatible. We further pointed out that Jainism does not clearly distinguish between the *jīva* and the self.⁵ The *Jaina* admission of *kevala jñāna* points to monism; for, in perfect and infinite knowledge, the exclusively psychological self is transcended and a unity of content and consciousness is reached. Total freedom denoted by *mukti* is incompatible with dualistic

1. P. 318 supra.

2. P. 181 supra.

3. P. 182 supra.

4. vide pp. 179-183 supra.

5. PP. 184-185 ff. supra.

obstructions. But Jainism does not seem to have thought out the implications of its doctrine of *kevalajñāna*.

The search for *mukti* was the basic passion of the Buddha and therefore, the systems of thought associated with his name are "impregnated with the flavour of deliverance" ¹. As we saw, a variety of concepts of deliverance has been developed in the schools of the *Hīnayāna* and the *Mahāyāna*, all of which may be said to have been informed by the spirit of the Buddha. The most salient feature of the buddhist concept of deliverance is the organic relation in which it has been brought with a profoundly thoughtout system of ethical life. True, in no schools of Indian thought has the importance of right living been altogether ignored, but no school stresses its decisive importance so much as the buddhist schools do. The *ariyaastāngikomaggo* ² seems to suit only those who are somewhat preoccupied with their own culture and perfection. But the path which the *Bodhisattvas* tread ³ with unsurpassed courage makes for the most opulent growth and development of the richness of the spirit. Their ethics are the most precious part of the schools of Buddhism.

But when we turn to their metaphysics, the picture becomes less reassuring: for there is great difficulty in deciding what exactly the Buddha taught. ⁴ The buddhist insistence on *anatta* ⁵ creates the impression that there is no stable principle anywhere in the Universe either within or without man. A call to ethical life, however exalted, but uninformed by a clearly intuited and affirmed spiritual principle must prove repellent. No doubt, such a life is good in itself and so must be cultivated; but the philosophic spirit in man inquires into the spiritual roots of such ethics. If he is told that there is no radical spiritual principle he may be well dismayed and so be excused for looking askance at that system of conduct. But more important for philosophy is the question of the principles involved. Unless the ethical life be an expression in action of a

1. Cullavagga IX, 1, 4.

2. pp. 95 ff. supra.

3. pp. 131. supra.

4. p. 148. supra.

5. p. 79. supra.

perfect spirit in man and the Universe, what relation can there be between life and the attainment of Nirvāṇa? The noble eight-fold way and the *Bodhisattva's* career must be taken as the unfoldment of the real Self of man. Otherwise, there will be no relation, organic or otherwise, between conduct and its crown, viz., deliverance.

In contrast, the Advaitic *sādhana* of which *Karmayoga* is an indispensable element, is organically linked to the Advaitic doctrine of the Self. All yogas are at once means and ends in the sense that while they help the *sādhaka* to realize the perfect Self of all, *siddhas* or *muktas*, express themselves through them.¹ This concept of the means as ends spread out, a corollary of Advaita, seems to have been missed by the buddhist thinkers.

The nature of Nirvāṇa is as indeterminate in Buddhism as the nature of the self. True the buddhists usually deny the reality of the latter. On the character of Nirvāṇa also there is hardly any unanimity.² In the *Hīnayāna* schools, Nirvāṇa appears either as a "lifeless residue—a separate reality of elements in their death" or a blank of unconsciousness, *klesa-janmanoh kṣayaḥ*, without any positive counterpart.³ The *arhat* in the *Hīnayāna*, corresponding to the *jīvanmukta* in Advaita, is also somewhat forbidding; he is a self-centred individual whose sympathy and love find little expression in impersonal action.⁴ In the *Mahāyāna* the ethical ideal leaves nothing to be desired.⁵ But its two schools offer only negative metaphysics. The *Vijñānavādin* denies the reality of everything except the stream of his momentary consciousness, and yet calls for a lofty ethical life. The *Sūnyavādin* denies every abiding principle while not abating his ethical demands. As we remarked earlier, this divorce of metaphysics from ethics tends to rob the latter of its foundation and significance.⁶ The

1. cf. *sarvatraiva hyadhyātmaśāstre kṛtārthalakṣaṇānīyānitāny-eva sādhanānyupadiśyante yatnasādhyatvāt* BGC. pp. 114, 115.

2. vide pp. 148 ff. supra.

3. p. 148. supra.

4. p. 149. supra.

5. P. 150. supra

6. vide, "Can there be ethics without metaphysics," a paper by Dr. T.M.P. Mahadevan, IPC. Proceedings, p. 130, 1952,

condemnation of all objects of experience as unreal or *sūnya* conveys no meaning unless there is a stable standard of reality established somewhere. While the *Vijñānavāda* grants a momentary reality to consciousness, the *Sūnyavāda* revels in a very orgy of negation, denying every conceivable thing. Denial or sublation without a stable basis or *adhiṣṭhāna* is the radical fallacy of the *Mahāyāna* schools. To leave the concept of reality entirely vague and seek to build on it an attractive ethic serve only to bewilder. Śaṅkara had in mind only the *Mādhyamika* metaphysics when he remarked that it violates all means of right cognition.¹ The effort to win Nirvāṇa to escape from sorrows which do not exist is clearly pointless. Again the Absolute of the *Mādhyamikas*, not associated with any principle of negation, cannot account for anything and so serves no philosophic purpose. Further, this Absolute is said to be only *śānta* and *śiva*,² and not also conscious and blissful.³ Therefore, the *Advaitin* cannot approve of the *Mādhyamika* view of deliverance, though Stcherbatsky asserts that the Advaitic and the *Mādhyamika* views are identical⁴. The difference between the two relates to the nature of the Absolute in the two systems. The Advaitic Absolute is *saccidānanda* raised, no doubt, to an ineffable degree, and in some sense this Absolute is the source of the world in which enter, as factors, existence, consciousness and bliss. Hence it is not hatred of Buddhism,⁵ which prevents the Advaitin from affirming identity of views with the *Mādhyāmika* dialectician.

The position of the *Vijñānavāda* is slightly different. It arose as a reaction against the extremism of the *Mādhyamika*.⁶ If the *ālayavijñāna* were conceived as stable and as manifesting itself empirically as *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*, there will be practical identity between the Absolute of Advaita and that of the *Vijñānavāda*. This is to say, not that Śaṅkara derived *parabrahman* from the *Laṅkāvatāra* or Maitreyanātha, but that, possibly, the latter deviated from the upaniṣadic concept of Brahman.

1. 'SB. on BS II, 2, 31.

2. vide P. 144 supra.

3. vide P. 155 supra.

4. Ibid.

5. Vide concept of Nirvāṇa, p. 38, Stcherbatsky.

6. P. 155 supra.

The vital difference between the Advaitic and the Buddhist concept of *mukti* derives from the different concepts of the Self evolved in these schools of thought. The relative unreality of the objective world is common to the *Mahāyāna* and Advaita. But the latter has a compact system of metaphysics with a carefully thoughtout concept of the Absolute which is the source and essence of the concrete world¹. What distinguishes Advaita from all other schools of Indian thought is its clear-eyed perception that reality and value meet in indivisible union.² Nothing real is left outside the the Absolute to be discarded as value-free. Self or *ātman* is only one among other equally real principles in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*; in the *Sāṃkhya-yoga* inert *prakṛti* is basically different from *Puruṣa* and so is ultimately to be shunned and left over. In *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, the metaphysical position is practically the same as in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. In Jainism, too, the concept of self is mixed up with materialistic notions. Buddhism fosters a lofty system of ethical values, but being without roots in any well-conceived metaphysics, it is deprived of steady nourishment and tends to hang in mid-air. In contrast to them all, Advaita, with the metaphysics of the Upaniṣads and the ethics of *Bhagavad Gītā*, constitutes an ideal combination which recognizes and provides for the deepest elements of man's spiritual nature. In the next and final section of this chapter we shall try to show that it adequately safeguards the most enlightened interests of the evolving human personaliyy.

(vii) The Advaita mukti as Life's goal.

We started with the object of elucidating the Advaitic concept of *mukti* so as to bring out its deep philosophic and spiritual import. No system of Indian thought is "more concerned with the great problem of how man can attain spiritual union with infinite being,"³ and none, as we saw, has been more thorough-going in the solution offered than the Advaita. In the course of our exposition we showed that the doctrine of *samsāra*, to which Advaita attaches an

1. pp. 223. ff. supra.

2. vide The Vedānta of Śaṅkara pp. 83-84.

3. Indian thought, Preface vi. Schweitzer.

empirical significance, 'far from being a doctrine of despair, is a source of hope and reassurance. For, it guarantees that every man may expect to achieve deliverance through the realization that he is the same in essence as the infinite spiritual Being of the world. This unique value attached to human life stands in striking contrast to 'the one life - one chance theory of salvation' which finds support, e.g., in the Christian religion.¹

It has been remarked that "the peculiarity of the Indian eye of thought is that it sees or searches every where for the spirit".² The Advaitic *mukti* which is the same as *brahmātmabhāva* is the complete answer to the persistent hunger of the seeker after the spirit. It is based upon the intuition that "the material universe is only an appearance of the spirit" and that the perfection which man seeks is in reality an eternal possession of his, which only a delusion hides away from him. This position apparently robs *sādhana* of much of its significance but on the other hand, to think of *mukti* as the attainment of an extrinsic perfection is to make it transitory and its possession precarious. Therefore, Advaita insists that *mukti* is the intuition of one's inherent spiritual perfection. "Within the range of the finite we can never see or experience that the End has been really secured. The consummation of the infinite End, therefore, consists merely in removing the illusion which makes it seem yet unaccomplished".³ The fear⁴ that this view paralyses effort is based on a confusion between a metaphysical truth and a living fact. The purpose of Advaita *sādhana* is to actualize the metaphysical truth of perfection inherent in the individual. That very truth guarantees that the effort at its realization is never wasted but sure to be crowned with success. Besides, the judgement that *sādhana*

1. vide, The meaning of Life in Hinduism and Buddhism, pp. 36. ff. F. H. Ross, London, 1952.
2. The Indian conception of life p. 174. Aurobindo, IPC. Proceedings, 1950.
3. Hegel. Qd. Idea of God, p. 412 cf. There is one road and one road only, we have held, by which the finite creature can identify itself with perfection, and that begins by accepting perfection as real. Value and Destiny, P. 303, Bosanquet.
4. vide, Idea of God, p. 412.

is as unreal as the rest of empirical life is valid only from the metaphysical point of view of the *Advaitic* reality. To get to it in truth and effectually to make the judgement under reference *sādhana* is indispensable.

In the light of the Advaitic ideal of *mukti* "life as a whole becomes a passage to the infinite, and a discipline for spiritual perfection".¹ The object of the discipline is to make God consciousness habitual. The *mukti* ideal which demands "a heightening of mind and reason to their greatest lights and powers" in order to reach out to the infinite Being in us stresses the autonomy of the human spirit. *Mukti* in Advaita is not a gift from on high; nor is the divine Being outside of or discrepant with the being of man.² Advaita insists that to "get at the core of God at his greatest one must go to the depths of the soul, to the roots, to the heights," for, "all that God can do is focussed there". Briefly, Advaita immeasurably deepens our sense of the value and destiny of the human individual. It fully supports the poet's intuition that,

Our destiny, our being's heart and home
Is with infinitude and only there.³

Only it would not consent to any watering down of the import of these words. But it may be asked how, when the individual as such does not survive in *mukti*, it can inspire his efforts and become his supreme goal. The Advaitin points out that the *mukti* he seeks after is not an external possession to be owned by the individual and to feel proud about. It is growth of the individual in every dimension of his being. Hence there is no question of any loss except in the sense in which the adult may be said to lose the prattle of his childhood days. The 'loss' involved in *mukti* is the loss of an illusion and the activities issuing therefrom; it is the loss of the finitude of the individual. Insistence on preserving the finite ego in the state of deliverance arises from the baseless notion that *mukti* is an

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1. The Indian conception of life p. 177.
 2. cf. The knower and the known are one. Simple people imagine that they should see God as if He stood there and they here. This is not so. God and I, we, are one in knowledge - Eckhart, Qd. The meaning of Life, p. 22.
 3. The Prelude, Bk. VI.

object among objects to be owned. In *mukti* is preserved the essence of all that we value, viz., truth, consciousness, and bliss not as three entities, but as a living integral reality, the one supreme good. It is not a negation, but a positive fulfilment of all that, as finite individuals, we are striving to realize. It is liberation from one-sidedness and partiality. The basic fact on which such an ideal is based may be recognized in the "fundamental instinct towards the identification of the self with ultimate reality",¹ the *ātmakāma* as the upaniṣads term it.

The desire for survival, when rightly analysed and tested, will resolve itself into a desire for the survival of the best in man.² His present private ego constituted by its exclusive relations is often felt and judged as not the best in him. The current ego is subject to the self-transcendent impulse which brooks nothing finite. Indeed, the past of the same individual may appear, in enlightened retrospect, to be hostile and deserving of rejection. This is the essence of remorse and self-loathing. The process of self-transcendence thus seems to be inevitable in the development of personality. The Advaitic ideal of *mukti* suggests that the process must, ultimately, culminate in a total outgrowing of the finite self or ego.³ Freedom from exclusiveness expressed in active sympathy, knowledge, and love is a rational ideal and its full realization, according to Advaita, is of the essence of *mukti*. Personality as such cannot characterize this state, for finitude is the hall mark of personality and *mukti* is the negation of finitude.⁴ Personality is an accident of passing circumstances and, therefore, cannot characterize a state of stable perfection.⁵ Even so,

1. cf. Value and Destiny, pp. 271-272.

2. Ibid PP. 276. ff;

3. cf. I cannot desire my continuance as what would seem to my present consciousness the same personality, while also desiring completeness and stability in my experience. Ibid p. 287.

4. cf. In desiring a highly developed perfection we are desiring to be something which can no longer be identified with or by incidents of the terrestrial life; Ibid. p. 285.

5. cf. We with our lives are like islands in the sea or like trees in the forest. Our normal consciousness is circumscribed for adaptation to our external earthly environment, but the fence is weak in spots; fitful influences from beyond leak in - William James, Qd. Theories of Religious experience, p. 27. J. M. Moore, New York, 1938.

as we emphasized earlier, the fully delivered Self remains, to empirical consciousness, identical with God, the embodiment of all values. The *mukta's* capacity for the realizations of values is augmented infinitely and finds expression in cosmic activities as the divine Being. While *mukti*, then, is not a state of finite personality, it has room for super-personality, and impartial play of truth, goodness, beauty, and holiness. Unlike the case in Buddhist Nirvāṇa, in the Advaitic *mukti*, there is no irrevocable loss of value to the world of aspiring spiritual beings. As the divine Being, the *mukta* admits of spiritual communion.

The Advaitic ideal of *mukti*, again, unveils the vision of a world "which is a living, breathing, palpitating, all-embracing, all-animating whole."¹ It is often alleged that the Advaitic ideal entails the rejection of the world as a fiction, *tuccha*. It is the pretensions of the world as an independent reality that are stigmatized as a falsity by the Advaitin. In the state of *mukti* the world is transfigured into the living image of the divine; ignorantly imagined spatio-temporal character, *nāma* and *rūpa*, vanishes like the rope-snake. Thus the Advaitic ideal of *mukti* implies the exaltation of both man² and world to the status of the divine.

A word may be added as regards the validity of the Advaitic approach to *mukti* or Brahman. It rests upon the fact that our discursive, reason, which always sunders the 'what' from 'that,' content from existence, or predicate from subject, is incompetent to do justice to the integrality of the real. Discursive reason cannot proceed without distinctions. Hence it cannot apprehend the plenary reality which has no distinctions of its own. The only knowledge which is immediate and indubitable is Self-knowledge, i.e., knowledge not of, but knowledge that is, the Self. This intuitive experience is *ātmasākṣātkāra* or *anubhūti*. The appeal to the

1. Head Quarters of Reality, p. 133. E. Holmes, 1933.
2. Of. "The only God that exists, the only God in whom I believe.....my God the miserable, my god the poor of all races" Vivekananda. On this R. Rolland comments: India's destiny was changed by him, and his teaching [re-echoed throughout humanity. Prophets of the New India, p. 460. Also cf. *sarvabhūteṣu cātmanāṃ sarvabhūtāni cātmani | samampāśyannāmayāji svārājyamadhigacchati ||* Manu XII, 91

upanishads, a prominent feature of Advaita, really means only an appeal to the integral experience of the Self. There is nothing arbitrary about it.¹ The Advaita, in effect, says "Grow and you will know. Make yourself more real and you will see deeper into the heart of reality."²

The Advaita, then, claims that Self-intuition, which comes as the culmination of strenuous *sādhana*, yields the truth which delivers from bondage and finitude. Of course, the tree is known by its fruit. The Advaita claim must be tested in the crucible of experience. Here its ideal of *jīvanmukti* assumes decisive significance. The *Jīvanmuktas* are not a long-vanished race. These supermen are there to furnish the living proof of the validity of the *Advaitic* claim that the realization of Self delivers one from the clutches of the separatist ego. "No doubt the status of the *siddha* and *mukta* baffles the positivist mind. But the *Advaitin* has seized on the ideal of *mukti*, kept it a living and practicable thing, sounded all the ways to this spiritually perfect existence, and made it the common highest aim and universal spiritual destiny of every human being."³ Indeed, the significance of the *Advaitic* ideal lies in the fact that "spiritual freedom and perfection were not figured as a high and far-off ideal, but presented as the common human necessity, a thing for all to grow into, made possible to all" on the basis "of renunciation and the love of impersonal perfection". Undoubtedly the ideal presented is none too easy. It demands spiritual heroism of a rare quality. But it makes sense and is a challenge to man's spirit of adventure. The souls home-sick for the universal spirit take up the challenge; also, those whose love of philosophy does not stop short at mere theorizing.

1. vide Gauḍapāda, pp. 79 ff.

2. That this is not an improper approach to Reality seems admitted. cf. "Here, says science, I have left a domain in which I shall not interfere. I grant that you have some kind of avenue to it, through the self-knowledge of consciousness, so that it is not necessarily a domain of pure agnosticism" Eddington Qd. Meaning and Purpose p. 189. K. Walker, 1940.

3. Adapted from the Indian conception of Life.

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129	33	mahātyāga i.e.,	mahātyāga, i.e.,
130	15	-ficient	-ficent
130	19	becomes,	becomes
133	27	bhāvasvabhāvābhāv,	bhāvasvabhāvābhāva
134	16	in most	inmost
134	28	nirupādiṣṭeṣanirvāṇa- dhātu	nirupādisesanirvana- dhātu
136	30	is not be	is not to be
137	Title	Yogācāra of Viñāna- vāda view of Nirvāṇa	Mādhyamika School on Nirvāṇa
138	1	envelopes	envelops
138	21	then	than
138	28	buddhist	Buddhist
139	13	vijñāvādins	Vijñānavādins
140	15	existenece	existence
140	24	Nirvāṇa	Nirvāṇa
141	Title	Yogācāra or Vijñāna- vāda View of Nirvāṇa	The Mādhyamika School on Nirvāṇa
141	19	still,	still
141	33	as much these	as much as these
142	Footnote 1	P. 145	P. 136
143	Title	Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda View of Nirvāṇa	The Mādhyamika School on Nirvāṇa
145	13	sprung	sprang
145	14	buddhist	Buddhist
145	18	mataphysical	metaphysical
145	32	becames	becomes
146	27	Vaibyaṣikas	Vaibhāṣikas
147	7	Sautrantikas	Sautrāntikas
147	9	-continnum-	-continuum-
147	14	sautrāntikas	Sautrāntikas

Page	Line	For	Read
148	6	philanthrophy	philanthropy
148	25	tense	sense
149	Sub-title	The vijñānavādin's	The Vijñānavādin's
150	18	Mādyamikas,	Mādhyaṃikas,
151	13	S'aṅkara	S'aṅkara
151	18	Tathāgata	Tathāgata.
151	21	says that doctrine	says that the doctrine
152	12	nagations	negations
152	13	dialeetical	dialectical
152	25	ultimate	ultimate
154	6	vedic	Vedic
154	16	ātman	ātman
154	31	permanet	permanent
155	4	unity-in-defference	unity-in-difference
155	15	Indrabūti :	Indrabhūti :
155	Footnote 3 line 7	ture	true
155	Footnote 3 line 8	point of	point of view of
155	Footnote 3 line 11	point of the	point of view of the
155	Footnote 3 line 17	prediction	predication
155	Footnote line 21	pot	post
155	Footnote line 23	indescribability	indescribability
156	12	it	is
157	25	cf	of
157	28	indifference ;	in difference ;
158	18	intelligence	intelligence
158	20	existences	existence
158	21	references	reference
162	12	(no full stop)	put full stop (.)
164	Footnote 3 line 3	manaḥpāryāyah	Full Italics : manahparyāyah
165	19	mithātvamohaniya	mithyātvamohaniya
165	30	pasaions	passions
166	29	Ofcourse	Of course

Page	Line	For	Read
167	21	upasamita	upaś'amita
169	9	spiritul	spiritual
169	10	tattvārthas'raddhāna	tattvarthas'raddna,
170	1	reinitiation	initiation
173	17	wellcultivated	well cultivated
174	21	samygdṛṣṭi.	samyagdṛṣṭi.
175	21	suppreseed	suppressed
175	35	kavali	kevali
176	Footnote line 9	Forberance	Forbearance
176	Footnote line 10	straight forwardness	straight-forwardness
179	12	tīrtaṅkara	Tīrthaṅkara
179	15	upaniṣadic	Upaniṣadic
180	8	paramevayoman	parame vyoman
180	12	moksa	mokṣa
181	9	ātman	ātman.
181	14	two-it	two. It
182	6	it	its
183	13	Upaniṣads,	Upaniṣads,
183	Footnote 4	Prakataṇa	Prakaraṇa
184	19	walking	waking
189	Footnote 1 Line 3	abov	above
190	6	whe	who
190	28	then	than
191	6	al	all
192	19	inthe	in the
194	18	being of	of
194	26	body sense-organs	body, sense-organs
194	Footnote 7 Line 4	ephemerāl.	ephemeral.
195	26	Pañca dasī	Pañcadaśī
196	4	Bondage.	Bondage
196	22	antivedic	anti-vedic
198	9	perceives	perceives
198	18	seem	seems

Page	Line	For	Read
198	19	<i>In the</i>	In the
199	4	tranquility	tranquillity
199	7	upaniṣads	Upaniṣads
199	10	vedic	Vedic
199	17	pratyavāya,	pratyavāya.
199	28	results	results.
199	31	injunction	injuction
200	20	ststed	stated
201	16	Jñana	Jñāna
201	19	or	of
201	24	kamas	karmas
202	8	vedic	Vedic
202	10	Mokṣa.	Makṣa
202	14	Karmakāṇḍa	Karmakāṇḍa
204	6	Kumārilla	Kumārila
204	11	moksa	mokṣa
204	17	samasāric	Samsāric
204	19	upaniṣadic	Upaniṣadic
204	28	mīmāṃsaka	Mīmāṃsaka
205	11	upaniṣadic	Upaniṣadic
205	25	to	(deleted)
206	4	upaniṣadic	Upaniṣadic
206	6	or	nor
206	14	vedic.	Vedic
206	22	Bādarāṇa's	Bādārāyaṇa's
207	1	objections	objections
207	15	is	is,
207	17	vedic	Vedic
207	22	mīmāṃsaka	Mīmāṃsaka
207	25	liberation	liberation,
208	5	Pūrvamīmāṃsa	Pūrvamīmāṃsa
208	17	tho	the
209	14	full fledged	fullfledged
213	9	Bhagavadgīta	Bhagvadgītā
215	1	Vamaṃ	Yamaṃ
216	3	Brahma	Brahma,
216	8	Jñānam	Jñānam
216	9	Brahmaśnanda	Brahmaśnanda
216	12	of of	of
218	13	vedantas.	Vedantas.

Page	Line	For	Read
219	8	satsāmānyādhikāṇyam-sarvasya	satsāmānyādhikāṇyam-sarvasya
220	5	unreality	unreality
220	8	unreal	unreal
220	17	illusory	illusory
225	19	śaśaśaṅgadhanurdh- arah	śaśaśaṅgadhanurdh- arah
225	Footnote 6	5	6
226	14	of	of
226	16	Kena,	Kena
227	22	in	is
227	27	perishes	perishes.
228	23	senses.	senses.
228	26	antaḥkāraṇa	antaḥkāraṇa
229	6	svayamayotih	svayamjyotih
229	6	caitanyaśvabhāvam.	caitanyaśvabhāvam.
231	Footnote 2	its author - Hegel.	its author : Hegel.
232	13	Brahmakham	Brahma Kham
232	18	understood	understood
232	28	teacher	teacher
233	5	sees	sees
233	16	transcendental,	transcendental,
234	1	otherhand	other hand
234	26	Ātmān;	Ātman;
235	2	bliss	bliss
235	3	for self-persistence,	for self-persistence,
235	7	is expressly affirmed.	is expressly affirmed.
235	11	prasanna;	prasanna,
235	11	śiva;	śiva,
235	14	Brahman-	Brahman.
235	17	eternal,	eternal,
235	19	ārtta	ārtta.
235	20	Brāmic	Brāhmīc
235	25	vaiśaḥ.	vaiśaḥ.
236	5	antaḥkāraṇa	antaḥkāraṇa
238	19	upaniṣad,	Upaniṣad,
239	2	So far	So far
239	Footnote 5	name,	name,
239	Footnote 5	agree	agree.
240	6	exclaimed :	exclaimed :
240	10	transcen,	transcen.

Page	Line	For	Read
240	Footnote 5	1947 Eckhart :	1947. Eckhart :
241	7	as the world ²	as the world. ²
241	10	fulness off.	fulness off,
241	10	E'en	e'en
241	24	Self of the Universe	self of the universe
241	Footnote 7	Eternity	Eternity
242	18	be coming	becoming
242	25	Īśvara	Īśvara
242	26	Īśvara	Īśvara
243	5	Īśvara,	Īśvara,
243	8	Advaita even	Advaita, even
243	16	casualty	causality
243	30	Īśvara	Īśvara
244	1	peraccidens	per accidens
244	1	Upanisads	Upaniṣads
244	2	Īśvara	Īśvara
244	3	Īśvara	Īśvara
244	6	Īśvara	Īśvara
244	9	Īśvara	Īśvara
244	Footnote 1	raliseimum	realissimum
245	10	sāmkhya,	Sāṃkhya,
245	24	Philosophy	philosophy
246	2	satan	Satan
247	9	eg.	e. g.,
247	22	upaniṣads	Upaniṣads
247	Footnote 4	B.S.	Ś.B.
248	11	referānce	reference
248	17	immence,	immanence,
249	28	regarded	regarded
250	19	self expression	self-expression
250	Footnote 7	carriers	carriers
251	1	hormanizes	harmonizes
251	3	ānada	ānanda
251	4	respiration of man is	respiration of man, is
251	18	comic self	cosmic self
251	23	Puruṣasūktas.	Puruṣasūkta ⁶
252	2	Muṇḍakaverse	Mundaka verse
252	12	to the seedform	the seedform
252	12	the world,	of the world,

Page	Line	For	Read
252	20	upaniṣads	Upaniṣads
252	21	of high type	of a high type.
252	23	Bramhasūtras.	Brahmasūtras.
252	24	upaniṣadic	Upaniṣadic
252	31	lower & the	lower and the
253	1	himto	him to
253	3	principle	principle
253	4	my very self	' my very self '
253	8	Jīva Jagadantaḥ- praviṣṭayā.	Jīva, Jagadantaḥ- praviṣṭayā.
253	21	from	form
253	25	nityaśuddhabuddha- muktaśvabhāvaḥ.	nityaśuddhabuddha- muktaśvabhāvaḥ.
254	14	given	given
254	Footnote 1	Aurabindo	Aurobindo
254	Footnote 1	consciousness,	consciousness,
255	6	though	through
255	17	external	eternal
255	23	inequalities,	inequalities,
256	3	doctrine	doctrine
256	15	Baghvān	Bhagavān
256	27	the the cosmic	the cosmic
256	Footnote 3	grandour.	grandeur.
257	16	huminity	humanity
257	Footnote 3	Incarnations	Incarnations
262	18	Avaita	Advaita
264	13	existence	existence
264	19	existence	existence
285	27	sence	sense
295	22	meke	makes
296	Footnote 3	tatdeva	tadeva
300	Footnote 1	jñāma	jñānamā
303	13	dvatins	dvaitins
304	5	devaitins	dvaitins
314	Footnote 1	-sacivacya,	-sacivasya,
314	Footnote 2	usei	uses
314	Footnote 3	nājñānam	nājñānam
329	Footnote 7	rūpatyanam	rūpatayainam
350	14	avidvā	avidyā
355	18	notion	the notion
362	Footnote 2	hāraṇasya	kāraṇasya
365	33	soul	souls
368	last line	of	or

Page	Line	For	Read
382	Footnote 1	sattvakra-	sattvapra-
391	31	quality ?	duality ?
397	6	on	of
406	Footnote 3	-endriyśaviaya	-endriyaviśaya
424	29	medicant.	mendicant.
438	1	anangatā	ananyatā
446	lastline	apposition	opposition
449	Footnote 5	jādam	jaḍam
452	18	thoughts	thoughts
466	10	The author the	The author of the
467	20	varity.	verity.
467	22	variety	verity
468	25	greatness	greatness
469	4	brahmākārāvṛtti,	brahmākāravṛtti,
469	5	cons	cons-
469	6	ciousnesss.	ciousness.
469	11	couciousness	consciousness
470	8	physical,	physical
470	19	independance	independence
470	19	anapckṣatvam,	anapekṣatvam,
470	Footnote 3	kariyā.	kriyā.
472	11	visuddhe vib	visuddhe vib-
472	21	onthe	on the
473	2	riṣṭhā	niṣṭhā
473	11	prapañcayravīlaya	prapañcapravilaya
473	17	means vidyā	means of vidya
473	18	pro duct	product
474	9	iden	iden-
474	17	jīva-	jīva.
476	1	jīvanmukti	jīvanmukti
476	6	kṛma mukti	krama mukti
476	Footnote 1	devided	divided
476	Footnote 1	jñānaphalbhūta	jñānaphalabhūta
477	4	dawn of tho	dawn of the
477	Footnote 1	bhayati	bhavati
478	12	Gods.	gods.

